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Foreword and academic vita 
Writing my doctoral thesis has been quite a journey for me—a journey, which I 
have enjoyed very much and which has been an extremely rewarding experience. I 
have been fortunate enough to not having traveled by myself, but in close fruitful 
exchange with my doctoral advisors, Prof. Dr. Klaus Dieter Wolf and Prof. Dr. 
Peter Schlotter, and a number of highly valued fellow researchers as well as with 
the support and encouragement of friends. It is quite a challenge to express the 
full gratitude I feel towards these people and for having had the opportunity of 
this journey. 
My journey started in 2005, two years after receiving my political science 
M.A. degree of the University of Heidelberg. After holding the position of 
research associate in a research project at the Institute for Political Science in 
Heidelberg, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) offered me the great 
opportunity of working in the multi-disciplinary program area „International 
Organisation, Democratic Peace and the Rule of Law“ and of starting to develop 
my doctoral thesis within this framework. Being a research associate at the PRIF 
allowed me to be part of a community of researchers committed to furthering the 
academic agenda around the democratic peace theory and to building bridges 
between academia, policy and practice. I have benefitted particulary from the peer 
exchange in the PRIF postgraduate colloquium under the prudent guidance of 
then-PRIF Executive Director, Prof. Dr. Harald Müller, in the International 
Relations colloquium at the Technical University of Darmstadt under the prudent 
guidance of Prof. Dr. Klaus Dieter Wolf, and in the discussion forum “External 
Democratization Policy”, of which I was lucky enough to be a founding member, 
benefiting from the initiative of Dr. Sonja Grimm and Dr. Julia Leininger. Initially 
focused on bringing together German female researchers who focus their work on 
democratization and democracy promotion and being funded by Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) in 2010-2015, this discussion forum has in the 
meantime evolved into a wider research network funded by the Leibniz-
Wettbewerb 2015-2018.  
Seizing opportunities as they arise, my journey led to me to another track and 
a path I stayed on ever since. After consultant assignments, GTZ (since 2012: 
GIZ), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische (since 2012: Internationale) 
Zusammenarbeit, offered me a position in a sector advisory project in 2007 
working closely with the Federal Ministry for Economic Development and 
Cooperation (BMZ), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European 
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Commission, and the World Bank on good governance, democracy and the rule of 
law at the intersection between policy, research and practice. The experience with 
GTZ strengthened my understanding of the challenges and concerns of the 
implementation level of international cooperation and the demand for practice-
oriented guidance from research and policy. This experience was further deepened 
by positions I have held in GTZ/GIZ projects in Cambodia and Laos since 2010—
always in the field of good governance. While maintaining my association with 
PRIF, my engagement with GTZ/GIZ slowed down the process of working on my 
doctoral thesis significantly. Therefore, it was only when I took a sabbatical that I 
had sufficient time and energy to set my mind on finalizing my study at the end of 
2016. 
I would like to sincerely thank Klaus Dieter Wolf and Peter Schlotter for 
accompanying me throughout the entire journey and for believing in its 
completion in 2016/2017. Klaus Dieter Wolf has been exceptional in his 
encouragement, in highlighting the theoretical contribution of my study, in 
providing valuable methodological guidance, and in always making himself 
available for feedback when needed. Peter Schlotter, who had already appraised in 
2002 my M.A. thesis on the contribution of OSCE long-term missions to crisis 
prevention, was the one bringing me to PRIF. I cannot thank him enough for that. 
His advice has been highly beneficial especially with regard to the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for which he is an expert of high 
renown for in the German research community. My gratitude also goes to Harald 
Müller, who among many other fruitful suggestions was the key person in 
encouraging me early on to pay attention to the praxeological value of my study. 
I would like to thank the participants of both colloquia at PRIF and the TU 
Darmstadt in the period between 2005 and 2007 for their valuable input to 
different early draft chapters of my doctoral thesis, especially Dr. Claudia 
Baumgart-Ochse, Dr. Una Becker-Jacob, Dr. Melanie Coni-Zimmer, Prof. Dr. 
Nicole Deitelhoff, Dr. Moira Feil, Dr. Susanne Fischer, Dr. Katja Freistein, and 
Dr. Jonas Wolff. Of particular importance to me was the exchange within the 
discussion forum that focused exclusively on topics of external democratization 
and democracy promotion. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Dr. Tina Freyburg, 
Dr. Sonja Grimm, Dr. Julia Leininger, Dr. Tatjana Reiber, Prof. Dr. Solveig 
Richter, and Prof. Dr. Vera Van Hüllen. In my view, it is impossible to grasp the 
extent to which being part of such fruitful exchange fora contributes to translating 
an initial idea into a “ripe” concept and into a complete empirical study. I am 
forever grateful. 
The extent and depth of my research would not have been possible without the 
invaluable information and views provided by numerous interlocutours in Georgia 
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as well as at the OSCE headquarters. Furthermore, the OSCE granting me the 
status of researcher-in-residence at the archives of the OSCE Office in Prague in 
2009 and 2016 permitted access to restricted OSCE documents through which I 
gained indispensable insights into the inner workings of the regional organization 
and the internal processes and procedures in dealing with the challenges of the 
political transformation context of Georgia. Many thanks to the OSCE 
Documentation Center for the trust and for maintaining such a highly useful 
program! For her invaluable support during my research at the OSCE 
documentation center and archives, I would like to thank first and foremost Alice 
Nemcova, OSCE Senior Documentation and Information Assistant. I am also 
thankful for the support of Jan Plesinger, the Head of the OSCE Office in Prague, 
David Bednar, Senior Information Technology Assistant, and Katerina Cerna, 
Archives Assistant. 
The autonomy to focus on developing my doctoral thesis at its early stages 
was provided by the funding I received initially from PRIF in 2005 and then from 
a special scholarship fund from 2005 until I started working with GTZ in 2007. I 
still feel very honored of having been one of only two researchers who were 
selected by a committee chaired by Prof. Dr. Dr. Senghaas to be awarded the 
“Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-Schröder-Stipendium für vorausschauende Friedens-
politik” (Chancellor Gerhard Schröder Scholarship for anticipatory Peace Policy). 
Prof. Dr. Harald Müller and Prof. Dr. Peter Schlotter proposed my thesis for this 
thematic scholarship. For this, I will always be grateful. The scholarship was 
funded by donations collected on the occasion of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s 
60
th
 birthday and was managed by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). In 
addition to a monthly allowance, the scholarship provided funding for research 
trips to the OSCE headquarters and to Georgia. Martin Gräfe of FES provided 
helpful guidance through all the administrative aspects of the scholarship. I would 
like to warmly thank the then-German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, for 
initiating the scholarship fund and for receiving my fellow stipendiary and myself 
in the Chancellory in August 2005 amidst the run-up to the 2005 federal elections. 
Many thanks also to Anke Fuchs, then-FES Chairperson, and Dr. Manuela Erhart, 
then-Head of the FES scholarship department, for accompanying us to the 
meeting with the German Chancellor. 
Last but certainly not least, I owe the most to my dear friend and highly valued 
colleague Dr. Julia Leininger. She has been tireless in her encouragement, in her 
availability despite her always dense schedule, and in her extremely helpful and 
constructive suggestions. I thank her for her heart and her mind, for being my 
confidante and my friend. Thank you! 
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I submitted my doctoral thesis to TU Darmstadt in January 2017 under the title 
“Successful Democracy Promotion by Regional Organizations—The interactive 
contribution of the target country’s domestic context conditions and the 
democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites for context sensitivity: The case of 
the OSCE in Georgia”. It was assessed by Prof. Dr. Klaus Dieter Wolf and Prof. 
Dr. Peter Schlotter. Further members of the examination committee in March 
2017 were Prof. Dr. Nina Janich and Prof. Dr. Markus Lederer. This document 
contains only marginal changes to the original version submitted that do not go 
beyond minor typographic corrections, changed formatting, and a revision of the 
title. I hope that interested researchers and students will enjoy reading my study. 
 
Frankfurt am Main, September 2017 
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Zusammenfassung 
In der Forschung zu internationaler Demokratieförderung und 
Normdiffusionsliteratur besteht Konsens über die entscheidende Rolle interner 
Länderkontextbedingungen für den Erfolg externer Förderansätze. In jüngerer Zeit 
betonen Vertreterinnen und Vertreter beider Forschungsstränge die Bedeutung der 
Interaktion internationaler Akteure und lokaler Faktoren im Zielland. So gelten in 
Wissenschaft und Praxis auf den spezifischen Länderkontext angepasste, d.h. 
kontextsensible Herangehensweisen als erfolgversprechender. Dennoch sieht sich 
die Praxis der internationalen Demokratieförderung mit dem Vorwurf aus den 
Sozialwissenschaften und der Evaluationsforschung konfrontiert, ihre 
Demokratieförderungsansätze unabhängig vom Länderkontext zu formulieren, 
gestalten und umzusetzen (“one size fits all”) und damit ihren Erfolg zu 
schmälern. So stehen internationale Demokratieförderer vor diesem Hintergrund 
unter Druck, ihre Ansätze zu hinterfragen und Herangehensweisen zu finden, die 
mehr Sensibilität für die betreffenden lokalen Kontextbedingungen aufweisen und 
somit wirksamer sind. Der Druck wird dadurch verstärkt, dass die nach dem Ende 
des Kalten Krieges entstandene regelrechte „Demokratieförderungsindustrie“ seit 
den US-geführten und als demokratiefördernd deklarierten Militärinterventionen 
in Afghanistan und dem Irak Anfang der 2000er Jahre in eine Legitimationskrise 
geraten ist. Die Forschung wiederum hat bislang wenig dazu beigetragen, den 
„one size fits all“-Vorwurf hinreichend auf den Prüfstand zu stellen, die 
Kontextbedingungen von Demokratisierungsländern für eine kontextsensible 
Anpassung der Demokratieförderungsansätze zu systematisieren und den 
organisationsinternen Voraussetzungen der Demokratieförderer für die 
kontextsensible Anpassung ihrer Ansätze und Herangehensweisen 
Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken. An diesen Forschungslücken setzt die vorliegende 
Dissertation an und zielt darauf ab, einen Beitrag zu leisten, diese zu schließen. 
Zur Überprüfung des „one size fits all“-Vorwurfs bzw. -Arguments wird hier der 
Fall eines Demokratieförderers ausgewählt, der aufgrund seiner Charakteristika 
ungeeignet ist, den Vorwurf empirisch zu untermauern—ein „schwieriger Fall“ 
(„tough case“), d.h. von dem Kontextsensibilität zu erwarten ist. Diese Arbeit 
beruht auf der Annahme, dass ein Demokratieförderer dann in der Lage ist, seine 
Ansätze maßgeschneidert an die spezifischen und sich verändernden 
Kontextbedingungen des Ziellandes anzupassen, wenn dieser über 
organisationsinterne Voraussetzungen verfügt, die es ihm ermöglichen, fundierte 
Kenntnisse über den Kontext zu erlangen, aufrechtzuerhalten und in seine 
Politikformulierung und -umsetzung zu „übersetzen“. Solche Voraussetzungen 
sind interne Verfahrensweisen und Standards, die als Grundlage der 
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kontextsensiblen Planung des Länderprogramms zumindest eine Kontextanalyse 
vorsehen sowie zur Aufrechterhaltung aktueller Kenntnisse z.B. Mechanismen 
zum Monitoring und der Berichterstattung von der operativen an die politische 
Ebene. Regionalorganisationen wird nachgesagt, dass sie allgemein über eine 
bessere Kenntnis und mehr Sensibilität für den lokalen Kontext verfügen als 
andere internationale Organisationen. Die Organisation für Sicherheit und 
Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE) ist eine Regionalorganisation und verfügt 
zudem, wie gezeigt werden wird, über organisationsinterne Voraussetzungen – 
u.a. operative Fähigkeiten und interne Verfahren zur Beobachtung und 
Berichterstattung – die sie in die Lage versetzen, ein kontextsensibler und 
anpassungsfähiger Demokratieförderer zu sein. Die OSZE ist daher als 
schwieriger Fall („tough case“) für die Überprüfung der These geeignet, dass 
Demokratieförderer kontextunabhängig ihre Förderansätze gestalten und einsetzen 
(„one size fits all“). 
Die empirische Studie wird in zweierlei Hinsicht einen Wechsel der in der 
Demokratieförderungsforschung sonst üblichen Perspektive vornehmen: 
Zwar stellen zahlreiche Arbeiten den Demokratieförderer in das Zentrum ihres 
Erkenntnisinteresses, doch gilt die Aufmerksamkeit dieser Untersuchungen meist 
den Motiven, potentiellen Interessenkonflikten sowie akteursspezifischen 
Ansätzen und Instrumenten der Demokratieförderung. Die organisationsinternen 
Voraussetzungen, wie Verfahrensweisen und Standards, die die vorliegende 
Arbeit in den Blick nimmt, stellt in der Demokratieförderungsliteratur derzeit 
noch einen blinden Flecken und somit einen Perspektivwechsel dar.  
Zum anderen wird die vorliegende Studie das in der 
Demokratieförderungsforschung übliche Verhältnis der externen und internen 
Dimensionen, mit dem meist die Wirkung des externen Demokratieförderers auf 
den internen Demokratisierungsprozess im Zielland untersucht wird, umkehren. In 
diesem Zusammenhang wird die Arbeit spezifische Typen des Wandels des 
externen Umfelds des Demokratieförderers konzeptualisieren, d.h. der lokalen 
politischen Kontextbedingungen des betreffenden Demokratisierungslandes, die 
sonst üblicherweise die interne Dimension darstellen. Diesbezüglich wird 
zwischen „Brüchen“ im Demokratisierungsprozess, d.h. plötzlichen und radikalen 
Veränderungen, und graduellem Wandel differenziert. Hinsichtlich letzterem 
werden die Typen graduellen Wandels in den strukturellen und in den 
akteurszentrierten politischen Kontextbedingungen unterschieden. 
Die idealtypische Antwort eines kontextsensiblen Demokratieförderers auf 
einen „Bruch“ sowie auf graduellen Wandel in den strukturellen 
Kontextbedingungen ist eine politische Anpassung bzw. Überprüfung des 
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Länderansatzes und eine strategische Anpassung bzw. Überprüfung der 
Umsetzungsstrategie und/oder im Falle eines „Bruchs“ politische ad-hoc-
Maßnahmen. Die idealtypische Antwort auf graduellen Wandel in den 
akteurszentrierten Kontextbedingungen ist eine praktische Anpassung der 
Aktivitäten und/oder Kooperationspartner innerhalb der existierenden 
Förderbereiche im Zielland.  
Ob sich ein kontextsensibler und anpassungsfähiger Demokratieförderer an 
alle Typen des Wandels anpassen kann, die unterschiedlich hohe Hürden und 
politischen Druck für eine Anpassung aufweisen, wird am Beispiel der OSZE im 
Kontext von Georgien im Südkaukasus im Zeitraum 1992 bis 2004 analysiert, d.h. 
eines Ziellandes, dessen Demokratisierungsprozess Brüche und entsprechenden 
Wandel in den politischen Kontextbedingungen im Untersuchungszeitraum 
aufweist. Die Autorin wird untersuchen, ob und wie der Demokratieförderer auf 
diese spezifischen Typen des Wandels reagiert bzw. sich kontextsensibel an diese 
durch Nutzung seiner organisationsinternen Verfahrensweisen anpasst. Der 
interaktive Beitrag der lokalen Kontextbedingungen, d.h. des externen Umfelds 
des Demokratieförderers, und der organisationsinternen Voraussetzungen, d.h. der 
internen Verfahrensweisen des Demokratieförderers, gestalten/bedingen die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass der Demokratieförderer seinen Ansatz kontextsensibel 
an die sich verändernden politischen Kontextbedingungen anpasst und somit 
erfolgreicher ist. Die Erwartungen hinsichtlich der Wahrscheinlichkeit einer 
kontextsensiblen Anpassung der Demokratieförderung sind in folgenden 
Hypothesen ausgedrückt, deren Gültigkeit anhand der empirischen Analyse 
überprüft werden wird: 
(1) Wenn der Wandel in den politischen Kontextbedingungen des Ziellandes 
der Demokratieförderung rapide und radikal erfolgt, ist eine Anpassung der 
Intervention durch den Demokratieförderer wahrscheinlicher als in Situationen 
graduellen Wandels, da sowohl die politischen Kosten einer Nichtanpassung als 
auch der politische Druck zur Anpassung relativ hoch sind. 
(2) Wenn der Wandel in den politischen Kontextbedingungen des Ziellandes 
der Demokratieförderung graduell erfolgt, ist eine Anpassung der Intervention 
durch den Demokratieförderer unwahrscheinlicher als in Situationen von 
“Brüchen”, da der politische Druck zur Anpassung relativ niedrig bis moderat ist. 
(3) Wenn der Demokratieförderer über organisationsinterne Voraussetzungen 
verfügt und diese einsetzt, dann wird Anpassung an die lokalen politischen 
Kontextbedingungen im Zielland der Demokratieförderung wahrscheinlicher – 
auch in Reaktion auf jene Situationen graduellen Wandels, in denen eine 
Anpassung sonst unwahrscheinlicher als in Reaktion auf “Brüche” ist. 
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Die Konzeptualisierung der Typen des Wandels trägt zur Systematisierung des 
politischen Kontexts des Ziellandes internationaler Demokratieförderung bei und 
ermöglicht Aussagen, unter welchen Kontextbedingungen und in welcher Weise 
es für Demokratieförderer erfolgversprechend ist, eine kontextsensible Anpassung 
an veränderte Kontextbedingungen vorzunehmen. Die Betrachtung der 
organisationsinternen Voraussetzungen, die den Demokratieförderer in die Lage 
versetzen, kontextsensibel zu agieren – eine bislang ausgeblendete Perspektive in 
der Demokratieförderungsforschung – leistet einen Beitrag zur Klärung, wie 
Demokratieförderer anpassungsfähig an spezifische und sich verändernde 
Kontextbedingungen sein können. 
Die Studie verbindet die Forschung zu internationaler Demokratieförderung, die 
selbst auf den Feldern der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft und Transitions-
/Demokratisierungsforschung, der Internationalen Beziehungen und 
Normdiffusionsliteratur sowie der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung aufbaut, 
Studien zu Internationalen Organisationen und Organisationstheorie in einem 
innovativen Ansatz und untersucht den interaktiven Beitrag spezifischer Typen 
des Wandels in den lokalen Kontextbedingungen und der organisationsinternen 
Voraussetzungen internationaler Demokratieförderer dazu, eine kontextsensible 
Anpassung und somit den Erfolg demokratiefördernder Ansätze wahrscheinlicher 
zu machen. Mit der Verbindung dieser verschiedenen Stränge der 
Forschungsliteratur trägt die vorliegende Arbeit durch die Überprüfung des „one 
size fits all“-Vorwurfs sowie oben genannter Hypothesen zur weiteren 
Theoriebildung bei und schafft einen praxeologischen Mehrwert durch die 
Eröffnung neuer Einblicke, wie Regionalorganisationen beschaffen sein sollten, 
um kontextsensibel und anpassungsfähig an spezifische Typen des Wandels in 
den politischen Kontextbedingungen des Ziellandes und somit erfolgreichere 
Demokratieförderer sein zu können. 
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Summary 
The research fields that focus on international democracy promotion and on norm 
diffusion share consensus on the predominant role of the domestic conditions of 
the target country context with regard to the success of external approaches. 
Recently, researchers of both fields have emphasised the relevance of 
international actors’ and domestic factors’ interaction. Thus, approaches that have 
been adapted to the specific target country context, i.e. context-sensitive 
approaches, are considered more promising to be successful by researchers and 
practicioners. Nevertheless, the practice of international democracy promotion 
finds itself confronted with social scientists’ and evaluation researchers’ 
allegation of formulating, designing and implementing its democracy promotion 
approaches irrespective of the country context, following a “one size fits all” 
approach, thereby limiting chances for success. In light of this, international 
democracy promoters are under pressure to review their approaches and find ways 
of being more sensitive to the domestic context conditions and, thus, potentially 
more effective. This pressure has increased by the legitimization crisis that the 
virtual “democracy promotion industry”, which has evolved after the end of the 
Cold War, has been facing since the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq in the early 2000 that have been associated with democracy promotion 
because of the United States government’s rhetoric at the time. Research has 
contributed little so far to sufficiently testing the “one size fits all” allegation, to 
systematizing democratizing countries’ context conditions for a context-sensitive 
adaptation of democracy promotion approaches, and to paying attention to 
democracy promoters’ intra-organizational prerequisites for the context-sensitive 
adapation of their approaches and procedures. It is these research gaps that the 
present doctoral thesis aims at contributing to close. 
For the purpose of testing the “one size fits all” thesis, this study selects the case 
of a democracy promoter that is, because of its characteristics, unlikely to 
empirically support the thesis—a “tough case”. This means that a democracy 
promoter is selected that is expected to be context-sensitive. This study is based 
on the assumption that a democracy promoter is capable of adapting its 
approaches sensitive to the specific and changing context conditions of the target 
country if it possesses intra-organizational prerequisites, which enable it to gain 
and maintain a sound knowledge of the country context and to “translate” this 
knowledge into policy formulation and implementation. Such prerequisites are 
internal procedures and standards, which provide at least for a context analysis as 
a basis for the context-sensitive planning of the country program as well as, for 
instance, mechanisms of monitoring and reporting from the operational to the 
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political level that allow maintaining up-to-date information. Regional 
organizations are said to generally have a better knowledge of and to be more 
sensitive to the domestic context than other international organizations and 
democracy-promoting states. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) is a regional organization and—as will be shown—has developed 
organization-internal prerequisites, such as operational capabilities and certain 
procedures of monitoring and reporting, that put it in a good position to be a 
context-sensitive and adaptable democracy promoter. Therefore, the OSCE is 
well-suited as a “tough case” for empirically testing the claim that democracy 
promoters apply “one size fits all” approaches irrespective of the specific context 
conditions. 
The empirical study will change the conventional perspective of international 
democracy promotion research in two regards: 
Several studies indeed place a specific democracy promoter at the center but 
seek to analyze the motivations, potential conflicts of interest, and the 
organization-specific appraoches to and instruments of democracy promotion. 
However, internal prerequisites of the democracy promoter, such as standards and 
procedures, which are at the center of analysis here, still represent a blind spot of 
democracy promotion research and, therefore, represent a change in perspective. 
Furthermore, the present empirical study will inverse the conventional 
external-internal perspective of international norm diffusion and democracy 
promotion research, with which the impact of external norm/democracy 
promotion on the internal norm adoption and/or democratization process in the 
target country is is usually analyzed. In this regard, specific types of change in the 
democracy promoter’s external environment will be concdeptualized, i.e. in the 
domestic political context conditions of the democratizing country in question that 
otherwise usually represent the internal dimension of the relationship between 
internal and external factors. The study differentiates “ruptures” in the 
democratization process, i.e. rapid and radical change, and gradual change. The 
latter further distinguishes sub-types of gradual change in the structural and in the 
actor-centered political context conditions. 
A context-sensitive democracy promoter’s ideal-type response to “ruptures” as 
well as to gradual change in the structural context conditions is political 
adaptation that may consist of adapting the country approach and strategic 
adaptation that consists of a review of the implementation strategy and/or, in the 
case of a “rupture” in political ad-hoc measures. The ideal-type response to 
gradual change in the actor-centered context conditions consists in the practical 
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adapation of activities and/or cooperation partners within existing areas of 
engagement. 
Whether a context-sensitive and adaptable democracy promoter is capable of 
adapting to all types of change, which provide for varying thresholds and political 
pressure for adaption, will be analyzed for the case of the OSCE in the context of 
Georgia in the South Caucasus in the period of 1992 to 2004. The democratization 
process of the target country of Georgia shows both “ruptures” and respective 
change in the political context conditions during the period under review. The 
author will analyze, if and how the democracy promoter responds to these specific 
types of change and adapts to these in a context-sensitive manner by utilizing its 
organization-internal procedures. The interactive contribution of domestic context 
conditions, i.e. of the democracy promoter’s external environment, and of the 
organization-internal prerequisites, i.e. of the democracy promoter’s internal 
procedures, shape the likelihood of context-sensitive adaption of the democracy 
promoter’s approach to the changing political context conditions and, thus, of 
chances for success. The expectations with regard to the likelihood of context-
sensitive adaption are expressed in the following hypotheses that will be tested in 
the empirical analysis: 
(1) If the change in the target country’s political context conditions is rapid and 
radical, the international democracy promoter is more likely to adapt than to 
gradual change because the political costs of non-adaptation and the political 
‘pressure’ to adapt are relatively high. 
(2) If the change in the target country’s political context conditions is gradual, the 
international democracy promoter is less likely to adapt than to “ruptures” 
because the political ‘pressure’ to adapt is relatively low to moderate. 
(3) If the democracy promoter possesses and utilizes the internal prerequisites 
(i.e. adaptability), then the engagement’s adaptation to the domestic political 
context conditions in target countries becomes likely, even in response to 
gradual types of change regarding which adaptation is less likely than in 
response to rapid and radical change. 
The conceptualization of types of change contributes to the systematization of the 
political context of international democracy promotion’s target country and allows 
insights into the context conditions, under which and in what way it is promising 
for democracy promoters to adapt to changing context conditions in a context-
sensitive manner and to be successful. Analyzing the democracy promoter’s 
organization-internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity—a novelty in 
international democracy promotion research—contributes to shedding more light 
on how democracy promoters can be adaptable to specific and changing context 
conditions. 
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This empirical study brings together the research on international democracy 
promotion—which builds on the fields of comparative political science and 
transition/democratization research, of International Relations and norm diffusion 
literature, as well as of peace and conflict research—studies on International 
Organizations, and organizational theory in an innovative approach. It explores 
the interactive contribution of specific types of change in the target country’s 
domestic political context conditions and of international democracy promoters’ 
organization-internal prerequisities to making context-sensitive adaptation and, 
thus, democracy promotion’s success more likely. By bringing the different 
strands of literature together, this study contributes to further theory-building by 
empirically testing the “one size fits all” claim holds as well as the above-
mentioned hypotheses; it adds praxeological value by allowing new insights into 
how regional organizations shall be shaped in order to be context-senstive and 
adaptable to specific types of change in the target country’s political context 
conditions and, thus, more likely to be successful democracy promoters. 
  
1. Introduction 
A virtual “democracy promotion industry” (Schraeder 2003: 25; Burnell 2006b: 1) 
has evolved after the end of the Cold War.
1
 With the proclaimed “end of history” 
(Fukuyama 1992), the unrivaled perception of democracy as a superior regime, 
and the fact that ‘Western’ governments’ preference for democracy no longer took 
a back seat to the perceived necessity of building strategic alliances against the 
Soviet Union after the end of the bloc confrontation, the international promotion 
of democratization has become a standard in the foreign and development policy 
repertoire of the northern industrialized states.
2
 While international democracy 
promotion had still been more of a side element of the United States of America’s 
anti-communist security policy and “war of ideas” (Carothers 1999: 29 ff.) in the 
1980s (ibid.: 112), the 1990s are considered the “golden age” (Bridoux and Kurki 
2014: 65) of democracy promotion during which the support to democratization 
enjoyed high levels of popular support (Faust and Garcia 2014). However, 
following the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 
2000s that have been associated with democracy promotion because of the United 
States government’s rhetoric at the time, the practice has experienced a 
legitimatization crisis and “backlash” (Carothers 2006). ‘External’3 democracy 
promotion has since then faced a much less favorable international environment 
with the global stagnation of democracy, autocratic leaders openly challenging 
democratic values in international fora, and heightened sensitivities about 
                                                 
1
  Thomas Carothers contrasts less than one billion USD per year in the 1980s with a spending 
of more than ten billion USD on democracy assistance today (Carothers 2015: 60). According 
to Peter Burnell, reported international democracy assistance has been in excess of five 
billion USD annually (Burnell 2008). Between 1991 and 2000, the share of democracy-
promoting measures in official development assistance (ODA) worldwide has increased from 
0.5 percent to 5 percent, i.e. it has decupled (World Bank 2004).  
2
  Democracy-promoting states are mainly Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America; more recently also 
Poland. Less programmatic in their democracy promotion are Australia, Belgium, Finland, 
and Japan (Burnell 2006a: 345; Leininger 2010c: 35). In addition to their bilateral democracy 
promotion programs, member states of the European Union (EU) also engage via the EU as 
supranational organization that plays a crucial role in international democracy promotion. 
3
  ‘External’ is set into quotation marks because ‘external’ actors in international development 
cooperation and democracy assistance are often present in the ‘target’ country, interact with 
domestic/local actors, and are sometimes even integrated into the ‘target’ country’s 
government institutions.  
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‘external’ actors interfering with domestic affairs.4 Against the background of 
these developments, international democracy promoters have come under pressure 
to revisit their approaches and consider ways on how to be more sensitive to the 
domestic context (Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 109) and, thereby, also more 
effective. 
Gaps in the research on international democracy promotion 
This study aims at contributing to closing several research gaps with regard to this 
topic: Although research on international democracy promotion lagged behind the 
“golden age” of the practice in the 1990s, the complaint that the topic was 
“understudied and poorly understood” (Schraeder 2003: 22) is no longer justified. 
The scholarly literature on international democracy promotion—that draws from 
the fields of International Relations (IR) and norm diffusion literature, 
comparative politics and transition and democratization literature, as well as from 
peace and conflict studies—has grown considerably. There is generally a vast 
consensus in the more recent literature on norm diffusion and international 
democracy promotion that the domestic context is of predominant importance for 
the effectiveness of international engagement (e.g. Zimmermann forthcoming; 
Bridoux and Kurki 2014; Leininger 2010c; Reiber 2009; Hobson 2009; Jawad 
2008). Norm diffusion research has experienced a reorientation in terms of 
increasingly emphasizing domestic norm translation processes and the 
“localization” of global norms.5 In light of this, context-sensitive approaches are 
considered more promising to be successful than blueprints designed irrespective 
of specific country conditions (“one size fits all”), for which democracy promoters 
have been widely criticized.
6
 Both strands of literature—on norm diffusion and on 
international democracy promotion—have increasingly moved the interactive 
character of international actors and domestic processes to the center of the 
research interest (e.g. Leininger 2010c, 2010a; Magen and Morlino 2009b; 
Zimmermann forthcoming).  
                                                 
4
  See page 26 of the present study regarding the perceived global stagnation or “decline” of 
democracy—depending on the definition of democracy. 
5
  Norms are understood as standards of behavior based on intersubjective validity (Deitelhoff 
2006: 39-44). International norm promotion consists of activities of the international 
community that aim at the take-over of a norm set in a new context. Norm translation refers 
to the interpretation of a norm set in a new context (Zimmermann forthcoming: 4). 
6
  A 2014 review of the literature on the effectiveness of ‘external’ interventions supporting 
processes of political transformation—democratization or stabilization—concludes that the 
specific domestic context is highly relevant for what works and what doesn’t (Zulueta-
Fülscher 2014: 44). 
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And yet, despite the praxeological relevance of the allegation that international 
democracy promoters apply “one size fits all” rather than context-sensitive 
approaches raised by several authors, it has been pointed out that this claim has 
not been sufficiently tested and empirically validated yet (Leininger 2010c: 79). 
This constitutes the first research gap that this study sets out to contribute to 
filling.  
Furthermore, there are hardly any studies that help to systematize the context 
conditions of the target country—or, phrased differently, that help to clarify which 
domestic context conditions international democracy promoters are expected to be 
sensitive to.
7
 Most existing studies have paid attention to rather broad categories 
of domestic context conditions, such as regime type, and largely neglected the 
process dimension of democracy promotion. Democratization processes, however, 
are ‘moving targets’. This is why the types of change in the domestic context 
conditions deserve attention. This lack of systematically clarifying the domestic 
context conditions constitutes the second research gap that this study aims to 
address.  
Thirdly, the way international democracy promoters are capable of gaining 
and maintaining a sound knowledge of the domestic context conditions that 
change over time are worth studying. So far, light has neither been shed on the 
types of change in domestic context conditions that context-sensitive international 
democracy promoters would be expected to adapt to, nor on international 
democracy promoters’ inner workings that enable them to be context-sensitive. 
This study aims at shedding more light on the inner workings of international 
democracy promoters by focusing on a particular aspect of these inner 
workings—organization-internal prerequisites that enable the democracy 
promoter to gain and maintain a sound knowledge of a target country’s political 
processes in order to be in a position to adapt their democracy promotion efforts 
sensitive to them. 
This study sets out to contribute to filling these three research gaps. 
                                                 
7
  One of the few examples of studies that make such an effort is Tatjana Reiber’s comparative 
analysis on democracy promotion and the consolidation of peace in three Latin American 
countries, in which she identifies a set of success factors for specific instruments of 
democracy promotion (Reiber 2009). These success factors relate to the democracy promoter 
on the one hand and to the conditions in the target country on the other hand. The latter 
contributes to systematizing the target country context of democracy promotion. For more 
details, see section 2.1.1, pages 36 f. 
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The study’s aim, change of perspective, and research question 
For the purpose of testing the “one size fits all” thesis, a “tough case” (George and 
Bennett 2004: 121) of a democracy promoter will be selected. A “tough case” is 
least likely to support the thesis, i.e. the predominant notion of scholars that 
democracy promoters apply their approaches irrespective of the specific context 
conditions. Such a “tough case” would be a democracy promoter that is expected 
to be context-sensitive. If the thesis holds against this tough empirical test, it is 
strongly reinforced. If the empirical case does not support the thesis, the test may 
help in differentiating the claim and specifying the conditions under which 
democracy promoters are sensitive to target countries’ domestic context 
conditions. 
Regional organizations are said to generally have a better knowledge of and to 
be more sensitive to the domestic context than other international organizations 
and democracy-promoting states (McMahon and Baker 2006: 18).
8
 The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a regional 
organization and—as will be shown—has developed organization-internal 
prerequisites, such as operational capabilities and certain procedures, that put it in 
a good position to know the domestic context conditions and to be aware of and 
adaptable to the political processes in host countries changing over time.
9
 
Therefore, the OSCE is well-suited as a tough case for empirically testing the 
claim that democracy promoters apply “one size fits all” approaches irrespective 
of the specific context conditions. 
This study will also aim at contributing to systematizing the domestic context of 
target countries of international democracy promotion and the changing 
conditions that a context-sensitive international democracy promoter would be 
expected to adapt to. It is presumed that context-sensitive adaptation is more 
likely under certain conditions than under others. In this regard, this study aims at 
clarifying whether different domestic context conditions pose different challenges 
                                                 
8
  The European Union (EU) has been criticized for applying similar approaches to very 
different contexts (e.g. Börzel and Risse 2004). This may appear as a contradiction to the 
notion that regional organizations are more context-sensitive. While the EU is, indeed, a 
regional organization with regard to member states and candidate states, it does not fit into 
this category when engaged in third countries. The criticism of context-insensitive 
engagement was aimed at the EU engagement in third countries, where the EU was said to 
apply the same approaches and mechanisms as those of EU enlargement policy. 
9
  In the terminology of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
country in which democratization is promoted is referred to as “host country”. This reflects 
that an OSCE mission can only be dispatched upon invitation of the OSCE participating 
State’s government. This study will mainly use the terms target country and host country. The 
European Union (EU) mainly uses the term “target country”; the term “recipient country” is 
preferred with regard to international development cooperation and aid.  
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for the international democracy promoter’s context-sensitive adaptation. 
Furthermore, it aims at clarifying which organization-internal prerequisites for 
context-sensitivity of the international democracy promoter may interactively 
contribute with the domestic political context conditions to increasing the 
likelihood of adaptation, including in response to such context-conditions under 
which adaptation is unlikely. For this purpose, this study will change the 
conventional perspective of international democracy promotion literature in two 
regards: 
Firstly, the empirical analysis will inverse the conventional external-internal 
perspective of international norm diffusion and democracy promotion research: 
Instead of analyzing the impact of ‘external’ norm/democracy promotion on the 
‘internal’ norm adoption and/or democratization process of the target country, 
here, the interest is rather whether and how the democracy promoter interacts with 
and responds to the (changing) domestic context.
10
 Thus, instead of considering 
the domestic conditions of the democratizing country as the internal dimension, 
this study conceptualizes these context conditions as the democracy promoter’s 
external environment that may pose different challenges for the democracy 
promoter’s context-sensitive adaptation of its engagement at different points in 
time. It will conceptualize specific types of change in the external environment of 
the democracy promoter, i.e. in the domestic political context conditions of the 
democratizing country in question that otherwise represent the internal dimension 
of the relationship between internal and external factors as usually defined in the 
literature (see pages 30 ff.).  
For a democracy promoter to be capable of developing and adapting 
approaches sensitive to the specific and changing context conditions in question, it 
is argued here that it requires organization-internal prerequisites that enable it to 
gain and maintain a sound knowledge of and to respond to the (changing) context. 
Thus, instead of considering the international democracy promoter as part of the 
‘external’ dimension of the domestic democratization process, this study focuses 
on the democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity. 
Looking at the democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites represents a novelty in 
international democracy promotion research as well as a second shift in 
perspective compared to those studies that do indeed place a specific democracy 
promoter at the center but seek to analyze the motivations, potential conflicts of 
interest, and the organization-specific approach to and instruments of democracy 
                                                 
10
  One example of a study that is also based on this change in perspective is Christine 
Hackenesch’s study on how the EU responds to domestic dynamics in Ehtiopia and Rwanda 
that open up different entry points for the EU (Hackenesch 2015). See also Fraser and 
Whitfield 2009 on understanding contemporary aid relationships. 
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promotion (e.g. Carothers 1997; Mair 1997; Carothers 1999; Burnell 2000a; Cox 
et al. 2000; Santiso 2002b). Internal prerequisites of the democracy promoter, 
such as standards and procedures, have not been the interest of those studies but 
are at the center of analysis here; internal procedures and standards and their 
utilization will serve as proxies for the democracy promoter’s context-sensitivity 
and adaptability. By analyzing the democracy promoter’s organization-internal 
prerequisites for context-sensitivity, this study contributes to shedding more light 
on the inner workings of international organizations. 
The research question that this study addresses is two-fold: Do different types of 
change in the political context conditions of the target country pose different 
challenges for the democracy promoter’s context-sensitive adaptation? Is a 
democracy promoter more likely to adapt to certain types of change in political 
context conditions than it is to others?  
Research question: Which intra-organizational prerequisites of the international 
democracy promoter can contribute to enhancing the likelihood of the 
engagement’s context-sensitive adaptation to the target country’s domestic 
political context conditions—even to those types of change that do not make an 
adaptation likely anyhow?  
Conceptual framework of the study 
In order to clarify which domestic context conditions context-sensitive democracy 
promoters would be expected to adapt to, in addition to the political situation at 
the outset of a democracy promoter’s engagement, this study will develop specific 
types of change in target countries’ political context conditions. It is considered to 
be plausible that differing degrees of political pressure on the democracy 
promoter to adapt as well as differing political costs of adaptation are associated 
with the different types of change. Based on political pressure and political costs, 
hypotheses on the likelihood of the international democracy promoter’s context-
sensitive adaptation in response to these specific types of change in the domestic 
context conditions will be developed.  
For instance, when the change in the political context conditions of the target 
country is radical and takes place rapidly, an international democracy promoter is 
likely to become aware of this change as well as under political pressure to 
respond in some way. Examples for such rapid and radical change are the 
dramatic changes to the political conditions in a country that are triggered by a 
coup d’état that violently ousts the sitting executive or by a failed coup, such as 
the recent baffled attempt in Turkey in July 2016. Another example are dramatic 
events, such as the large-scale terrorist attacks against several sites in the United 
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States of America on 11 September 2001 that resulted in a fundamental 
reorientation of foreign, defense and security policy as well as in strong 
limitations to civil freedoms and political rights. A war may also break out, 
rapidly destabilize a country and radically alter the political positions and 
priorities of key stakeholders. When international democracy promoters are 
engaged in such contexts, it is plausible to expect that they will respond to such 
dramatic changes in the country situation.  
In contrast, when change in the political conditions evolves gradually, it is 
likely to be more difficult to take note of the change. International democracy 
promoters under such circumstances run the risk of not noticing the point in time 
when an adaptation of their engagement would be wise in order to avoid negative 
consequences and failure—just like the frog in a well-known anecdote that, when 
put in a pot of boiling water, jumps out, but when put in a pot of cold water that is 
then slowly brought to a boil, remains sitting still and is being cooked to death. 
Good examples for gradual change in the political context condition of a 
democracy promoter’s target country are longer-term strategic election 
manipulations and efforts of elected executive leaders to weaken the institutional 
checks on their executive powers one by one by undertaking a series of 
institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge the 
ruler’s preferences (Bermeo 2016: 10). The latter could be observed in Russia 
under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, in Turkey under the rule of Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), and in Georgia under 
President Mikhail Saakashvili, for instance. Georgia is also an example for 
strategic election manipulation, as the empirical analysis in this study will show. 
When then-President Eduard Shevardnadze and his ruling party came under 
pressure from an increasingly strong opposition and outright election-day fraud 
became too obvious and politically costly, the efforts of clinging to power focused 
on using state resources for Shevardnadze’s campaign, giving more media 
presence to the incumbent, hampering voter registration, or packing the election 
commission with biased members (see chapter 4 of this study). Such 
developments often evolve slowly, thereby lacking “the spark that ignites an 
effective call for action” (Bermeo 2016: 14), sometimes because the extent of the 
change that occurred incrementally goes unnoticed. Like thermal sensors may 
have helped the frog in the cold water that was slowly brought to a boil avoid 
negative consequences, international democracy promoters are argued here to 
benefit from intra-organizational prerequisites that help ‘sharpen their senses’. 
Organization-internal prerequisites that enable the international democracy 
promoter to gain and maintain a sound knowledge of the domestic political 
context conditions in the target country of its engagement are likely to increase 
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the democracy promoter’s chances to also become aware of and to consider 
adapting to gradual change. For instance, a democracy promoter with operational 
capabilities on the ground, such as a field mission, with frequent contacts and 
interaction with domestic stakeholders is likely to have more immediate and 
intimate knowledge of domestic political developments, their background and 
possible consequences. Thus, such operational capabilities would constitute an 
organizational prerequisite that enables the democracy promoter’s up-to-date 
knowledge of the country situation. Another example is regular reporting 
procedures that may help ensure informed decision-making at democracy 
promoters’ distant headquarters. 
The empirical study brings together the research on international democracy 
promotion, studies on International Organizations, and organizational theory in an 
innovative approach. It explores whether the type of change in the target country’s 
political context conditions makes a difference with regard to the likelihood of 
adaptation by the democracy promoter and which intra-organizational 
prerequisites contribute to the context-sensitive adaptation to even those types of 
change with regard to which adaptation is less likely. The interactive contribution 
of domestic context conditions and the democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites for sensitivity to these context conditions presumably shape the 
likelihood of the democracy promoter to adapt its approach sensitive to the 
changing context conditions and, thus, of being more successful. The 
conceptualization of the types of change in political context conditions contributes 
to systematizing the political target country context of international democracy 
promotion in order to clarify under which conditions a successful democracy 
promoter would be expected to adapt its engagement sensitive to the domestic 
context. The empirical analysis will provide insights into whether the type of 
change makes a difference for the likelihood of adaptation. Looking at the 
democracy promoter’s organization-internal prerequisites—a novelty in 
international democracy promotion research—contributes to clarifying how 
democracy promoters can be sensitive and adaptable to specific and changing 
context conditions and to shedding light on a particular aspect of their inner 
workings. By bringing the different strands of literature together, this study 
contributes to theory-building and adds praxeological value by allowing 
conclusions on whether the “one size fits all” claim holds true and is strongly 
reinforced by the empirical test on the basis of a tough case or whether there are 
specific cases of democracy promoters that are or specific conditions under which 
democracy promoters are sensitive to the domestic context conditions of the target 
country and adapt to these. By opening up the “black box” of the analyzed 
international organization’s inner workings, the study will provide insights on 
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how democracy-promoting multilateral organizations need to be configured in 
order to be sensitive and adaptable to specific political conditions and types of 
change in the country context and, thus, have better chances of being a more 
successful democracy promoter. Thus, the findings will contribute to increasing 
the chances of international democracy promotion by multilateral organizations—
more specifically, regional organizations—to be more effective. 
Context-sensitivity is presumed to be a success factor of international democracy 
promotion. “Context” is used here in terms of the political conditions in the 
democracy promoter’s target country, in particular the type of political change. 
This understanding of the term “context” differs from the use of the term with 
regard to the comparative method in political science. With regard to the 
comparative method, the term “context” stands for factors and areas that do not 
influence the causal relationship of independent and dependent variables. They 
are, therefore, zero variables—meaning, for instance, that the “context” can 
neither be attributed to international democracy promotion efforts as independent 
variables nor to democratic progress as dependent variable (e.g. Grotz 2010). 
In this study, “context-sensitivity” is understood as the capability of the 
international democracy promoter to be aware of the target country’s domestic 
political conditions. 
In light of the fact that such country-specific conditions are a moving target, 
especially in a democratizing context, the process or time dimension of context-
sensitivity, i.e. the democracy promoter’s adaptability to changing context 
conditions, will be a focus of this study, too.  
“Adaptability” is understood as the capability of the international democracy 
promoter to become aware of the target country’s changing political conditions. 
Key presumptions of the study 
Apart from the key presumption of context-sensitivity increasing the potential 
effectiveness of international democracy promotion, this study rests upon several 
other presumptions: democracy and its promotion are per se desirable goals; 
‘external’ actors can only contribute to (and not determine) democratization as a 
process that is genuinely driven by domestic factors; international organizations 
that possess internal prerequisites, such as standard monitoring and reporting 
procedures, make better-informed decisions and are more likely to be context-
sensitive and adaptable; and regional organizations are more sensitive to the 
domestic context conditions of their member states than other international 
organizations.  
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In general, only few studies are optimistic regarding the influence ‘external’ 
democracy promotion can have on domestic democratization processes (e.g. 
Diamond 2003; Finkel et al. 2006); most are more skeptical (e.g. Carothers 1999; 
Schmitter and Brouwer 1999a; Burnell 2000a; Ottaway 2003a). Widespread 
consensus on the effectiveness of democracy promotion has prevailed only with 
regard to the European Union’s (EU) powerful instrument of political conditions 
for membership—“the single most effective contribution to meaningful 
democratization” (Schraeder 2003: 39; Orbie 2009). While the promise of EU 
membership provides a high incentive for democratic reforms, research has shown 
that the combination with technical support programs, that the EU embeds this 
political conditionality instrument in, has proven to be very fruitful (Pridham 
2000: 298). However, several authors have expressed reservations about this 
successful EU approach being applicable as effectively outside EU enlargement 
countries (e.g. Kelley 2004: 49; Schimmelfennig 2005a; Burnell 2008: 419; 
Freyburg et al. 2011; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011).
11
 While the author of 
this study agrees with the notion that “external actors can contribute very little to 
the development of truly popular or grass-roots democracy anyway” (Burnell 
2000c: 4) in light of democracy being seen as “a domestic affair par excellence” 
(Schmitter 1996: 27), she argues that what ‘external’ promoters of 
democratization can do in order to contribute constructively is ensure that their 
engagement is adapted in response to the specific (and changing) political 
conditions of the target country context. 
Against the background of this notion that democracy is a domestic affair and 
democratization genuinely a domestic process, context-sensitive approaches of 
international democracy promoters are claimed to be more promising than those 
designed at ‘Western’ headquarters with little knowledge of the country context 
(e.g. Zimmermann forthcoming; Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 66 ff., 73; Leininger 
2010c: 80; Hill 2010; Grävingholt et al. 2009; Hobson 2009: 400; Reiber 2009: 
64-77; Jawad 2008: 627; Carothers 2002: 19).
 
 
                                                 
11
  Notwithstanding a number of quantitative and qualitative studies that aim to measure the 
effectiveness of international democracy promotion, authors still assert little systematic 
knowledge on what works and why (Schraeder 2003: 27 ff.; Burnell 2008: 431; Magen and 
Morlino 2009b: preface). Magen and Morlino (2009) consider the “understanding of the 
causal impact of international instruments on domestic outcomes […] still woefully 
undertheorized and under-researched” and “the dynamics of international influence on 
democratic development […] poorly understood”. In general, most impact assessments face 
the problem of trying to measure the effectiveness of a democracy promotion engagement at 
the micro or meso level (e.g. technical assistance projects) with regard to the systemic macro 
level of regime type and democratic quality (i.e. “micro-macro paradox”). On general 
problems of assessing the impact of external democracy promotion, see Green and Kohl 
2007; Burnell 2000b: 340 ff.; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999a: 29 ff. 
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Chances for success of international democracy promotion are lower if it is not 
perceived to be legitimate by and does not enjoy support of the majority of the 
target population. Thus, legitimacy of the international democracy promoter and 
its effectiveness are interrelated issues in ‘externally’ promoting democratization. 
Any effort to promote democracy against the will of the population would 
normatively and intrinsically contradict the goal of democracy, understood as 
“government of the people, by the people, and for the people”12. If democracy (or 
a certain type of democracy) is imposed upon a society, it contradicts the intrinsic 
value of democracy, and it runs the risk of being perceived as ‘neocolonial 
paternalism’, and resistance is to be expected. And yet, Peter Burnell considers 
the reality of democracy promotion as oftentimes a very one-sided relationship 
that bears negatively on effectiveness and sustainability: “That is, the democracy 
promoters […] dominate the relationship, even though one consequence could be 
that democratic outcomes are not fully authentic and take root only with great 
difficulty.” (Burnell 2000c: 9) Albrecht Stockmayer speaks about “a world that 
assumes to know what is ‘good’ and another world that does not necessarily share 
or want to share the North’s view about his universals” (Stockmayer 2006: 252). 
International democracy promotion takes place within (at least) two systems—
‘the promoter’ and ‘the promoted’—that are differently encoded; therefore, there 
is always the risk of a counterproductive dialectic resulting from cultural and 
institutional bias on the part of the democracy promoter.
13
 In order to avoid such 
consequences and a contradiction to the intrinsic value of democracy—thus, to 
increase legitimacy and chances for success of international democracy 
promotion—scholars argue that it is essential for the democracy promoter to 
recognize that the primary motive force for democratization is and must be 
internal to the country in question and to acknowledge local ‘ownership’ (Youngs 
2012: 115; Diamond 2008: 316). “Outsiders lend support to a process that is 
locally driven” (Burnell 2000c: 9) and, arguably, need to admit the greatest 
possible degree of autonomy to the development of the target country
14
, to know 
                                                 
12
  Abraham Lincoln’s often cited democracy definition of 1863. 
13
  International democracy promotion is said here to take place in at least two systems because 
several scholars of norm diffusion research and international democracy promotion have 
recognized that there is neither a genuine ‘local’ nor a genuine international/’external’ 
dimension. Rather, local processes are conceived of as “glocalized” and of having already 
internalized certain international values; international actors in democracy promotion (and 
development cooperation in general) often become an integral part of the domestic system 
and of domestic political processes themselves (Robertson 1995; Zimmermann forthcoming: 
6). Also see footnote 52. 
14
  In some country contexts, this “possible degree” may be more limited than in others—in post-
war situations for instance. Based on her comparative analysis of the OSCE engagement in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia and Serbia—or rather based on the case of the OSCE 
engagement in Bosnia and Hercegovina in particular—Solveig Richter concludes that the 
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the specific country situation, and to adapt approaches, instruments, areas of 
engagement and target actors in response to these circumstances.  
One key argument in favor of country-specific approaches to international 
democracy promotion is based on the finding that specific institutional models 
and “blueprints” can hardly be successfully transplanted to any given country 
setting because such institutions function differently depending on the specific 
domestic context conditions (Tilly 1995; Grotz 2000; Fukuyama 2004; Leininger 
2010c: 114). Furthermore, if not earlier, then at the latest the transitions in 
different parts of the world after the end of the Cold War have made clear that the 
patterns of change as well as chances and challenges for democratization in 
countries moving away from authoritarian rule differ greatly from the ideal of the 
“transition paradigm” (Carothers 2002: 6). The “transition paradigm” refers to the 
assumption that “any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be 
considered a country in transition toward democracy” (Carothers 2002: 6). 
Optimistic views of a global spread of democracy after the end of the Cold War 
based on the ideal of the “transition paradigm” had to soon face a political reality 
of “hybrid regimes” (Zinecker 2004), “democracies with adjectives” (Collier and 
Levitsky 1997), and/or “political grey zones” (Carothers 2002: 9) that are “neither 
dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy” (ibid.) and “that include 
elements of democracy but should be understood as alternative directions, not way 
stations to liberal democracy” (Ibid.: 14).15 Such different patterns of change 
would require a context-sensitive international democracy promoter to be aware 
of the type of change and flexible enough to adapt in response. 
                                                                                                                                     
often-criticized ‘external’ approach of establishing certain ‘domestic’ institutions completely 
or mainly without the participation of domestic actors has been rehabilitated by her findings. 
According to her study, “operational strategies” of the OSCE in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
according to which the OSCE has taken over sovereign tasks of the target country, have 
proven to be effective in establishing functioning democratic institutions. Therefore, Richter 
argues that input legitimacy is less relevant for generating support for the democratic system 
than output legitimacy (Richter 2009: 384). 
15
  “To take one example, during the 1990s, Western policy makers habitually analyzed 
Georgia’s post-1991 political evolution as a democratic transition, highlighting the many 
formal achievements, and holding up a basically positive image of the country. Then 
suddenly, at the end of the decade, the essential hollowness of Georgia’s ‘democratic 
transition’ became too apparent to ignore, and Georgia is now suddenly talked about as a 
country in serious risk of state failure or deep sociopolitical crisis.” (Carothers 2002: 18). 
This political reality of grey zones “is actually the most common political condition today of 
countries in the developing world and the postcommunist world” (Ibid.: 18). A recent 
compilation of case studies from the post-Soviet region explores the character of post-Soviet 
regimes and reviews their political transformations since the end of the Cold War through a 
combination of theoretical approaches and detailed, empirical analysis, highlighting the 
difficulties and benefits of applying the concepts of hybrid regimes, competitive 
authoritarianism and neopatrimonialism (Stewart et al. 2012). 
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Tatjana Reiber found that the instruments’ suitability for addressing the 
respective key problem source of the country in question—while not a sufficient 
condition—is of predominant importance for increasing the chances for successful 
democracy promotion (Reiber 2009: 387). The effect of one instrument as well as 
of a specific measure in different country settings cannot be expected to be the 
same, not to mention that the risks of democratization as well as of its promotion 
differ depending on the specific country context (e.g. Zulueta-Fülscher 2014).
16
 
Therefore, how to be constructive across the full range of political and societal 
situations represents a major challenge facing international democracy promotion 
(Burnell 2000c: 28). This is why it is argued here that a democracy promoter 
requires internal prerequisites in order to be able and have the capabilities to gain 
and maintain a sound knowledge of the specific political conditions of the target 
country at the outset of the engagement and over time. One approach fitting all 
situations is not plausible. Apart from that, if it is acknowledged that 
democratization is genuinely an internal process, then the target country’s 
ownership of the process and the path chosen would consequently need to be 
accepted. This argument has been raised by scholars of norm diffusion research, 
of international democracy promotion research, and of critical International 
Relations.
17
 And yet, international actors have been certified making limited use 
                                                 
16
  Empirical evidence has shown that countries in the process of democratization as well as 
intermediate regimes are more prone to violence, more repressive, and less stable than 
autocracies; democratic transitions in post-conflict societies are particularly risky and likely 
to result in renewed fighting (Snyder 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2002; 
Regan and Henderson 2002). Because consolidated democracies, in contrast, are considered 
to be stable and peaceful, Tatjana Reiber, among others, argues that international democracy 
promotion plays an important role in the above-mentioned risky contexts nevertheless (Reiber 
2009: 49). In light of this, it is argued here that promoting democratization requires the 
democracy promoter to know the context conditions of the ‘target’ country well and select its 
approach accordingly in order to be successful and in order to mitigate the risks associated 
with democratization processes. Regarding the demand of a risk-reduction strategy, see 
Burnell 2005: 372. 
17
  See Poppe and Wolff 2012 for a discussion of the argument for local ownership. On the 
critical debate of “exporting” models of liberal democracy, see Hobson 2009: 391; Hobson 
and Kurki 2012; Youngs 2012. While Bridoux and Kurki 2014 acknowledge that local 
ownership, localized perspectives and context-sensitivity have found their way into rhetoric 
and language of democracy assistance (Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 67 ff.), they claim that the 
meaning of democracy in such “local processes” supported by democracy promoters was still 
defined by the powerful “West” that holds the resources and knowledge and, thus, the 
“pedagogy of power” (Teivainen 2009) was still at play (Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 69 ff.). 
Lisbeth Zimmermann (Zimmermann forthcoming: 6) points out that such arguments helped 
open up conceptual debates on democratic norms but failed to offer insights on how more 
localized norms could look like. Zimmermann argues that the research on norm contestation 
is more fruitful in this regard. This research field has contributed to a reorientation of the 
norm diffusion literature to pay more attention to domestic norm translation processes and 
international norm promoters’ interaction with those. Norm contestation considers the 
contestation process and communication about differing interpretations of a norm set to be 
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of tailor-made and country-specific approaches and lacking flexibility concerning 
changing circumstances (e.g. Burnell 2000b: 346 f.) by not paying (sufficient) 
attention to the specific political conditions (Börzel and Risse 2004: 30; Zeeuw 
2004: 126, 2005: 499; Burnell 2007: 37; Jünemann and Knodt 2007; Howard 
2008: 341; Reiber 2009: 32; 69-70).
18
 
Whether this allegation of democracy promoters’ “one size fits all” approaches 
holds true against the empirical test of a tough case, is one aim of this study. This 
test will both strongly reinforce and empirically validate the “one size fits all” 
thesis, or it will show that there are cases of context-sensitive democracy 
promoters. Particularly, the test shall show what role the interactive contribution 
of domestic political context conditions and organization-internal prerequisites of 
the democracy promoter play in terms of context-sensitive adaptation of the 
engagement. This study will neither aim at an impact analysis nor assess whether 
the OSCE has applied the ‘right’ approach for achieving democratic progress. 
Rather, factors increasing the chances for success of ‘external’ democracy 
promotion—the democracy promoter’s capability for context-sensitivity and 
adaptability with regard to and in interaction with specific types of change in 
political context conditions of democratizing countries—are the focus here. 
Proceeding 
The remainder of this study comprises six chapters.  
This introductory chapter is followed by an introduction to the thematic 
embedding and conceptual framework in chapter 2.  
Chapter 2.1 will focus on the former and elaborate underlying presumptions of 
the research interest by giving an overview of the state of the art of the research 
on international democracy promotion and on international organizations as 
promoters of democratization.  
                                                                                                                                     
necessary for norms to be legitimate in a new context (Wiener 2004, 2007, 2008: 203). 
During such processes, a norm’s content and meaning is often adapted (Acharya 2004, 2009; 
Zwingel 2012). 
18
  For instance, Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse note that the EU democracy promotion 
strategies and policies as well as the mechanisms and incentives to promote compliance “look 
surprisingly similar” (Börzel and Risse 2004: 30) and “vary only slightly with type of third 
country” (Börzel and Risse 2004: 2). They show that this “one size fits all” approach in third 
countries resulted from an incremental process of EU instruments having initially been 
developed for the African, Carribean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, then “travelled” 
simultaneaously to the Eastern enlargement countries, to Russia, the Newly Independent 
States (NIS), and the Mediterranean Partnership. Börzel and Risse expect that “diversity and 
sensitivities for the local context enter the picture mostly in the implementation phase and via 
the local EU delegations” (Börzel and Risse 2004: 30). 
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The conceptual framework will be developed in chapter 2.2. In order to 
acknowledge the process dimension of the target country’s democratizing context, 
specific types of change in the target country’s domestic political context 
conditions will be developed in section 2.2.1, drawing from democratization and 
international democracy promotion literature. In addition the target country’s 
political situation at the outset of the democracy promoter’s engagement, these 
types of change would require a context-sensitive democracy promoter to adapt its 
engagement correspondingly. Hypotheses on the likelihood of adaptation will be 
developed in light of the political costs of adaptation and the political pressure to 
adapt associated with the respective type of change. Section 2.2.2 will utilize 
Ernst B. Haas’ neofunctional approach as a starting point for conceptualizing 
context-sensitivity and adaptability of a democracy-promoting international 
organization. The democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites to be capable of 
knowing and responding to the domestic context conditions at the outset of its 
engagement will be conceptualized as well as the internal prerequisites for 
adaptability that are considered to interact with rapid and radical and with gradual 
types of change in such a way as to increase the likelihood of the democracy 
promoter’s context-sensitive response and adaptation. It is argued that the more 
unlikely adaptation with regard to a specific type of change is the more important 
are elaborate organization-internal prerequisites of the democracy promoter for 
context-sensitivity. A corresponding hypothesis is developed. The selection of the 
OSCE as a tough case to test the “one size fits all” thesis with regard to the 
changing Georgian context from the beginning of the OSCE engagement in 1992 
to shortly after the rapid and radical change of the November 2003 “Rose 
Revolution” will be justified in chapter 2.3. Thus, the period under review is from 
1992 to 2004. 
Chapter 3 will start out with providing the historical background of the OSCE and 
democracy promotion in chapter 3.1 and proceed with elaborating the 
development of democracy-related norms and standards of the OSCE as a basis 
for democracy promotion in chapter 3.2 before analyzing the OSCE’s operational 
capabilities and organizational prerequisites for context-sensitive democracy 
promotion in chapter 3.3. The OSCE has developed a unique set of specialized 
institutions and field presences that are all mandated with monitoring 
developments in OSCE participating States and regularly report to OSCE 
decision-making bodies in terms of early warning of violations of OSCE 
commitments.
19
 These operational capabilities and monitoring and reporting 
                                                 
19
  The OSCE is not a subject of international law (Völkerrechtssubjekt) and, therefore, has 
participating instead of member states; OSCE commitments are politically but not legally 
binding. 
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procedures of the OSCE provide for a good basis for the context-sensitive 
adaptation of an engagement to specific types of change in political context 
conditions. How they are put to practice and how well they are utilized by the 
OSCE in the context of Georgia will be the focus of the analysis in chapter 5. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the domestic political context conditions of OSCE democracy 
promotion, i.e. Georgia’s political transformation process from independence in 
1991 until shortly after the 2003 “Rose Revolution”. This analysis will analyze 
Georgia’s political conditions at the outset of the OSCE engagement and identify 
different types of change in Georgia’s political transformation process that, in 
order for the democracy promoter to be successful, would require adaptation 
according to the types of change and of adaptation developed in chapter 2.2. 
Whether and how the OSCE’s organizational prerequisites for context-sensitive 
democracy promotion are utilized by the OSCE in Georgia to respond to the 
changing political context conditions with adaptation will be the focus of chapter 
5.  
Chapter 5 will analyze whether and how the OSCE has utilized its organizational 
prerequisites to analyze the political context conditions at the outset of OSCE 
engagement in Georgia, to become aware of the various types of change in 
Georgia’s political transformation process, and to adapt its engagement in 
response. 
Chapter 6 will systematically synthesize the empirical findings of chapters 3, 4 
and 5 and test the hypotheses developed in chapter 2.2. The findings on the 
international democracy promoter’s initial context-sensitivity will be synthesized 
in chapter 6.1. Chapter 6.2 systematically synthesizes the findings with regard to 
the likelihood of adaptation in response to “ruptures” and in response to types of 
gradual change in political context conditions. Chapter 6.3 addresses the 
interactive contribution of the democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites with 
these types of change. 
Chapter 7 concludes by putting the findings of this study into broader perspective, 
elaborate their theoretical and praxeological added value and generalizability, and 
provide suggestions for further research in the field of international democracy 
promotion. 
Sources 
Sources for the empirical analysis of the OSCE are mainly primary OSCE 
documents. More than 3,000 primary documents have been analyzed by the 
author, including a large number of “restricted” and “confidential” documents that 
the author was granted access to as “researcher-in-residence” at the OSCE 
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archives in Prague/Czech Republic.
20
 With regard to public primary documents, 
the OSCE homepage provides for a very good online library, as most “open” 
OSCE documents have been digitized dating back to 1975. This online library 
contains “open” decisions of the OSCE consultative and decision-making bodies 
(i.e. Summits, Ministerial Council, Permanent Council), speeches by the OSCE 
Secretary General and Directors of OSCE institutions, findings and conclusions 
on monitored elections, opinions on election codes and other domestic legislation 
of participating States and host countries, annual reports on OSCE activities, and 
the like.  
In addition, the journal “Helsinki Monitor”, published four times per year from 
1990 to 2007 and “The OSCE Yearbook”, edited by the Institute for Peace 
Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/Germany, frequently 
contain contributions by (former) Directors of OSCE institutions, (former) heads 
of units of the OSCE Secretariat, (former) OSCE Heads of Mission, and mission 
staff members.  
The reason for the focus on primary sources is that the internal procedures, 
especially (but not limited to) monitoring and reporting, are at the center of the 
research interest of this study. For the purpose of validating the author’s 
interpretation of primary documents, a limited number of informal talks with 
OSCE field and headquarter staff were held in Tbilisi/Georgia and Prague/Czech 
Republic.
21
 Field research in Georgia was conducted for two weeks in September 
2007; a planned second field trip in August 2008 had to be cancelled because of 
the South Ossetia war and military confrontation between Georgia and Russia that 
resulted in the closure of the OSCE field mission at the end of 2008.
22
 Research 
trips to the OSCE Office in Prague were conducted in February/March 2009 and 
May/June 2016. 
  
                                                 
20
  The OSCE claims in its “Records & Document Management Administrative Instruction 
No.3” under point 7 “Document Security Management” that OSCE documents are managed 
according to the principles of openness and transparency. Documents are said to only be 
labelled “restricted” when unauthorized disclosure of or unauthorized access to such 
documents would be disadvantageous to the interests of the OSCE or to the interests of one or 
more of its participating states. 
21
  Most interlocutors have asked that information provided in these informal talks be treated 
confidentially. The author can provide a list of interlocutors upon request. 
22
  The mandate of the mission was not extended beyond December 2008; the actual closure and 
withdrawal of all field staff took until March 2009. 
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2. Thematic embedding and conceptual framework 
2.1 Thematic embedding: international democracy promotion by 
international organizations 
2.1.1 Presumptions and overview of the state of the art of 
international democracy promotion 
“The ‘one size fits all’ approach [to international democracy promotion] is 
unconvincing. “ (Burnell 2004: 115) 
This section introduces three presumptions with regard to international democracy 
promotion that this study rests upon—two basic ones in addition to the main 
presumption: 
 The establishment and consolidation of democracy as well as its promotion 
are “per se a desirable goal” (O´Donnell et al. 1986) and a “universal value” 
(McFaul 2004; Sen 1999a).  
 ‘External’ democracy promotion can play a(n important) role in 
democratization although the latter is genuinely an ‘internal’ process. 
The main presumption underlying this study is that: 
 Context-sensitivity and adaptability of an ‘external’ promoter of 
democratization increases the potential of its approach to be successful.  
Before entering the elaboration of these presumptions, some remarks on 
terminology are in order. While the terms “context”, “context-sensitivity” and 
“adaptability” have already been briefly introduced above and will be further 
discussed below in chapter 2.2, the key terms of “democracy”, “democratization” 
and “international democracy promotion” need to be defined as well: 
There is no single all-encompassing and uncontested definition of democracy. 
Some definitions concentrate on certain institutions and processes, some on 
certain political values and principles, such as legitimacy, accountability, 
participation, openness and transparency in the conduct of public affairs, or the 
rule of law. The term, today, covers a range of political orders, all of which have 
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in common the claim to bind the rule in a state to the norm of the citizens’ 
political equality, to be based on the will of (a significant part of) the elective 
citizens, and to ascertain those that govern to be accountable to those that are 
governed (Schmidt 2000: 20). In most of the present democracies, the 
“government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (Abraham Lincoln, 
1863) is exercised by elected representatives and strictly restrained by a 
constitution and by law. The basic requirement of a democratic constitution and 
constitutional reality is that the ownership and exercise of government has to be 
derived from the citizens to an at least noteworthy degree and with regard to 
decisive functions and has to be accountable to them (Böckenförde 1987: 894).  
Democracy terms used in political science can be roughly grouped into 
minimalist and substantial terms. Empirically, democracy terms serve to capture 
either the ‘state of affairs’ in the target countries of democracy promotion or 
international democracy promoters’ policy goal. Normatively, democracy terms 
are used to attribute an end point to the target country’s development or a target 
point to international democracy promoters’ policies. The more demanding such 
an end point is defined, the harder it will be to achieve it, making democracy 
promotion’s failure almost inevitable (see Leininger 2010c: 47-50).  
As most studies on international democracy promotion, this study defines 
democracy based on Robert A. Dahl’s empirical concept of polyarchy with the 
two main characteristics of political participation and contestation (Dahl 1971).
23
 
For a political regime to be considered a democracy, it needs to meet seven 
minimum criteria, according to Dahl: (1) election and de-election of 
representatives; (2) regularly held free and fair elections; (3) inclusive passive and 
active right to vote; (4) freedom of expression; (5) right of access to information; 
(6) freedom of assembly and association; and (7) accountability of the 
government towards the population (Dahl 1971: 238 ff., 1998: 86 ff.). Such a 
procedural understanding of democracy allows its operationalization as well as its 
delineation from other concepts, such as good governance. 
Political participation and contestation, the two main characteristics of Dahl’s 
polyarchy concept, are reflected in the definition of democracy as “the rule on the 
basis of political freedom and equality as well as far-reaching rights of the adult 
                                                 
23
  Several authors—most prominently, Milja Kurki—criticize that such a liberal model of 
democracy has tended to dominate in international democracy promotion since the 1990s and 
argue that democracy as a concept is contested. In order to take context-sensitivity seriously, 
democracy promoters need to enter an open dialogue on local conceptions of democracy in 
their approaches (e.g. Hobson and Kurki 2012; Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 100 ff., 5 ff.). 
Similar arguments have been made in contestation literature that found its way into norm 
diffusion research. As a result, norm diffusion research experienced a re-orientation from an 
outside-in perspective to paying attention to domestic norm translation processes. 
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population to participate politically [that; P.J.] is derived directly or indirectly 
from the people, contested in competitively organized decision-making […]” 
(Schmidt 2000b: 21; translated by P.J.).
24
 
Democratization is understood here as the process of establishing or deepening a 
democracy (Nohlen 2010a: 153) according to the above definition.  
International democracy promotion (or: the ‘external’ promotion of 
democratization)
25
, then, is understood as all peaceful means adopted, supported, 
and (directly or indirectly) implemented by a foreign state, an international 
organization or a societal actor that are explicitly aimed at directly contributing to 
establishing or deepening democracy in a state or in a society.
26
  
Different from this definition used here, the term is oftentimes used by 
scholars to also cover military means (e.g. Grimm and Merkel 2008; Grimm 
2010), while the restriction to peaceful means is captured by the terms 
“democracy assistance” or “democracy aid”. The term “democracy promotion” 
generally also captures the means utilized for sustainably deepening the 
democratic political culture within a consolidated democracy (Leininger 2010b). 
Notwithstanding this general notion, this study will limit the focus on the 
international perspective, i.e. to foreign and development policy, and exclude this 
domestic dimension. Furthermore, this study will not focus on international 
democracy promotion by societal/non-governmental actors but on governmental 
actors, more specifically on intergovernmental organizations. The term 
“democracy promotion” will be used synonymously with the terms 
“international”/”’external’ democracy promotion” throughout this study. 
Democracy and its promotion—a desirable goal  
While taking note of past and ongoing debates outlined in this section, this study 
will not normatively question the practice of international democracy promotion 
                                                 
24
  Note that Schmidt’s definition includes the addition: “[…] and exercised with reference to the 
entire or the majority of the electorate”. However, this element would go beyond Dahl’s 
polyarchy concept that does not include an output dimension. 
25
  The terms “international democracy promotion“, “‘external’ democracy promotion”, 
“democracy promotion”, “international promotion of democratization”, “‘external’ promotion 
of democratization” and “promotion of democratization” are used synonymously here. 
26
  This definition is a modification of the definition introduced by Siegmar Schmidt according 
to which democracy promotion comprises all peaceful measures of a state, an international 
organization or a societal actor that directly contribute to establishing, strengthening or 
deepening democracy in a state or a society (Schmidt 1999: 9). Different from Schmidt, the 
definition introduced here includes the elements of “explicit” and “foreign” and also draws 
from a definition provided by Philippe C. Schmitter and Imco Brouwer by including 
“adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by” (Schmitter and Brouwer 
1999a: 12). 
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but rest upon the presumption that because of democracy’s values its promotion is 
a desirable goal per se. Although democratization is considered to genuinely be a 
domestic process, it is further presumed that ‘external’ democracy promoters can 
play a role in this process (see the following section).  
In contrast to the Cold War era when it was still disputed whether democracy 
constitutes the best form of political governance, democracy has predominantly 
been considered to be a functionally superior type of regime in relation to other 
regime types since the 1990s
27
: Far from being a perfect political order, “[a] 
second-best democracy is [considered to be] better than the best nondemocracy” 
(Dahl 1998: 230)—or, as Winston Churchill had already phrased it: “the worst 
form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to 
time” (James 1974: 7566). 
In recent years, however, several commentators on the state of and trends with 
regard to democracy in the world have asserted that the unrivaled positive image 
of democracy has been in decline during the last decade. As a reason for 
democracy’s perceived decreasing attractiveness, several contributors to a January 
2015 issue of the “Journal of Democracy” refer, on the one hand, to the 
decreasing political and economic performance of advanced democracies 
(Carothers 2015: 69 f.; Diamond 2015: 144). For instance, Thomas Carothers sees 
this decreasing performance reflected in distortions in representation and 
dysfunctional political polarization in the United States of America as well as in 
the financial crisis and the rise of extremist parties in Europe (Carothers 2015: 69 
f.).
28
 On the other hand, several authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, such as 
China, Russia and Turkey, have shown a growing assertiveness and self-
confidence—a development that Larry Diamond refers to as “authoritarian 
                                                 
27
  This statement still holds true even in light of the the fact that several autocratic leaders have 
started to openly challenge democratic values in international fora in recent years or in light 
of the recent “democracy in decline” debate (see below and page 26) that argues that the 
number of democracies has been stagnating or been in decline since 2006. As various surveys 
confirm, these developments cannot be interpreted in such a way that democratic values are 
contested on a global scale. Rather, the World Values Survey for instance shows that popular 
support for democratic values has never been as high as presently—provided that 
physiological and safety needs are fulfilled (see 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp [last accessed in October 2016]). 
28
  This assessment has been strongly underpinned by the recent 2016 presidential election 
campaign in the United States and the victory of the highly controversial candidate Donald J. 
Trump who polarized even the members of the Republican Party that he was running for. 
Furthermore, right-wing leaders have been elected to office in Hungary and Poland and new 
right-wing political parties have entered the political landscapes in Europe challenging 
existing political institutions and values, such as the “Alternative for Germany” (“Alternative 
für Deutschland”, AfD) that has gained significant numbers of votes in local elections in 
Germany in 2016 putting established political parties under high pressure to regain trust and 
confidence of a large proportion of the electorate. 
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resurgence” (Diamond 2015: 151). As a third reason, Robert Kagan highlights the 
geopolitical balance between democracies and “their rivals” to be shifting to the 
disadvantage of the former (Kagan 2015). Philippe C. Schmitter, however, 
emphasizes in the same journal issue that the desire for democracy as an ideal 
“has never been greater or more broadly distributed” (Schmitter 2015: 32). This 
view is supported by survey data, such as the World Values Survey.
29
 
As a result of the “third wave”30 (Huntington 1991) of democratization during 
the last quarter of the 20
th
 century, practitioners and scholars alike consider 
democracy a “universally relevant system”31 (Sen 1999a: 5) whose roots can be 
nurtured in all regions of the world (Danford 2000) and promoted as a “world 
value” (McFaul 2004). Democracy is said to have a remarkable ability to 
guarantee equal participation of approximately all adult citizens, a higher degree 
of integration of societal groups with opposing interests, and to cope with 
problems at issue to an at least acceptable degree (Schmidt 2000a: 26). Political 
and social participation, according to Amartya Sen, had “intrinsic value” for 
human life and well-being; of “instrumental importance” were democracy’s 
political incentives in keeping governments responsible and accountable; and the 
practice of democracy would give citizens the opportunity to learn from one 
another, help society to form its values and priorities and to understand needs, 
rights and duties, thus providing for democracy’s “constructive importance” (Sen 
1999a: 10).
32
 Furthermore, democracy is said to serve peace and stability; the 
“democratic peace” theory in International Relations as well as transition research 
postulate a positive relationship between democracy and peace (Czempiel 1996; 
Linz 1997; Russett 1993; Hasenclever 2003).
33
 However, since this positive 
                                                 
29
  See footnote 27. 
30
  Huntington’s classification into the following “waves” is the most often used in literature: 
“first wave” between 1828-1929, “second wave” between 1943 and 1962, and “third wave” 
since 1974 (Huntington 1991: 16). However, there also exist classifications differing from 
Huntington’s. One example is Klaus von Beyme’s classification that starts with the regime 
changes and the evolution of new states after World War I (Beyme 1996: 11). 
31
  Sen also refers to democracy as a “universal value” (Sen 1999a), arguing that the universality 
of a value is not defined by universal consent or unanimity, but “[r]ather, the claim of a 
universal value is that people anywhere may have reason to see it as valuable.” (Sen 1999a: 
12) 
32
  However, accomplishments and problems as well as benefits and costs of democracy are still 
debated. Some argue that several virtues ascribed to democracy actually appertain to 
institutions, good governance principles and factors, such as the rule of law, the independence 
of the judiciary, high welfare levels, or the interaction of these factors with the democratic 
constitution (Schmidt 2000a: 529). See footnote 36 regarding critical views on the claim that 
democracy is beneficial to development. 
33
  The theory refers particularly to the absence of interstate wars between democracies and is 
more contested with regard to the absence of intrastate violence. It is argued that democracy 
eliminates the root causes of conflict, namely political exclusion, inequality and illegitime 
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relationship is not undisputed and democratization processes themselves hold the 
risk of destabilization, the case of context-sensitive democracy promotion is 
further strengthened because the risks of democratization and its promotion differ 
from context setting to context setting. 
The unrivaled perception of democracy as a superior regime after the end of 
the Cold War is also reflected in declarations of multilateral organizations with 
membership across the former two blocs, including the OSCE. Within the 
framework of the OSCE’s predecessor—the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
34—in particular, participating States adopted 
democracy-related declarations and agreements (see chapter 3.2). Although these 
are not legally but only politically binding, the CSCE/OSCE norms and standards, 
developed in the 1990s, are said to have unfolded meaningful influence on 
transformation processes at the time and prepared the ground for strategies of 
international democracy promotion (Boonstra et al. 2011: 409 f.). The then 35 
participating States of the CSCE recognized in the June 1990 “Copenhagen 
Document” that “pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for 
ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (CSCE 1990c: 
2). In November 1990, they signed the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe” 
stating that: 
“We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only 
system of government of our nations. […] Democratic government is based 
on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections. 
                                                                                                                                     
governance (Lund and Mehler 1999: 47; Smith 2004: 7; Reiber 2009: 45 ff.), that democracy 
provides for rules and procedures for the non-violent conduct of conflicts (Linz 1997: 448; 
Schmidt 2000b: 498; Reiber 2009: 46), and that the political culture in democracies generally 
facilitates non-violent conflict conduct (Bloomfield and Reilly 1998: 17; Doyle 1999: 4; 
Hasenclever 2003: 205; Reiber 2009: 46 ff.). However, the relationship between democratic 
governance and peace is not as clear and linear as sometimes postulated (Geis 2001). More 
nuanced views have pointed to wars of democracies against non-democracies and to almost-
wars between democracies (Krell 2000; Russett 2005) as well as to democracy-specific 
motives and incentives for violent means (Daase 2004: 54; Geis and Wagner 2006: 280 ff.). 
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that democratization processes or semi-democratic 
regimes are particularly prone to internal (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Mansfield and Snyder 
2008) as well as external (Mansfield and Snyder 2004) use of violent means. The Peace 
Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) dedicated an entire research program to “the antinomies 
of democratic peace” between 2000 and 2009; see 
http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/Antinomies%20of%20Democratic%20
Peace.pdf (accessed 28.07.2016) as well as Müller 2004. 
34
  The OSCE has its roots in the conference process referred to as the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that started in 1975 and was renamed OSCE at the 
Summit in Budapest in December 1994 as the participating states came to the conclusion that 
the CSCE had grown out of simply being a conference process. Although the OSCE does not 
possess the legal status of a subject of international law (Völkerrechtssubjekt) and its 
decisions are not legally but only politically binding, it does possess all usual characteristics 
of an International Organization, such as standing decision-making bodies, permanent 
institutions and staff, regular financial resources and field offices. See chapter 3. 
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Democracy has as its foundation respect for the human person and the rule 
of law. Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance 
of all groups of society, and equality of opportunity for each person. 
Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character, entails 
accountability to the electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply 
with the law and justice administered impartially. No one will be above the 
law.” (CSCE 1990a: 3) 
With the “Charter of Paris”, the CSCE participating States accepted one single 
political regime—representative democracy—as politically binding for the first 
time in European history. This constituted a remarkable step within the CSCE 
process that had been established between the Cold War blocs in 1975.
35
 In 
October 1991, the representatives of the participating States even declared that 
“the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE 
[i.e. relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of 
law; P.J.] are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States 
and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned” 
(CSCE 1991: 3). In 1993, former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali expressed his perception of democratic governance to be best-
suited to guarantee and protect human rights (Boutros-Ghali 1993: 17) and, in 
1996, as constituting “an ingredient for both sustainable development and lasting 
peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1996: 9).36 In 2000, the UN General Assembly with 193 
member states adopted the “Millennium Declaration” that considers democratic 
and participatory governance based on the will of the people to best assure the 
                                                 
35
  The “Helsinki Final Act”, signed by the states of two competing societal systems in 1975, 
established the CSCE process that aimed at developing rules for non-violent conduct between 
the blocs via dialogue. 
36
  However, the view that democracy is beneficial to development is not undisputed. First of all, 
it depends on the definition of development—a broad sense of human development is 
different from its definition as economic growth, as considered by the World Bank for 
example. Some claim that non-democratic systems are better at bringing about economic 
growth, as has been referred to as the “Lee Hypothesis”, due to its advocacy by Lee Kuan 
Yew, the former President of Singapore. Amartya Sen’s review of several comparative 
studies gives plausibility to the claim that there is no clear relation between economic growth 
and democracy in either direction (Sen 1999b). But consensus has evolved on several policies 
that can help foster economic development, such as openness to competition, the use of 
international markets, public provision of incentives for investment and export, a high level of 
literacy and schooling, successful land reforms, and other social opportunities that widen 
participation in the process of economic expansion (Sen 1999a: 7). None of these can be 
assumed to be inconsistent with greater democracy. Apart from this, interestingly, no 
substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a 
relatively free press (Dr'eze and Sen 1987; D'Souza 1990; Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
1992b; IFRCRCS 1994). “The positive role of political and civil rights applies to the 
prevention of economic and social disasters in general.” (Sen 1999a: 8) Furthermore, several 
studies suggest that democracies are inclined to favor trade among each other, to cooperate, 
and to form alliances (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Bernstein and Berger 1998; Remmer 1996; 
Mansfield et al. 2002). 
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rights of men and women “to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, 
free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice” and 
declares that no effort will be spared “to promote democracy and strengthen the 
rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the right to development” (United Nations 
2000). Recently, in September 2015, the reference to democratic values and 
principles in international agreements was further strengthened when the heads of 
state of the UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda. With the 16
th
 sustainable 
development goal (SDG 16), it contains a goal on peaceful and inclusive societies, 
based on democratic principles such as accountability and participation.
37
 
Against this historical background, a virtual “democracy promotion industry”38 
developed after the end of the bloc confrontation, as the preference of ‘Western’ 
governments for democracy no longer took a back seat to the perceived necessity 
of building strategic alliances against the Soviet Union (Wolff 2008: 5 f.; see also 
Guilhot 2005: chapter 1; Robinson 1996b: chapter 2; Carothers 1991). The former 
“thinly populated” “specialized niche” of democracy promotion evolved into “a 
substantial, well-institutionalized domain” with a wide range of actors (Carothers 
2015: 59). The EU elevated to a “normative power” in democracy promotion in 
the perception of many observers (e.g. Bicchi 2006; Orbie 2009; Whitman 2011). 
In addition to nearly every ‘Western’ government, a large number of transnational 
non-profit and for-profit non-governmental organizations, regional organizations, 
such as the OSCE and the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as 
many multilateral organizations, among them the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the UN Development 
Program, and the UN Democracy Fund, entered the field.  
The research on ‘external’ democracy promotion during this “golden age” 
(Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 65) of the practice has predominantly been descriptive 
and practice-oriented (Reiber 2009: 31) with studies providing overviews on 
democracy promoters, their goals and means (e.g. Mair 1997; Carothers 1999; 
Burnell 2000a) as well as focusing on their motives and strategies (e.g. Carothers 
1997; Cox et al. 2000; Santiso 2002a), comparative assessments of selected fields 
of democracy promotion, such as support to civil society or electoral assistance 
(e.g. Robinson 1996a; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Kumar 2000; Reilly 2001) in 
addition to evaluations often commissioned by the democracy promoters. 
                                                 
37
  See http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/ (last accessed in 
December 2016). 
38
  See footnote 1 for numbers of official allocations made to democracy promotion. 
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After this “golden age” of democracy promotion in the post-Cold War 
environment of the 1990s, the practice experienced a “backlash” (Carothers 
2006). Laurence Whitehead interprets the post-2001 “retreat of democracy 
promotion as a foreseeable consequence of the 1990s overreach” (Whitehead 
2015: 10). Following the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in 
the early 2000s that have been associated with democracy promotion because of 
the rhetoric of the United States government at the time, the lively debate in 
literature on whether and to what degree state and non-state actors should be 
actively involved in democracy promotion efforts abroad intensified (Schraeder 
2003: 25 f.; see also Fukuyama and McFaul 2007). Critical views based on critical 
theory and dependence-theoretical thinking claim that democracy promotion is 
associated with oppressive policies of neo-colonial or hegemonial powers (e.g. 
Robinson 1996b; Abrahamsen 2001; Shamsie 2004). Other authors raise doubts in 
the wholeheartedness of the democracy promotion efforts based on realist theory 
of International Relations (Hyde-Price 2006, 2008; Schweller 2000), point to the 
struggle of interests and values (Schewe and Wolff 2014; Leininger et al. 2012; 
Grimm and Leininger 2012) and the tradeoffs between democratization and 
peace/stability (Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Reiber 2009: chapter 2.).
39
 
The practice of international democracy promotion came to be seen as “losing 
the force” (Whitehead 2009). In addition to questions of legitimacy and 
effectiveness
40
, the claim of democracy promotion’s loss of force has more 
recently also been supported by arguments in the context of the “democracy in 
decline” debate. The “democracy in decline” debate relates to the finding that the 
number of democracies has been decreasing since 2006 (e.g. Diamond 2015). 
However, this finding depends on how democracy is defined and measured. 
Therefore, other authors do not share the finding and see a “crisis and transition, 
but not decline” (Schmitter 2015) or consider the claim a “myth of democratic 
recession” (Levitsky and Way 2015). Arguments made in this debate assert that 
the decline or at least the global stagnation of the number of democracies has 
contributed to “a loss of momentum”, energy and impetus of democracy 
promotion
41
, that doors have increasingly been closed to democracy promoters in 
                                                 
39
  An excellent analysis of the literature can be found in Leininger 2010c: 32-77, here: 47 and 
53. 
40
  On democracy promotion’s effectiveness and the issue of measuring it, see footnote 11 as 
well as Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher’s 2014 review of the literature on the effectiveness of 
external interventions supporting democratization or stabilization (Zulueta-Fülscher 2014). 
41
  Sarah Sunn Bush offers another aspect of the perceived “loss of momentum” of democracy 
promoters and points to a general “taming of democracy assistance”. In her study with that 
title, Bush analyzes why technical programs of democracy assistance that do not confront 
dictators are more common than aid to dissidents and political parties that had initially 
dominated the field. To answer this question, she tests and finds support for the argument that 
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light of heightened sensitivities about ‘external’ actors interfering with domestic 
affairs, that democracy promoters’ own democratic performance has undermined 
their credibility and persuasiveness, and that democracy promoters’ political 
commitment for democracy promotion has been in decline in favor of the foreign 
policy priority of political stability (Carothers 2015: 66 ff.).
42
  
Examples for the closing of doors have been observed also with regard to the 
OSCE: In 1999, the OSCE long-term mission with a monitoring and reporting 
mandate in Ukraine was degraded to a project coordinator; the government of 
Uzbekistan succeeded in 2006 in transforming the OSCE presence from an OSCE 
Center in Tashkent into one project coordinator who did not have the liberty 
anymore to freely meet with non-governmental organizations (Boonstra et al. 
2011: 414). In literature, there is a growing interest in such developments with 
articles dealing with authoritarian strategies to counter or prevent democracy 
promotion efforts, the promotion of autocracy as well as with ‘negative’ external 
actors in democratization processes (Tolstrup 2009; Bader et al. 2010; Burnell 
2010a, 2010b; Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Whitehead 2014; von Soest 2015; 
Tansey 2016). 
The backlash against democracy promotion, the challenges and weaknesses of 
the current practice, certainly put pressure on democracy promoters to revisit and 
rethink their approaches. An effort to give impulses in this regard has been made 
by Jeff Bridoux and Milja Kurki in their “critical introduction” to democracy 
promotion. In their conclusions, they argue that many of the challenges faced by 
democracy promoters today arise from decades of practices that led recipients to 
perceive democracy promotion as merely an instrument of foreign policy in the 
hands of great powers (Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 109). Bridoux and Kurki, 
therefore, demand that democracy promoters must be more sensitive to the local 
context of democratization (ibid.).
43
 This argument is generally made in the more 
                                                                                                                                     
non-governmental organizations seek out tamer types of aid in order to survive and thrive, 
especially as they become more professional (Bush 2015). 
42
  On conflicting objectives in international democracy promotion, see the work of Grimm and 
Leininger 2012; Leininger et al. 2012; Wolff 2012; Wolff and Spanger 2014; Wolff et al. 
2012. 
43
  With their call for more genuine sensitivity to the local context of democratization, Bridoux 
and Kurki argue that democracy promoters need to take seriously the wide range of ways 
democracy can be understood and practiced, to be more sensitive to the way local contexts 
shape what is possible in this regard, and to directly tackle democracy promoters’ biases with 
regard to selecting partners through reflecting on their own assumptions. This call is one of 
three pathways Bridoux and Kurki suggest for the revision of the role and practices of 
democracy promotion in today’s world. The other two pathways are: Firstly, to move away 
from apolitical, neutral and technical instruments and funding structures that dominate 
contemporary democracy promotion. This means for them to improve the dialogue with new 
partners in democratizing countries in terms of a more explicit discussion on democratic 
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recent research on norm diffusion that has integrated findings of contestation 
literature. In this field of research, the domestic contestation process and 
communication about differing interpretations of a norm set is considered to be 
necessary for norms to be legitimate in a new context (Wiener 2004, 2007, 2008: 
203). During such processes, a norm’s content and meaning is often adapted 
(Acharya 2004, 2009; Zwingel 2012). The reoriented norm diffusion literature 
nowadays pays more attention to domestic norm translation processes and 
international norm promoters’ interaction with those (e.g. Zimmermann 
forthcoming). 
International organizations, especially regional organizations, run less risk of 
being perceived to promote democratization as an instrument of powerful states to 
pursue their foreign policy goals (McMahon and Baker 2006: 6). Regional 
organizations are said to reflect a microcosm of their members’ attitudes. Within 
the framework of the OSCE, for instance, participating States have committed to 
build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of 
their nations and agreed that the OSCE commitments related to democracy and 
fundamental freedoms are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all 
participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the 
State concerned (see above and chapter 3.2).  
Regional organizations are centered on member governments from 
geographical and/or geopolitical areas and are expected to be generally more 
sensitive to the local context than other international organizations (ibid.). A 
democratizing context, however, is ‘a moving target’ and political conditions are 
likely to change throughout this political transformation process. Such change 
may be challenging for a democracy promoter to detect or it may differ in the 
political pressure and costs of adaptation and, thus, in varying likelihood of 
adaptation. Even a context-sensitive democracy promoter, such as a regional 
organization, would, therefore, need to ensure being aware of such changes in 
order to be in a position to make an informed decision whether to adapt the 
engagement in response (or not). It is argued here that organization-internal 
prerequisites are relevant in this regard. Whether different types of change in the 
political context conditions of the target country make a difference in terms of the 
challenges for adaptation is what this study aims to shed light on by analyzing the 
OSCE as a democracy-promoting regional organization in Georgia. If so, it 
further seeks to identify which intra-organizational prerequisites can contribute to 
                                                                                                                                     
expectations and less ‘measurement’ and ‘competition’ (Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 107 ff.). 
“Secondly, democracy promoters must think about and frame how their work on democracy 
affects state-market relationships in ‘target states’ and with what consequences” (Bridoux and 
Kurki 2014: 109). 
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the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation to all types of change—including 
those types of change regarding to which adaptation is rather unlikely. 
‘External’-‘internal’ interrelationships in democratization processes 
The ‘external’ promotion of democratization—more broadly “the international 
dimensions of democratization” (Whitehead 1996b)—has long been a neglected 
topic in research until the mid-1990s. One reason for the initial academic neglect 
of the international dimensions of democratization is that the ‘traditional’ 
consensus of transition literature, which is part of the political science field of 
comparative politics, has emphasized the importance of domestic factors.
44
 The 
most notable of these domestic factors within the multicausal phenomenon of 
transitions are the degree of unity among ruling elites or opposition movements, 
the vibrancy of civil society, the receptivity of political culture, the degree of state 
control, and the strength of the national economy (e.g. Diamond et al. 1989). The 
editors of transition research’s reference work “Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule” (O´Donnell et al. 1986) stated that national forces and calculations played 
the decisive role in transitions and considered the search for international factors 
as “fruitless” (Ibid: 18 f.).45 Most transition studies at the time attended to this 
assessment and did not consider ‘external’ factors as determining variables. One 
of the few exceptions to this was the work of Geoffrey Pridham, who initiated a 
broader consideration of the international context already in 1991 with the 
compilation “Encouraging Democracy. The International Context of Regime 
Transition in Southern Europe” (Pridham 1991). 
These earlier works have based their conclusions mainly on empirical findings 
from initial transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America between 1974 and 
1989. However, retrospective analyses have underscored an important difference 
                                                 
44
  Synonyms for transition research or transitology are transformation research, research on 
regime change, or democratization research. One branch of transitology—consolidation 
research—deals specifically with the conditions and challenges of consolidation following the 
finding “that sustaining democracy is often a task as difficult as establishing” (Schedler 1998: 
91), as observed for example in post-Soviet country cases. 
45
  However, one of the three editors of “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule”—Laurence 
Whitehead—differed from this ‘mainstream’ and took a different position than O’Donnell 
and Schmitter in this very book (Whitehead 1986). Even Schmitter, who had stated in 1986: 
“one of the firmest conclusions that emerged [...] was that transitions from authoritarian rule 
and immediate prospects for political democracy were largely to be explained in terms of 
national forces and calculations. External actors tended to play an indirect and usually 
marginal role [...]“ (Schmitter 1986: 5), later, in 1996, reconsidered the emphasis on the 
overriding importance of national forces and calculations in favor of the insight: “Perhaps, it 
is time to reconsider the impact of the international context upon regime change. […] Without 
seeking to elevate it to the status of prime mover, could it not be more significant than was 
originally thought?” (Schmitter 1996: 27-8) 
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between these initial transitions and those in Central and Eastern Europe and Sub-
Sahara Africa after 1989 that have on average been more influenced by 
international phenomena.
46
 Accordingly, younger comparative studies have 
resulted in a reassessment and the insight that “the international processes […] 
deserve sustained attention” (Whitehead 1996a: 24). Since the end of the Cold 
War, growing attention has been paid to identifying and conceptualizing 
‘external’ factors in domestic democratization processes. Since then, most studies 
in democratization research have not raised any doubts—implicitly or explicitly—
against the relevance of the international dimension (Kneuer 2007: 16).
47
 
Influential in terms of shedding light on the relative importance of domestic 
versus international factors in explaining democratization has been the work of 
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way on “rethinking the international dimension of 
regime change” (Levitsky and Way 2005, 2006). They explain cross-national 
variation in international influence on democratization with differences in the 
degree of “linkage”—that is the density of (economic, political, diplomatic, social 
and organizational) ties and cross-border flows (of trade and investment, people 
and communication)—and “leverage”—that is the degree to which domestic 
governments are vulnerable to external democratizing pressure. Levitsky and Way 
find that leverage without linkage has rarely been sufficient to induce 
democratization (Levitsky and Way 2006: 379). While they consider domestic 
variables critical for explaining regime outcomes, they find that unfavorable 
structural domestic conditions can be outweighed at times by extensive linkage 
and intense international pressure (ibid: 396). 
Notwithstanding the recognition of the international dimensions of 
democratization since the early and mid-1990s, the international promotion of 
democratization remained “at best under-studied and poorly understood” 
(Schraeder 2003: 22) until about a decade later. With the US-led military 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq following the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, which were associated with democracy promotion and regime 
change, the academic interest in examining the practice of ‘external’ democracy 
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  According to Laurence Whitehead, these phenomena refer to (1) “contagion” or “diffusion” 
(Whitehead 1996a; also see Starr 1991; Kopstein and Reilly 2001), that is the extensive and 
unintended spread of an idea within a given geographical region; (2) explicit acts of 
intervention by a foreign power; and (3) “consent”. The latter refers to foreign influences 
providing an international context that can either facilitate or hinder the development of 
democratic practices within a given country. An example is the EU’s requirement that 
aspiring countries must embody a certain level of democratic standards (“Copenhagen 
Criteria”) before being considered for membership, thereby providing a powerful incentive to 
democratize (Rupnik 2000). 
47
  On the relevance of transition research for the rise of external democracy promotion in 
general see Smith 2007: chapter 5; Guilhot 2005: chapter 4. 
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promotion started to grow (e.g. Magen and Morlino 2009a; Crawford 2003b, 
2003c; Ottaway 2003b; Carothers 2004; Youngs 2004; Burnell 2005). Throughout 
the past decade, the number of studies with a differentiated look at various 
democracy promoters—often with a focus on specific target regions—and on 
various approaches to the promotion of democratization have increased 
considerably. Although studies dealing with the United States of America—the 
first actor worldwide to consider the spreading of democracy as its ‘mission’—has 
dominated the field (e.g. Smith 1994; Robinson 1996b; Carothers 1991; Schraeder 
2002; Cox et al. 2000; Monten 2005), other actors, such as other bilateral 
democracy promoters or international organizations, have also increasingly 
become involved in ‘externally’ promoting democratization and gained the 
interest of research. Especially the European Union (EU) has received a lot of 
attention (e.g. Gillespie and Youngs 2002; Crawford 2000, 2003a; Youngs 2001; 
Ethier 2003; Kubicek 2003) and is perceived as a “normative power” in this 
regard (Bicchi 2006; Orbie 2009; Whitman 2011).
48
 The research on EU 
enlargement has played a significant role for identifying success factors and 
causal patterns with regard to the impact of international actors on domestic 
developments (e.g. Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). 
Generally, incentive-based instruments following the logic of consequences 
and instruments of persuasion and learning following the logic of appropriateness 
can be distinguished. Research on political conditionalities has revealed that this 
instrument of democracy promotion works best when incentives meet the 
democratizing country’s expectations (e.g. EU membership) and possible 
sanctions in the case of non-compliance are clearly defined and will be 
implemented (e.g. legal consequences). While the promise of EU membership 
provides a big incentive for democratic reforms, research has shown that the 
combination with technical support programs, that the EU embeds this political 
conditionality instrument in, has proven to be very fruitful (Pridham 2000: 298). 
More socialization-/persuasion-based methods are said to work well when 
domestic opposition is low (Kelley 2004), when the socializing actor enjoys moral 
authority and targeted actors identify with it (Reiber 2009: 73f.). With the 
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  Marianne Kneuer’s comparative study on democratization by the EU in Southern and 
Central-Eastern Europe, for instance, is based on the premise that democratization is to be 
explained by a combination of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects (Kneuer 2007: 70) and 
analyzes the interaction between the EU and the respective democratizing state. In general, 
attention was paid particularly to the EU’s target region of Central and Eastern Europe (see 
for example Vachudova 2001; Cimoszewicz 2003; Dimitrova and Pridham 2004; 
Schimmelfennig 2005c, 2005b). Also outside of the EU literature, Eastern Europe is a well 
represented target region in the studies on the international dimension of democratization 
processes (e.g. Dawisha 1997; Pridham et al. 1997; Rupnik 2000; Zielonka and Pravda 2001; 
Schimmelfennig 2002; Dimitrova and Pridham 2004; Pridham 2006). 
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exception of EU accession countries (e.g. Schraeder 2003: 39; Schimmelfennig et 
al. 2006), a systemic impact of democracy promotion could so far not be 
substantiated. While some authors are generally pessimistic about democracy 
promotion’s effectiveness, this may also have to do with various challenges that 
impact assessments of democracy promotion face, such as the micro-macro 
paradox for instance.
49
 
While democratization literature as well as conflict research mostly considers 
international democracy promotion a factor that can at best complement domestic 
dynamics in a facilitating or hampering manner
50
, most authors who attribute a 
decisive role to international democracy promoters in influencing domestic 
democratization processes are found in the research on EU democracy promotion 
and in the field of International Relations. In general, international factors have 
been considered decisive in International Relations and domestic actors perceived 
as parts of the international system. The International Relations‘ perspective on 
the relative importance of international versus domestic factors has, therefore, 
evolved diametrically to that in comparative politics‘ transition research: While 
transitologists generally emphasize the predominant importance of domestic 
factors in democratization processes and have only gradually acknowledged that 
international factors may play a role, too, in International Relations studies, 
international factors are generally considered decisive but domestic factors have 
received increasing attention (e.g. Brinks and Coppedge 2006).  
Relevant contributions to the research on international democracy promotion 
have especially been provided by rationalist and constructivist institutionalists. 
Compliance and socialization, i.e. the process of adopting and—in the case of the 
latter—internalizing democratic norms, practices and values at sub-systemic level, 
and the role of international actors in this process represent key themes of 
institutionalist studies (e.g. Börzel and Risse 2002; Risse et al. 2002; Ethier 2003; 
Kelley 2004; Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). As in most studies on 
‘external’ democracy promotion, the direction of causality is supposedly clear 
with international norm promotion as independent and the norm diffusion result 
(i.e. norm adoption and internalization) as dependent variable. Lisbeth 
Zimmermann points out that domestic debate about norm sets and domestic 
political processes have initially been of little interest to norm diffusion research. 
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  See footnote 11. 
50
  Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have summarized this as follows: “Outsiders can rarely 
have a huge effect on the choice of trajectory, but upon occasion they can provide a decisive 
impetus for good or for ill” (Mansfield and Snyder 2007: 9). See also Peou 2007; Magen and 
Morlino 2009c. In terms of the “ill”, Julia Leininger, for instance, comprehensively elaborates 
the risk of international democracy promotion to be a hindering factor in processes of 
democratic consolidation (Leininger 2010c: 200-10). 
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Norm diffusion research rather characterized the search for the right mixture of 
norm promotion strategies to achieve the highest possible degree of norm 
takeover as a technical matter (Zimmermann forthcoming: 5). Solveig Richter 
concludes, notwithstanding important contributions to the research on 
international democracy promotion, compliance and socialization studies have 
failed to systematically analyze the context-specific interaction of identified 
variables (Richter 2009: 29).
51
 
More recent studies on norm diffusion, international democracy and good 
governance promotion propose that the contribution of the international actor, i.e. 
the norm or democracy promoter, be conceptualized as an integral part of 
domestic processes, i.e. democratization or norm adoption/ translation/ 
internalization processes respectively, rather than an external factor (e.g. Magen 
and Morlino 2009c, 2009d; Leininger 2010c; Zimmermann forthcoming; Groß 
and Grimm 2014).
52
 Julia Leininger, for instance, elaborates that the promotion of 
democratic consolidation within the framework of development cooperation in 
aid-dependent countries is part of a complex, integrated system of interactions and 
interrelationships between macro-structural, meso-institutional and micro-
behavioral factors, in which the implications and effects of ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ 
policies can hardly be distinguished (Leininger 2010c: 241 f.). She argues that 
international democracy promotion, therefore, needs to be analyzed based on the 
political system of the recipient country as the central unit of inquiry—thus, 
changing the perspective from selecting specific strategies and certain programs 
of individual democracy promoters as the entry point of the analysis of 
international democracy promotion to developments of the domestic political 
regime and the factors that contribute to these developments (Leininger 2010c: 
229). In their book on “International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of 
Law, Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino argue that “it is difficult to view 
international factors as truly independent variables, since democratization 
processes (unlike modernization, for instance) are ultimately always carried 
through domestic actors, institutions and procedures. It is external-internal 
                                                 
51
  In contrast, Lisbeth Zimmermann notes that ‘conventional’ norm diffusion research does take 
interaction between domestic context and international actors into account. She adds, 
however, that this interaction is only taken into account insofar as norm promoters 
strategically adapt to the specific domestic situation of the target country, such as to the 
presence of strong veto players or in order to accommodate local partners in transnational 
advocacy networks (Zimmermann forthcoming: 5; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Magen and 
Morlino 2009b). 
52
  Correspondingly to the argument that international norm/democracy promoters are no 
genuinely external or outside factor, some authors claim that there is also no authentic ‘local’ 
in such processes. Rather, all domestic processes were “glocalized” to some degree, i.e. 
shaped by both localized and globalized tendencies at the same time (Robertson 1995; 
Zimmermann forthcoming: 6). Also see footnote 13. 
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interactions, rather than external factors per se, which are more accurately said to 
shape domestic outcomes” (Magen and Morlino 2009c: Kindle position 883). As 
Magen and Morlino, Lisbeth Zimmermann, too, looks at the process of norm 
adoption and implementation in the promotion of the rule of law. She claims that 
“[a] simple outside-in model of rule of law promotion does not capture the 
interaction taking place between international norm promoters and domestic norm 
translation” (Zimmermann forthcoming: 9). Therefore, she aims to show that this 
interaction does not fit a unidirectional model of norm diffusion (ibid: 8) and 
argues that “political discourse and political processes in [target] countries also 
influence the choices of international actors” (ibid: 9). According to 
Zimmermann’s findings, international norm promoters change their 
conditionality- and shaming-oriented strategies to more inclusion- and dialogue-
oriented strategies when they realize that the respective norm set is strongly 
contested (ibid: 10; 270).  
This study also aims at analyzing how the international democracy promoter 
responds to domestic developments and processes and whether the international 
democracy promoter adapts to the (changing) domestic context conditions—
however, with a different perspective. While research has not yet provided 
sufficient clarity on which democracy promotion approaches are adequate for 
even broader categories of countries, the developments in transition countries 
after the end of the Cold War have underlined the large variety of political 
patterns and dynamics. The domestic political context has not yet been 
sufficiently systematized. In light of this, multidimensional and complex 
democratization processes as ‘moving targets’ require democracy promoters to be 
capable of being aware of and of analyzing the specific problems and challenges 
of their ‘target’ country in order to adapt their democracy promoting engagement 
accordingly. Therefore, this study will contribute to systematizing the domestic 
political context, conceptualize specific types of change in this regard, and aim at 
clarifying whether these types of change make a difference in terms of the 
challenges they pose for the democracy promoter’s context-sensitive adaptation. 
This study will further aim at clarifying how internal prerequisites for context-
sensitivity and adaptability of the democracy promoter and the types of change 
contribute interactively to the likelihood of adaptation (see chapter 2.2).  
In this regard, this study bases its main presumption that context-sensitive 
approaches to democracy promotion are more promising than ‘blueprint 
approaches’ (see the following section) on taking a medium position in the debate 
on the relative importance of domestic versus international factors in 
democratization processes: Democratization processes are considered complex 
and non-linear ‘internal’ processes that are mainly determined by domestic 
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factors; ‘external’ democracy promoters can play a supporting role in these 
domestic processes. The perspective of this study, however, inverses the ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ dimensions and will look at the interaction between the 
organization-‘external’ environment of the target country with changing context 
conditions and the organization-‘internal’ prerequisites of the democracy 
promoter to take note of and analyze changes and developments as a basis for 
taking an informed decision on context-sensitive engagement and adaptation. The 
plausible argument is made that different types of change in the domestic political 
context conditions exert different degrees of ‘adaptation pressure’ and require 
different types of adaptation that come with different ‘adaptation costs’. The 
different types of change in domestic political context conditions, thus, pose 
different challenges for the democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites for 
context-sensitivity and adaptability. The interactive contribution of domestic 
context and organization-internal prerequisites to the likelihood of context-
sensitive adaptation and, thus, the potential for successful democracy promotion is 
at the center of this study. 
Context-sensitivity and adaptability as success factors of democracy promotion 
There is vast consensus in the more recent literature on international democracy 
promotion that context-sensitive approaches are more promising to be successful 
than blueprints designed irrespective of specific country conditions, for which 
democracy promoters have been criticized (Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 73; Hill 
2010; Leininger 2010c: 80; Grävingholt et al. 2009; Reiber 2009: 69-71; 387; 
Hobson 2009; Zeeuw 2004: 24; Call and Cook 2003: 7; Carothers 2002: 8 f.; 
Ohlson and Söderberg 2002: 5; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999a: 9; Lingnau 1996: 
802 ff.). In light of this vast consensus, this study takes this claim as the main 
presumption, although more of systematic empirical evidence would be necessary 
to further solidify this finding, as was provided for instance by Tatjana Reiber in 
her study on democracy promotion and the consolidation of peace in the post-war 
societies of Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua (Reiber 2009).
53
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  The need for further systematic empirical evidence is especically highlighted by empirical 
evidence that context-sensitive approaches do not necessarily translate into better outcomes. 
Lisbeth Zimmermann in her study on the interaction of rule of law promotion and norm 
translation in Guatemala, for instance, found that locally appropriated norm sets and more 
dialogue-oriented rediscussion processes created moments of procedural legitimacy but did 
not translate into long-term domestic legitimacy of the appropriated norm set, better 
compliance with the norm set, and more stability in the post-conflict setting (Zimmermann 
forthcoming: 271). However, Zimmermann argues that, even so, norm appropriations were 
still important for democracy (ibid: 273). 
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In contrast to the vast consensus that international democracy promotion can only 
be successful when democracy promoters’ approaches are tailored to the specific 
challenges and conditions of the country context, democracy promoters have been 
certified rather having applied “an early appealing but simplistic conception of a 
unified strategy for a common global pattern of democratization” (Carothers 
1997: 128).
54
 Often, the practice of democracy promotion is considered to be 
supply- rather than demand-driven, to be designed based on what the democracy 
promoter has on offer rather than on what would be adequate for and sensitive to 
the specific country situation (Reiber 2009: 387). Several authors also note 
conflicting objectives to be the source of the lack of sensitivity for the specific 
context: “At times other geopolitical, historical, or cultural considerations may 
minimize or even trump individual country democracy-promotion policies” 
(McMahon and Baker 2006: 2).
55
 Approaches have supposedly hardly ever shown 
sensitivity for country-specific conditions and values as well as hardly ever 
displayed flexibility adequate for the respective situation and changed 
circumstances, but rather applied “one size fits all” approaches (Börzel and Risse 
2004; Haukenes and Freyberg-Inan 2013) and displayed “a set of very similar 
institutional blueprints that are transposed onto different contexts” (Howard 2008: 
341). 
In light of the evidence that the political paths of countries moving away from 
authoritarianism differed greatly
56
, several studies have aimed at differentiating 
context settings and demand the development of approaches tailored to these 
situations: 
Based on a thorough analysis of existing literature, Julia Leininger synthesizes 
varying tasks and areas of engagement of democracy promoters depending on the 
                                                 
54
  Carothers (1997: 122-124) concludes that (US) democracy assistance has failed to address the 
underlying structural relations of power. A similar analysis specific to civil society is 
provided by VeneKlasen 1996. 
55
  Such a clashing of the normative goal of democracy promotion with other foreign policy 
interests also compromises effectiveness. With regard to the conflicts between the goal of 
democracy promotion with other foreign policy goals in terms of security, economic and 
normative preferences, see Freyburg 2012; Grimm and Leininger 2012; Leininger et al. 2012; 
Wolff 2012; Wolff and Spanger 2014. Between 2008 and 2012, the Peace Research Institute 
Frankfurt (PRIF) dedicated a research project to the topic under the title “The Promotion of 
Democracy as a Risk Strategy: Democratization Policy of Democracies”, summarized at 
http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/Kernprojekt%20IV-2.pdf (accessed in 04/2008) [in 
German]. Competing foreign policy interests among the northern industrialized democracies 
have also affected democracy promotion efforts, most notably in terms of hindering effective 
co-operation (Schraeder 2003: 41). 
56
  See page 12 and footnote 15. 
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democratization phase.
57
 During the turbulent opening phase that is characterized 
by time pressure and information deficit, Leininger considers short-term measures 
to be dominant, such as mediating between conflict parties or advice on 
establishing institutions inducing democratic transition, in addition to the often 
already ongoing cooperation with opposition forces or civil society organizations 
(Leininger 2010c: 165 f.).
58
 In line with the latter, Philippe C. Schmitter and Imco 
Brouwer point to focusing support on political parties, interest groups acting as 
political organizations, and political movements during the opening as well as the 
transition phase (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999a: 19, 44). The democratic transition 
phase usually requires short-term support for the organization and holding of 
elections as well as for the negotiation processes on the distribution of powers and 
on institutional arrangements of the new political regime, most commonly through 
electoral assistance and the facilitation of dialogue processes (Leininger 2010c: 
166). Processes of democratic consolidation offer multiple entry points for 
democracy promoters but are highly context-dependent in Leininger’s view. This 
could be interpreted in such a way that context-sensitivity and adaptability are 
most relevant in that challenging phase of democratization processes. Direct 
measures of democracy promotion would aim at deepening institutional reforms 
and at influencing behavior and attitudes of the political elites and the population 
through developing the capacities of state institutions and officials, civic 
education, training on democratic practices, training of journalists, and supporting 
campaigns for instance (Leininger 2010c: 166 ff.). These areas of engagement 
correspond to the suggestions made by Schmitter and Brouwer (Schmitter and 
Brouwer 1999a: 19, 44). 
Thomas Carothers takes regime types as a basis when he argues that 
democracy promoters’ “standard menu” of institutional support to electoral 
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  Peter Burnell as well as Philippe C. Schmitter and Imco Brouwer, too, point out that 
democracy promotion measures should differ depending on the phase of democratization 
(Burnell 2000a: 1 ff.; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999a). In their reference work on transitions, 
Guillermo O‘Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter und Laurence Whitehead (O’Donnell et al. 
1986a) have developed three phases of democratization processes based on Dankwart 
Rustow’s dynamic model of a preparatory, a decision and a habituation phase (Rustow 1970). 
According to O’Donnell et al., each democratization process starts out with the erosion and 
opening (sometimes: liberalization) of an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. This opening 
phase is sometimes followed by a phase of transition, during which decisions are taken to 
establish a democratic regime and respective institutions. The beginning of the phase of 
democratic consolidation is usually marked by the adoption of a democratic constitution and 
ideally consists of a sustainable institutionalization and deepening of democratic procedures 
and practices. 
58
  Leininger does not present this synthesis as democracy promotion recipies for the different 
transition phases, rather she highlights that transitions are chaotic and (partly) reversible 
processes with open ends making strategy development and planning in democracy 
promotion very difficult (Leininger 2010c: 131 ff.). 
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commissions, parliaments and judiciaries is likely to be inadequate in countries 
that moved from authoritarian rule to semi-authoritarian stasis and recommends 
concentrating on promoting an independent civil society and media instead. In 
semi-authoritarian countries with a dynamic and growing economy, the promotion 
of pluralism and the rule of law may, in his view, be fruitful areas of democracy 
promotion in order to back independent business people (Carothers 2015: 62-3).  
In countries that cycle in and out of civil conflict, Carothers recommends 
concentrating on constitutional reform, security sector reform, bridge-building 
among contending groups, and support to civil society actively contributing to 
reconciliation efforts (Carothers 2015: 63). In contrast to this recommendation, 
Tatjana Reiber, in her study on success factors of democracy promotion as a 
means for the consolidation of peace in post-war societies, has not found solid 
empirical evidence for substantiating the hypothesis that the stronger the focus of 
the ‘external’ engagement on institutions of reconciliation, the higher the chances 
of success (Reiber 2009: 372 ff.). Reiber asserts that such as the above-mentioned 
efforts aimed at contextualizing democracy promotion have remained rather rough 
around the edges and imply to a certain extent that countries in the same 
democratization phase or the group of post-conflict societies do not differ much 
from each other (Reiber 2009: 70). Therefore, she develops her research design 
based on the—in her view—more precise insights of socialization research and 
compliance studies regarding the conditions under which certain forms of 
‘external intervention’ are effective. The degree to which a democracy promotion 
instrument is adequate to the context setting depends on the number of success 
factors the context matches (Reiber 2009: 77). She differentiates her findings 
regarding the selection of democracy promotion instruments and the selection of 
areas and measures of democracy promotion: According to her, democracy 
promoters can increase their chances of success if they pay attention to selecting 
instruments adequate for addressing the key sources of the country-specific 
problems.
59
 However, Reiber notes that a generalizable conclusion regarding the 
question which area of engagement will strengthen reconciliation could not be 
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  While adapting the instruments to the problem source is a necessary condition for adequate 
democracy promotion, it is not sufficient according to Reiber’s findings. She adds that the 
selected instrument(s) need(s) to also match the democracy promoter’s characteristics, such 
as resources, technical authority, negotiating power, moral authority, credibility (Reiber 2009: 
387). The democracy promoter’s characteristics are one of four success factors she identifies 
and analyzes—the others being problem source, addressee’s characteristics, process factors—
to measure the adequacy of the following five instruments depending on the context 
conditions: conditionality, social influence, material support, knowledge transfer, dialogue 
(Reiber 2009: 71 ff.). Reiber notes that there are country situations, in which all factors are 
unfavorable for democracy promotion, thus, providing hardly any entry points for adequate 
democracy promotion (Reiber 2009: 374, 83 ff.). 
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drawn. The same measures could have dissimilar effects under different context 
conditions (Reiber 2009: 388). This is why Reiber emphasizes the necessity to 
thoroughly analyze the respective problems of the target country in order to select 
targeted and adequate measures of democracy promotion (ibid.). 
This demand is exactly where this study sets off: the necessity that the democracy 
promoter analyzes and monitors the country context and adapts the democracy 
promotion engagement on that basis in order to increase the chances for success. 
The organizational prerequisites of the democracy promoter for meeting the 
asserted requirement of context analysis and monitoring and context-sensitive 
selection and adaptation of the engagement at the outset as well as in response to 
specific types of change are at the center of the analysis. They will be analyzed 
with regard to the case of the regional organization OSCE as promoter of 
democratization in Georgia, thereby testing the thesis of “one size fits all” 
approaches against a tough case and aiming to show which organization-internal 
prerequisites can enable a democracy promoter to be context-sensitive and adapt 
to even those types of change in context conditions in which adaptation is not 
likely. 
2.1.2 Presumptions and overview of the state of the art of 
international organizations as ‘external’ promoters of 
democratization 
“[R]egional organizations reflect a microcosm of their members’ attitudes toward 
democratization […and] can assist member states in developing mutually 
acceptable, and contextualized, democratic principles and practices. “ 
(McMahon and Baker 2006: 6 ff.) 
While the last quarter of the twentieth century clearly demonstrated that the vast 
majority of international democracy promotion efforts have constituted unilateral 
‘interventions’, throughout the past decade and a half, the growing involvement of 
a wide array of international organizations has been an important component of 
the “democracy promotion industry” (see above, page 26). The international 
community has increasingly seen the utility in donor harmonization and collective 
action, as expressed in agreements reached at several high-level fora on 
international aid effectiveness in Paris/France (2005), Accra/Ghana (2008) and 
Busan/South Korea (2011). Even international organizations with a broad and 
heterogeneous membership of both democratic and non-democratic states, such as 
the United Nations (UN) and its affiliated organs, have progressively sought to 
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codify democratic values and expand opportunities for democratic government 
throughout the world (Schraeder 2003: 25 ff.).  
For scholarship to underscore the promise for more effective attempts at 
promoting democratization associated with multilateral efforts (Ibid.: 27; see also 
Russett and Oneal 2001; Pevehouse 2002a; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999b), it had 
been necessary to emancipate from the realist school’s world view that did not 
ascribe to international organizations an independent influence on national 
politics. While rational institutionalists consider international organizations to be 
the solution to cooperation problems between states by minimizing transaction 
costs and overcoming conflicts of interest and security dilemmas, institutionalists 
have taken the decisive step of viewing international organizations as more than 
arenas for cooperation among nation-states—that is as self-contained actors.  
Against this background, three further presumptions that this study rests upon 
relate to international organizations as international promoters of democratization: 
 In line with the institutionalist school of thought, international organizations 
are understood here as self-contained actors—collectives with their own 
interests that develop objectives, strategies and programs of their own, 
independently from their member states (Ness and Brechin 1988: 269; Archer 
2001; Simmons and Martin 2002: 193; Rittberger and Zangl 2003: 33 ff.). 
 Regional organizations, a sub-set of international organizations, are presumed 
to be more sensitive to the context of a target country—and, therefore, have 
better prospects for being successful democracy promoters—because they are 
not perceived as an outside entity and reflect the position of their members’ 
attitudes toward democratization (Pevehouse 2002b: 611; McMahon and 
Baker 2006: 6 ff.). 
 International organizations that possess internal prerequisites, which enable 
them to gain and maintain a good knowledge of the political context of the 
country in question, are presumed to be more likely to adapt their engagement 
sensitive to political context conditions and to specific types of change in 
context conditions respectively and, thus, be successful international 
promoters of democratization (March and Olsen 1989: 170; Haas 1990; 
Howard 2008). 
As in the previous section, some remarks on terminology are in order before 
further elaborating the presumptions on international organizations as ‘external’ 
promoters of democratization. 
International organizations are a specific form of international institution. 
Robert O. Keohane, for instance, defined international institutions as persistent 
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sets of rules (formal and informal) that regulate behavioral roles, constrain activity 
and shape expectations (Keohane 1988: 384). Keohane differentiates three forms 
of international institutions: social conventions; international regimes that are 
complexes of rules and procedures, the core elements of which have been 
negotiated and explicitly agreed upon by states; and international organizations. 
International organizations are the most formalized form of international 
institution and are generally understood as an association of two or more subjects 
of international law (usually states), structured by membership and based on an 
international treaty, with own organs that address issues of common interest 
(Klein and Schmahl 2010: marginalia 12).
60
 By possessing an organizational 
structure, such as a bureaucracy and a budget, international organizations can be 
and are considered here self-contained actors of international politics.  
International organizations as self-contained actors 
Robert O. Keohane characterizes international organizations as purposive 
institutions with explicit rules, specific assignments of roles to individuals and 
groups, and the capacity for action. Unlike international regimes, international 
organizations can engage in goal-directed activities such as raising and spending 
money, promulgating policies, and making discretionary choices (Keohane 1988: 
384). The most important functions that have been attributed to international 
organizations are agenda-setting, norm-setting, socialization, regulation, 
monitoring of norm compliance, and the provision and distribution of information 
(Simmons and Martin 1997) as well as facilitating cooperation and contributing to 
compliance with norms (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). While international 
organizations can serve as important “vehicles” (Christopher 1995) of member 
state interests, they also appear and are considered here as self-contained actors 
(e.g. Hasenclever 2002; Russett and Oneal 2001) that, for example, promote 
democracy with the objective of development and/or conflict resolution. This is 
not to neglect that the OSCE—the case of democracy promoter under review 
here—is, indeed, a political organization that is dependent on the consensus of 
participating States at the political decision-making level (see chapter 3). 
However, the implementation level will be the main focus in this study, at which, 
it is argued, the OSCE acts as a self-contained actor with a certain degree of 
autonomy from headquarters and a specific organizational profile and identity (see 
chapter 3). 
                                                 
60
  According to this definition, the OSCE is, strictly speaking, not an international organization. 
The OSCE has not been founded on the basis of an international treaty and agreements 
reached within its framework are only politically and not legally binding. However, with 
organizational structures, a secretariat, and a budget, the OSCE can be considered a de facto 
international organization (see chapter 3). 
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Democracy promotion of international organizations—regional organizations in 
particular—is said to run less risk of being perceived as an instrument to pursue 
the foreign policy goals of powerful states (McMahon and Baker 2006: 6) because 
they are not considered an outside entity forcing their preferences upon the 
countries in question (Pevehouse 2002b: 611). “[R]egional organizations reflect a 
microcosm of their members’ attitudes toward democratization […and] can assist 
member states in developing mutually acceptable, and contextualized, democratic 
principles and practices“ (McMahon and Baker 2006: 6 ff.). 
International Relations scholars have developed differentiated approaches for the 
analysis of the evolution, functioning and relevance of international organizations 
in global politics, in which they were able to draw from a variety of institutionalist 
research traditions of related disciplines, such as international law, sociology and 
economics. 
With regard to the development of studies of international institutions since 
the end of the Second World War, Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons have 
provided a comprehensive analytical review (Martin and Simmons 1998). They 
highlight that early post-war analyses of international organizations lacked a 
theoretical and conceptual basis but were far less naïve and legalistic and more 
insightful than they were often given credit for. For instance, these studies already 
recognized that the nature of the political system of a target country provided a 
context for international institutions’ effectiveness, that elaborate organizational 
structure was not always the best approach to achieving international cooperation, 
and that institutional effectiveness should be subject to empirical investigation 
(Martin and Simmons 1998: 732). While still lacking a theoretical hook, several 
early studies in the 1950s were not merely concerned with whether international 
organizations had an impact, but also made an effort of explaining how they 
affected the behavior of states. Suggested factors, such as transparency, 
reputation, legitimacy as well as domestic political pressures, resembled many of 
the same insights that have informed “modern” institutionalism (ibid.: 731) and 
are considered success factors in international democracy promotion research 
today. The events of the 1970s that took place outside of the structure of formal 
international organization have given rise to the study of international regimes 
(ibid: 736 f.).
61
  
                                                 
61
  A major event of the 1970s that influenced scholarship on international institutions was the 
Vietnam War that raged beyond the formal declarations of the UN. Another influential event, 
calling into question formal organizations, was the unilateral decision of the United States of 
America that shattered two decades of predictable monetary relations under the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
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Formal international organizations, which in the first decades after the Second 
World War were at the heart of research as a “manifestation of what was ‘new’ 
about post-war international relations” (Simmons and Martin 2002: 193), have 
subsequently been sidelined by a theoretically diverse body of literature on 
international regimes—understood as rules, norms, principles, and procedures that 
focus expectations regarding international behavior. Initially, attention was paid to 
describing the phenomena of interdependence and international regimes; in the 
1980s, the research interest moved to closer analysis of the conditions under 
which countries cooperate (Keohane 1998) and, in the early 2000s, to global 
governance and the democracy deficit of international governance (e.g. Koppell 
2008; Wolf 2008, 2005; Wolf et al. 2004; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; 
Abrahamsen 2004; Karns and Mingst 2004; Zürn 2003; Kern 2002).
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With regard to analytical approaches that International Relations scholarship 
has developed, Dirk Peters, Katja Freistein and Julia Leininger introduce their 
edited volume “Handbook International Organizations” [translation, P.J.] with a 
dense overview of theories on international organizations (Peters et al. 2012). The 
different theoretical approaches to international organizations seek to explain 
different aspects, i.e. cooperation, the existence of international organizations and 
their activities as such on the one hand and the effects of cooperation on the other 
hand. While neo-realism considers international organizations to be instruments of 
powerful states (e.g. Grieco 1988) and does not assign them an independent 
importance, rationalist institutionalism considers international organizations to be 
arenas that reduce transaction costs of and obstacles for state cooperation and 
addresses the question why states create or act through international organizations 
(e.g. Abbott and Snidal 1998) or deals with their rational design (e.g. Koremenos 
et al. 2001). 
More recent approaches of institutionalism, namely constructivist 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism respectively, however, ascribe 
international organizations the qualities of actors in the international system. 
According to this view, after having been founded by states in order to pursue 
their foreign policy goals and to provide the arena for coordination and 
                                                 
62
  For a review of theories that claim to explain international regimes, see Haggard and 
Simmons 1987. In international regimes analyses in contrast to studies on formal international 
organizations, effects were not looked at as outcomes of tasks performed by a collective 
international agency anymore but rather as outcomes influenced by a constellation of rules. 
According to Martin and Simmons 1998, further research on international regimes moved in 
three directions: first, to the focus on how international regimes were created and transformed 
as well as the behavioral consequences of norms and rules; second, to the normative aspects 
of international regimes and the subjective meaning of such norms; third, to intertwined 
explanations of international regimes and of international cooperation more generally (ibid.: 
737 f.). 
  45 
cooperation between states, reduce transaction costs, and overcome information 
deficits, international organizations transform into collectives with their own 
interests and develop objectives, strategies and programs of their own (e.g. Ness 
and Brechin 1988: 269; Archer 2001; Simmons and Martin 2002: 193). They are 
identified as value communities that diffuse norms, socialize, and shape state 
preferences and politics (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699 ff.)—for instance 
with regard to democratic values. Such characteristics of international 
organizations can only be developed because of the administrative apparatus 
international organizations are equipped with, for instance the existence of a 
permanent secretariat (e.g. Archer 2001: 30-3; Rittberger and Zangl 2003: 106 
ff.). Despite the relevance of the administrative apparatus and internal procedures 
for international organizations’ characteristics and functioning—including their 
context-sensitive engagement in international democracy promotion—mainstream 
works in the discipline of International Relations have contributed surprisingly 
few studies on the everyday workings of international organizations, although the 
past quarter century has seen a flourishing of research on international 
institutions.
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International organizations’ internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity 
As elaborated, international organizations’ functioning as self-contained actors 
depends on an administrative apparatus, their inner workings and procedures. The 
empirical analysis of the regional organization OSCE as international democracy 
promoter in Georgia is based on the plausible argument that the domestic context 
conditions, i.e. the types of change in the political conditions in particular, make a 
difference in terms of the challenges they pose for the context-sensitive adaptation 
of democracy promotion. Provided that the empirical analysis confirms that the 
domestic context matters in terms of the likelihood of adaptation, it is argued here 
that international organizations’ successful engagement as democracy promoters 
depends on their capability to be context-sensitive and adaptable to the specific 
context situations across the different types of change in the context conditions. 
Because democratization processes are ‘moving targets’ and because the types of 
change presumably differ in the challenge they pose for the likelihood of 
adaptation, it is argued here that even generally context-sensitive democracy 
promoters, such as regional organizations, require certain organization-internal 
prerequisites for context-sensitivity and adaptability to interactively contribute 
with the type of change to the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation. Paying 
attention to such inner workings of international organizations, more specifically 
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  As will be analyzed in the paragraphs below, the literature on international bureaucracies is 
an exception to the shortcoming. See for an overview below and Bauer and Weinlich 2011. 
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to their internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity and adaptability, is a novelty 
to the study of international democracy promotion. Even more generally with 
regard to the study of international organizations, only throughout the last ten to 
fifteen years have scholars made efforts to shed more light on the inner workings 
of these international institutions. 
After few landmark analyses of international bureaucracies several decades 
ago (Weiss 1975; Pitt and Weiss 1986), in the early 2000s, international 
organizations have been (re)discovered and conceptualized as administrations 
with a view on their role and function as international bureaucracies and on the 
influence of individual civil servants within their bureaucracies on policy 
outcomes (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Dijkzeul 
and Beigbeder 2003; Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; Xu and Weller 2004; Fröhlich 
2005; Bauer 2006; Liese and Weinlich 2006; Bauer and Knill 2007; Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; 
Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003; Bauer 2006; Fröhlich 2005; Mathiason 2007). 
There is no commonly accepted definition of the frequently used term 
“bureaucracy” (Beetham 1996). However, it is often linked to the work of Max 
Weber, in which he attributes the following characteristics to ideal-type 
bureaucracies in his rational-legal form of authority: the administration of such an 
ideal-type bureaucratic organization is governed by impersonal rules and standard 
operating procedures (technical and/or normative); it has clear jurisdictional areas 
of competency; it follows the principle of office hierarchy; its staff is specialized 
and professionalized; it is managed based on documents (Weber 2006 [1915]: 220 
ff.). Weber himself as well as Robert K. Merton point out that there is a flip side 
to these characteristics that, on the positive side, may make bureaucracies 
effective by guaranteeing predictability and reliability through the dominance of 
rules, but which may, on the negative side, also result in rigidity and the inability 
to adjust—for instance, when strictly-following-rules turns from a means to an 
end in itself (Merton 1940: 563). 
The more recent studies of the 2000s on international organizations as 
international bureaucracies have built on and extended arguments that stress the 
role of institutions in the provision of information, as Keohane has argued, and in 
learning processes, as Ernst B. Haas and Peter Haas have emphasized. From the 
late 1950s into the early 1980s, various studies had already aimed at establishing 
whether international organizations contributed to “learning” (Martin and 
Simmons 1998: 735)—a strand of research that had been stimulated by Ernst B. 
Haas’ “neofunctional approach” (Haas 1958, 1990; see section 2.1.1). According 
to neofunctionalism, individuals “learn” and undergo attitudinal changes by 
participating in international organizations’ policy-making processes. In the face 
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of increasingly complex, transboundary interdependence of politics and its 
oftentimes unforeseeable and suddenly occurring consequences, since the early 
1990s, scholars have started to more explicitly recognize that technical 
knowhow—as provided by international organizations—has become all the more 
important for political governance and international policies (Haas 1992). 
Correspondingly, international bureaucracies’ expertise has gained attention in 
research because the simple coordination of national policies has been considered 
insufficient for solving complex transboundary problems (Liese and Weinlich 
2006: 492). Some scholars even argue that effective governance in a unilateral 
nation-state approach is hardly possible anymore (Leibfried and Zürn 2005) and 
national administrations need to “internationalize” their competences and 
coordinate their activities with international administrations (Wessels 2000). 
Depending on the goals and mandate of the respective international 
organization, the scope of tasks of their secretariats varies and ranges from 
supporting multilateral negotiation processes in and outside of the respective 
international organization, to supporting processes of signing and ratifying 
agreements on international norms, and/or to generating, categorizing and 
analyzing knowledge (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 31-2) that is provided to 
member states for the purpose of informed decision-making (Abbott and Snidal 
1998) and/or utilized for the planning and implementation of operations, such as 
programs of democracy promotion—the focus of this study. The growing research 
interest in the issue of planning and implementing international organizations’ 
decisions in the field has evolved against the background of the expansion of 
international organizations’ operations on the ground throughout the 1990s (Liese 
and Weinlich 2006: 500). From the range of international secretariats’ tasks, 
Andrea Liese and Silke Weinlich conclude that it can be presumed that the inner 
workings of international organizations play a substantial role for policy-making 
and policy-implementation of international organizations (Liese and Weinlich 
2006: 500) and, as is argued here, for the likelihood of context-sensitive 
adaptation and, thus, successful democracy promotion. Nevertheless, “the number 
of studies that shed light on their [i.e. international organizations’; P.J.] inner 
workings is still relatively small” (Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003: 1); we “know 
very little about the actual workings of these bureaucracies” (Benner et al. 2007: 
2). 
This study ties in with such approaches ascribing actor qualities to international 
organizations and shedding light on their inner workings. International 
organizations, more specifically: the sub-type of regional organizations, are the 
object of inquiry. Their functioning is not simply assumed to be given; rather, the 
research interest is on the question which internal prerequisites of the democracy-
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promoting regional organization contribute interactively with specific types of 
change in context conditions to the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation and, 
thus, successful democracy promotion (see section 2.2.2, pages 57 f.). The 
empirical analysis aims to show whether the specific type of change in domestic 
context conditions, developed in the following chapter, matters for the likelihood 
of adaptation and, if yes, which internal prerequisites contribute to the likelihood 
of adaptation even in situations of those types of change during which adaption is 
more unlikely and challenging for the international democracy promoter. Thus, 
this study will contribute to shedding more light on the inner workings of 
international organizations by focusing on a particular aspect of these inner 
workings—the internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity and adaptability that, 
in interaction with the type of change in domestic political context conditions, 
contributes to the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation and, thus, to 
successful democracy promotion. The following section will develop specific 
types of change in domestic political context conditions and introduce a 
neofunctional approach to adaptation (and learning) in international organizations 
as a starting point for conceptualizing context-sensitivity and adaptability in terms 
of organization-internal prerequisites. 
2.2 Conceptual framework: types of change in domestic context 
conditions and international democracy promoters’ internal 
prerequisites for context-sensitivity 
“Democracy promoters need to focus in on the key political patterns of each 
country in which they intervene […and] must proceed from a penetrating analysis 
of the particular core syndrome that defines the political life of the country in 
question, and how aid interventions can change that syndrome.” (Carothers 2002: 
18 ff.) 
The fact that international democracy promotion is part of the standard repertoire 
of the foreign and development policies of the northern industrialized states and a 
task of international and regional organizations today is presumed to be given in 
this study and not normatively questioned. As elaborated above, there is vast 
consensus among scholars that the context-sensitive promotion of democratization 
is more promising to be successful than standard programs of democracy 
promotion that are designed and implemented irrespective of domestic context 
conditions. 
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Which domestic context conditions are a context-sensitive international 
democracy promoter expected to respond to? Democratization processes are 
complex and non-linear processes, as the political reality of many ‘democratizing’ 
countries of the “third wave” has demonstrated; many of these countries have 
been described by scholars as being stuck in the consolidation phase, as “hybrid 
regimes”, “democracies with adjectives”, or as “political grey zones” that are 
neither dictatorial regimes nor clearly headed towards democracy. The very 
particular political conditions and patterns of change of a country undergoing such 
a complex and non-linear transformation process may plausibly be assumed to 
differ with regard to the challenge they pose for context-sensitive adaptation by 
the democracy promoter. And yet, despite the praxeological relevance of the 
notion that context-sensitive democracy promotion approaches are more likely to 
be successful than blueprint approaches, research has provided little guidance for 
practicioners so far on the context conditions that context-sensitive democracy 
promoters would be expected to adapt to as well as little insight into international 
democracy promoters’ internal prerequisites that may interactively contribute with 
the domestic context conditions to the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation.  
This chapter, therefore, develops specific types of change in the political 
context conditions of international democracy promotion’s target countries in 
order to contribute to systematizing the domestic context and to clarifying which 
conditions a context-sensitive democracy promoter would be expected to adapt to. 
Hypotheses on the likelihood of adaptation by the democracy promoter with 
regard to the respective types of change will be developed and empirically 
analyzed. Furthermore, the empirical analysis will aim to clarify which internal 
prerequisites of the democracy promoter may interactively contribute with the 
domestic context conditions to the likelihood of adaptation even in situations of 
change in which adaptation is rather unlikely. It is argued that with regard to those 
types of change when adaptation is unlikely, an international democracy promoter 
requires to be ‘equipped’ with more than a general sensitivity for the region and 
country in question, such as regional organizations are said to possess, for 
instance. The argument here is that the complexity and diversity of 
democratization processes require a democracy promoter to have certain internal 
prerequisites that enable it to be aware of the very specific and changing political 
context conditions of their target country. In this chapter, different types of change 
in the domestic context conditions as well as the democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites for context-sensitivity and adaptability will be conceptualized as a 
framework to empirically analyze whether and how the democracy promoter’s 
prerequisites and the domestic political context conditions interactively contribute 
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to the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation and, thus, of successful 
democracy promotion. 
In the following section, drawing from democratization and international 
democracy promotion literature, specific types of change in the target country’s 
domestic political context conditions will be developed that would require a 
context-sensitive democracy promoter to adapt its engagement correspondingly. 
Hypotheses on the likelihood of adaptation will be developed in light of the 
political costs of adaptation and the political pressure to adapt associated with the 
respective type of change. It is argued in this respect that the more unlikely 
adaptation with regard to a specific type of change is the more important are 
certain internal prerequisites of the democracy promoter for context-sensitivity. 
Section 2.2.1 will utilize Ernst B. Haas’ neofunctional approach as a starting point 
for conceptualizing context-sensitivity and adaptability of a democracy-promoting 
international organization. Context-sensitivity is understood in this study as the 
capability of the democracy promoter to be aware of the target country’s specific 
political conditions. Adaptability is understood in this study as the process or time 
dimension of context-sensitivity and, therefore, as the capability of the democracy 
promoter to be aware of changing political context conditions in the target 
country. The internal prerequisites of the democracy promoter to be capable of 
knowing and responding to the domestic context conditions at the outset of its 
engagement will be conceptualized as well as the internal prerequisites for 
adaptability that are considered to interact with rapid and radical and with gradual 
types of change in such a way as to increase the likelihood of the democracy 
promoter’s context-sensitive response and adaptation. 
2.2.1 What to be sensitive to: Types of change in the domestic 
political context conditions and corresponding types of 
adaptation 
Although democracy promotion as a practice has come of age after a quarter 
century and the complaint that scholars were neglecting the topic (Schraeder 
2003: 21) is no longer justified, generalized knowledge on adequate measures for 
specific situations is still scarce—especially because such “specific situations”, 
i.e. the political context of target countries, have not yet been sufficiently 
systematized. This study, therefore, aims at contributing to systematizing the 
domestic context of international democracy promotion by developing specific 
types of change in the political context conditions of target countries (see Table 1, 
page 54), acknowledging the process dimension in addition to the target country’s 
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domestic political situation at the outset of the democracy promoter’s 
engagement. Corresponding ideal types of adaptation will also be developed. 
In order to conceptualize the changes in context conditions under which one 
would ideally expect a context-sensitive democracy promoter to respond by 
reconsidering the democracy promotion engagement, this study draws from 
democratization and international democracy promotion literature. In general, the 
types of change summarized in Table 1 are differentiated into gradual change and 
rapid and radical change (“ruptures”) in the political transformation process. 
Nancy Bermeo also uses this differentiation in her analysis of “democratic 
backsliding” (Bermeo 2016: 6). 
Rapid and radical change (“ruptures”) 
Bermeo conceptualizes such rapid and radical change to involve a broad range of 
institutions and, in the case of her object of inquiry, the outright breakdown of 
democracy. In the conceptualization for the purposes of this study, the ‘direction’ 
of the rapid and radical change will be left open and may involve both, the 
direction towards an unambiguously authoritarian regime as well as the rapid 
opening of a window of opportunity towards a deepening of democratization. In 
addition to this more structural understanding of “rupture”, an actor-centered 
aspect is also included in the conceptualization summarized in Table 1, i.e. rapid 
and radical change in the political positioning, for instance as a result of violent 
conflict, and the resulting change in the cost-benefit calculations of key actors. 
Because of the ‘sudden’ change associated with such “ruptures” in the 
transformation process, the pressure for international democracy promoters to 
adapt is relatively high and—because the change is ‘radical’—the requirement to 
adapt is relatively far-reaching. Thus, in such situations, one would ideally expect 
democracy promoters to launch ad-hoc political responses to pressing problems at 
headquarters-level and/or, possibly subsequently, to reconsider their country 
approach (‘general/political adaptation’). Similarly, at field-level, one would 
ideally expect a shift of focus to the implementation of ad-hoc measures in 
response to the most pressing problems and/or, possibly subsequently, a review of 
the implementation strategy and/or considering an adaption of the areas of 
engagement and/or the instruments of democracy promotion, such as political 
dialogue, socialization, knowledge transfer and capacity development (‘strategic 
adaptation’). 
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Gradual change 
The types of gradual change shall also capture both structural as well as more 
actor-centered changes and are, therefore, differentiated accordingly. To 
conceptualize these two types of gradual change, the author will draw from 
domestic success factors identified by democratization research (see page 30) as 
well as from the above-mentioned proposals for situation-specific approaches 
made by democracy promotion experts (see page 37 f.). Their studies point to 
regime type, democratization phase as well as to more fine-grained patterns of 
factors in order to outline conditions requiring democracy promoters’ context-
sensitive responses (as well as Schmitter and Brouwer 1999a; Reiber 2009; 
Leininger 2010c; Carothers 2015). Regime types are considered to be a category 
too broad for the adaptation types in focus here and are considered more suitable 
for designing the initial approach at the outset of the engagement. 
Gradual change in structural context conditions: The deepening or backsliding of 
the democratization process will be utilized for conceptualizing gradual structural 
change of the context conditions. When the democratization process deepens, 
democratic institutions become more stabilized and political actors increasingly 
comply with democratic practices and internalize democratic norms. Such a 
development opens up new and a wider variety of entry points for democracy 
promoters in terms of instruments, areas of engagement and addressees of support 
measures. Therefore, the adaptation ideally expected from a context-sensitive 
democracy promoter is a reconsideration of the country approach at headquarters-
level (‘general/ political adaptation’) and/or considering a review of the 
implementation strategy and/or adaptation of the instruments of democracy 
promotion (‘strategic adaptation’). The inverse case, reducing the variety of entry 
points and creating new challenges, is “democratic backsliding”. While the term is 
borrowed from Bermeo (2016), who also includes rapid and radical forms of 
backsliding in her concept, such as coups d’état and massive election-day vote 
fraud that would be considered here under “rupture”, the understanding of 
backsliding here is limited to gradual forms of backsliding. These can involve 
“executive aggrandizement” that “occurs when elected executives weaken checks 
on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that 
hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences” 
(Bermeo 2016: 10 ff.) through legal channels. Gradual forms of backsliding may 
also involve “strategic election manipulation” that occurs long before polling day, 
rarely involves obvious violations of the law, and is “aimed at tilting the electoral 
playing field in favor of incumbents [… and] done in such a way that the elections 
themselves do not appear fraudulent” (ibid.).  
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Because the change is gradual, it is presumably not as easy to detect for the 
international democracy promoter as rapid and radical change. This makes 
adaptation not very likely, unless the democracy promoter is equipped with 
organizational prerequisites that are analytical and sensitive to such gradual 
change because it is challenging to identify the change as such as well as the point 
in time when to adapt. However, the change is rather ‘fundamental’ because it 
affects political structures, democratization phase and possibly even the regime 
type. Compared to “ruptures”, the ‘pressure’ on the democracy promoter to adapt 
is considered moderate (see Table 1). In contrast to the rather ‘fundamental’ 
change, the democracy promoter’s flexibility to adapt is considered here to be 
moderate to relatively low because the political costs of the ideal response are 
relatively high in the case of political adaptation at headquarters-level to moderate 
in the case of strategic adaptation at implementation level. Identifying the point in 
time when the political costs of adaptation are ‘acceptable’ and worth the ‘benefit’ 
is considered challenging for the democracy promoter. 
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen have elaborated that ‘political adaptation’, 
i.e. macro-level change at headquarters, involves “stickiness of adaptation” 
(March and Olsen 1989: 169), indicating that such decisions at the political level 
are only taken inertly. This is why such ‘political adaptation’ is more likely to be 
expected in the case of rapid and radical political change and pressing problems—
in this study identified as “ruptures” (t1.c). For instance, placing the political 
mandate of an OSCE long-term mission at the disposal of the participating States 
for debate in the OSCE Permanent Council always entails a certain risk that the 
mandate would not be renewed at all or would be watered down because of a 
changed geopolitical situation or changed particular interests. Thus, the political 
costs of ‘political adaptation’ are very high. In comparison, more flexibility would 
be given in the case of ‘strategic adaptation’ at implementation level where the 
autonomy of the OSCE operational capabilities is relatively high (see chapter 3.3). 
However, ‘strategic adaptation’ is still relatively far-reaching and would ideally be 
consulted with partners in the target country, such as government representatives. 
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, for instance, in 
the second half of the 1990s, has introduced the procedure of agreeing on 
memoranda of understanding with the institutions in target countries it supports 
and/or cooperates with (see chapter 3.3). Thus, although the democracy 
promoter’s flexibility in the case of ‘strategic adaptation’ can be considered higher 
than in the case of ‘political adaptation’, it is still argued to be moderate and not 
high as with regard to ‘practical adaptation’ in response to gradual change in 
actor-centered context conditions (see below). 
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Table 1: Types of change in the target country’s political context conditions 
and corresponding ideal types of adaptation of the democracy promoter 
 DOMESTIC CONTEXT  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
 type of 
change in 
context 
conditions 
conceptualization of 
type of change in 
context conditions 
 ideal response at 
field-level 
(implementation-/ 
micro-level) 
ideal response at 
headquarters-
level (political/ 
macro-level)  
 
G
R
A
D
U
A
L
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
gradual 
change 
of actor-
centered 
context 
conditio
ns (t1.a) 
gradual changes over 
time in ownership, 
number and strength of 
actors, e.g.: 
 degree of unity among 
the ruling elite or 
opposition forces 
 strength of ruling party 
and/or opposition 
 vibrancy of civil 
society, degree of 
mobilization / 
participation 
 practical 
adaptation: 
 (consideration of) 
adapting 
activities within 
existing areas of 
engagement 
--- 
 gradual 
change 
of 
structur
al 
context 
conditio
ns 
(t1.b) 
change in 
democratization process: 
 deepening (e.g. 
democratic institutions 
stabilize, democratic 
norms and practices 
are increasingly 
complied with) 
 backsliding (e.g. 
strategic election 
manipulations, execut. 
aggrandizement) 
 strategic 
adaptation:  
 (consideration of) 
review of 
implementation 
strategy and/or  
 (consideration of) 
adaptation of 
instruments 
and/or areas of 
engagement 
general/political 
adaptation:  
 (consideration 
of) adapting the 
country 
approach 
 
R
U
P
T
U
R
E
 
rapid 
and 
radical 
political 
change 
of a wide 
scope 
(t1.c) 
rapid and radical change: 
 across a broad range of 
political institutions 
(e.g. coup d’état) 
 of political positioning 
of key political actors 
(e.g. as a result of 
violent conflict or 
changed cost-benefit 
calculations) 
 strategic 
adaptation: 
 shift of focus to 
implementation 
of ad-hoc 
measures in 
response to 
pressing 
problems; 
 (considering the) 
review of 
implementation 
strategy and/or  
 (consideration of) 
adaptation of 
instruments 
and/or areas of 
engagement 
general/political 
adaptation: 
 launching of 
ad-hoc political 
measures in 
response to 
pressing 
problems and/or 
 (consideration 
of) adapting the 
country 
approach 
Source: own account 
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Most challenging for the democracy promoter is identifying the point in time 
when it would be appropriate to adapt in the case of a stagnating democratization 
process. This case is not included in the typology of change here because it does 
not represent change. However, a democracy promoter would be well-advised to 
explore the reasons for this stagnation and to reconsider at least its strategy and 
instruments at implementation level (‘strategic adaptation’) when nothing moves, 
when democratic norms have formally been introduced, democratic institutions 
have been created, but are basically not filled with life. 
Gradual change in actor-centered context conditions: Transition research has 
identified several actor-centered domestic factors that are important in 
democratization processes (see page 30 above). These domestic factors relate to 
the degree of unity among the ruling elite or opposition movements, the strength 
of the ruling party or of opposition forces, the vibrancy of civil society and the 
degree of political mobilization and participation. Changes in these factors are 
considered here to be relevant for the democracy promoter and are, therefore, 
regarded as constituting the type of gradual actor-centered change that one would 
ideally expect the democracy promoter to consider practically adapting to at field-
level (‘practical adaptation’). Such practical adaptation involves considering 
adapting and/or engaging in new activities. This type of change in the political 
context conditions is argued to not exert a high degree of political pressure on the 
democracy promoter to adapt, but to allow for the highest degree of flexibility 
among the three types of change. Practical adaptation is, therefore, considered to 
be of high practical utility. 
However, because of the incremental nature of the change, the gradual change in 
actor-centered context conditions is presumably (at least) as challenging to detect 
for the international democracy promoter as the gradual change in structural 
context conditions—much more challenging than with regard to the rapid and 
radical nature of “ruptures”. This makes adaptation to gradual change generally 
not very likely, unless the democracy promoter is equipped with organizational 
prerequisites that enable it to be sensitive even to such gradual change. It is 
argued here that if the democracy promoter possesses and utilizes such internal 
prerequisites and detects gradual change in actor-centered conditions, then 
practical adaptation is rather likely because of the high degree of flexibility 
associated with this type of adaptation and despite the low political pressure to 
adapt. 
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Hypotheses on the likelihood of an adapted democracy promotion response to 
the type of change in the domestic political context conditions of the target 
country 
From the above elaborations on the two general types of change in the domestic 
political context conditions of the target country of international democracy 
promotion, i.e. gradual change as well as rapid and radical change (“ruptures”), 
the following plausible expectations can be derived: An adaptation of the 
democracy promotion engagement is likely in response to “ruptures” in the 
political transformation process because the change in domestic context 
conditions is rapid and radical and, new challenges are, therefore, obvious and 
exerting relatively high political pressure on international democracy promoters to 
respond. In contrast, it is plausible to expect that adaptation is less likely for 
political developments of gradual change because the change is less radical, 
evolves incrementally, and is, therefore, more difficult to detect for the democracy 
promoter. This is why the political pressure to adapt can be presumed to be lower 
than in situations of “ruptures”. Furthermore, it is presumably more challenging 
for the democracy promoter to identify when the point in time in the gradual 
development is reached to respond with adapting the engagement. The likelihood 
of adaptation can plausibly be differentiated for the two sub-types of gradual 
change in actor-centered and in structural context conditions, given the presumed 
varying degrees of political ‘pressure’ to adapt and of the political costs of the 
respective ideal responses.  
The following hypotheses reflect these plausible expectations on the likelihood 
of context-sensitive adaptation and, thus, on successful democracy promotion: 
(1) If the change in the target country’s political context conditions is rapid 
and radical, the international democracy promoter is more likely to adapt 
than to gradual change because the political costs of non-adaptation and the 
political ‘pressure’ to adapt are relatively high. 
(2) If the change in the target country’s political context conditions is 
gradual, the international democracy promoter is less likely to adapt than to 
“ruptures” because the political ‘pressure’ to adapt is relatively low to 
moderate. 
The research question that this study seeks to answer is two-fold: Do the two 
different types of change in the political context conditions of the target country 
pose different challenges for the democracy promoter’s context-sensitive 
adaptation? If yes, and it is more challenging for a democracy promoter to adapt 
to gradual types of change in context conditions than it is to “ruptures”, which 
intra-organizational prerequisites can contribute to the context-sensitive 
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adaptation by the democracy promoter to even those types of change that do not 
make an adaptation likely anyhow? 
In order to conceptualize democracy promoting international organizations’ 
internal prerequisites, the next section will introduce Ernst B. Haas’ neofunctional 
approach to adaptation processes in international organizations as the theoretical-
conceptual access to context-sensitivity and adaptability. Haas’ models of 
organizational adaptation (and learning) are utilized as a starting point for 
conceptualizing context-sensitivity and adaptability. The democracy promoter’s 
internal prerequisites are developed as ‘proxies’ for context-sensitivity and 
adaptability, i.e. intra-organizational procedures to collect and process 
information on the situation on the ground as a basis for adapting the democracy 
promoter’s programmatic/country approach and operational output sensitive to the 
specific political context conditions at the outset of the engagement and changing 
over time. 
2.2.2 How to be context-sensitive: Democracy-promoting 
international organizations’ internal prerequisites 
Theoretical-conceptional access: adaptation of International Organizations 
A starting point in order to conceptualize and analyze the context-sensitivity and 
especially its process/time dimension adaptability of international organizations to 
new insights and changing conditions and challenges is the work of Ernst B. Haas. 
In his inspiring 1990 book “When Knowledge Is Power”, he developed “Three 
Models of Change in International Organizations”64 seeking to explain “the 
change in the definition of the problem to be solved by a given organization” 
(Haas 1990: 3). He argues that international organizations change the way they 
attempt to solve problems through two processes that differ in their dependence 
on (new) knowledge that may be introduced into decision-making: adaptation and 
learning (Haas 1990: 17). Haas defines these processes as shown in Table 2. 
                                                 
64
  In order to avoid conceptual confusion because the following paragraphs refer to the two 
processes of ‘adaptation’ and ‘learning’: The “three models of change”, referred to in the 
book title, relate to (1) adaptation through incremental growth, (2) adaptation through 
turbulent nongrowth, and (3) learning to manage independence (or: managed independence). 
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Table 2: Definitions of international organizations’ adaptation and learning 
processes based on Haas (1990) 
Implications for: 
Adaptation 
“the ability to change one’s behavior 
so as to meet challenges in the form of 
new demands without having to 
revaluate one’s entire program and 
the reasoning on which the program 
depends for its legitimacy” (p. 33f.) 
 
Learning 
“the process by which consensual 
knowledge is used to specify causal 
relationships in new ways so that the 
result affects the content of public 
policy” (p. 23) 
Theories and 
values 
 behavior changes as actors add 
new activities (or drop old ones) 
 implicit theories underlying the 
programs are not examined 
 underlying values are not 
questioned. 
 behavior changes as actors 
question original implicit theories 
underlying programs 
 
 original values are examined. 
Purpose  ultimate purpose of the 
organization is not questioned 
 emphasis is on altering means of 
action, not ends 
 technical rationality triumphs 
 ultimate purpose is redefined 
 
 means as well as ends are 
questioned 
 substantive rationality triumphs. 
Ends  new ends (purposes) are added 
without worrying about their 
coherence with existing ends 
 change is incremental without any 
attempt at nesting purposes 
logically 
 new nested problem sets are 
constructed 
 new ends are devised on the basis 
of consensual knowledge that has 
become available 
Source: based on Haas (1990: 3). 
Haas considers learning to be “the process by which consensual knowledge is 
used to specify causal relationships in new ways so that the result affects the 
content of public policy” (Haas 1990: 23) implying “that the organization’s 
members are induced to question earlier beliefs about the appropriateness of ends 
of action and to think about the selection of new ones, to ‘revalue’ themselves” 
(Haas 1990: 24). In comparison, he considers adaptation to be “the ability to 
change one’s behavior so as to meet challenges in the form of new demands 
without having to revaluate one’s entire program and the reasoning on which the 
program depends for its legitimacy” (Haas 1990: 33 ff.). “Successful adaptation 
implies using the techniques of management and design found to be theoretically 
and practically appropriate.” (Haas 1990: 29). According to Haas, adaptation 
relies largely on technical rationality, because it is incremental adjustment; 
ultimate ends are not questioned, but the change in behavior takes the form of a 
search for more adequate means to meet the new demands. Adaptation in this 
sense is the focus of this study. It is considered here to be of a high practical 
utility, despite the fact that learning is usually rated higher in literature, as is 
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shown below and as Haas’ definitions provided in Table 2 indicate by associating 
adaptation to incoherence and lack of logic. Despite this high practical utility of 
adaptation, scholars have paid and are paying much more attention to learning 
processes. 
Haas has been criticized for having fallen short of fully opening up the ‘black 
box’ of international organizations, although he has himself emphasized that ”it is 
not individuals, entire governments, blocs of governments, or entire organizations 
that learn; it is clusters of bureaucratic units within governments and 
organizations” (Haas 1990: 26, emphasis P.J.). According to this critical view on 
Haas, his work has remained largely typological and his understanding of learning 
processes is very much based on the importance of consensually held scientific 
knowledge on problems in the environment (Benner et al. 2007: 18). Several more 
recent studies—most often building on the typological work of Haas (1990)—put 
some more effort into opening up the ‘black box’ and seek to trace learning 
processes within the international organizations’ secretariats at headquarters as 
well as within missions on the ground. They indicate a growing interest in 
organizational learning in international bureaucracies: 
The edited volume “Organizational Learning in the Global Context” (Brown et 
al. 2006), for instance, addresses the issue of organizational learning within the 
context of several empirical studies, covering very different units of analysis that 
range from the European Union, the United States government, and the Russian 
energy sector to the Catholic Church, drug cartels, and terrorist groups. With a 
focus on a single unit of analysis, Eva Senghaas-Knobloch and colleagues analyze 
political-organizational learning within the International Labor Organization 
(Senghaas-Knobloch et al. 2003) and Kathrin Böhling opens up the ‘black box’ of 
the European Commission and shows how it creates its own space for decision-
making apart from member state control by accumulating, applying and storing 
advice from non-governmental experts (Böhling 2007). 
Presumably triggered by the “Brahimi Report” on UN peace operations that 
stressed that “lessons learned in headquarters practice are not routinely captured” 
(UN 2000: 37) and that “not enough has been done to improve the system’s ability 
to tap that (field) experience or to feed it back into the development of operational 
doctrine, plans, procedures or mandates” (UN 2000: 39), recently, significant 
research effort has been put into organizational learning in UN peacekeeping. 
Two such efforts were conducted in Germany: At the Global Public Policy 
Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, a research team has been working on “United Nations 
Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning” from 2007 to 2012, building on 
Haas’ approach (Benner et al. 2007; Benner and Rotmann 2008). The results have 
been published in Benner et al. 2011. Another research project on “Administrative 
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Science meets Peacekeeping: Administrative Science Theory Building and the 
Implementation of Peace Operations” from 2006 to 2007 as well as the follow-on 
project on “Coping with the complex side of bureaucracy: The internal dynamics 
of United Nations peace operations” from 2009 to 2011 were conducted at the 
Department for Politics and Public Administration of the University of Konstanz. 
It aimed at exploring problematic aspects in the implementation of peace 
operations by international administrations and of the respective analytical 
potential for research in administrative science.
65
 Frederik Trettin and Julian Junk 
found that “the mission leadership is critical […] in generating knowledge and 
enabling its translation into learning” (Trettin and Junk 2014: 22). 
Because of this study’s focus on adaptation, including adaptation at the field-/ 
implementation-level, very instructive for the research interest here is the 
conclusion drawn by a study that analyzed ten cases of UN multidimensional or 
integrated peacekeeping missions (Howard 2008). The study originated as a PhD 
dissertation mentored by Ernst B. Haas. Lise Morjé Howard’s structured, focused 
comparison results in the conclusion of her book on “UN Peacekeeping in Civil 
Wars” that UN peacekeeping succeeds when field missions establish significant 
autonomy from UN headquarters, allowing civilian and military staff to adjust to 
the environment.
66
 In contrast to this success factor, Howard argues that failure 
frequently results from operational directives originating at UN headquarters, 
often devised in relation to higher-level political disputes with little relevance to 
                                                 
65
  The goal of the project has been to establish an analytical ‘toolbox’ for the implementation 
dynamics of international peace operations and the decision-making processes on which they 
are based (see the homepage of this research project at http://www.uni-
konstanz.de/FuF/Verwiss/Seibel/en_research/dsf_en (cited April 2008)). While no final report 
or publication on the specific results of the Konstanz research projects was available to the 
author of this study during the time of writing, the report on the conference “Public 
Administration meets Peacebuilding – Peacebuilding Operations as Political and Managerial 
Challenges”, held at Konstanz on June 15-17, 2007, presents some findings. The report is 
available at http://kops.ub.uni-
konstanz.de/volltexte/2010/10686/pdf/DSFConfRepFinal_100212.pdf (accessed 14.10.2015). 
Furthermore, the special issue “Micropolitics meets Geopolitics: internal dynamics and 
dysfunctions of international organizations” of the Journal of International Organizations 
Studies was edited by research associates of the Konstanz projects (see the introduction Junk 
and Trettin 2014). In their own contribution “Spoilers from Within: Bureaucratic Spoiling in 
the United Nations Peace Operations”, they focus on the obstructing behaviour of individual 
members of the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy and its potential impact on the operation’s 
overall performance (Trettin and Junk 2014). 
66
  Intra-mission learning that she refers to as “first-level organizational learning” is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for success. It becomes sufficient only in combination with the 
consent of the warring parties for the UN operation and consensual but only moderately 
intense Security Council interests. “First-level organizational learning” only takes place 
during the time in which the operation is being executed, as opposed to “second-level 
organizational learning” between the missions. 
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the specific context in question.
67
 This conclusion is very much in line with the 
argument in favor of context-sensitivity made here as well as with Haas’ emphasis 
on the importance of the “environment” (here: ‘context’) for processes of 
adaptation (and learning). 
It is exactly this focus on the ‘environment’ and the ‘context’, respectively, that 
this study will build upon in emphasizing the interaction between context and 
democracy promoter and the importance of context-sensitivity and adaptability 
when promoting democratization. Haas argues that the main impulses that may 
lead to adaptation (or learning) come mostly from the external environment in 
which the organization is placed and not from inside the organization (Haas 1990: 
27).
68
 In this regard, he distances himself from ‘traditional’ organization theory 
that mainly derived its ideas from studying business firms (Haas 1990: 28 ff.). 
While much of the literature on organizational learning focuses on business 
organizations and under-emphasizes political factors, relying on quasi-Darwinian 
market forces as explanatory factors, younger literature gives up the conventional 
understanding of the 1970s of organizations as closed systems. A more open 
concept allows for the interaction between organization and environment, at first 
limited to a one-way relation of the environment determining the organization’s 
goals and instruments, as in the work of Haas, and more recently as mutually 
constitutive (Dingwerth and Campe 2005; Meyer and Scott 1992; Scott and 
Meyer 1994; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). This study ties in with focusing on the 
interactive contribution of international organization (i.e. the democracy 
promoter) and the environment (here: the specific and changing domestic political 
context conditions in the target country of democracy promotion). In order to 
analyze the capability of international organizations to adapt their activities to the 
demands of the circumstances (according to new insights and/or changed context 
conditions), as aimed at in this study, one needs to focus on respective intra-
organizational procedures—“any organization behavior involving self-reflection 
leading to change” (Haas 1990: 24) and routine responses to respective 
environments, such as reports, that constitute “surprisingly efficient instruments” 
(March and Olsen 1989: 170) for organizational functioning. These organization-
                                                 
67
  As cases of failure, Howard (2008) identifies the four UN multidimensional peacekeeping 
missions in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, and Bosnia. In contrast, the six UN peacekeeping 
missions in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, and East 
Timor have, in her view, been successes. 
68
  Haas considers the following environmental conditions that are most likely to lead to change: 
the desirability of finding new cause-effect chains, i.e. the incentives motivating bureaucratic 
units; the possibility of finding them, understood as a function of the state of scientific 
knowledge, the degree of consensus it enjoys, and the availability of epistemic communities 
for spreading the word; and the urgency for finding them, such as the existence of a crisis that 
calls out for immediate action (Haas 1990: 27 ff.). 
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internal prerequisites interact with the specific domestic context conditions and 
types of change contributing to the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation and, 
thereby, of successful democracy promotion. 
Haas defines the environment and changes to the environment that initiate 
adaptation (and learning) of international organizations differently from how the 
domestic political context of the target country is defined here (see page 9 above) 
and from how the three types of change are conceptualized (see section 2.2.1). 
Nevertheless, his approach provides a good starting point for the 
conceptualization of international organizations’ context-sensitivity and 
adaptability developed in the following section. As will be shown, the respective 
conceptualization in this study will go beyond Haas’ limitation of international 
organizations’ adaptation resulting from changes in the immediate organizational 
environment and not from inside the organization. Rather, the interactive 
contribution of organizational environment/domestic political context and internal 
prerequisites of the organization are in focus here. Organization-internal 
prerequisites, such as monitoring and reporting procedures and feedback 
processes between different units of the international organization, will be 
integrated into the research design.
69
 The conceptualization of context-sensitivity 
and adaptability, provided in the following section, will build on Haas’ 
understanding that adaptation means to alter operations in the face of a changing 
environment or the recognition that earlier decisions and activities have not 
worked well. Accordingly, to be adaptable, as focused here in addition to being 
context-sensitive, is understood as the capability of the international democracy 
promoter to be aware of the target country’s changing political conditions and 
means to provide for relevant institutional provisions, mechanisms, and standards 
in order to be capable of taking the (changing) context into account.  
Scholars have apparently underestimated the practical utility of adaptation and 
paid little attention to such processes in contrast to learning processes—with few 
exceptions (e.g. Howard 2008; Barnett 2005; March and Olsen 1989). Haas as 
well as most of the literature cited above have put more emphasis on learning than 
on adaptation. Learning usually seeks generalized knowledge. But, as Michael 
Barnett cautions, “generalized knowledge that overlooks local contexts can lead to 
a tremendous mismatch between the activities of international actors and the 
needs of those on the ground” (Barnett 2005: 5). Therefore, focus here is on the 
                                                 
69
  Haas considers two feedback processes as precondition for learning—the feedback from 
dissatisfaction with the outcome to the formulation of new member-states’ demands and the 
feedback from organizational output to programming (Haas 1990: 20). In Haas’ view, 
international organizations learn or adapt because of member-state dissatisfaction so as once 
more to give greater satisfaction (Haas 1990: 18). He therefore considers them “satisficers” 
rather than optimizers. 
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democracy promoter’s capability for context-sensitive adaptation, i.e. on 
adaptability, which is of high practical utility in the view of the author and, as the 
process/time dimension of context-sensitivity, a key success factor of support to 
democratization processes. A crucial issue in this regard are organizational 
capabilities and procedures that allow collecting and utilizing the experiences of 
the organization’s staff on the ground, such as an operational presence in the field, 
procedures to monitor the political context conditions and developments as well 
as the organization’s own work, and procedures for reporting and feedback to the 
headquarters (see Figure 1 on page 65). Howard’s above-cited finding that UN 
field missions’ autonomy from headquarters constitutes a factor facilitating the 
missions’ success can plausibly argued to be highly relevant for the above-
conceptualized types of adaptation that involve only the field-level, namely 
practical adaptation and strategic adaptation. The following sections will elaborate 
the ‘proxies’ for international democracy promoters’ context-sensitivity and 
adaptability. 
Democracy promoters’ internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity at the outset 
While a general sensitivity for the domestic context, such as regional 
organizations are said to possess, is a good basis, it is argued here that a 
democracy promoter requires internal prerequisites that enable it to gain and 
maintain a sound knowledge of the context in order to be sensitive and adaptable 
to the specific complexities of and change within the domestic political conditions 
and the democratization process in question. 
At the outset of the democracy promoter’s engagement (t0), it is essential for the 
international actor’s decision-making level to have a sound information base on 
the target country’s present political situation, challenges, demands and context 
conditions for selecting the country approach, areas of engagement, mandated 
operational institutions, and the goal(s) of the ‘intervention’ with context-
sensitivity. Organizational procedures that provide for conducting a context 
analysis of the target country’s political conditions, such as fact-finding missions 
or political economy analyses, would enable the international democracy 
promoter to make an informed and context-sensitive decision on the country 
approach at the political/headquarters-level and on the implementation approach 
at field-level. Thus, such a context analysis at t0 serves as a proxy for the 
organization’s context-sensitivity, that is the capability of the democracy promoter 
to be aware of the target country’s specific political conditions—the 
organizational prerequisite for a response that is adapted to the political country 
context at the outset of the engagement (see Table 3). 
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Table 3: Proxy for context-sensitivity - democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites and ideal response at different organizational levels at the 
outset 
domestic 
context 
conditions of 
the target 
country 
 
democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisite for context-
sensitivity (‘proxy’) 
 context-sensitive adaptation / 
ideal response of the regional 
organization 
  headquarters 
/ political 
level 
field-/ 
implementation 
level 
domestic 
political context 
conditions of the 
target country at 
the outset of 
democracy 
promotion (t0) 
 context-
sensitivity 
(‘space’ 
dimension) 
context analysis at 
t0 point in time: 
standard 
procedures that 
enable the 
democracy 
promoter to know 
the specific 
country situation 
(“context”), such 
as political 
economy analysis, 
needs assessment, 
fact-finding / 
rapporteur mission 
prior to 
programming 
 development 
of the country 
approach at t0 
based on the 
context 
analysis  
development of 
the 
implementation 
strategy, areas of 
engagement and 
instruments at t0 
based on the 
context analysis  
Source: own account 
The OSCE will be considered context-sensitive at t0, if the OSCE’s initial 
decision on how to engage with and whether to promote democratization in 
Georgia—that is at the political level regarding the country approach and at the 
operational/field-level regarding the implementation strategy—correspond to an 
initial context analysis of the political context conditions in the target country 
Georgia (see Figure 1). 
Democracy promoters’ internal prerequisites for adaptability 
The context of a democratizing country is a ‘moving target’ that changes over 
time. Democratization as such is a complex and dynamic process and this political 
transformation context also changes as a result of efforts to promote 
democratization. Therefore and in order to take into account the process 
dimension of international democracy promotion that has largely been ignored in 
research (Carothers 1997: 119), sensitivity for the specific country situation also 
requires internal prerequisites and capabilities of the democracy promoter to know 
of changing circumstances and to ‘process’ this knowledge (‘adaptability’) as a 
basis for considerations to adapt efforts in response to change and/or new insights. 
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Figure 1: Regional Organizations’ internal procedures for context-sensitivity 
and adaptability as prerequisites for adaptation to country context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own account 
Internal prerequisites with regard to “ruptures”: As elaborated in section 2.2.1, 
“ruptures” in a target country’s political transformation process constitute a type 
of change that is so radial and takes place so rapidly that it is likely to be obvious 
for an international democracy promoter who is faced with such new challenges 
and demands that a review of the country approach and/or implementation 
strategy are in order and/or that ad-hoc measures in response to pressing problems 
may have to be considered. Thus, it is unlikely that special internal prerequisites 
of the democracy promoter are needed to ‘detect’ the change. However, with 
regard to a review of the country approach at headquarters and/or of the 
implementation strategy at field-level, a new analysis of the radically changed 
political context is needed for an informed decision—for instance, either in the 
form a commissioned context analysis (such as by a rapporteur mission) or 
through analytical capacities of the democracy promoter’s own expert staff in the 
headquarters’ bureaucracy and/or in the operational structure. 
For the democracy promoter to be capable to respond quickly to the rapid and 
radical change, decision-making structures at the political level need to be able to 
be convened on an ad-hoc basis in order to decide upon a political ad-hoc 
response and/or a review of the country strategy. With regard to the 
implementation of ad-hoc measures and/or a review of the implementation 
strategy, the operational structure (e.g. field mission) requires respective decision-
making authority (e.g. in the person of the head of mission). In order for the 
democracy promoter to be in a position to respond flexibly by launching ad-hoc 
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measures in the field, operational capabilities on the ground are argued here to 
enhance the chances. Table 4 provides an overview of the international democracy 
promoter’s internal prerequisites that serve to contribute interactively with rapid 
and radical change of the target country’s political context conditions to the 
likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation and, thus, successful democracy 
promotion. 
Table 4: Proxies for adaptability—democracy promoter's internal 
prerequisites and ideal response at different organizational levels to 
“ruptures” 
DOMESTIC 
CONTEXT  
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
type of change in 
context 
conditions 
 
Democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites for adaptability 
(‘proxies’) 
 
democracy promoter’s 
context-sensitive 
adaptation / ideal 
response to change 
R
U
P
T
U
R
E
 
rapid and 
radical 
political 
change of a 
wide scope 
(t1.c) 
  operational capabilities on the ground 
(field mission); 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s) (expert staff); 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s) (head of 
mission) 
 ad-hoc measures at 
field-level: 
 shift of implementation 
focus to ad-hoc 
measures in response 
to pressing problems 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s) (expert staff and/or context 
analysis); 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s) (head of 
mission) 
 strategic adaptation at 
field-level: 
 (considering the) 
review of 
implementation 
strategy and/or  
 (consideration of) 
adaptation of 
instruments and/or 
areas of engagement 
 analytical capacities of / expert staff in 
headquarters’ bureaucracy (secretariat 
and/or context analysis); 
 decision-making body can convene on 
ad-hoc basis 
 political ad-hoc 
measures: 
 launching of ad-hoc 
political measures in 
response to pressing 
problems and/or 
 analytical capacities of / expert staff in 
headquarters’ bureaucracy (secretariat 
and/or context analysis); 
 decision-making body convene on a 
regular basis 
 general/political 
adaptation: 
 reconsideration of 
country approach 
Source: own account 
Internal prerequisites with regard to gradual change: As elaborated in section 
2.2.1 and as expressed in the above hypotheses, this study will test the 
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presumption that the context-sensitive adaptation of the democracy promoter’s 
engagement is less likely in situations of gradual change in the target country’s 
political context conditions than it is in response to “ruptures”. This presumption 
is based on the argument that the nature of change with regard to “ruptures” is 
radical and therefore more obvious than when change evolves gradually. If this 
presumption is confirmed, democracy promoters arguably require internal 
prerequisites to interactively contribute with gradual types of change to context-
sensitive adaptation that go beyond analytical capacities and decision-making 
authority that are considered to be ‘sufficient’ with regard to “ruptures” (Table 4). 
Table 5: Proxies for adaptability—democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites and ideal response at different organizational levels to gradual 
change 
DOMESTIC 
CONTEXT  
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
type of change in 
context conditions  
Democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites for adaptability 
(‘proxies’) 
 
democracy promoter’s 
context-sensitive 
adaptation / ideal 
response to change 
G
R
A
D
U
A
L
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
gradual 
change of 
actor-centered 
context 
conditions 
(t1.a) 
  operational capabilities on the ground 
(field mission); 
 monitoring and reporting procedures 
(regular reports on political 
developments); 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s) (expert staff); 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure (head of mission) 
 practical adaptation at 
field-level: 
 (consideration of) 
adapting activities 
within existing areas of 
engagement 
gradual 
change of 
structural 
context 
conditions 
(t1.b) 
 
 monitoring and reporting procedures 
(regular reports on political 
developments); 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s) (expert staff); 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s) (head of 
mission) 
 strategic adaptation at 
field-level:  
(consideration of)  
 review of 
implementation strategy 
and/or  
 adaptation of 
instruments and/or areas 
of engagement 
  monitoring and reporting procedures 
(regular reports on political 
developments); 
 analytical capacities of / expert staff in 
headquarters’ bureaucracy 
(secretariat); 
 regular meetings of decision-making 
body 
 general/political 
adaptation at 
headquarters-level:  
 reconsideration of 
country approach 
Source: own account 
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Because gradual change is more difficult for the democracy promoter to 
‘detect’, the plausible argument is made here that procedures for regular and 
situation-specific monitoring of political developments in the areas of engagement 
and—ideally—beyond these areas enable the democracy promoter to become 
aware of gradual change and to consider an adaptation of the engagement in 
response. As mentioned above, reports constitute “surprisingly efficient 
instruments” (March and Olsen 1989: 170) for organizational functioning (see 
section 2.2.2). Table 5 reflects this additional internal prerequisite that is argued to 
contribute to the likelihood of adaptation in interaction with gradual types of 
change. Without analytical capacities the democracy promoter would not be able 
to come to conclusions which of the reported information is ‘relevant’ in terms of 
the above-conceptualized types of change and, thus, for adaptation. 
Table 5 shows another difference in the internal prerequisites that are to 
interact with gradual change in terms of the likelihood of adaptation compared to 
those that interact with “ruptures”: While the rapid nature of “ruptures” requires 
the flexibility of the headquarters’ decision-making structures to convene on an 
ad-hoc basis, regular meetings are considered ‘sufficient’ to allow for political 
adaptation in response to gradual change in structural context-conditions. 
As elaborated above, practical adaptation, conceptualized as the ideal response 
to gradual change in actor-centered context conditions, promises to be of the 
highest practical utility because of the high degree of flexibility that the 
democracy promoter enjoys in this regard because of the relatively low political 
costs of this type of adaptation. And yet, gradual change in actor-centered 
conditions is the most ‘demanding’ type of change for the democracy promoter’s 
adaptability in terms of the internal prerequisites. As a gradual type of change, it 
is more difficult to ‘detect’ than a “rupture”, likely even more than gradual change 
in structural conditions because the change is less far-reaching, while the 
‘pressure’ on the democracy promoter to adapt is relatively low for the same 
reason.  
In order for the democracy promoter to become aware of such changes in 
actor-centered conditions—such as a change in the ‘ownership’ of a partner 
institution with regard to a reform process (e.g. the political will)—as well as in 
order to be capable of responding with a high degree of flexibility—for instance 
with considering or engaging in new activities in the existing areas of 
engagement—the internal prerequisite of having operational capabilities on the 
ground, such as a field mission, is argued here to enhance the chances of practical 
adaptation. The democracy promoter’s operational presence on the ground allows 
the democracy promoter to maintain contacts with actors in the target country, 
monitoring can be conducted in an ongoing manner and take place beyond 
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intermittent monitoring visits. The presence on the ground thereby contributes to 
the democracy promoter’s timely awareness of political developments and actor-
centered change in the target country.  
When the democracy promoter has operational capabilities, such as a field 
mission, the operational structure would require a certain—or as Howard (2008) 
put it: “significant”—degree of autonomy to ‘process’ the monitoring information 
at implementation level and consider and decide upon the practical or strategic 
adaptation of the engagement in response to the identified change. Such autonomy 
can take the shape of a field mission leader who has the authority to take decisions 
with regard to implementation without prior consultation or consent of 
headquarters. As Howard’s study has shown for instance (Howard 2008), 
autonomy of the democracy promoter’s field presence from headquarters is 
conducive to timely and flexible adaptation of the operational ‘output’ to changed 
conditions and/or new insights at implementation level—that means with regard 
to practical and strategic adaptation.  
For the democracy promoter to be in a good position to adapt politically to 
monitored and reported change in the political context conditions, decision-
making structures at headquarters-level need to convene on a regular and 
relatively frequent basis or—depending on the situation—can be called-upon to 
meet on an ad-hoc basis and allow for feedback and reports from the 
implementation level to be taken into consideration. 
The practical utility of practical adaptation becomes all the more important 
because the promotion of democratization is an “international growth industry 
where the lack of an instruction manual at the start has imposed a requirement to 
learn by doing” (Burnell 2000b: 343). Practical adaptation allows correcting poor 
decisions or practices on the part of the democracy promoter with relatively low 
political costs. In light of this, self-reflection capacities of operational 
structure(s), for instance in the form of self-reflective activity reports, represents 
another internal prerequisite contributing to the likelihood of practical 
adaptation—however, not in interaction with gradual change but in response to 
critical insights on the democracy promoter’s own performance.70  
The OSCE will be considered adaptable if it possesses and utilizes the internal 
prerequisites conceptualized with regard to interacting with the respective types of 
change in Georgia’s political transformation process (see Table 4 and Table 5). 
                                                 
70
  Note that this internal prerequisite is not included in Table 5 because it is not an internal 
prerequisite interacting with a type of change. 
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Hypothesis on the likelihood of an adapted democracy promotion response to the 
type of change in the domestic political context conditions of the target country 
(3) If the democracy promoter possesses and utilizes the internal prerequisites 
(i.e. adaptability) summarized in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5, then the 
engagement’s adaptation to the domestic political context conditions in target 
countries becomes likely, even in response to gradual types of change 
regarding which adaptation is less likely than in response to rapid and radical 
change. 
2.3 Case selection: the OSCE in Georgia as a tough case for testing 
the “one size fits all” thesis 
This study will probe the scholarly notion that international democracy promoters 
apply “one size fits all” approaches irrespective of the specific political situation 
in the respective target country. It will do so by exploring whether the ‘external’ 
democracy promoter chooses its democracy promotion approach with sensitivity 
to the specific context conditions in Georgia at the outset of its engagement and 
adapts its efforts to the circumstances on the ground changing over time. Thus, 
this study will focus on both the ‘space’ (specific country/context conditions) and 
the ‘time’ (changed context conditions) dimension. The focus will not be on 
assessing whether the democracy promoter has selected the ‘right’ approach with 
regard to a specific political country situation, but rather put at the center of 
attention whether the democracy promoter selected its approach in response to a 
thorough context analysis and adapted its engagement in response to changes in 
the political transformation process by utilizing its organization-internal 
prerequisites that enable it to gain and maintain a sound knowledge of political 
conditions in its target country. 
A “tough case” (as opposed to “easy case”) is selected here to probe the “one size 
fits all” claim. “In general, the strongest possible supporting evidence for a theory 
is a case that is least likely for that theory but most likely for all alternative 
theories, and one where the alternative theories collectively predict an outcome 
very different from that of the least-likely theory. […] Theories that survive such 
a difficult test may prove to be generally applicable to many types of cases […]” 
(George and Bennett 2004: 121). Although the claim addressed here cannot be 
attributed the status of a theory, this study will still follow this logic of a tough 
case. As outlined above, it has become a common—explicit and implicit—
assumption or conclusion of many studies that democracy promoters do not adapt 
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“the size” of their intervention to fit the country context of the respective 
intervention. 
Therefore, a case—a democracy promoter—will be selected that is likely to be 
context-sensitive and adaptable with regard to the specific and changing political 
context conditions of the country in question, i.e. a case that is very unlikely to fit 
the above-mentioned observation of “one size fits all”. In general, a “tough case” 
to probe the “one size fits all” claim requires applying three criteria for case 
selection. First, a democracy promoter must be selected that is more likely to 
adapt its intervention to a country context than other actors. Second, the 
democracy promoter’s set of internal prerequisites must have a range wide enough 
to enable the democracy promoter to become aware of relevant developments and 
change in the target country’s political context and to make an informed decision 
to adapt (or not) in response to this change. Third, the context of the intervention 
of this democracy promoter must have a varying record of democratization with 
developments that make adaptation of democracy promotion efforts necessary. 
Research on democracy promotion has identified a certain sub-set of actors 
promoting democracy to “represent the broader international community while 
remaining sensitive to the geographic, social, and historical contexts of the 
location” (McMahon and Baker 2006: 18): regional organizations. Regional 
organizations are not understood here as “vehicles” of member states but as actors 
in their own right and important players in world politics “because they have 
agency, agenda-setting influence and potentially important socializing influences” 
(Simmons and Martin 2002: 198). Their participation in the promotion of 
democratization has served to “address one criticism of democratization, that it is 
solely a Western model of government imposed by countries that have little 
knowledge of, or sensitivity to, indigenous realities” (McMahon and Baker 2006: 
18), because regional international organizations are not an outside entity forcing 
their preferences upon regimes (Pevehouse 2002b: 611). First of all, most regional 
organizations, with the exception of Asian and Arab organizations, have 
developed region-specific democratic norms (Börzel and Van Hüllen 2015). For 
instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have all 
engaged in setting norms that codify democratic ruptures or unconstitutional 
change of government as illegal in the respective regional context (Hartmann and 
Striebinger 2015; Leininger 2015; Lohaus 2015). Based on these norms, 
“[r]egional organizations can assist member states in developing mutually 
acceptable, and contextualized, democratic principles and practices” (McMahon 
and Baker 2006: 7). Therefore, regional organizations are a particularly well-
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suited research object for the main research interest here. They are unlikely to fit 
the “one size fits all” thesis and, thus, represent tough cases.  
From the ‘universe’ of possible cases, that is regional organizations ranging from 
the ASEAN and the Arab League to the African Union (AU) that has been 
constituted as successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), ECOWAS, 
the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU), the 
regional Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is selected 
here.  
The OSCE promotes democracy and assists participating States in building 
democratic institutions and bases its decisions on the consensus principle—
including the ‘host’ country. While the OSCE consensus principle has often been 
considered a particular vulnerability of the OSCE to differing interests among the 
participating States, it has the advantage of providing any engagement with the 
consent of the target country’s government, thereby creating a certain degree of 
ownership and making the OSCE’s efforts more legitimate (Jawad 2008: 623, 
2012b). The consensus principle ensures that also smaller participating States are 
listened to (Pevehouse 2002a: 523) and that the country in question is not only the 
object dealt with but also decision-making subject (Vetschera 2001a: 142). 
Solveig Richter argues that, in addition to the consensus principle, the 
geographically broad, non-exclusive membership of the organization ensures the 
OSCE non-partisanship and an influence in Europe’s “problem cases” (Richter 
2005: 98). With this inclusive approach, the OSCE gains insights into the target 
country’s structure as an “insider third party” with insider knowledge and insider 
relations (Chigas 1996: 25 ff.). The absence of own political interests ensures non-
partisanship and maintains the status of third party (Richter 2005: 98; Chigas 
1996: 63). This non-partisanship in the field is not to neglect that national interests 
of individual participating States play, indeed, a role in the Permanent Council, 
the OSCE’s regular body for consultations and decision-making, in which all 
participating States are represented (see chapter 3).  
The OSCE—with its 56 participating States, a staff of 450 people in its 
various institutions and around 3,000 in its field operations, and a budget of 
around 164 million Euro in 2008—is a small regional organization compared to, 
for example, the EU
71
 or large international organizations, such as the UN
72
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  The EU has an overall budget of 134.4 billion euros proposed for 2009; 5.7 percent of this 
amount accounts for administrative expenditure and 5.5 percent for the EU as a global player. 
For the budgetary period of 2007 to 2013, the European Neighborhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) approximates 12 billion euros in European Commission funding; the ninth 
European Development Fund (EDF) was allocated 13.8 billion euros for 2000 to 2007, the 
tenth EDF was allocated 22.68 billion euros for 2008 to 2013. 
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regard to which demands for reform are said to be almost as old as the 
organization itself by critical voices—a virtual “never ending story” (Paschke 
2005). It is plausible to expect a small organization to have a higher potential for 
being relatively flexible and for adapting more quickly to changing circumstances 
or new insights. The OSCE’s predecessor—the CSCE—is said to have had a 
“legendary capacity” to adapt to new circumstances (Buchsbaum et al. 1994: 79). 
It is, therefore, likely that the OSCE disposes of a set of internal prerequisites that 
allow the organization to be flexible and to adapt to the domestic context, such as 
regular meetings of decision-making organs, operational capabilities on the 
ground as well as monitoring and reporting procedures. The OSCE is a non-career 
organization and OSCE long-term missions in the field are largely secondment-
based. While this requires participating States to actually second personnel, this 
practice usually allows such field missions to be deployed comparatively quickly 
and be used flexibly (Zellner et al. 2004: 94).
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Research on OSCE democracy promotion to date has been described as a 
“typical product of applied sciences that are committed to day-to-day events” 
(Schlotter 1999: 18; translation P.J.). Most of the many contributions have a 
strongly descriptive and sometimes prescriptive character (Richter 2009: 27 ff.; 
e.g. Lutz and P. 2000; Ghébali and Warner 2001; Ghébali et al. 2004; Evers et al. 
2005; Zellner 2005; Ghébali and Warner 2006). Many studies have dealt with the 
specific OSCE institutions or with the OSCE’s role in conflict management (e.g. 
Sandole 2007; Kemp 2008; OSCE Yearbook contributions). Few studies have 
dealt with the OSCE’s impact (e.g. Chigas 1996; Flynn/Farrell 1999; Huber 2003; 
Zellner 2004, 2006c; Merlingen/Ostrauskaitè 2005) or its democracy-promoting 
engagement beyond focusing on individual areas of engagement, such as 
elections. Solveig Richter is one of the few authors who has contributed an 
interesting study that deals specifically with the impact of OSCE democracy 
promotion in South Eastern Europe (Richter 2009). 
The OSCE’s context-sensitivity and adaptability will be analyzed with regard 
to its role as an international democracy promoter in a specific country in which a 
“rupture” in the process of the political transformation occurred in addition to 
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  The UN budget approved for 2006 to 2007 amount to 3.8 billion USD (around 3.03 euros). 
The UN Secretariat alone has a staff of about 8,900 people under the regular budget drawn 
from some 170 countries. 
73
  However, secondments have also been the source of criticism because OSCE field staff is 
mainly seconded by ‘Western’ participating States who are usually in a better position to 
afford such secondments and are said to have a larger pool of qualified personnel that is more 
likely to be selected especially for the Head of Mission positions. The criticism is that the 
OSCE has a geographical imbalance with field staff coming mainly from ‘Western’ states and 
field missions being deployed only to ‘Eastern’ countries. 
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gradual changes in the context conditions (see chapter 2.2 in general and Table 1 
in particular). In the case of this type of rapid and radical change in the political 
context conditions of the host country, the ‘pressure’ on the OSCE to adapt is 
high, which is why an adaptation is likely, thereby reinforcing the selection of a 
tough case. From the variety of countries and regions in which the OSCE has 
fielded missions, the South Caucasus has been considered “a proving ground 
where the tools and models of settling conflicts, building democratic institutions, 
creating market economies, as well as breaking old stereotypes and establishing 
new values are being tested” (Gegeshidze 2002: 11).  
Political developments in the three countries of the South Caucasus after the 
end of the Cold War certainly did not meet the ideal of the “transition paradigm”, 
making context-sensitive and flexible approaches all the more relevant. This is 
why the period under review will cover the period of the 1990s. The political 
developments in one of the three South Caucasus countries after the end of the 
Cold War—Georgia74—have been habitually considered a democratization 
process by ‘Western’ policy-makers during the 1990s (Carothers 2002: 18).75 
However, at the latest the events of November 2003 that became known as the 
“Rose Revolution”—mass demonstrations against extensive election fraud that 
resulted in the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze—have made clear 
that political developments in Georgia had not been such of a deepening of 
democratization. Therefore, one can expect that certain gradual changes have 
taken place before the “rupture” of the “Rose Revolution” that brought into power 
a new government of “young reformers”, radically changing the context 
conditions and opening up a window of opportunity for democracy promoters. 
“After more than ten years of independence, international aid, and ‘external’ 
democracy promotion efforts, [this supposedly; P.J.] put an end to a period of […] 
resignation, unfolding a political dynamic of unexpected chances and challenges.” 
(Jawad 2005: 1)  
Against this background, Georgia in the period of the early 1990s until shortly 
after the “rupture” of the “Rose Revolution” is a context very suitable to test the 
“one size fits all” thesis because democracy promoters can be expected to have 
become aware of the changes—at least of the “Rose Revolution”—and to have 
considered adapting their democracy promotion efforts—at least following the 
events of November 2003. Whether these expectations hold true for the OSCE in 
                                                 
74
  Georgia became a CSCE participating state in March 1992, where the second CSCE/OSCE 
long-term mission was dispatched to the same year—initially not with a focus on the 
promotion of democracy. Since the mid-1990s, the OSCE gradually intensified its activities 
promoting liberal norms in Georgia. 
75
  See footnote 15, page 12. 
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Georgia—whether the OSCE became aware of changes and developments in the 
political context conditions of Georgia and whether the OSCE adapted its efforts 
accordingly (see Table 1) will be analyzed in chapter 5 of this study. The period 
under review will cover the timeframe from 1992 when Georgia became a 
participating State of the CSCE/OSCE until 2004 after the “rupture” of the 
November 2003 “Rose Revolution”. 
First, however, the following chapter 3 will provide a historical background of the 
OSCE (chapter 3.1) and its development of democracy-related norms and 
standards as a basis for democracy promotion (chapter 3.2), and analyze the 
OSCE’s operational capabilities for democracy promotion as well as their 
potential for a context-sensitive engagement in the field (chapter 3.3). 
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3. Analysis of the democracy promoter: the OSCE and the 
promotion of democratization 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent collapse of many 
authoritarian systems, most Western democracies have declared the promotion of 
democracy a goal of foreign policy and development cooperation—sometimes in 
co-operation with international organizations (Pevehouse 2002a: 515; see also 
Christopher 1995). Among these international organizations is the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which is a regional organization 
that has from its very beginning been founded on a comprehensive approach to 
security, linking democratic values to security.  
Such a link between democratic values and security is comprised in the OSCE 
principles. These were agreed upon in the 1975 “Helsinki Final Act”, the first 
international document acknowledging the direct link between human rights and 
security (CSCE 1975: 4-8). After the 1989 structural watershed in international 
relations, the 35 participating States of the OSCE’s predecessor, the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), recognized at the Expert Meeting 
in Copenhagen in June 1990 that “pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are 
essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
(CSCE 1990c: 2). At the second Summit after Helsinki in 1975, the CSCE heads 
of state and of government signed the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe” in 
November 1990. This Charter went beyond the “Helsinki Final Act” by explicitly 
affirming the direct relevance of democratic governance to security. For the first 
time in European history, the OSCE participating States accepted a single political 
regime—representative democracy—as politically binding and prepared the 
ground for its promotion: “We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen 
democracy as the only system of government of our nations.” (CSCE 1990a: 3) 
This successful setting of politically binding democracy-related norms and 
standards of the CSCE/OSCE are said to have meaningfully influenced the 
transformation processes of the 1990s as well as the democratic norms and 
standards of other organizations, such as the European Union (Boonstra et al. 
2011: 409). In order to monitor and support the compliance with and the 
implementation of the OSCE principles and standards, the OSCE has established 
operational capabilities, specialized institutions and structures as well as field 
presences in a number of participating States (see section 3.3). With these, the 
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OSCE should have a sound knowledge and good information base of the context 
conditions related to OSCE commitments in participating States and therefore be 
a regional organization likely to be context-sensitive in its decision-making and 
operations. 
Section 3.1 will provide an overview of the historical background of the OSCE 
and democracy promotion and analyze developments from the Helsinki Summit in 
1975 to the year of peaceful revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. 
Section 3.2 will review the setting of democracy-related norms and the 
development of respective standards during the institutionalization process of the 
early 1990s. And section 3.3 will introduce the institutions and structures for 
decision-making and implementation with regard to democracy promotion and 
analyze their potential for context-sensitive and adapted engagement. 
3.1 Historical background of the OSCE and democracy promotion: 
the CSCE process of 1975-1989 
“The states of the Warsaw Treaty always considered the CSCE to be a framework 
that was to guarantee the territorial status quo of post-war Europe, to improve 
access to Western markets, and to provide additional legitimation to the 
maintenance of their political systems. In contrast, the Western states tried […] 
improving the chances for a peaceful change of system in the Eastern European 
societies by establishing and promoting fundamental and human rights within the 
CSCE framework while normalizing interstate relations.” 
(Gießmann 1996: 10 ff., translation P.J.) 
The OSCE’s history traces back to Helsinki in 1973/1975.76 The Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), aimed at containing the East-West 
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  Strictly speaking, the OSCE’s history traces even further back. Especially the Soviet Union 
aimed at an “institutional innovation” (Bredow 1992: 26, translation P.J.) by proposing a 
European conference on security and cooperation under the multilateral umbrella of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization in the mid-1960s. Already in 1954, “the Soviet Union [had 
unsuccessfully] proposed that a 50-year treaty be drawn up for signature by all European 
states and be supported by permanent institutional machinery”. These initiatives can be 
interpreted as Soviet efforts to roll back US influence and to ensure the European status quo 
(Bredow 1992: 11, 33; Wrede 1990: 20). While mistrusting the Soviet aspirations, the ‘West’ 
was interested in integrating the Eastern bloc into an international political system of norms 
(Schlotter et al. 1994: 13). The Federal Republic of Germany’s 1970/1972 “East Accords” 
under Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (with the Soviet Union on 
12 August 1970, with Poland on 7 December 1970, and with the German Democratic 
Republic on 21 December 1972) as well as the SALT-I treaty between the USA and the 
USSR of 26 May 1972 both contributed significantly to the détente. Preparatory talks for the 
CSCE eventually began on 22 November 1972 hosted by Finland (OSCE 2007: 2). 
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conflict by permanent dialogue, formally opened in Helsinki on 3 July 1973. It 
was attended by the heads of state or government of 35 states that adopted final 
recommendations. The actual substantive work in preparation of the Summit was 
done in Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975. The “Helsinki Final 
Act”—the result of these first multilateral East-West negotiations—was signed at 
the first CSCE Summit that took place in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975. 
With the Helsinki Final Act, the 35 participating States
77
 agreed upon basic 
principles “regulating” their behavior among each other as well as vis-à-vis their 
citizens. Although, it is not legally but only politically binding, the Helsinki Final 
Act has considerable political weight due to the “cross-block multilateralism” and 
the decision-making consensus principle. The comprehensive Final Act is 
constructed along three main areas or “baskets”: (1) The first basket constitutes 
the political core of the Final Act. Its first part, the “Declaration on Principles 
Guiding Relations between Participating States” (the “Decalogue”), contains pari 
passu basic principles, also known as the “Ten Commandments of Helsinki”, 
among them the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the 
freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
78
 “The ‘Decalogue’ of 
principles can be interpreted as an attempt to fulfil the need of containing the 
East-West conflict by the formulation of common principle standards of behavior” 
(Schlotter 1999: 123, translation P.J.). (2) The second basket consists of 
agreements on cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical areas as well 
as the environment. (3) The third basket relates to cooperation in humanitarian 
and other areas, which, later, has become known as the “Human Dimension”. 
The Final Act, which already referred to a “multilateral process initiated by the 
Conference” (CSCE 1975: 57), established the formal framework of the CSCE 
and constituted—against the background of ideological differences—about the 
maximum of what “the West” and “the East” have been in the position to 
substantially admit to (Bredow 1992: 75). This formal framework has been 
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  CSCE Particpating States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Holy See, 
Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, 
Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States 
of America, Yugoslavia, (Albania has consequently been absent until 1990). 
78
  The ‘Decalogue’, that is the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between 
Participating States, under basket one of the ‘Helsinki Final Act’, consists of the following 
ten principles: 1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; 2. 
Refraining from the threat or use of force; 3. Inviolability of frontiers; 4. Territorial integrity 
of States; 5. Peaceful settlement of disputes; 6. Non-intervention in internal affairs; 7. Respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief; 8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 9. Co-operation among 
States; 10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. 
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supplemented by the final documents of CSCE Follow-up Meetings. While the 
meetings in Belgrade (1977-78) and Madrid (1980-83) had reflected the 
aggravation of East-West relations in the years of 1977 to 1984, the Vienna 
Follow-up Meeting, starting on 4 November 1986, took place against the 
background of a revived détente.
79
 The Vienna Final Document decided upon the 
densest follow-up program of eleven interim conferences before the next CSCE 
Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki in 1992. Although this did not resemble an actual 
institutionalization in the shape of an International Organization, it established an 
almost continuous exchange of opinions (Ropers and Schlotter 1987: 16). The 
agreements reached have been considered “the so far biggest progress since the 
1975 Final Act” (Krell et al. 1989: 81, translation P.J.). This progress referred to 
agreements regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and—more important for 
this study—the area of the “Human Dimension”. 
The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document has established a consultation 
mechanism under the heading of “Human Dimension of the CSCE” integrating 
the seventh principle of the Helsinki Decalogue “Respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or 
belief” with the third basket of the Helsinki Final Act on human contacts, 
information and culture. This provided for a third thematic dimension next to the 
politico-military and the economic and environmental dimensions. The Human 
Dimension relates to the area of “[...] human rights, fundamental freedoms, human 
contacts and other issues of a related humanitarian character [...]” (CSCE 1989: 
34). The “Vienna Mechanism in the Area of the Human Dimension”—not to be 
mistaken for the 1990/92 (Vienna) “Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation 
as regards Unusual Military Activities”—provides for the exchange of 
information on questions relating to the Human Dimension and consists of four 
separate phases during which the participating States may: 
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  The final documents of the CSCE Follow-up Meetings in Belgrade (4 October 1977 to 9 
March 1978) and Madrid (11 November 1980 to 6 September 1983) reflected the aggravation 
of East-West relations in the years of 1977 to 1984 as a consequence of increased USSR 
armament efforts and the USSR’s stationing of its new mid-range rockets SS 20 starting in 
1977, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the NATO Double-Track Decision of 1979 
arranging for the stationing of US mid-range rockets in Europe if the USSR would not agree 
to remove its new SS 20 rockets, the failure of the SALT-II armamament control agreement 
of 1980, and the declaration of martial law in Poland 1981-83. Some authors spoke of a 
“second Cold War” (Halliday 1983). The Belgrade meeting resulted in an “anemic solution” 
(Bredow 1992: 84) of affirming the Helsinki principles and further Follow-up and Expert 
Meetings. The Madrid meeting produced a considerable final document providing for the 
organizational innovation of a conference on confidence- and security-building measures and 
disarmament. The 1986 final document of this conference marked a restart of the détente 
policy, also vitalized by the resumption of bipolar dialogue betweent the USA and the USSR 
that had been facilitated by Mikhail Gorbatchev’s re-orientation of Soviet foreign policy. 
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 respond to requests for information made by other participating States; 
 hold bilateral meetings, should these be requested by other participating 
States; 
 bring situations and cases in the human dimension to the attention of other 
participating States; 
 discuss the issues raised under the Mechanism at CSCE/OSCE meetings.
80
 
Between 1975 and 1989, the CSCE, including its Follow-up Meetings, has 
produced a comprehensive body of norms for the 35 participating States’ 
relations—a code of conduct of high political relevance and moral status (Wrede 
1990: 153).  
This “code of conduct” was, however, interpreted differently between ‘East’ 
and ‘West’, and different emphasis was given to the principles of the “Helsinki 
Final Act”. While ‘the West’ repeatedly accused ‘the East’ of human rights 
violations and did not consider the right of free choice of the political system 
contained in the Decalogue’s first principle as a means to preserve the status quo 
of undemocratic regimes but—in combination with the eighth principle “Equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples”—as an opportunity for transition, ‘the 
East’ argued with respect to the Decalogue’s first principle “Sovereign equality, 
respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty”81 and sixth principle “Non-
intervention in internal affairs”. The “Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations 
between Participating States” under the first basket of the “Helsinki Final Act” 
has noted that all ten principles “are of primary significance and that, accordingly, 
they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted 
taking into account the others.”  
Thus, given the consensus principle and differing interpretations of principles, 
an effective implementation of agreements proved difficult. However, “within the 
three baskets, the transfer of knowledge and money was exchanged for 
guaranteeing certain fundamental freedoms” (Czempiel 2001: 137, translation 
                                                 
80
  The 1990 Copenhagen Final Document introduced deadlines for the first two phases. In this 
regard, a request for information has to be responded to in written form within four weeks; 
bilateral meetings are to be held within three weeks after they have been requested; topics to 
be discussed need the consent of both parties. This mechanism has been activated several 
times, especially between January 1989 and April 1992. For example, the United Kingdom 
activated it between 1989 and 1990 against Bulgaria, Romania, and the former states of the 
German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia; between 1990 and 1992 Austria, 
Hungary, Turkey, and Russia applied the mechanism in different cases in order to draw 
attention to minority rights violations (OSCE 2004c). 
81
  The paragraph on sovereignty states: “They [participating States] will also respect each 
other’s right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems 
as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.” 
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P.J.). The principles of the “Final Act” provided for “a hold for criticism 
concerning societal circumstances especially in Eastern European states” 
(Gießmann 1996: 12, translation P.J.), empowering democratic forces in the states 
of the Warsaw Pact. In 1976, the Moscow Helsinki Group (“Public Group to 
Promote Fulfillment of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR”) was founded by 
leading members of the broken-up dissidents group to monitor the Soviet Union’s 
compliance with the 1975 Final Act. Similar groups were also formed in other 
Warsaw Pact countries, such as “Charter 77” in Czechoslovakia in 1977 or the 
“Helsinki Watch Group” in Poland in 1979. Some of them have not been able to 
survive for a longer period (Leary 1977: 121 ff.). In Georgia, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, dissident and later first president of independent Georgia, was 
sentenced to three years of forced labor and two years in exile (CSCE 1978: 119). 
In Washington D.C., the U.S. Helsinki Commission, the “Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe”, was founded in 1976 as a United States government 
agency in order to collect information on human rights violations.
82
 With the 
Helsinki Final Act, “it was the first time in an international inter-State agreement 
that the human rights principles had been elevated to the same status as traditional 
fundamental principles regulating inter-State relations such as non-recourse to 
force and respect for territorial integrity.“ (Pentikäinen 1997: 83). 
Despite the selective interpretation of CSCE principles and repeated controversies 
between the blocs that mutually accused each other of disregarding the Helsinki 
principles
83, thus hampering the principles’ implementation, the CSCE process 
has been considered not only a “taming” of the East-West conflict but has also 
been perceived to have contributed to its “resolution” (Bredow 1992). The “old 
CSCE” ended with the above-mentioned Vienna Final Document of 15 January 
1989 and its follow-up program. The “old CSCE” had deliberately abstained from 
an institutionalized bureaucracy “à la United Nations” and applied the so far 
proven mechanism of respectively agreeing on specific conferences on certain 
issues (Wrede 1990: 153). The “differentiation of the CSCE process into 
additional, thematically restricted Expert Meetings and Fora between the Follow-
up Conferences constituted […] a significant step of consolidating multilateral 
diplomacy” (Schlotter et al. 1994: 19, translation P.J.). To sum up, 
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  See http://www.csce.gov. 
83
  These mutual accusations especially refer to the ‘Western’ allegation of human rights 
violations and the resulting ‘Eastern’ argument of interference with internal affairs. The 
‘Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States’ under basket one 
of the ‘Helsinki Final Act’ has noted that all ten principles “are of primary significance and 
that, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being 
interpreted taking into account the others.” 
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“the CSCE has, all in all, helped to keep the profound change in Europe and 
the international system in peaceful paths. In doing so, it has repeatedly 
changed its form and functions, but always in a way that potential for conflict 
could be absorbed.” (Bredow 1992: 163, translation P.J.) 
The CSCE principles agreed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the “Human 
Dimension” established with the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document provided the 
basis for the development of democracy-related norms and standards of the 
CSCE/OSCE throughout the 1990s (see section 3.2) as well as their promotion 
through the CSCE/OSCE’s operational capabilities and specialized institutions 
(see section 3.3). 
3.2 The development of OSCE democracy-related norms and 
standards as a basis for democracy promotion 
Based on the principles agreed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1989 
Vienna Concluding Document, the CSCE/OSCE has a remarkable record of 
setting democracy-related norms and developing respective standards in the early 
1990s. The 1990 Copenhagen Document and the 1991 Moscow Document, in 
particular, have led some authors to conclude that the normative standard-setting 
of the CSCE/OSCE was then complete (Heraclides 1994: 291 ff.). The 
achievements were remarkable, indeed. With the Copenhagen Document, the 
CSCE participating States of the former opposing blocs committed themselves to 
democracy as the only form of government and expressed their conviction that 
pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting-
up the lasting order of peace, security, justice and cooperation. With the 1991 
Moscow Document, the CSCE/OSCE has been the first international institution to 
introduce the principle that democracy-related human dimension issues do not 
belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned and even 
introduced a right to intervention in such cases where human dimension 
commitments are seriously endangered or violated. Where previous documents 
had expressed general principles, the Copenhagen and Moscow Documents 
introduced new concepts or elaborated existing ones more extensively (Glover 
1995: 32). 
“The year of 1989, which had already begun full of hopes with the Vienna Final 
Document of 15 January, became the ‘year of peaceful revolutions’ in Central and 
Eastern Europe” (Wrede 1990: 163, translation P.J.). The CSCE process did not 
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remain unaffected by the 1989/90 events
84
 as the disappearance of the East-West 
confrontation affected the “fractions” within the CSCE.85 
The Bonn Economic Conference between 19 March and 11 April 1990 “was the 
first event in the CSCE context that did not have an intersystem character” 
(Bredow 1992: 134, translation P.J.). For the first time, all participating States 
argued in favor of market economy and private property. While the Vienna Final 
Document had not made an explicit reference to democracy, the Bonn Expert 
Meeting considered the diversity of opinion and democracy to be indispensable 
prerequisites of prosperous political economy: “[...] democratic institutions and 
economic freedom foster economic social progress [...]” (CSCE 1990b: 2). At the 
same time, democracy and free elections, the rule of law and political pluralism 
were explicitly considered constitutive criteria of internal developments in CSCE 
participating States: “[T]he participating states, recognizing the [r]elationship 
between political pluralism and market economies, and being committed to the 
principles concerning: Multiparty democracy based on free, periodic and genuine 
elections; [t]he rule of law and equal protection under the law for all, based on 
respect for human rights and effective, accessible and just legal systems [...]“ 
(CSCE 1990b: 4). Thus, it has been concluded: “The Final Document, in which 
the Eastern European states admit to market economy and democracy, therefore, 
marks a regulative turning point in Europe.” (Bedarff and Deutsch 1992: 307, 
translation P.J.). 
The Bonn conference was followed by a CSCE Expert Meeting in Copenhagen 
from 5 to 29 June 1990. Democracy and the rule of law were acknowledged as 
preconditions for peace and security. “The participating States express their 
conviction that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the 
development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are 
prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice 
                                                 
84
  These events refer to free elections in Poland in June 1989; the opening of Hungary’s borders 
to GDR citizens in June 1989; peaceful “Monday rallies” in Leipzig in October/November 
1989; the overthrow of GDR Head of State and Party, Erich Honecker, on 18 October 1989; 
the fall of the Wall, that had devided Germany since 1961, on 9 November 1989; overthrow 
and execution of Romania’s dictator Ceausescu in December 1989; Vaclav Havel being 
elected President of Czechoslovakia in December 1989; Mikhail Gorbatchev being elected 
Head of State of the USSR on 15 March 1990; free elections in the GDR on 18 March 1990; 
free elections in Hungary in March/April 1990; declarations of independence of Lithuania (11 
March 1990), Estonia (30 March 1990), and Latvia (4 May 1990); free elections in Romania 
in May 1990; Boris Yeltsin being elected President of the Russian Federation on 29 May 
1990; first free elections in Bulgaria in June 1990; NATO und Warsaw Pact considering each 
other no longer as foes since July 1990; German Reunification on 3 October 1990. 
85
  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, neutral and non-aligned countries took a mediating role 
between the blocs; towards the end of the Cold War, main polarity has increasingly not been 
between groups but within groups. 
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and co-operation [...].” (CSCE 1990c: 2). The participating States committed 
themselves to democracy as the only form of government.
86
 The Copenhagen 
Document outlines a number of human rights and fundamental freedoms that had 
never before been formally accepted in the CSCE context. Democracy was 
considered an integral part of the rule of law.
87
 The term “pluralistic” for 
specifying democracy was used for the first time in an international document. It 
was the aim of participating States to make totalitarian forms of government 
impossible within the CSCE area (Bortloff 1996: 225-40). The Head of the Soviet 
delegation entitled the Copenhagen Final Document a pan-European 
“constitutional charter” (Rohde-Liebenau 1992: 268)—however, in retrospect, the 
document was not able to live up to this “title”. Nevertheless, the CSCE has 
developed a detailed norm set and definitions and standards relating to 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights that is unmatched in the world 
(Borchert 1999: 156). 
Thus, while Bonn, in a way, had lifted economic and regulative differences, 
Copenhagen overcame differences with regard to the conception of the human 
person and society. With the end of the Cold War, the conflict items that the “old 
CSCE” had aimed at regulating disappeared (Schlotter et al. 1994: 20). 
Considering the enormous changes in Europe, widespread consensus evolved in 
all European states to convene a Summit of all 35 Heads of State and Government 
before the end of 1990. 
The participating States, thus, convened a special Summit in Paris from 19 to 21 
November 1990.
88
 Against the background of the vanishing bloc confrontation, 
the Paris Summit was an expression of “the CSCE’s functional change from an 
instrument of regulating the East-West confrontation towards a factor of stability, 
of the reconciliation and coordination of interests, and of cooperation within a 
new common European order” (Kubiczek 1992: 338, translation P.J.). The Final 
Document, signed on 19 November 1990 in Paris, in a way declared the end of the 
East-West conflict (at a normative level) (Schlotter 2002: 295) and paved the way 
for a new direction of the CSCE/OSCE. In the “Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two 
States”, the 22 states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact committed to the 
                                                 
86
  Representative and parlamentarian democracy, in this context, refers to regular, free and 
secret elections (with fair conditions for campaigning), the separation of powers, 
accountability of the executive and civilian control of the military and the police. 
87
  The rule of law, in this context, also refers to legal certainty, the independence of judges and 
lawyers, equality before the law, and binding the executive to the law. 
88
  As the GDR had ceased to exist, only 34 Participating States took part in the Paris Summit. 
However, Albania that had so far been constantly absent from the CSCE process was 
attributed the status of an observer, as it had expressed the wish to unrestrained participation 
at all CSCE conferences prior to the Paris Summit. 
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improvement of their relations. In the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe” of 21 
November 1990
89
, the CSCE/OSCE was called upon to contribute to the historic 
change in Europe and to face the challenges after the Cold War era. The 
signatories declared: 
“We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only 
system of government of our nations. In this endeavour, we will abide by the 
following: […] Democratic government is based on the will of the people, 
expressed regularly through free and fair elections. Democracy has at its 
foundation respect for the human person and the rule of law. Democracy is 
the best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of all groups of 
society, and equality of opportunity for each person. Democracy, with its 
representative and pluralist character, entails accountability to the 
electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and 
justice administered impartially. No one will be above the law.” (CSCE 
1990a: 3) 
One year later, the representatives of the participating States declared at the 
Expert Meeting on the Human Dimension in Moscow from 10 September to 4 
October 1991: 
[…] that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy 
and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these rights 
and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the international order. 
[The participating States; P.J.] categorically and irrevocably declare that the 
commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are 
matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not 
belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.” (CSCE 
1991: 3, emphasis by P.J.)
90
 
The CSCE was the first international institution to articulate the principle that 
the democracy-related human dimension commitments do not belong exclusively 
to the internal affairs of the state in concerned (Glover 1995: 31). The Moscow 
Document introduced several new commitments relevant for the promotion of 
democracy, such as the support to an elected democratic government facing an 
attempted or actual overthrow and the protection of human rights during a state of 
public emergency. The representatives of the participating States adopted the 
“Moscow Mechanism” that complements and strengthens the 1989 “Vienna 
Mechanism” (see above).91 Most importantly, the Moscow Mechanism introduces 
                                                 
89
  This Charter was signed by 34 participating States and by Jacques Delors, the then President 
of the Commission of the European Communities. 
90
  This principle that human dimension commitments are not an internal affair was reiterated at 
the Helsinki Summit in 1992 and the Ministerial Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1997. 
91
  The phases of the Vienna Mechanism remained the same in the Moscow Mechanism; 
however, the deadlines that had been introduced in Copenhagen in 1990 were shortened as 
follows: The participating State concerned has to answer in written form within ten days of a 
request; bilateral meetings are to be held within one week of the request (CSCE 1991: 31). 
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a right of intervention and allows for the initiation of an investigation of serious 
threats to CSCE/OSCE commitments without prior consensus among participating 
States and without involvement of the CSCE/OSCE Chairperson, the decision-
making bodies or institutions. It provides the option of sending missions of 
experts to assist participating States in the resolution of a particular question or 
problem relating to the human dimension via fact-finding, good offices or 
mediation.
92
 This right to intervention has great potential for the promotion and 
protection of democracy, but has so far not lived up to this potential in practice. 
Notwithstanding the widened scope of possible CSCE/OSCE actions in the human 
dimension and the great potential of the Moscow Mechanism, in practice, the 
human dimension mechanisms have been used very little and not systematically: 
The OSCE’s capability to deploy a small group of rapporteurs on short-notice 
has been limited, the findings are not binding by any means, and political follow-
up has been patchy at best (Boonstra et al. 2011: 411). Although the Moscow 
Mechanism gives participating States the option to deviate from the consensus 
principle, the great potential it offers to investigate violations of democracy-
related commitments nevertheless depends on the political willingness of at least a 
number of participating States to utilize it. In only three cases, the Moscow 
Mechanism was successful: In 1992, a rapporteur mission was deployed to 
                                                                                                                                     
Regarding the deadlines introduced in Copenhagen in 1999, see footnote 80. In addition to 
the 1989 Vienna Mechanism that provides for the exchange of information on questions 
relating to the human dimension and the 1991 Moscow Mechanism introducing a right to 
intervention, the CSCE/OSCE created additional mechanisms in the other dimensions: the 
1990 Vienna “Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military 
Activities”; the 1991 “Berlin Mechanism” for early warning to be applied in case of serious 
emergency situations that may arise from a violation of one of the Helsinki principles or as 
the result of major disruptions; as well as the 1991 “Valletta Mechanism” for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes that represents the formalization of the fifth Helsinki principle. 
92
  Following a request for information or for a bilateral meeting, the team of experts may be 
invited by the participating State concerned upon the suggestion of the requesting state. The 
state concerned will select the experts that will not include the participating State’s own 
nationals, residents or appointees or more than one national or resident of any particular state 
from a resource list established at the CSCE/OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw (CSCE 1991: 32; the CSCE/OSCE institutions and 
structures, including the ODIHR, will be introduced in section 3.3.). If the state concerned 
refuses to invite such a team, does not establish a mission of experts within a period of ten 
days after the inquiry has been made, or the requesting participating State judges that the 
issue in question has not been resolved, a mission of up to three rapporteurs may be 
established at the initiation of the requesting state with the support of at least five other 
participating States (CSCE 1991: 33). This procedure may also be initiated directly—without 
prior “failure” of a mission of experts—by a participating State with the support of at least 
nine other participating States in the case “that a particularly serious threat to the fulfilment of 
the provisions of the CSCE human dimension has arisen” (CSCE 1991: 34). There is also the 
option of cutting the procedures short by decision of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO; 
the CSO role and functions were transferred to the later-established Permanent Council; see 
section 3.3) upon request of any participating State (CSCE 1991: 34). 
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Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. counting as one case). The same year, 
Estonia invited a mission of experts to review the legislation regarding citizenship 
and language. Moldova also invited a mission of experts in 1993 in order to 
analyze minority rights. Ten participating States initiated a mission in 2002/2003 
to follow-up on inquiries regarding the assault upon the president of 
Turkmenistan, but rapporteurs were rejected entry into the country (Milanova 
2005: 284). In contrast to these few cases in which the Moscow Mechanism was 
activated, there have been cases of serious violations in the OSCE area that the 
OSCE has insufficiently responded to and regarding to which the Moscow 
Mechanism has not been activated.
93
 Randolf Oberschmidt argues that the reason 
for the Moscow Mechanism not playing a role within the OSCE anymore has to 
do with the fact that the institutionalization of the organization (see chapter 3.3) 
has resulted in the OSCE addressing issues of the human dimension 
“permanently” and in an institutionalized manner at the sessions of the Permanent 
Council (Oberschmidt 2000: 323). Section 3.3 will introduce the OSCE structures, 
specialized institutions and field presences. 
Together with the Moscow Mechanism’s right to intervention, introduced in 1991, 
the norms set by the 1990 Copenhagen Document and Charter of Paris provided 
the basis for the OSCE promotion of democratization. This “normative function” 
of the OSCE is complemented by three other functions: the “international-security 
function” that played a prominent role during the Cold War; the “conflict-
management function”; and the “good-governance-assistance function” aimed at 
supporting transition countries on their path to democracy, rule of law, and market 
economies (Zellner 2005: 7). The latter two functions are operational in nature 
and evolved in the 1990s when the CSCE/OSCE developed its operational 
capabilities with institutions and operational structures that are introduced in the 
following section. Those related to the “good-governance-assistance function” 
will be the focus. 
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  Boonstra et al. mention as examples the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan in 2005 and the 
ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 (Boonstra et al. 2011: 411). Regarding the Andijan 
massacre and the OSCE (non-) response, see Rhodes 2005. 
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3.3 OSCE institutions, operational capabilities and procedures: 
organizational prerequisites for context-sensitive democracy 
promotion 
“The CSCE was well-placed to play a vanguard role in democracy and human-
rights promotion by virtue of its wider strategic importance during the final years 
of the Cold War.” (Boonstra et al. 2011: 410) 
“We emphasize that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human 
dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all 
participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the 
State concerned. The protection and promotion of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the strengthening of democratic institutions continue 
to be a vital basis for our comprehensive security.” (CSCE 1992c: 5) 
With the setting of democracy-related norms and standards in the early 1990s, the 
CSCE/OSCE also began to extend it’s hitherto role as forum for dialogue and 
negotiation by operative tasks of conflict management and democracy and good 
governance promotion. In the 1990 “Charter of Paris for a new Europe”, 
CSCE/OSCE participating States declared that the “common efforts to consolidate 
respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen peace and 
to promote unity in Europe require a new quality of political dialogue and co-
operation and thus development of the structures of the CSCE” (CSCE 1990a: 
12). Thus, several offices and institutions were established, meetings took place 
more regularly, and the CSCE’s work received clearer structures. This 
“combination of regular consultations and first signs of rudimentary organization-
building” (Schlotter et al. 1994: 22, translation P.J.) became apparent in the 
“Supplementary document to give effect to certain provisions contained in the 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe”. The institutionalization of the conference 
diplomacy was introduced by the creation of offices and institutions that fulfilled 
at least the functional criterion of an International Organization. In order to avoid 
the creation of a large, centralized bureaucracy, these offices were all designed to 
be very small—with a staff of three to four employees, supported each by their 
respective national administrations—and decentralized—with headquarters in 
Prague/Czech Republic, Vienna/Austria and Warsaw/Poland. 
After the initiation of the institutionalization in Paris in 1990, the 
institutionalization process was accelerated and expanded against the background 
of menacing developments. For the first time in decades, CSCE participating 
States were confronted with warfare and its consequences in their region. 
Although the “Charter of Paris” had declared “the era of confrontation and 
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division in Europe” (CSCE 1990a: 3) to have ended, the CSCE faced new 
challenges and the destabilization of European security after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the subsequent breakup of Yugoslavia. This was reflected by 
the following words of the Helsinki 1992 Summit Declaration “The Challenges of 
Change” that underline the change from the 1990 Paris atmosphere of departure to 
concern and sobering: 
„We have witnessed the end of the cold war, the fall of totalitarian regimes 
and the demise of the ideology on which they were based. All our countries 
now take democracy as the basis for their political, social and economic life. 
The CSCE has played a key role in these positive changes. Still, the legacy of 
the past remains strong. We are faced with challenges and opportunities, but 
also with serious difficulties and disappointments.” (CSCE 1992c: 4) „[…] 
Gross violations of CSCE commitments in the field of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including those related to national minorities, pose a 
special threat to the peaceful development of society, in particular in new 
democracies.” (ibid: 7) 
At the Fourth Follow-up Meeting that took place from 24 March to 8 July 1992 in 
Helsinki, the Heads of State and Government therefore decided to put in place a 
comprehensive program of coordinated action and additional tools for the 
CSCE/OSCE to address tensions before violence erupts and to manage crises. 
Thus, in order to address tensions before violence erupts, these tools needed to be 
aimed at early warning and, therefore, at context-sensitivity. In addition to this 
conflict management function, the Heads of State and Government also explicitly 
emphasized the democracy and good governance promotion function: 
“We emphasize that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human 
dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all 
participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of 
the State concerned. The protection and promotion of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the strengthening of democratic institutions 
continue to be a vital basis for our comprehensive security.” (CSCE 1992c: 
5; emphasis by P.J.) “The transition to and development of democracy and 
market economy by the new democracies is being carried forward with 
determination amidst difficulties and varying conditions. We offer our 
support and solidarity to participating States undergoing transformation to 
democracy and market economy. [...] Making this transition irreversible will 
ensure the security and prosperity of us all.” (Ibid.) “There is still much work 
to be done in building democratic and pluralistic societies […].” (Ibid: 7) 
With regard to the operational tasks related to the new CSCE/OSCE functions of 
conflict management and democracy promotion, institutions and instruments for 
their implementation were created. The Ministerial Council in Rome in 1993 
reaffirmed that human dimension issues were fundamental to the comprehensive 
security concept and developed a road map of activities to better integrate and 
strengthen the human dimension within CSCE/OSCE institutions, structures and 
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processes. Among the activities of the roadmap were the inclusion of democracy-
related human dimension issues as an integral part of deliberations on a regular 
basis and emphasis on human dimension issues in mandates of the CSCE/OSCE 
missions—including the promotion of democratic institutions and processes—as 
well as in the missions’ follow-up reports. 
By these steps of institutionalizing the CSCE, the CSCE had de facto developed 
from a process into an organization—however, without becoming an International 
Organization in a strict sense. By establishing permanent institutions and 
operative capabilities the functional criterion of an International Organization was 
fulfilled—but the CSCE/OSCE was not based on a founding treaty under 
international law and the CSCE/OSCE was, therefore, not a subject of 
international law (Völkerrechtssubjekt). The next consistent step was carried out 
by the Heads of State and Government at their Summit Meeting in Budapest on 5 
and 6 December 1994: the change of name from Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) coming into effect on 1 January 1995 (CSCE 1994b: 1 and 
section I).
94
 However, the change in name altered neither the character of 
CSCE/OSCE commitments as being politically but not legally binding nor the 
status of the CSCE/OSCE and its institutions, as the decision explicitly noted 
(OSCE 2007: 8).
95
 
The strictly political character of CSCE/OSCE documents entails that the 
CSCE/OSCE cannot make use of coercive instruments of democracy promotion 
(and enforcement), such as negative conditionalities like sanctions that the 
European Union (EU) can utilize or military intervention as ultima ratio of the 
United Nations (Richter 2005: 99). The OSCE also does not have the resources 
and leverage to provide economic incentives like the EU. The OSCE depends on 
the cooperation of the participating State in question and, therefore, relies on 
political dialogue, processes of learning, exchange and persuasion (Kirchhoff 
2000: 69). Which operational capabilities and institutions the OSCE has at its 
disposal to put these instruments into practice for the promotion of 
democratization will be analyzed in the following sections. 
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  At the 1994 Budapest Summit, the CSCE/OSCE Heads of State and Government reconfirmed 
that “[r]espect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law is 
an essential component of security and co-operation in the CSCE region. It must remain a 
primary goal of CSCE action.” (CSCE 1994b: para.14). 
95
  A proposal by the Russian Federation at the Rome Council meeting the previous year to 
transform the CSCE into an international organization with legal status had not been 
accepted. 
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OSCE decision-making bodies 
The Summits of Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States 
set OSCE priorities at the highest political level (see Figure 2, page 93). In Paris 
in 1990, they were agreed to take place every two years. However, since the end 
of the 1990s, dissent regarding the role and priorities of the OSCE among 
participating States has steered the organization into a crisis and Summits did not 
take place between the Istanbul Summit in 1999 and the Astana Summit in 2010. 
Again, since 2010, no Summit has taken place (as of August 2016). 
The Ministerial Council is the central political decision-making and governing 
body of the OSCE for policy-making and meets, as a rule, towards the end of 
every term of Chairpersonship at the level of Foreign Ministers. The 
Chairpersonship rotates annually among the participating States (see below). 
The Permanent Council (formerly the “Vienna Group” of the Committee of 
Senior Officials) has been the OSCE body for regular political consultation and 
decision-making since 1995 and meets on a weekly basis at Ambassadorial level 
in Vienna. It can also be convened for emergency purposes. It is composed of 
permanent representatives of the participating States at the OSCE. While such a 
permanent political plenary body had been considered unnecessary at the 
beginning of the institutionalization process in the early 1990s, the OSCE’s shift 
to operational tasks of more intensive preventive diplomacy, conflict management 
and democracy promotion has changed this notion. Because of its frequent 
meetings and the possibility to convene the Permanent Council for emergency 
purposes, it is highly relevant for decision-making on operations and prompt 
responses to situations that arise on the ground and, thus, for context-sensitive and 
adaptable decisions. This meeting frequency and flexibility is especially crucial 
with regard to “ruptures” but also to gradual change in structural political context 
conditions when political ad-hoc responses or general/political adaptation 
constitute the ideal response according to the above conceptualization (see chapter 
2.2). 
The Permanent Council has become the most important forum for political 
debates, consultations and decision-making within the OSCE. Among the key 
tasks of the Permanent Council are deciding upon deploying expert and rapporteur 
missions and establishing and mandating long-term field missions as well as upon 
their political and operational support. The Permanent Council’s decisions are 
informed by the Heads of long-term missions and field presences and by the 
specialized institutions, such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). 
They regularly report to the Council on their activities as well as on political 
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developments in the areas of their respective mandate. These regular reports 
provide for a dense information base, bring potential problems to the attention of 
all participating States at an early stage, and allow such problems to be addressed. 
Thus, this practice of regular reporting contributes to a continuous monitoring ex 
officio and to joint discussion of participating States’ compliance or non-
compliance with OSCE commitments (Borchert 1999: 162; Richter 2005: 100). 
With this institutional set-up of the Permanent Council and the reporting practices 
of operational structures elaborated in the following section, the OSCE is in a 
good position for context-sensitive and adapted political decision-making and 
programming of operations (see Figure 3, page 95). 
Figure 2: Organizational chart of OSCE institutions and operational 
capabilities 
Source: based on OSCE 2000: 38 ff. 
OSCE operational capabilities for democracy promotion96 
The OSCE Chairpersonship rotates annually among OSCE participating States. 
The Ministerial Council decides which participating State is to hold the 
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  Because of the focus of this study on democracy promotion, the OSCE specialized institution 
of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in The Hague/Netherlands is not 
introduced in this section. The position was created at the Summit in Helsinkin in 1992 in 
response to the growing number of ethno-political conflicts as a result of unresolved minority 
issues. The HCNM task is the early warning of and early action regarding potential conflict 
and destabilization between participating States. The HCNM mandate is focused on national 
minorities that are citizens of the state in which they live, such as Russians in the Baltic 
states, but excludes minorities without titular nations (Stadler 2000: 293). 
Summit of Heads of State and Government 
Ministerial Council 
Forum for Security Cooperation Permanent Council 
Chairperson-in-Office 
(CiO) 
ODIHR 
RFoM 
Parliamentary Assembly 
Secretary 
General 
Secretariat 
Long-term Missions 
and Field Presences 
Political 
Organs 
Personal Representative of 
the CiO (PRC) 
HCNM 
Specialized 
institutions 
and operational 
capabilities 
Supervision 
Support 
  94 
Chairpersonship. The position of Chairperson-in-Office (CiO), which was 
introduced by the 1990 Charter of Paris and formally institutionalized by the 1992 
Helsinki-II Document, is held by the Foreign Minister of the respective 
participating State. In order to ensure continuity in OSCE activities, the office-
holder is supported by his or her predecessor as well as by his or her successor, 
together forming the OSCE Troika. 
The CiO is responsible for the coordination and implementation of all executive 
measures and may take initiative with regard to certain situations in participating 
States, such as political crises or violent conflicts, by means of political dialogue 
or public statements (i.e. socialization). Therefore, such CiO interventions 
constitute one possible context-sensitive organizational response to relevant types 
of change in the political context conditions (see Table 1, page 54) that the OSCE 
field presences or specialized institutions report on (see Figure 3). For instance, 
the CiO intervened by means of political dialogue during the “rupture” of the 
September/October 1993 warfare in Georgia (see chapter 5.2) as well as by means 
of socialization when publicly underlining the importance of free and transparent 
elections during rising political tensions in Georgia in the run-up to the November 
2003 parliamentary elections that would develop into the “rupture” of the “Rose 
Revolution” (see chapter 5.6). 
It has become an OSCE practice that ad-hoc groups or task forces for specific 
crises or conflict situations are established to support the Troika based on the 
Chairperson’s or the Permanent Council’s recommendation. These ad-hoc groups 
consist of a limited number of participating States and have a clearly delineated 
set of tasks. Task forces also intervene by means of political dialogue in critical 
situations in participating States. For instance, during rising political tensions in 
Georgia against the background of democratic backsliding, the Head of the OSCE 
Task Force for Georgia met with President Eduard Shevardnadze and other high-
ranking Georgian interlocutors to discuss election preparations in early-September 
2003 (see chapter 5.5). 
The CiO may appoint a Personal Representative (PRC) to support the office-
holder in his or her responsibilities. OSCE CiOs have so far made effective use of 
the instrument of the Personal Representative—often to lay the basis and 
negotiate the conditions for establishing a long-term mission in the participating 
State in question. This has also been the case with regard to Georgia: a Personal 
Representative of the CiO (PRC) was appointed in 1992 who subsequently 
negotiated the memoranda of understanding with the conflict parties in 
preparation of the long-term mission that was dispatched in December 1992 and 
initially headed by the PRC (see section 5.1.2). 
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The OSCE Secretary General is the OSCE’s highest ranking administrative 
officer and does not have a political weight comparable to the Secretary Generals 
of the United Nations or of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Initiatives to strengthen the OSCE Secretary General in this regard failed. One 
example for such an initiative is that of Germany and the Netherlands in May 
1994. They introduced the “Common Agenda for Budapest” that aimed at creating 
the position of an OSCE Secretary General with political competences analogue 
those provided for by Article 99 of Chapter XV of the UN Charter: “The 
Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter 
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security.” However, this initiative found no consensus. The OSCE Secretary 
General serves as the CiO’s deputy and is accountable to the Chairperson at all 
times (see Figure 2).  
Figure 3: OSCE institutions and operational capabilities for context-sensitive 
democracy promotion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: decision-making bodies in red colour; operational capabilities in orange colour. Note: Summits, Forum for 
Security Cooperation, Secretary General, Parliamentary Assembly, and High Commissioner on National Minorities not 
depicted. 
Source: own account 
The OSCE Secretary General heads the Secretariat in Vienna/Austria that, 
nowadays, consists of several departments including the Conflict Prevention 
Center (CPC) with a Policy Support Service, an Operations Service, a 
Programming and Evaluation Support Unit, and the Forum for Security 
Cooperation Support. As mentioned above in section 2.1.2, international 
organizations’ secretariats are important for the respective organization’s context-
sensitivity and adaptability insofar as they contribute with expert staff to 
generating, categorizing and analyzing knowledge (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 
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31-2) that is provided to member/participating states for the purpose of informed 
decision-making (Abbott and Snidal 1998) and/or utilized for the planning and 
implementation of operations, such as programs of democracy promotion. As 
shown in Table 4 (page 65) and Table 5 (page 66), such analytical capacities of 
the headquarters’ bureaucracy are relevant with regard to general/political 
adaptation and political ad-hoc responses. 
The OSCE Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) is responsible for 
planning the establishment, restructuring and closing of OSCE field operations, 
supports their work, and is their primary link with other OSCE structures 
including the OSCE decision-making bodies (see Figure 3).
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 The CPC is to 
ensure the timely distribution of reports from the field, i.e. the proxy for 
adaptability (see Table 4, Table 5, and Figure 1), thereby contributing to context-
sensitive and adapted decision-making of the Permanent Council regarding 
operations. The CPC is also to keep field operations informed, providing advice 
on programmatic and management issues, ensuring that policy guidance is 
communicated and reflected in a coordinated way in their work on the ground 
(OSCE 2015: 2). 
The 1990 CSCE Summit in Paris created a Parliamentary Assembly (PA) in 
Copenhagen/Denmark that is to facilitate interparliamentary dialogue within the 
OSCE area and support the strengthening and consolidation of democratic 
institutions in participating States. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has an 
advisory and opinion-forming role with regard to participating States’ compliance 
with and implementation of OSCE commitments. At times, this OSCE institution 
intervenes in participating States by means of political dialogue or socialization. 
Examples for this were the OSCE PA President’s public critical statement in 
September 1996 regarding the local authorities’ rejection to allow international 
monitoring of the 1996 local elections in Georgia’s Ajaria region as well as the 
PA President’s separate meetings with President Eduard Shevardnadze, 
parliamentarians, members of the Central Election Commission and members of 
the Supreme Court  to discuss issues regarding the April 2000 presidential 
election in Georgia (see empirical analysis below). 
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in 
Warsaw/Poland has been designated by the participating States as the central 
institution of the democracy-related human dimension. The ODIHR has the task 
of “translating the grand principles set out in the OSCE documents into concrete 
realities and turning the universal standards into specific programmes”, as former 
ODIHR Director Audrey Glover has put it (Glover 1995: 35). However, doubts 
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  On the origins and development of the CPC, see Vetschera 2001b. 
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were raised on the capacity of the institution that had been perceived as “tiny” 
with a “low profile” at the beginning. With the ODIHR’s integration into the 
planning and implementation of OSCE activities since 1994/1995, the operational 
profile of the ODIHR was raised (Hurlburt 1996: 369). The ODIHR had initially 
focused primarily on organizing seminars for participating States in order to 
“educate” on and convey a common understanding of human dimension principles 
before its “operational nature” has been further strengthened in the mid-1990s. 
The ODIHR is of central importance for assessing the degree of democratic 
maturity of participating States providing them with legitimacy and acceptance in 
the international arena (Flynn and Farrell 1999: 525; Richter 2005: 99 ff.). This 
happens mostly through the observation and assessment of elections in 
participating States. Election observation reports constitute an instrument of 
socialization by pointing out achievements and/or shortcomings but also contain 
recommendations for improving the legal framework, institutions and processes of 
elections, thereby providing a good basis for the context-sensitive adaptation of 
support measures in this regard. Efforts to provide the ODIHR with an explicit 
obligation to bring violations of human rights commitments to the attention of the 
Permanent Council failed in 1992, 1993 and 1994. The Final Document of the 
1994 Budapest Review Conference at least encourages the CiO to inform the 
Permanent Council of such serious cases, including “on the basis of ODIHR 
information” (Hurlburt 1996: 373). In terms of peer review, the ODIHR organizes 
bi-annual high-level “Human Dimension Implementation Meetings”—a 
mechanism introduced in 1992. With these, the OSCE aims at making transparent 
the degree of actual (non-) compliance with and implementation of OSCE 
principles that participating States have politically committed to and give 
recommendations on how implementation can be improved. While considered the 
OSCE’s most important human rights event (Letschert and Hazewinkel 2004: 32), 
it has been noted that “there is vastly diminished willingness on the part of the 
participating states to utilize the OSCE as a forum to engage in public review of 
non-compliance” (Schlager 2000: 362). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
complain that there was hardly any follow-up to recommendations of the Human 
Dimension Implementation Meetings. The Meetings are not effectively used as a 
tool to improve implementation; nevertheless, these events are said to provide at 
least opportunities for informal contacts—also between government 
representatives and NGOs, a growing number of interesting thematic side events, 
and good key note speeches (Letschert and Hazewinkel 2004: 40; Buchsbaum 
2001: 216).  
Initially named “Office for Free Elections”, a key success of the ODIHR has 
been the setting of international standards and the development of a methodology 
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of free and fair elections that are used by other international organizations as 
reference (Boonstra et al. 2011: 466 ff.; Rousselier 1993: 27-9). At the 1994 
Budapest Summit, the ODIHR received an expanded election observation 
mandate that goes beyond the polling and covers the entire election process 
before, during, and after election-day. Particularly through its election monitoring 
reports that are, here, also considered a proxy of OSCE adaptability, the ODIHR 
has received international visibility and recognition. Elections, often regarded as 
the most visible “litmus test” of democracy, are at the center of ODIHR activities 
(Oberschmidt 2000: 323).  
In addition to this key area of ODIHR engagement, the ODIHR actively 
contributes to democracy promotion in the field by offering expertise with regard 
to democratic processes and institutions and providing comments and input to 
legal documents—often in response to requests by OSCE long-term missions or 
by a participating State. The long-term missions are in the position to ‘translate’ 
the context and ensure context-sensitive and adapted contributions by the ODIHR 
and other OSCE specialized institutions. 
In 1997, the ODIHR was restructured and thereby transformed into an 
operational institution with two sections, one on elections and one on democracy-
building (OSCE/ODIHR 1996a: 4).
98
 With this transformation into an operational 
structure, the ODIHR has begun the practice of developing formal and integrated 
work plans with projects focused on practical issues in the area of international 
democracy promotion (OSCE/ODIHR 1996a: 6). Since then, the ODIHR 
concludes memoranda of understanding with recipient states and implements 
programs on specific aspects of the rule of law, civil society, and democratic 
governance stipulated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, often in the form of 
training measures, round table seminars, and awareness-raising campaigns. For 
such tasks, the ODIHR relies heavily on external experts and international non-
governmental organizations that it contracts for the implementation of activities 
(Oberschmidt 2001: 280). Relying on external technical experts, who are not 
necessarily familiar with the specific country context, risks providing advice and 
input based on ‘models’ that may not be suitable for the respective setting. In this 
regard, cooperation with a long-term mission on the ground is considered essential 
in helping to ‘translate’ between technical expertise and local context, thereby 
ensuring context-sensitive and adapted contributions (see Figure 3). Compared to 
the early 1990s, ODIHR cooperation with field missions has intensified 
significantly—especially with smaller missions that do not have their own 
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  In the meantime, additional divisions have been established: human rights, tolerance and non-
discrimination. Furthermore, a contact point for Roma and Sinti-related issues had been part 
of the ODIHR since 1994. 
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democratization sections, as the large missions in the Balkans for instance 
(Oberschmidt 2001: 281). 
After the OSCE Secretariat, the ODIHR has grown into the second largest 
OSCE institution. However, the ODIHR has had to face the constant dilemma of a 
blatant mismatch of the broad spectrum of tasks and the limited resources 
allocated by participating States for these tasks from the very beginning on 
(Oberschmidt 2000: 323). Although the budget allocated to ODIHR has increased 
considerably throughout the 1990s
99
, this specialized OSCE institution was 
nevertheless dependent on participating States’ voluntary contributions for 
concrete projects. While such voluntary contributions increase the ODIHR’s 
operational capacities on the one hand, the ODIHR, at the same time, runs the risk 
of being perceived as “sub-contractor” that is implementing priorities set by 
individual participating States (Oberschmidt 2001: 280) and not necessarily 
responding to developments in the political conditions in a context-sensitive and 
adapted manner. This risk is aggravated by the limits to an institutional memory 
that would ensure certain continuities in substance and activities. The limited 
institutional memory is a result of the high fluctuation of personnel because of the 
OSCE’s nature of a non-career organizations relying on secondment. 
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM) in Vienna/Austria 
plays a relatively small role among the OSCE’s specialized institutions. However, 
this specialized institution has raised the organization‘s profile in the area of the 
freedoms of the press and of opinion since its creation at the end 1997 following a 
decision of the 1996 Lisbon Summit (Richter 2009: 126). The mandate of the 
Representative was being negotiated for nearly eight months after Germany had 
formally submitted a proposal to the Permanent Council in October 1996 and the 
December 1996 Lisbon Summit had tasked the Permanent Council to elaborate 
such a mandate (Herkes 1998).  
The RFoM is to monitor the development of the freedom of the media in 
participating States, thereby potentially contributing to the OSCE’s adaptability. 
In the case of serious violations of OSCE commitments in this field, the RFoM is 
to intervene. Such RFoM interventions constitute one possible adapted 
organizational response to changes in the context conditions of participating 
States (see Figure 3). Although the agreed mandate leaves the RFoM with not 
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  The converted approximate budget for the ODIHR’s predecessor, the Office for Free 
Elections amounted to 250,000 EUR in 1991. By 1997, the converted approximate budget of 
ODIHR had increased to 3.25 million EUR or 7.61 percent of the OSCE budget. In 2001, the 
ODIHR budget reached 6.57 million EUR or 3.14 percent of the OSCE budget, and, in 2004, 
11.5 million EUR or 6.4 percent of the OSCE budget (Oberschmidt 2001: 280; OSCE 1997: 
49, 2001: 120, 2004b: 147). 
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more than words at his or her disposal (Koven 2001: 108 ff.), this institution has 
gained a reputation of a credible and non-partisan authority by having critically 
dealt with developments also in Western Europe and having protected journalists 
with targeted interventions (Duve 2004: 571; Möller 2003: 334). 
The OSCE long-term missions are considered to play a leading role in 
implementing OSCE programs of international democracy promotion and 
monitoring compliance with human dimension commitments (Boonstra et al. 
2011: 467), to be “[p]erhaps the most important aspect of the Organization’s 
relentless activities aimed at the promotion of stability, cooperation and universal 
values” (Abadjian 2000: 30), and to be one of the greatest comparative advantages 
of the OSCE compared to other international organizations and promoters of 
democratization (Zellner 2005: 20). Since the deployment of the first mission of 
long-duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina in August 1992, OSCE long-
term missions have become an independent and central institution for crisis 
prevention and the promotion of democratization, the rule of law and human 
rights. Their concept emerged pragmatically, was applied case-by-case, following 
no blueprint, and following no standard guidelines governing their operating 
modalities (Ghebali 2004: 206).
100
  
OSCE long-term missions are largely secondment-based (i.e. non-career-
based) with flat hierarchies and only a few bureaucratic competence structures. 
This allows such field missions to be deployed comparatively quickly and be used 
flexibly (Zellner et al. 2004: 94). However, it also requires the availability of a 
pool of qualified personnel—especially in light of the usually rather short term of 
the deployments of often only six to twelve months (Neukirch 2000: 307).
101
  
Wolfgang Zellner et al. have identified three “generations” of field operations to 
date: The first generation has usually been deployed in response to imminent 
crisis in the early 1990s and typically perform monitoring and reporting tasks (i.e. 
proxy for adaptability; see Table 5, page 66), facilitate negotiations between 
conflict parties, and provide various kinds of human dimension assistance with a 
rather low level of interference in domestic affairs of the host state. The second 
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  At the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999, OSCE participating States agreed on very general 
provisions regarding OSCE field operations (OSCE 1999: para. 37-41). The OSCE 
Secretariat issues an OSCE General Guide for Mission Members in June 2013 
(SEC.GAL/54/00), a Code of Conduct for Mission Members in November 2000 
(SEC.GAL/144/00), and Security Instructions for OSCE Field Activities in June 2001 
(SEC.GAL/98/01). 
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  In response to this challenge, the OSCE developed a training strategy in 1998/1999 and 
launched the REACT concept on Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams that aims 
at better training and preparation of OSCE mission members by the participating States or the 
OSCE itself (Neukirch 2000: 307). 
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generation has been deployed since around 1995 and consists of larger-size post-
conflict rehabilitation missions with broader tasks, often operating under the 
protection of NATO and EU military forces and sometimes taking over sovereign 
tasks of the host state
102
. The third generation are small OSCE centers and offices 
that focus on maintaining the lines of communications with the state institutions 
and civil society organizations of the host country as well as on non-political 
project services in response to host country requests (Zellner et al. 2004: 92-4). 
Vahram Abadjian has also made an effort of classifying OSCE field operations 
and chosen to group them into conflict prevention, crisis management, post-
conflict rehabilitation, and liaison office (Abadjian 2000: 24). He points out that 
all classes of field operations have integrated “democratization tasks” at some 
point and argues that this results from the shared understanding of OSCE 
participating States that a conflict cannot be considered resolved unless the root 
causes have been eliminated; in order to achieve this situation, a democratic 
environment of respect of fundamental freedoms and human rights and the rule of 
law needs to have been established (ibid.: 26, 29). Claus Neukirch identifies 
certain similarities across the different kinds of OSCE field operations classified 
by the “generation” or other approaches: In general, all long-term missions 
address democracy-related human dimension issues in the host countries. This 
usually includes the monitoring of the human rights situation (i.e. adaptability; see 
Table 5, page 66), sometimes also assistance with regard to improving this 
situation (i.e. adapted organizational responses). Many missions support the 
establishment of domestic ombudsperson institutions in cooperation with the 
ODIHR or the United Nations in order to strengthen the host country capacities 
for the protection of human rights (Neukirch 2000: 309). All these observations 
are true for the OSCE long-term mission to Georgia (see chapter 5). 
The flexible system of deploying, managing, and closing field operations has 
contributed to the vast field experience of the OSCE. The long-term field presence 
in the shape of such missions allows the OSCE to ‘have its fingers on the pulse’ of 
the political context conditions and developments in participating States and 
support the implementation of norms across OSCE dimensions on the ground. 
This requires the consent of the participating State “hosting” the mission. The 
Permanent Council needs to reach a consensus on the mandate and the budget of a 
mission, which often requires lengthy negotiations. On the basis of the mandate, a 
memorandum of understanding has to be concluded with the host country (Zellner 
et al. 2004: 91). The duration of a mandate is usually six or twelve months before 
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it needs to be extended again by consensus in the Permanent Council.
103
 While 
this appears as a contradiction to the notion of long-term mission and makes the 
mandate of a mission vulnerable to politically motivated non-extensions for which 
the non-consent of one participating State would be sufficient
104
, one may also 
consider this practice a window of opportunity for regularly (re-) considering the 
situation in the host country, reviewing the mandate, and—when necessary—
adapting the mandate (see Figure 3). This aspect is particularly relevant with 
regard to general/political adaptation and will be analyzed with regard to the 
OSCE as international promoter of democratization in Georgia (see chapters 5 and 
5.6). 
While adopting the mandate usually requires some time, once established, the 
mission enjoys a high degree of autonomy. The mandates usually allow the 
mission to take initiative and leave the Heads of Mission, holding the rank of 
Ambassador, room for maneuver (Huber 2003: 128; Schlotter 1996; Neukirch 
2000). This autonomy provides a good basis for adapting the engagement in 
response to change in the political context conditions of the host country and is 
considered here an internal prerequisite relevant for adaptability especially with 
regard to practical adaptation and strategic adaptation in the field (see Table 5, 
page 66). The performance of the missions is said to largely depend on the 
personal charisma and diplomatic skills of the respective Head of Mission 
(Ghebali 2004: 209; Huber 2003: 132). According to an established practice, the 
CiO has the authority of designating the Head of Mission and providing him or 
her with guidance (ibid.).
105
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  This practice of continuously extending mission mandates has resulted in a debate on an 
“infinite loop” and on the questions of “exit strategy” and effectiveness (e.g. Meyer 1998, 
2000; Abadjian 2000; Huber 2003: 125). 
104
  Such politically motivated opposition and, thus, non-extension has been the fate of the 
following OSCE field operations: The long-term mission to Kosovo, Sandjak and Voivodina 
had to seize its activities in mid-1993 after Yugoslavia’s status as participating State was 
suspended and the Yugoslavian government, therefore, denied to prolong the memorandum of 
understanding; the long-term mission to Ukraine in mid-1999 after Ukraine had claimed that 
the crisis with Crimea was over; the long-term missions to Estnia and Latvia at the end of 
2001 after no consensus could be reached on the renewal of their mandates; the Assistance 
Group in Chechnya at the end of 2002 after Russia had opposed any prolongation when no 
other participating State was supporting her demand to revise the mandate and delete all 
references to political mediation; the long-term mission to Georgia at the end of 2008 when 
Russia was opposed to an extension unless a second long-term mission to South Ossetia 
would be established in recognition of its status as independent state that had been recognized 
by Russia at the end of August 2008. 
105
  This established practice was “codified” at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999, attributing 
the co-responsibility of guidance to both the Chairman-in-Office and the Permanent Council 
(OSCE 1999: para. 37). 
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Like the ODIHR and other specialized institutions, the Heads of Mission 
regularly report to the Permanent Council (see Figure 3). Such reporting 
procedures have increasingly become one reason for criticism since the early 
2000s, especially from Russia and from several post-Soviet countries. Because of 
critical reports on political developments, some host countries came to perceive 
the presence of OSCE long-term missions as a “stigma” (e.g. Zellner et al. 2004: 
95; Semneby 2005: 233). The bones of contention are the geographical 
concentration of OSCE activities in the ‘East’ and the perceived predominant 
focus on the human dimension. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
blame the OSCE for an imbalanced interference in internal affairs of only non-
‘Western’ participating States. They have translated this criticism into demands 
for a reform of the OSCE in general and the field operations in particular (e.g. 
Nikonov 2003; Bloed 2004; Ghebali 2004: 214 ff.; Zellner et al. 2004: 94 ff.; 
Chizhov 2005; Ghebali 2005; Morozov 2005). While important, the demand for a 
reform of the OSCE that is connected with these critical views is not the focus of 
this study. Rather, the reporting procedures are of interest here with regard to their 
potential for the OSCE’s sensitivity and adaptability for contexts in which the 
OSCE is engaged with the host country’s consent. 
The usually bi-weekly “activity reports” are supplemented with information on 
instant events or incidents in the form of “spot reports” as well as with systematic 
analyses of special political or technical topics in the form of “background 
reports”. These non-public but “restricted” reports are distributed to the 
delegations of the Permanent Council via the Conflict Prevention Center of the 
Secretariat. Some are classified “confidential” and are only distributed to the 
“Troika” or its ad-hoc groups (Ghebali 2004: 209). These mission reports 
constitute an invaluable source of information for the Permanent Council on 
political developments in participating States and potentially contribute to 
informed, context-sensitive and adapted decision-making. Therefore, the 
monitoring and reporting procedures of OSCE operational institutions and 
structures are of great interest for the research interest of this study. 
OSCE rapporteur missions 
In the context of the OSCE’s institutionalization process of the early 1990s and 
just before the Heads of State and Government would decide to put in place a 
comprehensive OSCE program of coordinated action and additional tools at the 
Fourth Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki from March to July 1992 (CSCE 1992c: 
sections II and III), the Council of Ministers adopted a “general mandate” at its 
meeting in Prague on 30 and 31 January 1992. This general mandate entailed the 
decision to establish a standard procedure for assessing progress of newly 
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admitted countries towards full implementation of CSCE/OSCE commitments 
that include democratic values. This standard procedure took the form of 
rapporteur missions. The reports of such rapporteur missions potentially serve as 
analyses of the context conditions in participating States and potential host 
countries of OSCE field missions and, thus, as internal prerequisite for context-
sensitivity at the outset of the OSCE engagement at t0. 
OSCE reporting procedures 
As mentioned, it has become a standard within the OSCE that the Heads of the 
long-term missions as well as the specialized institutions, such as the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media, 
regularly report to the Permanent Council. The Head of Mission’s presentations at 
Permanent Council meetings, for instance, usually take place when the duration of 
the mission mandate is up for extension. This allows an informed and up-to-date 
discussion of participating States. Berthold Meyer, therefore, concludes that it can 
be assumed that the Permanent Council prepares and takes decisions thoroughly 
and based upon up-to-date information on the respective situation (Meyer 1998: 
14).
106
 However, the degree to which the various types of reports are analytical 
varies to a great extent and can be assumed to depend on the personal style of the 
respective head of mission as well as on anticipated political sensitivities among 
the participating States that restrain open reporting. Cursorily, with regard to 
Georgia, the impression gained by the author from the review of the reports on 
Georgia for the period 1992 to 2004 is that the reports of the Personal 
Representatives on his intermittent visits in the early 1990s were generally more 
detailed and analytical, providing not only a description of developments and 
events but also an interpretation of what this may mean for the OSCE engagement 
and a reflection of this engagement. Later on, regular reporting procedures tended 
to be mainly used in a descriptive fashion with individual reports at some points 
that were more analytical and reflective. Chapter 5 will provide a closer look at 
this matter with regard to the OSCE democracy promotion engagement in Georgia 
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  Political positions of OSCE participating states certainly play a dominant role regarding the 
voting behavior within the Permanent Council, as Russia’s veto against an extension of the 
Georgia mission’s mandate at the end of 2008 after the August 2008 war between Georgia 
and Russia shows. Nevertheless, heads of mission have the opportunity to lobby for their 
proposals among the delegations of OSCE participating states prior to the Permanent Council 
sessions in which decisions on the respective mission’s mandate are taken and—depending 
on the respective personality of the head of mission—have used these during their visits to 
Vienna, as informal talks of the author with former members of OSCE long-term missions 
revealed. 
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as well the respective OSCE responses to different types of change in the political 
transformation process of the country. 
The author’s research at the OSCE archives in Prague have revealed that the long-
term mission to Georgia has collected comprehensive information on political 
developments in Georgia in general as well as, in particular, on developments in 
its areas of engagement since its establishment at the end of 1992.
107
 This 
information was regularly compiled in periodic activity reports that were 
submitted to the Vienna headquarters on a bi-weekly basis, twice a month.
108
 The 
bi-weekly activity reports were complemented by special situation reports, spot 
reports and background reports on specific circumstances on the initiative of the 
mission or in response to requests by OSCE bodies as well as by the head of 
mission’s presentations at Permanent Council meetings once or twice a year. 
Examples for mission-initiated situation-specific reports are the one on the 
resignation of the Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze in September 
1993 (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993n) or the July 1998 spot report on 
developments in the parliament of Georgia (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998k). An 
example of a special mission report, prepared in response to a request by the 
Office of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, is a February 1994 summary of major 
developments and problems in Georgia (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994l). A 
September 2006 background report, for instance, provided information on the 
development regarding local self-government elections to OSCE participating 
States (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2006). 
In order to give an impression of the numbers of these infrequent case-based 
reports in relation to the regular bi-weekly activity reports, Figure 4 was prepared 
based on an analysis of the OSCE archive’s document database.109 The figure 
shows a sharp increase of spot reports and weekly reports of the years 2003 and 
2004 outnumbering even bi-weekly activity reports. When the author reviewed 
these spot reports, it became evident that these reports reflect the frequent 
situation updates during the 2003 “Rose Revolution” as well as the increasing 
tensions in South Ossetia and Ajaria after the change of government resulting 
from the “Rose Revolution”. These tensions were likely triggered by the “state-
building strategy” that President Mikheil Saakashvili announced shortly after 
                                                 
107
  Research at the OSCE archives in Prague was conducted by the author in February/March 
2009 and May/June 2016. 
108
  In addition, weekly reports have been prepared for the border monitoring operation within the 
framework of the long-term mission that was included to the mandate in December 1999. 
109
  Note that documents have only been included in this electronic system since 1995 at the time 
of the research visits in 2009 and 2016. 
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taking office. The rise in numbers of weekly border monitoring reports during the 
same period reflects an increase of registered border crossings by armed persons. 
Figure 4: Numbers of different types of reports of the OSCE long-term 
mission to Georgia 1995-2004 
 
Source: Own analysis of document list generated from the database administered by the OSCE Documentation Center in 
Prague. 
The empirical analysis of the OSCE democracy promotion engagement in Georgia 
below will show how the OSCE utilized this internal prerequisite of reporting 
procedures for context-sensitive adaptation in response to political change. 
3.4 Synthesis: the OSCE as international democracy promoter 
The history of the OSCE shows that the OSCE has proven remarkably adaptable 
to changes in the international environment. The OSCE as international promoter 
of democratization in participating States has evolved from a conference process 
that significantly helped to contain the bloc confrontation during the Cold War era 
by providing a forum and framework for continuous dialogue between the bloc 
states. By developing a unique set of democracy-related norms and by 
transforming into an organization with decision-making structures and specialized 
institutions focused on democratization and human rights, the CSCE/OSCE 
adapted to the changed international environment of the early 1990s. With the 
main tasks of early warning and monitoring compliance with CSCE/OSCE 
commitments, these specialized institutions were designed to be context-sensitive 
and adaptable (see Figure 3). In response to the political reality that the processes 
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of dual transformation and democratization in post-Communist countries did not 
develop as smoothly as initially hoped and that violent conflict had not yet been 
eliminated from the OSCE area, the organization adapted again by gradually 
strengthening its operational capacities to support participating States in 
complying with OSCE commitments—especially with regard to human dimension 
issues including the promotion of democratization. 
The OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security ‘codified’ in a comprehensive 
set of norms and the ‘right of intervention’ acknowledged in the 1991 Moscow 
Document provide for the basis of OSCE democracy promotion. The specific 
characteristics of the OSCE—decision-making by consensus and a broad 
geographical participation—accounts for the OSCE’s cooperative approach to 
democracy promotion that basically rules-out any power-based instrument of 
coercion or negative conditionalities such as sanctions. With specialized 
operational institutions, such as the ODIHR and the RFoM, as well as with the 
long-term missions, “persistence, cooperative dialogue and a vast field presence” 
have become “the central pillars of OSCE democracy promotion” (Richter 2005: 
99). These operational capabilities function with a relatively high degree of 
autonomy compared to other international organizations and—through monitoring 
and reporting procedures—provide the basis for informed central decision-making 
structures. How these procedures are utilized for context-sensitive and adapted 
engagement of the OSCE in democracy promotion in Georgia will be addressed in 
the following chapters. 
Thus, while acknowledging on the basis of chapter 3 that the OSCE and its 
predecessor CSCE have proven adaptable regarding its own characteristics, 
structure and norm-setting in response to the changed international environment 
of the early 1990s, this study has yet to analyze whether the OSCE as 
international democracy promoter is also sensitive and adaptable to the (changed) 
political context conditions in host countries regarding its operations at 
implementation level. This analysis whether and how the OSCE utilizes its 
internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity and adaptability in Georgia during the 
period of 1992 to 2004 is provided in chapters 5 and 6 and will serve as the basis 
for answering the research question whether the “one size fits all” thesis holds in 
spite of probing it against a tough case or not. 
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4. Analysis of the country context: the political transformation 
process of Georgia and identification of types of change 1991-
2004110 
As elaborated above (see chapter 2.3), a country context has been selected for the 
analysis of the OSCE’s context-sensitivity and adaptation that experienced at least 
one “rupture” in its process of political transformation, i.e. a rapid and radical 
change of the political context conditions (t1.c; see Table 1 on page 54), in addition 
to actor-centered and structural gradual changes (t1.a and t1.b). Georgia in the South 
Caucasus was the site to at least one of such a “rupture” in the shape of the “Rose 
Revolution”, i.e. mass demonstrations against massive election fraud in November 
2003 that resulted in the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze and 
brought a government of “young reformers” into power. As the following 
empirical analysis will show, earlier developments in Georgia since independence 
in 1991 have not met the ideal of the “transition paradigm”, making context-
sensitive and flexible approaches all the more relevant. Against this background, 
Georgia in the period from 1992 to 2004 provides for a political context very 
suitable to test the “one size fits all” thesis because international democracy 
promoters can be expected to have become aware of the change—at least of the 
rapid and radical change resulting from the “Rose Revolution”—and to have 
considered adapting their democracy promotion efforts—at least following the 
events of November 2003.  
The following analysis of developments in Georgia’s political context conditions 
will start out by providing the background to the situation in Georgia at the outset 
of CSCE/OSCE engagement in 1992 and then be structured according to the types 
of change conceptualized in chapter 2.2 (see Table 1): 
 the “rupture” (t1.c.1) in efforts of political stabilization as a result of 
September/October 1993 warfare (section 4.2);  
 gradual change in structural political context conditions in the early 
Shevardnadze era (t1.b.1): introduction of democratic norms and institutions as 
a result of the constitution-making process in 1994-1995 (section 4.3); 
followed by 
                                                 
110
  Note that the entire chapter draws from several publications of the author, namely Jawad 
2005; Jawad 2006b; Jawad 2006a; Jawad 2008, 2012a. Therefore, references are not provided 
in any instance of a citation of own sources in the following sections. 
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 a phase of stagnation in the democratization process in 1995-1999: failed 
democratic consolidation (section 4.4);  
 gradual change in structural and actor-centered political context conditions 
in the late Shevardnadze era (section 4.5): democratic backsliding (t1.b.2) as a 
result of the disintegration of the ruling party and the strengthening of 
opposition forces and civil society in 1999-2003 (t1.a); and 
 the November 2003 “Rose Revolution” as a “rupture” in Georgia’s political 
transformation process (t1.c.2) and window of opportunity for democratization 
and its promotion (section 4.6). 
The following context analysis of political development in Georgia in the period 
of 1991 to 2004 and of the types of change according to the conceptualization 
provided in chapter 2.2 will structure the analysis in chapter 5 of whether the 
OSCE adapted its engagement as international democracy promoter in Georgia 
sensitive to the various types of political change in the period under review from 
1992 to 2004. 
4.1 The political context conditions at the outset of CSCE/OSCE 
engagement in Georgia in 1992 (t0): turbulent early years of 
transition 
In light of the transition model developed by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe 
Schmitter (1986)
111, Georgia’s liberalization and transition112 started before 
independence from the Soviet Union. The political regime opened up against the 
backdrop of the glasnost and perestroika policies pursued by Soviet President 
                                                 
111
  O’Donnell et al.‘s democratization phases have been developed based on Dankwart Rustow’s 
dynamic model of a preparatory, a decision and a habituation phase (Rustow 1970). The 
explanatory value of analyzing developments in Georgia along the lines of democratization 
phases has been debated in literature. Timm 2012, for instance, has argued that it may be 
more fruitful to shift the analytical focus from the level of political regime to political 
authority by applying the theoretical approach of neopatrimonialism. This would allow for 
explaining the performance of the political system and strategic calculations and behavioral 
rationales of political actors in Georgia. In Timm’s view, utilizing this alternative heuristic 
model helps to control the “democratization bias” and avoid the logic of the “transition 
paradigm”. 
112
  The term “transition” is used here in a narrow sense for the period between the liberalization 
of an authoritarian regime and the consolidation of a democracy during which political elites 
are replaced by (re)negotiating pacts (O’Donnell et al. 1986b). In comparison, the wider 
sense of the transition term is used as a synonym for the entire sequence of processes of 
regime change covering the period between the decay of the old regime or system, through 
the introduction of new rules (“first transition”), until the conclusion of the consolidation of 
the new regime or system (“second transition”) (Huntington 1991). 
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Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991). The national opposition, headed by Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, came to power following the October 1990 parliamentary 
elections in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a geopolitical rearrangement of the 
Caucasus region. While the northern Caucasus is composed of different regions 
and autonomous republics that are part of the Russian Federation, the Southern 
Caucasus comprises the three republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 
Each declared independence in 1991. Based on 89.7 percent of the votes in favor 
of independence in a referendum held on 31 March 1991, Georgia declared 
independence on 9 April 1991 and Gamsakhurdia was elected the first president 
of independent Georgia with 86 percent of the votes on 26 May 1991. In Georgia, 
more autonomous units had been built up under Soviet rule than in any other 
Soviet republic (with the exception of Russia itself).
113
 No other state in the post-
Soviet space has as many difficulties in securing or restoring territorial integrity or 
in controlling its territory (Slider 1997: 169).  
In the late 1980s, against the backdrop of the glasnost policy of the last Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–1991), Abkhazian and Ossetian nationalists 
began striving for more autonomy. In the early 1990s, communities in Georgia’s 
inter-ethnic conflicts violently sought to redefine their relations with neighboring 
others in a region characterized by a mosaic of interwoven communities. 
Contested understandings of sovereign territory and rival myths of a homeland, 
called the Georgian state as it existed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union into 
question. Immediately after regaining independence in April 1991, Georgia was 
confronted with several severe internal conflicts concerning foremost the two 
secession conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
114
 Georgia has not succeeded 
in expanding the sovereignty of the central government over its entire territory.
115
 
                                                 
113
  For the general role of Soviet nationality policy in the recurrence of national movements in 
the late 1980s or its effect on the relationships between different communities see particularly 
Dehdashti 2000: 22-36. 
114
  The region’s name—South Ossetia—is the term most frequently used in official documents 
and diplomatic discourse, as in this contribution. While at the beginning of OSCE mediation 
in 1992 Georgia wanted the region to be referred to as “Tshkinvali Region”, the South 
Ossetian de-facto authorities insisted on “South Ossetia”. Up to today, most Georgians refer 
to the region as “Shida Kartli”, as “Tskhinvali Region”, or—in the case of hardline 
nationalists—as “Samachablo”, the land of the aristocratic Georgian Machabeli family 
(International Crisis Group (ICG) 2004: 2). South Ossetia, bordering the Russian province of 
North Ossetia, represents the smallest among the secessionist entities in the post-Soviet space. 
It was granted the status of an autonomous region in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic 
in 1923. 
115
  On the contrary, in the wake of the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia claimed independence again as in July 1992 and December 1991. This time, 
their independent stati were recognized by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. 
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On 20 September 1990, South Ossetia proclaimed full sovereignty within the 
USSR, but aimed for a federation with North Ossetia as part of Russia after the 
dissolution of the USSR. After Ossetians had boycotted the October 1990 
parliamentary elections—in response to an election law adopted by the Georgian 
Supreme Soviet barring regional parties—South Ossetia held its own elections in 
December 1990. Adhering to his nationalist orientation, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the 
first elected president of independent Georgia, subsequently abolished South 
Ossetia’s autonomous oblast status.116 The conflict escalated and Tbilisi de facto 
lost control over South Ossetia by the end of 1990. With sporadic Russian 
involvement, the fighting escalated once more in the spring of 1992 and continued 
until June that year when a ceasefire agreement was reached. The 1990-1992 
South Ossetia war resulted in approximately 1,000 casualties and displaced 
around 60,000 people.
117
 This changed the intermixture of populations that had 
existed before the war.
118
 Despite these burdens, not to speak of the atrocities 
committed by both sides,
119
 until its re-ignition in July-August 2004, the South 
Ossetia conflict had been considered the regional conflict that had been most 
eased—also thanks to the OSCE’s efforts.120 
                                                 
116
  Autonomous regions (oblast) possessed the smallest degree of autonomy in the Soviet 
system, especially compared to autonomous republics, e.g., North Ossetia, which was given 
the status of autonomous republic in the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR), and 
Abkhazia, which was given status of autonomous republic in the Georgian SSR. 
117
  According to the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimations as of 1998, 
30,000 Ossetians from Georgia and 10,000 from South Ossetia registered as refugees in North 
Ossetia. Additionally, some 10,000 Georgians and persons of mixed ethnicity were displaced 
from South Ossetia to Georgia proper, and 5,000 internally displaced in South Ossetia. 
According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, 10,000 Georgian from South Ossetia became 
refugees and 80,000 Ossetians took refuge in the Russian north, see 
International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2007: 37-9. As of September 2004, 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) facilitated the return of no 
more than 1,734 persons (513 families) from North to South Ossetia and to Georgia proper 
(UNHCR, “Population Movements as a Consequence of the Georgian-South Ossetian 
Conflict”, updated 1 September 2004, cited in International Crisis Group (ICG) 2004: 6). 
118
  According to the 1989 census, Ossetians in South Ossetia numbered 65,000 (66.6 percent of 
an overall population of approximately 99,700, including some 26,000 ethnic Georgians), 
with 98,000 in the rest of Georgia. Today, South Ossetia has approximately 70,000 to 80,000 
inhabitants. 
119
  For a description of the atrocities committed by both sides in the 1990 to 1992 violent 
conflict, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) 1992a. 
120
  The 1992 Sochi Agreement led to the deployment of the trilateral Joint Peace Keeping Forces 
(JPKF), consisting of Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian troops, as well as the establishment of 
the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC), a negotiation mechanism with Georgian, 
South and North Ossetian, and Russian participation. Not only were there no military 
confrontations after the 1992 ceasefire agreement, but contacts and trade had revived between 
Ossetians and Georgians living in and around the zone of conflict, enabling a slow but 
progressive negotiation process. The zone of conflict had been defined in Protocol No. 3 of 
the Sochi Agreement signed in Vladikavkaz on 12 July 1994: a circle with a 15 km radius 
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As South Ossetia, Abkhazia in Georgia’s northwest sought secession from 
Georgia in the early 1990s. Between 1917 and 1931, Abkhazia had been a Soviet 
Republic in its own right, before being integrated into the Georgian Socialist 
Soviet Republic (SSR) as an autonomous republic.
121
 On 25 August 1990, the 
Abkhazian Supreme Soviet passed a “Declaration on the Sovereignty of 
Abkhazia”, which was annulled by the Georgian Supreme Soviet a few days later. 
After a declaration of independence in July 1992, the struggle for secession in 
Abkhazia escalated. Open violence had been raging in Abkhazia since August 
1992 when forces loyal to Tbilisi retook the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi. In 
September 1992, a ceasefire was declared by both sides but has repeatedly been 
broken or never fully complied with since then (see section 4.2). Like Ossetians, 
Abkhazians are ethnically distinct from Georgians; unlike Ossetians in South 
Ossetia, Abkhazians were a clear minority within the territory of Abkhazia before 
the 1992-1993 war, but by October 1993, almost all ethnic Georgians had fled 
Abkhazia.
122
 
The escalation of the secession conflicts was paralleled by a second development 
relevant for Georgia’s further transformation process: Gamsakhurdia was unable 
to consolidate his position after his election in May 1991. Apart from his lack of 
experience in governing a state and his unwillingness to engage in political 
compromise, Gamsakhurdia’s personal, extremely polarizing style of leadership 
played a decisive role in this regard. Accusations against non-Georgian minorities 
and a strong emphasis on unity undermined participation and political diversity 
(Jones 1994: 141-3). His followers subsequently split into rivalling factions. The 
initial unity of the former “National and Independence Movement” split more and 
more into particular interests. Police and security forces became increasingly 
involved in the criminal underworld and the shadow economy of the drug and 
weapons trade. They thereby contributed to the development of “markets of 
violence” (Elwert 2003).  
These developments culminated in the “Winter War” of January 1992 during 
which armed opposition groups drove the Gamsakhurdia government out of office 
and Gamsakhurdia into exile. The armed forces had taken advantage of the 
population’s growing dissatisfaction with the government’s perceived corruption, 
human rights violations and abuse of power. Gamsakurdia’s followers tried 
                                                                                                                                     
from the centre of Tskhinvali as well as a security corridor consisting of a 14 km band 
divided evenly on both sides of the former oblast’s administrative borders. 
121
  See footnote 116. 
122
  According to the 1989 census, Abkhazia had a population of 525,000 people, of which 
239,000 (45 percent) were ethnic Georgians. Almost all the Georgians fled Abkhazia by 
October 1993 (Khundadze 2004). With regard to demographic developments in a long-term 
perspective see Auch 2004b. 
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regaining power by attacking military and police forces in Western Georgia in 
1992 and 1993. This struggle resulted in their final military defeat in October 
1993 and Gamsakhurdia’s alleged suicide in January 1994. 
During Gamsakhurdia’s presidency, Georgia has been rated as “not free” in 
Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World Index” with a rating of 6 for political 
rights and 5 for civil liberties. It has been categorized as an “anocracy” with 
mixed authority traits reflected in the “combined polity score” of 3 on a scale of -
10 (=”strongly autocratic”) to +10 (=”strongly democratic”) in the “Polity IV 
Project”.123 
4.2 The “rupture” in efforts of political stabilization (t1.c.1) as a 
result of September/October 1993 warfare 
This section will analyze the efforts of Georgia’s interim government for political 
stabilization as well as the “rupture” (t1.c.1) in these efforts as a result of the 
September/October 1993 warfare in Abkhazia. 
After the military coup d’état of January 1992, the office of the president was 
abolished. Eduard Shevardnadze, former Secretary General of the Georgian 
Communist Party and last Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, returned from 
Moscow to Tbilisi in March 1992 and became chairman of the hastily established 
Interim State Council. Thereby, Shevardnadze became de facto head of state 
without having obtained democratic legitimacy to hold this position. Although, he 
                                                 
123
  The Freedom House ratings of “1” through “7” for “political rights” and “civil liberties” are 
based on country analyses of the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, the 
functioning of the government, freedom of expression and of belief, associational and 
organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. “1” 
represents the greatest degree of freedom and “7” the smallest. Various qualitative country 
reports on Georgia can be found at https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia (accessed 25 
April 2016). The “Freedom in the World” data, coverering the years 1973 to today, is 
available for download at 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/freedom_in_the_world_2016_data.zip (accessed 
25 April 2016). Data for Georgia is available starting with 1991.  
 The Polity scores can be converted into regime categories in a suggested three part 
categorization of “autocracies” (-10 to -6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5), and “democracies” (+6 to 
+10). “Anocracies” or “incoherent” regime categroies have mixed authority traits. The 
composite indicators “institutionalized democracy” and “institutionalized autocracy” are 
calculated separately from the component variables “Regulation of Chief Executive 
Recruitment”, “Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment”, “Openness of Executive 
Recruitment”, “Constraint on Chief Executive”, “Competitiveness of Political Participation”, 
“Regulation of participation”. The Polity IV datasheet for the annual time series from 1800 to 
2014 is available for download at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2014.xls (accessed 
25 April 2016). 
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had been elected chairman of parliament with 96 percent of the votes as the only 
candidate in the October 1992 parliamentary elections, only a November 1992 law 
established the chairman of parliament as head of state (U.S. Department of State 
1994). This constituted a decisive setback in the early transition period of the 
political transformation process as Shevardnadze was democratically 
legitimatized as elected president only in November 1995.
124
 In contrast to this 
setback with regard to the position of head of state, the 1992 parliamentary 
elections had been judged by international observers to have been free and fair 
notwithstanding reported widespread technical violations (CSCE 1992d). The 
registration of more than 40 political parties had reportedly followed an orderly 
democratic way. Gamsakhurdia’s followers contested the legitimacy of holding 
these elections and, consequently, did not register as a party (CSCE Secretariat 
1992a). 
Apart from the lack of democratic legitimacy of Georgia’s head of state, the 
picture of the South Caucasus country at the beginning of Shevardnadze’s 
leadership was further complicated by the absence of well-organized state 
structures, such as a strong cabinet, a state budget and a regular army 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993g; Wheatley 2005: 108).
125
 Under Gamsakhurdia, 
formal state structures had either ceased to exist or been captured by paramilitary 
and mafia groups (Wheatley 2005: 108). Shevardnadze tried to overcome these 
massive challenges by aiming to concentrate all decision-making power in his 
office.  
For instance, when he proposed a new cabinet structure in August 1993, he 
called parliament’s right to deny or confirm his ministerial appointees into 
question. However, this step met parliament’s resistance and culminated in 
political turmoil. The confrontation between Shevardnadze and parliament 
resulted in Shevardnadze’s resignation on 14 September 1993—a step that one 
could interpret as political blackmail. He declared that “repeated critical attacks” 
on him by parliamentarians made it impossible for his government to function 
effectively (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993n). In a speech in parliament one day 
later, he agreed to return to office if parliament suspended its activities for two 
months and declared a state of emergency. Parliament eventually agreed to these 
                                                 
124
  Shevardnadze was elected President with 74 percent of the vote (turnout 69 percent) in 
November 1995. 
125
  According to a report of the U.S. Department of State, in 1993, the Georgian government 
unsuccessfully tried to eliminate paramilitary forces in favor of establishing a single unified 
army. The regular army totalled only a few thousand men, poorly armed, trained, and 
equipped (U.S. Department of State 1994). 
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demands in order to prevent his resignation and gave Shevardnadze a free hand in 
taking crisis measures.
126
  
The state of emergency that was extended by another two months in 
November negatively affected political rights and civil liberties. Georgia’s 
political leadership took steps limiting the opposition’s activity, including the 
closing of publications and the arrest of some figures accused of sympathizing 
with ex-President Gamsakhurdia (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993b).
127
 
Notwithstanding these qualitative developments, the quantitative ratings for 
Georgia for 1992-1994 have marginally improved from a “freedom status” of “not 
free” in 1991 to “partly free” and from a “combined polity score” of 3 in 1991 to 
4 (i.e. still an “anocracy”).128 
Shevardnadze’s efforts to politically stabilize the domestic situation in Georgia by 
measures under the state of emergency were interrupted by the severe escalation 
of violence in Western Georgia
129
 (see above) and Abkhazia that resulted in a 
radical change of his previous position to continue his predecessor’s strategy of 
limiting Russian influence in the country as much as possible.  
Open violence had been raging in Abkhazia since August 1992 until a 
ceasefire declaration in September 1992. This ceasefire had repeatedly been 
broken and, in light of continued fighting, Russia mediated the Sochi Agreement 
on 27 July 1993. However, the Sochi Agreement and the arrival of UNOMIG 
observers in Abkhazia did not prevent the severe escalation and renewed warfare 
in Abkhazia in September 1993. With the help of armed groups from regions in 
Russia’s North Caucasus, Abkhazian separatists began to regain territory and 
control over Sukhumi in September 1993. The Georgian-Abkhazian war was one 
of the bloodiest post-Soviet conflicts, claiming up to 10,000 lives and displacing 
around 250,000 people, most of them ethnic Georgians. Notwithstanding 
                                                 
126
  “Georgia: Parliament votes to suspend sessions for two months to prevent Shevardnadze’s 
threatened resignation”, 
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1993/09/14/604290614/?v=2 (accessed 27.04.2016). 
127
  To enforce the state of emergency, the “Kommandatura” was created to enforce the state of 
emergency. Principal enforcers often included members of the paramilitary Mkhedrioni (also 
see footnotes 129, 136). These forces, including the police on a less frequent basis, committed 
human rights abuses during the year, including using their powers to repress the opposition 
and rob and intimidate the population (U.S. Department of State 1994). 
128
  The Freedom House rating for political rights improved from 6 in 1991 to 4 in 1992 to 
worsen again to 5 in 1993 and 1994. 
129
  Supporters of ousted President Gamsakhurdia and the forces who had overthrown him in 
January 1992 fought in Samegrelo in Western Georgia. The most prominent and best 
equipped paramilitary group, the “Mkhedrioni”, led by Djaba Ioseliani, was the principal 
armed defender of Shevardnadze's government during the civil war with Gamsakhurdia 
(U.S. Department of State 1994). 
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economic and geopolitical rationales, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict evolved 
into an ethno-political conflict that divided the multi-national society of pre-war 
Abkhazia (Antonenko 2005: 206).
130
 
Faced with this “rupture” (t1.c.1) in Georgia’s political developments, i.e. the 
imminent collapse of the young state as a result of escalating violence in the 
conflict with Gamsakhurdia followers in Western Georgia, who apparently used 
political turmoil in Tbilisi in August and September 1993, in addition to the 
renewed warfare in Abkhazia and the subsequent fall of the regional capital of 
Sukhumi in September 1993, Shevardnadze aimed at mending relations with 
Russia. He accepted Russia’s military presence in Western Georgia131 as well as 
her peacekeeping role in Abkhazia in October 1993, and strived for Georgia’s 
membership in the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS).
132
 In return, Russia promised to secure Georgia’s territorial integrity and to 
defend its borders (Slider 1997: 157).
133
  
Initially, Shevardnadze’s decision for Georgia to join the CIS came at a price 
with regard to domestic politics: it divided political forces; the internal security 
situation deteriorated at the end of 1993 and several political parties declared 
themselves in opposition to this decision, including a member of the government 
coalition—the “National Democratic Party” (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993b). 
What followed was an “overall housecleaning effort” of 1994 and 1995. On the 
one hand, this housecleaning reduced the number of veto players who were 
interested in maintaining the status quo of political instability and enabled 
Shevardnadze to pursue his political agenda and a new dynamic in the 
constitution-making process. On the other hand, the manner in which any forces 
opposing Shevardnadze’s course were handled gave reason for concern among the 
                                                 
130
  The Moscow Ceasefire Agreement of 14 May 1994 ended the war. The ceasefire has since 
been monitored by around 1,500 Russian-led peacekeeping troops under the aegis of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the United Nations Observer Mission to 
Georgia (UNOMIG). Negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhazian sides took place 
within the Geneva Peace Process, chaired by the UN, facilitated by Russia, and observed by 
the OSCE and the “Group of Friends” (USA, Germany, United Kingdom, France, and 
Russia). 
131
  An agreement with Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to jointly protect the railroad mainline 
leading from Russia and the Black Sea port of Poti to Tbilisi and Armenia was hoped to help 
restore Georgia’s economic connections with the outside world and contribute to stabilization 
of the situation in Western Georgia (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993c). 
132
  Georgia became a CIS member in December 1993. 
133
  Besides having its own interests in the region, Russia has maintained military bases in 
Georgia, deployed peacekeepers in Abkhazia, and acted as a mediator in South Ossetia. 
Moscow has applied a strategy of “controlled instability” (Bielawski and Halbach 2004: 7), 
using its role with regard to the two de facto states as a lever to maintain influence on their 
“metropolitan state”. 
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international community. Law enforcement institutions and the judicial system 
were exploited for political purposes.  
The rapprochement between Georgia and Russia constituted a radical change 
in the political positioning of Georgia’s head of state. Apart from the initial 
domestic political debate, it affected the cost-benefit calculations of the de facto 
authorities in Sukhumi/Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia given their 
previous expectation that Russia would support their struggle for independence 
from Georgia proper. This change of positioning, therefore, potentially opened up 
a window of opportunity for conflict settlement negotiations—especially with 
Tskhinvali that had not been the location of the most recent violent escalation. 
Key for initiating any kind of settlement process was having a credible negotiation 
partner and, therefore, political stability in Tbilisi. With support from Russia as 
well as from fluid clientelist networks, Shevardnadze—in contrast to 
Gamsakhurdia—eventually succeeded in disempowering warlords and their 
armed followers and in establishing a certain degree of public order, physical 
security, and relative stability thereby gaining some performance legitimacy. 
Therefore, the changed position towards Russia also opened up a window of 
opportunity with regard to refocusing domestic politics on Georgia’s 
democratization process as well as with regard to the ‘external’ promotion of 
democratization. According to the conceptualization provided in chapter 2.2 (see 
Table 1, page 54), the ‘pressure’ on democracy promoters to adapt at the time of 
such ruptures is relatively high, requiring ad-hoc measures and/or the political 
adaptation of reconsidering the country approach and the strategic adaptation of 
reconsidering the implementation strategy as well as areas of engagement and 
instruments applied for the promotion of democratization. 
4.3 Gradual change in structural context conditions (t1.b.1): 
constitution-making process and formal introduction of 
democratic norms and institutions in 1994-1995 
In order to achieve the above-mentioned successes of a minimum of security as 
well as the restoration of political order, in addition to ‘external’ support from 
Russia, Shevardnadze had to balance competing interests and evenly distribute 
state resources among various key actors and interest groups: the leaders of the 
old nomenklatura, the intelligentsia, nationalist forces, the various paramilitary 
groups and regional leaders as well as their followers (Timm 2012: 170; Baev 
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2003).
134
 Shevardnadze was able to rebuild a web of relationships with 
administrative cadres, factory bosses and security officials that had run Georgia 
under Shevardnadze during the 1970s.  
Notwithstanding the fact that his political party, the “Georgian Citizens’ Union” 
(CUG), had helped him consolidate his position as speaker of a fragmented 24-
party parliament at the end of 1993, his rule came to be based on rather fluid 
clientelist networks.
135
 Like similar “presidential parties” in other parts of the 
post-Soviet space, “the CUG was driven less by ties of ideology and class than by 
loyalty to Shevardnadze and a desire of local elites to secure their political and 
economic positions” (King 2001: 95-6). In the early years of Shevardnadze’s rule, 
he ensured loyalty to him by “the permission to loot state funds and international 
aid, including bribe extortion within structures and institutions controlled by the 
various power brokers” (Timm 2012: 171).136 
While Shevardnadze’s clientelist networks helped him gain some performance 
legitimacy, as mentioned above, his early years of rule lacked democratic 
legitimacy. Although he had been elected chairman of parliament in the October 
1992 general elections, only a law one month later established him as head of 
state (see above). The democratic legitimation of this position was provided as 
late as November 1995 when presidential elections were held after the new 
constitution had been adopted in August 1995. Some authors claim that there had 
not been any popular demand for a democratic constitution and that none of the 
political leaders since 1990 had taken responsibility for offering “the disoriented 
society” of Georgia a model of governance based on the principles of the 
separation of powers formalized in a constitution (Demetrashvili et al. 2005: 9). 
Nevertheless, there had been initiatives to draft a new constitution and replace the 
partially reintroduced 1921 constitution throughout Georgia’s transition phase 
towards the mid-1990s. In mid-1993, the constitutional commission had been 
expected to present a concept with the general constitutional principles for 
                                                 
134
  Shevardnadze gradually managed to partly emancipate himself from the influence of certain 
actors, especially the former entrepeneurs of violence, during his early years in office (Timm 
2012: 170). 
135
  The CUG was quite heterogeneous. As political party, it evolved from a political movement 
uniting all forces in support of Shevardnadze and his policy in late 1993. Interestingly, the 
word “party” is often shunned in the post-Communist countries of Eurasia in order to 
distinguish themselves from Soviet times and the rule of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (Fairbanks 2010: 144).  
136
  Barbara Christophe names the following examples of power brokers between their own 
patronal networks and the state system: The leader of the paramilitary Mkhedrioni, Djaba 
Iosseliani, received control over the ministry of interior; the military commander of the 
National Guard, Tengiz Kitovani, gained access to profitable looting opportunities at the 
ministry of defense, and Aslan Abashidze, the strongman oft he autonomous region of Ajara 
was permitted even greater regional autonomy (Christophe 2001: 74.5). 
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parliamentary approval and some work had in fact been undertaken with technical 
support from foreign experts (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993a). But the status 
issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had posed a huge challenge to this process, 
as did the parliamentary deadlock around the issue of Georgia’s CIS membership 
at the end of 1993. 
Therefore, it was not until 1994 when the process actually received some 
dynamic with several constitution drafts available for discussion in March, a 
round table discussion in June, and eventually the adoption of the new 
constitution in August 1995. Because of the opposing positions within the 
constitutional commission, some authors consider the ‘external’ support by 
international organizations and foreign experts as having had a catalytic impact on 
the process of drafting and adopting the constitution (Allison et al. 1996: 523-4; 
Gaul 2001: 77-8). International observers at the time also considered 
Shevardnadze’s personal and very committed engagement for seeking 
compromise at the final stages of the heated parliamentary debate to having 
played a significant role (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995g).
137
 
With the adoption of Georgia’s new constitution based on democratic principles, 
the ratings of Georgia improved to a Polity IV “combined polity score” of 5 (i.e. 
still an “anocracy”) based on slight improvements of the component variables of 
“competitiveness of participation” (from 3 to 4) and particularly the “political 
competition concept” (from 6 to 8). The overall Freedom House “freedom status” 
remained “partly free” throughout the remainder of the period under review (i.e. 
until 2004). However, the 1995 Freedom House rating for “political rights” 
improved from 5 in 1994 to 4.  
The new constitution, adopted in August 1995, can be considered as an 
explicit decision on the establishment of a democratic system. It introduced the 
formal requisites of democratic statehood to independent Georgia. Together with 
the presidential and parliamentary elections of November 1995, it represented an 
important milestone in the democratization process of the country, theoretically 
marking the beginning of the democratic consolidation phase.
138
 As Julia 
                                                 
137
  The most controversial issue was over the powers of the presidency. 
138
  Regarding the phases of a democratization process according to the transition model of 
O´Donnell et al. 1986, see footnote 57. While the process and conditions of democratic 
consolidation have yet to be researched in a systematic way in order to draw general 
conclusions, several conceptions of consolidation exist varying from minimalist approaches 
(Di Palma 1990: 138-44; Przeworski 1991: 26) to more demanding concepts (Pridham 1995; 
Linz and Stepan 1996). In contrast to the transition phase of democratization processes, 
during which the influence of actors is considered more pronounced, several authors see the 
explanatory value of actor-centered approaches to be more limited during the consolidation 
phase in light of democracy-obstructing structural conditions (Nohlen 2010b: 498). 
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Leininger points out in line with procedural definitions of democratic 
consolidation, direct measures in this phase aim at deepening institutional reforms 
and at influencing behavior and attitudes of the political elites and the population 
(Leininger 2010c: 166 ff.). This development of Georgia’s process to enter a new 
phase in its political transformation is considered here gradual change in the 
structural political context conditions. With the development, adoption and 
beginning implementation of the new constitutional framework, new entry points 
for international democracy promoters open up—both with regard to a broader 
palette of instruments at the democracy promoters’ disposal to support the 
deepening of the democratization process as well as with regard to new areas of 
engagement associated with newly (re)introduced democratic norms and 
institutions—for instance election observation, assistance with regard to the legal 
framework and administration of elections as well as with regard to institutions to 
be created under the new constitution. According to the conceptualization of types 
of change in the context conditions provided in chapter 2.2 (see Table 1, page 54), 
the ideal response of a context-sensitive democracy promoter to such a change in 
the democratization phase would consist in a ‘general/political adaptation’ by 
reconsidering the country approach and/or in ‘specific/strategic adaptation’ by 
reviewing the implementation strategy and/or adapting the instruments and/or 
areas of engagement of democracy promotion. 
4.4 Stagnation of Georgia’s democratization process: failed 
democratic consolidation in 1995-1999 
While formal democratic institutions were established and a series of required 
laws and legal instruments adopted after the adoption of the new constitution in 
August 1995, the following analysis will show that the political elite failed to 
comply with and internalize democratic rules of the game and thereby failed to 
expand the political order’s legitimacy during Shevardnadze’s rule, as required by 
conventional definitions of democratic consolidation (Morlino 1995; Nohlen 
2010b: 498).
139
 Such rules were far from becoming “the only game in town” 
(Przeworski 1991: 26) in Georgia during the late Shevardnadze era. In the second 
half of the 1990s, Georgia’s democratization process has not achieved notable 
progress in any of the three dimensions of consolidation: neither the 
                                                 
139
  Philippe C. Schmitter integrated the issue of democracy’s institutional design that political 
actors agree with and citizens support into the consolidation term (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 
87). 
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constitutional, nor the behavioral and the attitudinal (Linz and Stepan 1996).
140
 As 
mentioned above, both, the Polity IV “combined polity score” of 5 as well as 
Freedom House’s “freedom status” of “partly free” remained unchanged from 
1995 to 1999 (and beyond). This is also the case for Polity IV component 
variables, while Freedom House shows a slight improvement in political rights 
from 4 in 1995-1996 to 3 in 1997-1999. Freedom House’s “Nations in Transit” 
even measured improvements in the electoral process from 5.00 in 1997 to 4.50 in 
1998 and 4.00 in 1999, in the civil society scores from 4.50 in 1997 to 4.25 in 
1998 and 3.75 in 1999, in the independent media score from 4.50 in 1997 to 4.25 
in 1998 and 3.75 in 1999 as well as with regard to the judicial framework and 
independence from 5.00 in 1997 to 4.75 in 1998 and 4.00 in 1999. The following 
qualitative analysis provides more detailed insights into political developments in 
Georgia ‘beneath’ the stagnating democratization process by applying the 
theoretical approach of neopatrimonialism and shifting the focus from political 
regime to political authority.
141
 
Throughout this second phase of Shevardnadze’s rule, the informal manner of 
decision-making continued. However, the initial mode of authority based on fluid 
clientelist networks developed into an efficient neopatrimonial system 
characterized by more central control
142: “a very effective tool” (Timm 2012: 171) 
of this central control proved to be an “informal hierarchy of clientelism 
                                                 
140
  Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) have identified three dimensions in which democratic 
norms and values need to be accepted and defended in order for a democracy to be considered 
consolidated: Firstly, democracy is constitutionally consolidated when the constitution 
introduces democratic norms to the political system that government and opposition adhere 
to. Secondly, the behavioral consolidation of democracy is reflected in the democratic 
behavior of the relevant political and societal elites who accept democratic rules as “the only 
game in town” and abstain from manipulating them. In line with the minimalist approaches to 
democratic consolidation, this behavioral consolidation is what Adam Przeworski has 
summarized in the often-cited formula “Democracy is consolidated, when under given 
political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game 
in town, ...” (Przeworski 1991: 26) and what Geoffrey Pridham calls “negative” consolidation 
of democracy (Pridham 1995: 168). Pridham considers the reason for the “negative” 
consolidation to lie in the lack of an attractive alternative. Thirdly, the attitudinal 
consolidation of democracy refers to the internalization of democratic values by the citizens 
who feel obliged to protect democracy. This is what Pridham calls “positive” consolidation of 
democracy (Pridham 1995: 168). In his view, a democracy is “positively” consolidated only 
when the entire system is legitimate not only in the eyes of the elites because of the lack of 
alternatives but when the attitude, values, and behavior of the citizens reflect a stable belief in 
the legitimacy of democracy. 
141
  See footnote 111. 
142
  In contrast to simple clientelist networks, neopatrimonial authority is retreats to officially 
prescribed positions and preserves the option to enforce formal rules—if needed—and is, 
thereby, able to bridge interrupted resource flows or defuse increasing demands on the part of 
its clients to a certain extent (Erdmann and Engel 2006: 21-2; Timm 2012: 173). 
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overlap[ping] with the official state hierarchy” (Stefes 2008: 75) that was based 
on a complex system of endemic and highly institutionalized corruption.
143
 
According to Timm (2012), the institutionalization of corruption in Georgia 
during the second half of the 1990s was enabled by the permissive attitude of the 
Georgian ruling elite towards corruption as well as by the following incentive 
structures: consciously keeping wages in the state administration low, 
commoditizing public positions, and establishing a legal environment of 
conflicting, ambiguous and rapidly changing laws and regulations that ensured 
that people could not avoid violating rules.
144
 In combination with an extensive 
surveillance of state officials, this institutionalized corruption served as a 
mechanism of state control because it allowed compiling records of compromising 
materials that could be used for blackmail when compliance was needed—similar 
to the Soviet practice of kompramat.
145
  
Although politics under Shevardnadze were aimed primarily at generating 
opportunities to extort bribes rather than at shaping Georgia according to a 
‘Western’ understanding of governance (Christophe 2005: 97-8; Timm 2012: 
172), ambiguously, this system helped to create a positive international image of 
Georgia: Frequent corruption scandals—more likely, cases of clients’ non-
compliance with the patron and a strong warning signal to other clients to better 
comply—enabled Shevardnadze in the second half of the 1990s to present 
Georgia as highly committed to an anti-corruption policy and democratization. 
This secured a long period of steady aid flow from the international community 
that enhanced the possibility of material rewards within the neopatrimonial system 
and, thereby—ironically—stabilized the existing system (Timm 2012: 172).  
Figure 5 shows the steady increase of aid flows to Georgia between 1997 and 
2002, while the 2003 decrease of aid flows reflects the demystification of the 
                                                 
143
  Transparency International’s “Corruption Perception Index” score for Georgia deteriorated 
from 2.3 in 1999 (rank 84 out of 99) to 1.24 in 2003 (rank 124 out of 133). In 1998, the 
World Bank conducted a survey on the “price” people have to pay in order to enter into 
offices. According to this, the police corps, followed by the tax service, the customs, the 
courts, the president’s office, the prosecutor’s office, and the ministries have the highest rate 
of corruption (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998a).  
144
  This reflects that the neopatrimonial logic requires a sufficient instituitonalization of both the 
informal and formal dimensions. Their relationship is not to be understood as a zero-sum 
game. In order to use formal rules for sanctioning non-compliance when needed, there is a 
need for formal institutions—although these may be ineffective in producing public goods 
(Christophe 2005; Timm 2012: 173). 
145
  See Keith A. Darden regarding the three basic elements of state control: permissive attitude of 
state leaders towards corruption, extensive state surveillance to document malfeasance, and 
the use of this information to blackmail relevant political, economic or social actors when 
compliance is required (Darden 2001). 
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international image of Shevardnadze’s Georgia right before the “Rose 
Revolution”.146 
Figure 5: Net bilateral aid flows from OECD Development Assistance 
Committee donors to Georgia 1991-2005 (in current USD) 
 
Source: own query of datasheet of World Development Indicators for Georgia, available for download at the World Bank 
website at http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/geo?downloadformat=excel (accessed in May 2016). 
Shevardnadze had become the ultimate decision-maker both within the state and 
within his political party, the CUG. By balancing competing interests and the 
practice of kompramat, Shevardnadze ensured that no single group was able to 
challenge his authority as head of state, head of government and head of the ruling 
party. The tactic of divide et impera and of preventively co-opting possible 
opposition forces contributed to overcoming chaos and violence but called into 
question democratic principles and the rule of law. Laws were passed but their 
implementation was only guaranteed when their content coincidently 
corresponded to the personal self-interest of responsible authorities (Huber 2004: 
47). However, such ‘backstage’ developments are most often not visible and 
easily identifiable for ‘external’ actors who interact with domestic actors and 
institutions at the ‘frontstage’. The stability of Shevardnadze’s efficient 
neopatrimonial system that had characterized the period of democratic stagnation 
from 1995 to 1999 was upset when his authority came under pressure, resulting in 
a democratic backsliding and disintegration of his ruling party coalition, as the 
next section will show. 
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  The reason for the drop in aid flows between 1996 and 1997 could be that several donors 
reprogrammed from emergency and humanitarian aid to convential aid modalities. 
0
50000000
100000000
150000000
200000000
250000000
300000000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
  125 
4.5 Gradual change in structural and actor-centered context 
conditions: democratic backsliding (t1.b.2) as a result of the 
disintegration of the ruling party in 1999-2003 (t1.a) 
By the end of the 1990s, the population’s growing dissatisfaction with 
developments in Georgia had increasingly become visible, especially in the form 
of protests against the disastrous economic situation and the energy-supply crisis 
in particular. Shevardnadze responded by replacing the energy minister with 
increasing frequency (BTI 2003: 11). People’s growing dissatisfaction became 
also apparent in the October 1999 parliamentary elections when a heterogeneous 
opposition alliance received a noteworthy number of votes for the first time.
147
 
Although this indicated an emerging party system, fragmentation was still very 
high and political parties in Georgia continued to be weak. King (2001: 98) 
considered Georgia’s multiparty system at that time “to a great degree a notional 
one” in practical terms. Moreover, the usual alliance between reform-oriented 
representatives of the regime and moderate members of the opposition, which 
could have been expected according to conventional transition theory, was never 
formed in Georgia (BTI 2003: 1 ff.). In reaction to the opposition alliance’s 
“dramatic increase in their vote totals” in 1999, “Shevardnadze appointed these 
young politicians to high offices in ministries, only to stab them in their backs as 
they tried to deal with the old, corrupt power elites” (BTI 2003: 11).  
The slowly growing strength of opposition forces was paralleled by an internal 
power struggle within the CUG to succeed Shevardnadze. The CUG had split into 
a reform wing on the one hand and a group of presidential loyalists on the other 
already in 1999. The power struggle over Shevardnadze’s succession became 
particularly fierce after the April 2000 presidential elections.
148
 Shevardnadze had 
only been able to run for re-election due to a constitutional change. This internal 
                                                 
147
  Although the ruling party coalition CUG strengthened its position with 56.2 percent (41.8 
percent of which in the proportional vote) compared to 23.7 percent of the votes in the 
November 1995 parliamentary elections (Slider 1997: 181-2), the 1999 elections provided for 
a well-defined opposition with more than 25 percent in addition to this clear majority 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2000b: 28). This constitutes an improvement to the 1995 situation when 61.5 
percent of the votes had been given to parties that did not pass the 5-percent-threshold and the 
only non-ruling-party-coalition parties received 8 percent (National Democratic Party) and 
6.8 percent (Revival) (Slider 2000: 519).  
148
  Out of six candidates, Shevardnadze received 79.8 percent of the votes. However, 
international elections observers noted several irregularities, particularly with regard to the 
interference by state authorities in the election process, unreliable voter registers, deficient 
election legislation, and a not fully representative election administration. The OSCE Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights noted that “[c]onsiderable progress is 
necessary for Georgia to fully meet its commitments as a participating State of the OSCE, and 
restore the confidence of opposition parties and voters in the democratic process.” 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2000a: 24). 
  126
battle soon caused the presidential party to disintegrate and to splinter the 
reformists (BTI 2003: 11). The few individuals who had appeared to be genuinely 
committed to reform faced obstacles placed in their way by the government.
149
 As 
a result, important reform projects were left aside or watered down due to 
excessive tactical maneuvering. For instance, this was the fate of the issue of 
introducing the office of prime minister and of revising the law on local self-
administration, which ended up being characterized by strong tendencies of 
centralization (ibid.).  
Shevardnadze’s declining authority became apparent in increasingly authoritarian 
and repressive measures. After Georgia’s admission to the Council of Europe in 
April 1999, power abuses including extra-judicial killing, police torture, state-
condoned violence against religious minorities, and death threats to journalists 
coming from state officials have reportedly increased according to international 
human rights organizations (e.g. Amnesty International 2000; 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2000a, 2000b). Although state involvement in 
violent assaults against political and civil society organizations could not be 
proven, the lack of determination to prosecute them was a fact. Furthermore, in 
the late years of the Shevardnadze era, harassment of politically active NGOs 
became a new ‘norm’ and laws limiting their freedom were passed.150 In contrast, 
throughout the 1990s, there had hardly been any legislative limitations on civil 
society organizations. 
Given the absence of progress in governance and macro-economic performance, 
Georgia was eventually demystified in the eyes of the ‘Western’ donor 
community. Donors responded by cutting back financial and political aid.
151
  
                                                 
149
  One example refers to Shevardnadze’s successor as president who was, at the time, Justice 
Minister: Mikheil Saakashvili suggested a full-scale anti-corruption crack-down within his 
ministry in November 2000 but was publicly rebuked for the potential ‘negative 
consequences’ of his zeal by Shevardnadze. Later, in 2002, Saakashvili resigned from his 
position to fight a parliamentary by-election because the government refused to approve an 
anti-corruption law. However, this step can also be seen in light of the internal power struggle 
that took place within the CUG and produced a lot of ‘hysterical’ anti-corruption rhetoric 
without any political effect. 
150
  In April 2002, Shevardnadze compared NGO activities with those of terrorists and pleaded 
for greater financial control of these groups which, in most cases, were funded by foreign 
donors. In February 2003, the Ministry of Security circulated a draft law ‘On the Suspension 
of Activities, Liquidation, and Banning of Extremist Organizations under Foreign Control’, 
but toned it down in response to protests by human rights groups. The Ministry of Finance 
issued an order imposing state control over all grants to NGOs in March 2003. Three months 
later, a Tbilisi district court suspended this order (Piano 2004: 5; Jawad 2005: 27). 
151
  As a result of Georgia’s unsatisfactory macro-economic performance and progress on 
structural reforms, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did not release a second tranche of 
another USD 30 million in 2003. The same year, the European Commission revised its policy 
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Figure 6: Democratic governance indicator ratings for Georgia 1999-2003
152
 
Source: Ghia Nodia, Nations in Transit 2005: Georgia, Freedom House, 2005, p.1.  
Figure 6 provides a picture of the decline in democratic governance performance 
according to quantitative data of Freedom House’s “Nations in Transit” for 1999-
2003.
153
 With the exception of the scores for independent media and judicial 
framework and independence that started declining only in 2001, the performance 
in all other governance areas has worsened since 2000. Figure 5 above shows a 
clear decline in aid flows in 2003. This reduction in aid flows limited 
opportunities for material rewards and ultimately changed incentive structures in 
Shevardnadze’s neopatrimonial system. The deepening of internal splits and 
cleavages within the ruling party coalition as well as the use of increasingly 
authoritarian and repressive measures were the result. 
                                                                                                                                     
towards Georgia outside the regular cycle of programming reviews due to the deterioration of 
the situation (European Commission 2003: 3, 11). 
152
  The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 
representing the lowest level of democratic development. Freedom House’s Nations in 
Transit “democracy score” decreased from 4.17 in 1999 to 4.83 in 2003. With the exception 
of a slight decline from 1999 to 2000 of Freedom in the World’s “political rights” and Polity 
IV’s “regulation of participation”, “competitiveness of participation” and “political 
competition concept” scores, the decline in governance performance does not become visible 
in these other two quantitative indices. 
153
  However, the Freedom House ratings for Georgia between 1992 and 2002 were considered 
still too positive by some in retrospect. Larry Diamond, for instance, mainly refers to 
Freedom House data in his research but uses lower ratings for the case of Georgia (Diamond 
2015: 143-4, 55). 
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These gradual actor-centered changes of Shevardnadze’s decreasing authority, 
the disintegration of his ruling party coalition, the relative strengthening of 
opposition forces, and increasing public protests against socio-economic 
conditions (t1.a) significantly contributed to the gradual structural change of 
democratic backsliding (t1.b.2). With the destabilization of his neopatrimonial 
system, Shevardnadze was desperate to hold on to power by other means. This 
was reflected in increased election manipulations. While none of the elections 
conducted during the Shevardnadze era fully met international standards, election 
manipulations were intensified at the end of the 1990s, causing a rapid loss of 
democratic legitimacy: 
Already with regard to the October/November 1999 parliamentary elections, 
the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) noted 
“some irregularities”, “some instances of intimidation and violence observed 
during the pre-election period and on election days” as well as “few occasions of 
ballot stuffing”. It stated that “freedom of movement was at times restricted, and 
on occasions these restrictions prevented political parties from campaigning” and 
that “the election law allowed the ruling party to enjoy a dominant position in the 
election administration at all levels.” (OSCE/ODIHR 2000b: 2). The International 
Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), a Georgian local monitoring 
organization, reported widespread stuffing of ballot boxes, intimidation of voters 
by police and violence against independent election observers (King 2001: 98).  
The problems identified by the OSCE/ODIHR with regard to the April 2000 
presidential elections included interference by state authorities in the election 
process, deficient election legislation, a not fully representative election 
administration, unreliable voter registers, and ballot box stuffing. It stated that 
the authorities provided strong support for the incumbent’s election 
campaign. There was no clear dividing line between State affairs and the 
incumbent’s campaign. […] the State media failed to provide balanced 
reporting on candidates and gave the incumbent clear advantage. 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2000a: 2) 
Thus, Shevardnadze had established a constitutional democracy façade during his 
presidency. Georgia at the end of his presidency may be categorized as an 
“electoral authoritarian regime” following Andreas Schedler’s concept of this 
“modal type of political regime” and “new form of authoritarianism behind 
electoral façades“(Schedler 2006; Jawad 2012a).154 The elections that are 
regularly held in these regimes are: 
                                                 
154
  Political analysts have responded to the challenge of an empirical reality of “grey zones” by 
developing an array of “democracy with adjectives” terms (Collier and Levitsky 1997). “Most 
  129 
Broadly inclusive (they are held under universal suffrage), minimally 
competitive (opposition parties, while denied victory [as in the November 
2003 elections], are allowed to win votes and seats), and minimally open 
(opposition parties are not subject to massive repression, although they may 
experience repressive treatment in selective and intermittent ways). (Schedler 
2006: 3) 
These gradual actor-centered and structural developments in Georgia under 
Shevardnadze, combined with citizens’ apathy increasingly turning into 
frustration with poverty and pervasive corruption affecting all areas of life and 
causing permanent uncertainty, prepared the stage on which the events unfolded 
that became known as the “Rose Revolution”.155 From democracy promoters, one 
would at least expect practical adaptation in response to the above-mentioned 
gradual actor-centered change. In addition, with a higher threshold because more 
far-reaching, a general reconsideration of the country approach (‘political 
adaptation’) and a reconsideration of the implementation strategy, instruments and 
areas of engagement (‘strategic adaptation’) in light of the democratic backsliding 
would be sensible according to the above conceptualization (see Table 1, page 
54). 
                                                                                                                                     
of the ‘qualified democracy’ terms are used to characterize countries as being stuck 
somewhere on the assumed democratization sequence, usually at the start of the consolidation 
phase” (Carothers 2002: 10). One of the “democracy with adjectives” terms refers to the 
concept of “defective democracies” that is mostly used in German research. It is based on the 
assumption that a well-functioning liberal democracy consists of intertwined partial regimes 
(“embedded democracy”) and that defects in these partial regimes result in four types of 
defective democracies depending on which of these partial regimes is affected (Merkel et al. 
2003; Merkel and Croissant 2004). However, the author herself has argued that Georgia may 
better be analyzed in terms of authoritarian sub-types than a democracy with adjectives. This 
argument is made in light of the fact that conventional minimum democratic critieria of 
regular free and fair elections have not been met in Georgia for the period under review here 
(Jawad 2012a). The argument follows the claim that a regime cannot be categorized as even a 
diminished form of democracy if the very core principle of this “root concept” (Sartori 1971) 
is being contradicted. Therefore, some believe those regimes can be better described as 
(diminished) forms of authoritarianism (Linz 2000; Levitsky and Way 2002: 52). 
155
  In a May 2003 survey, 68 percent of respondents considered Shevardnadze “unfavourable” in 
political leaders’ ratings and only 6 percent considered him the “preferred next president”. 83 
percent answered the question “Generally speaking, things in Georgia are going in the...” with 
“wrong direction” and 11 percent with “right direction”. The question “How satisfied are you 
with the way democracy is developing in Georgia?” was answered by 40 percent with “very 
dissatisfied” and by 29 percent with “somewhat dissatisfied”. Regarding the question “Which 
political parties can deal most successfully with and solve the problems Georgia is facing?”, 
only 4 percent named Shevardnadze’s CUG, while 47 percent stated that they would never 
vote for Shevardnadze’s election bloc “New Georgia”. Furthermore, 50 percent of the 
respondents expected the upcoming 2003 parliamentary elections to be “not free and fair” 
(IRI, Gallup and IPM 2003: slides 3, 6, 19, 23-25, 73). 
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4.6 The “rupture” in Georgia’s political transformation process 
(t1.c.2): the “Rose Revolution” as a window of opportunity for 
democratization and its promotion in 2003-2004 
The “Rose Revolution” of November 2003 
Against the background of the devastating economic situation, the lawlessness of 
the political leadership, and the fact that state institutions were not capable of 
fulfilling their core functions and delivering services to citizens, the population’s 
dissatisfaction with the Shevardnadze government peaked in massive public 
protests against endemic election fraud in November 2003.
156
 On the one hand, 
these manipulations had been drastically increasing with the government’s 
decreasing popularity since the end of the 1990s and, on the other hand, had 
become more transparent with improved election laws and monitoring by civil 
society and international organizations (Nodia 2004: 2). With regard to the 2 
November 2003 parliamentary elections, the OSCE found unusually clear words 
in its final observation report: 
The 2 November Parliamentary elections in Georgia fell short of a number of 
OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic 
elections. The elections demonstrated that the authorities lacked political will 
to conduct a genuine democratic process. This resulted in widespread and 
systematic election fraud during and after election day (OSCE/ODIHR 
2004b: 1). 
The mass demonstrations that took place in Georgia spearheaded by the youth 
organization “Enough” (Georgian: kmara) as well as international attention paid 
to these developments forced Shevardnadze to resign on 23 November. The “Rose 
Revolution” of November 2003 brought a new government of “young reformers” 
around Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze into office. 
They all had defected from the ruling elite: Saakashvili had resigned from his 
position as Minister of Justice in 2002 in protest of the government’s refusal to 
                                                 
156
  In particular, inaccurate voter lists resulted in double voting on the one and disenfranchised 
voters on the other hand. Prior to elections, authorities had not made genuine efforts to 
compile accurate and reliable lists. While a wide variety of political parties provided voters 
with a genuine choice, their “playing fields” of campaign conditions was certainly uneven. 
The pro-presidential bloc abused administrative resources to its benefit and failed to 
distinguish between political party and state. The state media failed providing allocated air 
time and reporting in a politically balanced manner. The composition of election commissions 
at all levels gave a distinct advantage to pro-presidential parties. The pre-election period was 
marred by two acts of serious violence and intimidation of voters. Polling was characterized 
by irregularities such as ballot stuffing, multiple voting and destruction of ballot boxes 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2004b: 1-2). 
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approve an anti-corruption law
157
 and founded the “United National Movement” 
(UNM) party. Zhvania had become the CUG’s first Secretary General and later 
Chairperson of Parliament—a position he resigned from in protest against the 
attempt to crack down on the independent TV station “Rustavi2” in November 
2001. He later created the “United Democrats” party.158 Zhvania was succeeded as 
Chairperson of Parliament by Burjanadze, who emerged in August 2003 as head 
of an opposition electoral alliance named “Burjanadze-Democrats”. When 
Shevardnadze resigned, as Chairperson of Parliament, Burjanadze became Interim 
President and called for extraordinary presidential elections, as required by the 
1995 Constitution. 
Georgia’s Supreme Court annulled the election results on 25 November—those of 
the proportional election contest but not the majoritarian election results although 
many of these were equally questionable according to monitoring organizations. 
Partial repeat parliamentary elections were scheduled for 28 March 2004. 
Saakashvili was elected President with 96 percent of the votes in the extraordinary 
presidential elections of 4 January 2004.  
The “Rose Revolution” represented the first peaceful change of government in 
independent Georgia after Gamsakhurdia had been violently driven from office. 
Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik consider the Rose Revolution “electoral 
change”159 and the victory of the opposition the result of “breakthrough elections” 
(Bunce and Wolchik 2009). This reference can be somewhat misleading because 
the change of government was not directly brought about by democratic 
elections.
160
 Firstly, the executive was not up for elections; President 
Shevardnadze was not the incumbent and not up for vote in the parliamentary 
elections. Secondly, the protests, demanding the President’s resignation, began 
before official election results were even published. Thus, it was not the election 
results but public protests against the alleged massive election fraud demanding 
the President’s resignation that had induced Shevardnadze to step down. The 
extraordinary presidential elections of January 2004 brought a dynamic reform 
                                                 
157
  See footnote 149. 
158
  In the new government he was appointed Prime Minister. His mysterious death in January 
2005 was accompanied by rumors about rising tensions inside the pro-presidential camp. 
159
  Bunce and Wolchik introduce an “electoral model” identifying “tasks that, if implemented by 
opposition groups and citizens, will increase the likelihood of authoritarians’ a) losing at the 
polls, and b) actually ceding power and leaving office in response to such a loss” (Bunce and 
Wolchik 2009b: 97). Core elements of the model are rigorous election monitoring, impressive 
campaigning, voter-registration and voter-mobilization drives, advance preparation for 
protests, and parallel vote tabulations. 
160
  In their 2011 book on “Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries”, Bunce 
and Wolchik elaborate the application of their “electoral model” to the case of Georgia in a 
much more differentiated and less misleading way (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). 
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government under President Mikheil Saakashvili into office. This is considered a 
“rupture” in Georgia’s political transformation process (t1.c.2) in terms of a rapid 
and radical change from a government of an old, corrupt elite based on a 
neopatrimonial system and an ambiguous legal framework not directed at any sort 
of reform and democratic process to a new dynamic government of young reform-
oriented politicians with the political will to democratic reform. In light of this 
radical change, it would be rather likely that democracy promoters adapt and 
reconsider their country approaches and implementation strategy; in light of the 
rapid change, deciding upon ad-hoc measures would also be sensible. The 
political costs of inaction can be considered to be very high at such points in time 
(see chapter 2.2). 
Figure 7: Perception of various institutions in Georgia in 2003 and 2004 
 
Source: own graph produced from results of surveys conducted by the International Centre for Conflicts and Negotiations 
(ICCN). Polls of 1,000 respondents in three major cities of Georgia (spring 2003 and 2004), as cited in Nodia and 
Scholtbach 2007: 66. 
Initial reform successes of the Saakashvili government after the “Rose 
Revolution” 
Following the “Rose Revolution”, a dynamic reform government took office 
demonstrating the political will to change the inherited institutional environment. 
The hopes of the international community as well as of the Georgian population 
were high that the “Rose Revolution” would provide an impetus for democratic 
consolidation in Georgia. Interesting in this regard is a comparison of people’s 
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trust in various institutions before and after the “Rose Revolution”. Figure 7 
shows that positive ratings of all institutions have increased—in the case of state 
institutions by leaps and bounds. This increase of positive ratings indicates a 
significant gain of trust and, therefore, an improvement in input legitimacy. 
Contempt and mistrust in state institutions are common in non-communist 
authoritarian regimes and even democracies. Almost nowhere, however, are they 
as strong as in the former Soviet Union (Fairbanks 2010: 144). Against this 
backdrop, the improvements in the perception of state institutions after the “Rose 
Revolution” are even more impressive. This can be interpreted in the sense that 
the data for 2003 express the apathy, resignation and lack of trust prevailing in 
society during the Shevardnadze era, while the numbers for 2004 reflect the 
atmosphere of a new beginning and the hopes attributed to the new elite. The 
“Rose Revolution” opened a window of opportunity for progress in 
democratization and, thus, for ‘external’ democracy promoters in Georgia. 
After taking office, the new government under Mikheil Saakashvili achieved 
some noteworthy successes and structural change: moribund government 
institutions were rebuilt, the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration 
was increased, as was public revenue, the economy was transformed and 
macroeconomic performance improved.
161
 Especially the public administration 
reforms demonstrated remarkable success in combating corruption and in 
providing basic services to the population.
162
 While, in retrospect, there is 
widespread consensus that Saakashvili’s success in fighting corruption refers to 
only eliminating low-level official corruption, Shevardnadze‘s system of 
corruption pyramids can be considered abolished (Timm 2012: 175). The 
administrative reforms were based on a revision of the respective legislation, a 
reduction of the number of ministries, the introduction of clear standards and 
transparent administrative procedures, new infrastructure, a massive personnel 
reorganization of the state administration, targeted measures for improving public 
officials’ qualifications as well as raising the salaries of civil servants. Particularly 
those institutions of crucial importance to the Shevardnadze regime were the 
focus of reform efforts, i.e. the law enforcement agencies (Timm 2012: 174). 
                                                 
161
  According to the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”, the macroeconomic data 
improved from a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth (annual percent) of 6.2 
percent in 2002 to 11.0 percent in 2005as well as from a GDP per capita based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) (current international USD) of 3,016.1 in 2002 to 4,173.2 in 2005 (see the 
World Bank website at http://data.worldbank.org/, accessed in May 2016). 
162
  The 2003 “Corruption Perception Index” score of 1.24 indicating pervasive corruption and a 
rank of 85 out of 102 improved to a CPI score of 4.1 and a rank of 66 out of 180 in 2009 (see 
the “Transparency International” website at 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview, accessed in May 2016). 
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Within the first two years, over 16,000 police officers, 2,000 tax collectors and 
1,500 customs officers were removed from their posts (BTI 2006: 15). 
Georgia after the “Rose Revolution” differed very much in shape and appearance 
compared to the Shevardnadze era. Despite poverty and unemployment remaining 
relatively high, the living conditions of the Georgian population improved 
significantly with functioning state institutions actually delivering public services. 
Thus, the “Rose Revolution” does represent a rapid and radical change providing 
a window of opportunity demanding political adaptation at headquarter-level and 
strategic adaptation at implementation-level from ‘external’ democracy 
promoters. 
4.7 Synthesis: identified types of change in the political 
transformation of Georgia 1991-2004 and ideal OSCE 
responses 
As shown by the above analysis of the political context conditions in Georgia 
from 1991 to 2004, international democracy promoters have been faced with 
challenging political developments and various types of change at different points 
in time throughout the transformation process: 
 turbulent early years of Georgia’s transition process with several violent 
conflicts in the early 1990s; 
 the “rupture” in efforts of political stabilization as a result of the 
September/October 1993 warfare; 
 gradual change in structural political context conditions in the form of the 
constitution-making process and formal introduction of democratic norms and 
institutions in 1994-1995; 
 stagnation in Georgia’s political transformation process in 1995-1999; 
 gradual change in actor-centered context conditions in the form of the ruling 
party’s disintegration in 1999-2003; 
 gradual change in structural context conditions in the form of increasing 
strategic election manipulations (i.e. democratic backsliding) as a result of the 
ruling political party’s disintegration in 1999-2003; 
 the second “rupture” in Georgia’s political transformation in the shape of the 
“Rose Revolution” of November 2003 that opened a window of opportunity 
for further democratization and its promotion. 
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Table 6: Types of change in Georgia's political context conditions 1991-2004 
and ideal OSCE responses 1992-2004 
 GEORGIAN CONTEXT 1991-2004 
 type of change 
in context 
conditions 
type of change in the 
context conditions of 
Georgia 
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A
D
U
A
L
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
gradual 
change of 
actor-
centered 
context 
conditions 
 t1.a: 1999-2003 
disintegration of the 
ruling party and 
strengthening of 
opposition forces and 
civil society  
 gradual 
change of 
structural 
context 
conditions 
 t1.b.1: introduction of 
democratic norms and 
institutions as a result 
of constitution-making 
process 1994-1995 
  t1.b.2: 1999-2003 
democratic backsliding 
and increased strategic 
election manipulations 
 
 
R
U
P
T
U
R
E
 
rapid and 
radical 
political 
change of 
a wide 
scope 
 t1.c.1: late-1993 warfare 
and changed 
positioning towards 
Russia 
  t1.c.2: 2003-2004 “Rose 
Revolution” and 
change to reform-
oriented government 
Source: own account 
Table 6 synthesizes the identified types of change as well as the response one 
would ideally expect from a context-sensitive democracy promoter according to 
the conceptualization provided in chapter 2.2. 
Whether the OSCE designed its engagement in Georgia based on a good 
knowledge of the context conditions at the point in time t0 (see section 4.1) and 
whether the OSCE utilized internal prerequisites to respond to the respective types 
of change by adapting accordingly will be analyzed in the following chapter. 
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5. Analysis of context-sensitive adaptation: OSCE responses to 
identified types of change in Georgia’s political context 
conditions 1992-2004 
As elaborated in chapter 2.1, democratization is genuinely a domestic process that 
can be supported but not successfully imposed from the ‘outside’. ‘Outsiders’, i.e. 
international democracy promoters, lend support to a locally-driven process. 
Adapting the democracy promotion engagement sensitive to the (changing) 
political context of the target country is, therefore, considered a facilitator of 
successful democracy promotion. 
As mentioned earlier, this study will not assess whether the OSCE has applied the 
‘right’ approach or offer a solution to the question what the ‘right’ approach for a 
certain domestic situation and specific political context conditions on the ground 
would be. Furthermore, this study does not aim at analyzing the effectiveness or 
impact of international democracy promotion activities in terms of correlations 
between the activities of democracy promoters as independent variable and 
progress in the democratization process and improvements in democratic quality 
in the target country as dependent variable. 
Rather, this chapter will analyze whether the OSCE as international 
democracy promoter in Georgia utilized internal prerequisites for context-
sensitivity and adaptability to interact with the political context conditions so as to 
adapt its engagement sensitive these at the outset of OSCE engagement in 1992 
(t0) as well as to the types of change in Georgia’s political transformation (t1.x) 
analyzed in chapter 4. The analysis of the country context in chapter 4 structures 
the analysis in this chapter of whether the OSCE adapted its engagement as 
international democracy promoter in Georgia to the domestic political context 
conditions in the period under review from 1992 to 2004. The aim of this analysis 
of context-sensitive adaptation is to provide for the empirical basis for the 
systematic synthesis of findings in chapter 6 with regard to the hypotheses on the 
likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation in response to “ruptures” and to gradual 
types of change in the political transformation process, developed in chapter 2.2. 
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5.1 The OSCE’s utilization of internal prerequisites and response 
to the political challenges at the outset of OSCE engagement 
in Georgia in 1992 (t0) 
As has been elaborated above, in chapter 2.2, the OSCE as international 
democracy promoter in Georgia will be considered context-sensitive at t0, if the 
OSCE’s initial decision on how to engage with and whether to promote 
democratization in Georgia—that is at the political level on the country approach 
and at the operational/field-level on the approach to implementation—correspond 
to an initial context analysis of the political context conditions in the target 
country Georgia (see Figure 1 on page 64). While the question of whether the 
OSCE has standard procedures for analyzing the political context conditions in 
participating States, i.e. potential host countries has been answered in chapter 3.3, 
this chapter will analyze whether and how the OSCE has utilized its organization-
internal procedures for context-sensitivity, developed in the conceptual 
framework (see chapter 2.2 and Table 3 on page 63), in Georgia at the outset of its 
engagement at t0 in 1992. 
5.1.1 Context Analysis at the outset of CSCE/OSCE engagement in 
Georgia in 1992 at t0 
As elaborated above, the OSCE developed a standard procedure for assessing 
progress of newly admitted countries towards full implementation of 
CSCE/OSCE commitments that include democratic values in January 1992: 
rapporteur missions. The OSCE utilized this standard procedure with regard to 
Georgia amidst the turbulent early transition phase. Just shortly after the violent 
overthrow of independent Georgia’s first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, in the 
Winter War of December 1991/January 1992, Georgia became CSCE/OSCE 
participating State by decision of the CSCE/OSCE Council of Ministers on 24 
March 1992. The transitional Georgian government had already invited 
CSCE/OSCE rapporteurs in a letter on 28 February 1992. From 18 to 22 May 
1992, the rapporteur mission visited Georgia. By considering their role as oriented 
at contributing towards a stable and democratic future of Georgia in addition to 
the mandate of reporting to the OSCE participating States on Georgia’s progress 
towards full implementation of CSCE/OSCE commitments, the rapporteurs 
already indicated a role of the OSCE as ‘external’ democracy promoter in Georgia 
(CSCE Secretariat 1992g, CSCE Communication No. 186). 
The rapporteur mission summarized their analysis of conditions and 
developments in Georgia in its 18-pages report, dated 29 May 1992. The report 
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was circulated to the delegations of the Fourth Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki. 
Under the lead of former Belgium Prime Minister and then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Mark Eyskens, the rapporteurs assessed Georgia’s political situation in 
general as well as the state of affairs with regard to democratic institutions and the 
rule of law, the human rights situation, minority problems, economic issues, and 
military security. For this purpose, they had met with representatives of several 
ministries and the office of the prime minister of the transitional government, 
various political parties, the dissolved parliament, the judicial branch, the military, 
regional authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, civil society, culture, religious 
communities, ethnic minorities as well as with supporters of former President 
Gamsakhurdia, imprisoned former members of parliament, and internally 
displaced persons. The rapporteur mission had also inspected sites of violent 
incidents in South Ossetia and survivors of a “massacre“, which had just taken 
place during the mission’s visit (CSCE Secretariat 1992g). 
With regard to democratic institutions and the rule of law, the mission noted 
that state institutions were not functioning normally. They operated under martial 
law without a separation of legislative and executive powers. The mission raised 
the need to update and generally revise the partially reintroduced Georgian 
Constitution of 1921 in order to reflect the requisites of modern democracy. 
Because parliament had been dissolved, such a revision of the constitution would 
make sense only after parliamentary elections have taken place in order to have a 
properly constituted parliament in place. In the absence of parliament, legislative 
decrees were being promulgated without the consent of elected popular 
representatives. Therefore, the rapporteurs noted that the legislative decrees of this 
transitional period would have to be ratified by parliament after the elections. The 
uncontrolled powers and specific role of the public prosecutor’s office gave the 
rapporteurs reason for concern, as did the administration of justice in general. 
According to the findings, martial law limited the implementation of basic human 
rights—at least partly. Although the mission perceived the situation more 
stabilized since the consolidation of the new provisional government, it noted that 
freedom of assembly under the state of emergency was restricted and reported that 
demonstrations frequently turned violent—with violence being used by both the 
militia as well as the demonstrators.  
While perceiving real political will of the transitional authorities to reform 
institutions and substantive legislation, the rapporteurs expressed the view that the 
political climate in Georgia was not conducive to democracy, respect of human 
rights and observance of the rule of law, giving rise to grave concern and disquiet. 
This climate was characterized by mutual recriminations and accusations, by a 
partial boycott of the institutions, by a total lack of understanding, tolerance and 
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will to cooperation among the main protagonists. In light of this, the rapporteurs 
raised concern that martial law might be upheld, resulting in another 
postponement of parliamentary elections that had initially been scheduled for 
May/June 1992 and were then planned for October 1992 (CSCE Secretariat 
1992g).
163
 
In sum, the rapporteurs considered the political climate in Georgia still highly 
confrontational and not yet conducive to constructive cooperation among various 
actors. In light of this, six out of nine main conclusions and recommendations 
addressed political conflicts and minority problems, urging the conflict parties to 
agree on a ceasefire, to use means of consultation and mediation, to halt the 
proliferation of weaponry, and to respect international humanitarian law and 
standards of humanitarian behavior. With regard to democratization, the Mission 
stressed the predominant importance of holding general parliamentary elections in 
October 1992, as scheduled. The rapporteurs considered these elections the means 
to restore legitimacy against the backdrop of the state of emergency still being in 
place at the time. In this regard, they recommended international monitoring of 
both the campaign and the elections themselves.
164
 As mentioned above, only 
once a properly constituted parliament was in place, would it make sense, in their 
view, to update and generally revise the partially reintroduced Georgian 
Constitution of 1921 in order to reflect more closely the requisites of modern 
democracy. The rapporteurs also saw the need for CSCE/OSCE participating 
States and international organizations, such as development banks, the 
International Monetary Fund and the Council of Europe, to coordinate and offer 
Georgia assistance on the judiciary and civil service system, on legal reforms of 
major codes, and on financial and economic matters. Despite the generally 
                                                 
163
  With regard to the other issues—in addition to democratic institutions and the rule of law—
the Mission highlighted the following concerns among others: Georgia's economy was in 
crisis due to the disintegration of the economic structures and the loss of trade links on the 
territory of the former Soviet Union. As a consequence, the country was fully dependent on 
the import of energy and of 80-90 percent of raw materials for its industry. Furthermore, the 
Rapporteurs considered the minority conflicts in Georgia and the South Ossetian situation in 
particular to giving rise to serious concern with regard to grave violations of integrity and 
humanitarian rights, as leaders on both sides were perceived to have only limited control over 
their armed elements. The disturbing proliferation of weaponry in the hands of various 
political factions and ethnic groups on Georgian soil was also stressed in the report—a 
dangerous development that needed to be halted and reversed with a view to deescalating 
political tension and interethnic strife. While the Rapporteurs perceived freedom of religious 
worship to be existent in general, the Mission members identified signs of religious 
intolerance among some sections of the population causing the risk of difficulties in the future 
unless steps would be taken to encourage an open dialogue and tolerance on all sides. 
164
  In addition to these recommendations that refer to democratic institutions, the Rapporteurs 
also emphasized that minority rights shall be protected by all concerned parties, reminded 
them of respecting internationally recognized borders, called upon them to end violence and 
respect international humanitarian law (ibid.). 
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challenging political climate in Georgia, office holders showed the will to reforms 
based on democratic principles and values in the rapporteurs’ view 
(CSCE Secretariat 1992g).  
5.1.2 Initial CSCE/OSCE response to the analysis of political context 
conditions in Georgia at t0 in 1992 
The OSCE recommendations based on the rapporteurs’ analysis of the Georgian 
context in the early 1990s aimed at (1) monitoring the October 1992 
parliamentary elections that were considered being of predominant importance to 
restore legitimacy and (2) supporting conflict resolution. In addition, (3) further 
recommendations that did not point particularly at an engagement by the 
CSCE/OSCE itself included assistance on financial and economic matters as well 
as on the legal, judicial and public administration reforms. 
How did the OSCE respond to these recommendations that resulted from the 
initial context analysis of the May 1992 rapporteur mission?  
Monitoring of October 1992 parliamentary elections 
Various delegations of CSCE/OSCE participating States as well as governmental 
and non-governmental organizations observed the proceedings of the elections to 
parliament and to the chairmanship of parliament held on 11 October 1992.
165
 The 
CSCE/OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
helped coordinate CSCE/OSCE observers and collected their final assessment.  
Although the majority of observers deemed the elections “adequate” (Jones 
2015: 87), “technically correct and in accord with international standards and 
democratic procedures” (CSCE 1993: 17), areas of concern were duly noted. 
Among those rather serious concerns was the ongoing warfare in Abkhazia and 
Samagrelo in Western Georgia and the tense situation in South Ossetia and other 
regions that resulted in the postponement of voting in nine electoral districts, 
affecting almost ten percent of Georgia’s electorate (CSCE 1992d: 1). 
Furthermore, allegations of widespread human rights violations throughout the 
country were noted (CSCE 1992d: 1) as well as incidents of intimidation of 
opposition newspapers and a pro-Shevardnadze bias of TV channels (Jones 2015: 
87). The ODIHR also pointed to the more general lack of a democratic and 
constitutional framework for the previous transition of power that limited the 
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  For instance, see the report of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE 1992d). 
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ability of parties and candidates to freely present their views (CSCE Secretariat 
1992d).
166
 In conclusion, the ODIHR strongly recommended that participating 
states remain actively involved in democracy assistance (CSCE 1993: 17). 
Conflict Resolution 
OSCE fact-finding Mission to South Ossetia: In light of the warfare in South 
Ossetia, the CSCE/OSCE Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) proposed to the 
Chairman-in-Office (CiO) to dispatch a fact-finding mission to the conflict 
region.
167
 The tensions in South Ossetia had severely escalated in January 1991. 
The fighting continued until joint Russian, Georgian, South and North Ossetian 
peacekeeping forces were deployed in early July 1992 in order to implement and 
monitor a CSCE/OSCE- and Russia-mediated ceasefire agreement reached on 23 
June 1992.  
The fact-finding mission was dispatched on 25 July 1992—again under the 
lead of the former Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Mark Eyskens. The fact-finders 
recalled the rapporteur mission’s recommendation for international monitoring of 
the election campaign and the elections of the upcoming parliamentary elections. 
In this regard, they urged the CSO to charge the CSCE/OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) with also dispatching a team 
of human rights experts to South Ossetia in order to give consideration to the 
specific and complex political problems in this conflict region when monitoring 
elections and the campaign. With regard to the ceasefire in South Ossetia, the fact-
finding mission recommended dispatching a small observer team of 10-20 
military experts to the region to work in close cooperation with the Joint Control 
Commission as soon as possible (CSCE Secretariat 1992f). 
Personal Representative of the CSCE/OSCE Chairman in Office in Georgia: In 
the late summer of 1992, the Georgian government requested the CSCE/OSCE to 
send observers to the conflict region of South Ossetia (Eiff 1995: 179). Against 
this background, the CSCE/OSCE undertook another fact-finding mission to 
Georgia in mid-October 1992—shortly after the elections (see above). Based on 
the CSO recommendations given at their 16
th
 CSO meeting on 18 September 
1992, the CiO had appointed a Personal Representative for Georgia. The Personal 
Representative was assigned to undertake this second fact-finding mission 
accompanied by two military experts in mid-October 1992 (CSCE Secretariat 
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  This became evident in the single candidature for the election of the chairmanship of 
parliament. 
167
  The role and functions of the CSO were integrated into the Permanent Council during the 
CSCE/OSCE’s instituationalization process that had at that time just started. The CSO was, 
therefore, not separately analyzed in chapter 3.3. 
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1992c, CSCE Communication No. 288). The fact-finding mission was concerned 
with the risk of a possible deterioration of the situation and of renewed fighting in 
South Ossetia.  
At its 17
th
 meeting on 6 November 1992, the CSO intensely discussed the 
Personal Representative’s report on the fact-finding visit to Georgia as well as the 
recommendations that the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention 
Center of the CSCE/OSCE Secretariat had submitted in this regard. The 
recommendations aimed at dispatching a CSCE/OSCE mission to the region to 
monitor the ceasefire arrangement in South Ossetia, investigate possible 
violations, and integrate the joint peacekeeping forces in the CSCE/OSCE 
activities under the supervision of the Personal Representative who would be 
responsible for initiating and chairing negotiations between the parties to the 
South Ossetia conflict (CSCE Secretariat 1992b). The discussion in the CSO 
consisted of an exchange of statements made by the delegations of the United 
States of America, Russia, Canada, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Austria, Finland, 
Malta, Hungary, and the United Kingdom on behalf of the European 
Communities. Eventually, the CSO agreed on a text entitled “Personal 
Representative of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office for Georgia” and mandated him 
with  
 immediately beginning discussions with all parties to the Georgian-Ossetian 
conflict; 
 initiating a visible CSCE/OSCE presence in South Ossetia and establishing 
contact with local authorities and representatives of the population; 
 liaising with local military commanders of the peacekeeping forces in support 
of the existing South Ossetia ceasefire agreement; 
 facilitating the creation of a broader political framework for lasting 
conciliation in South Ossetia on the basis of OSCE principles and 
commitments; 
 helping to establish a negotiating framework between the parties to the 
conflict in Abkhazia with the aim of establishing a stable ceasefire and to 
work out a political solution to the conflict. 
 The Personal Representative was to report to the CiO on a regular basis about 
his activities in Georgia, considering further possibilities for their extension 
and submitting appropriate recommendations to the next meeting of the CSO 
(CSCE 1992a, 17-CSO/Journal No. 2, Annex 2). 
Thus, this mandate did not fully follow the Secretariat’s recommendation of 
equipping the Personal Representative and his mission with stronger tasks of 
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investigating possible ceasefire violations. It was, however, the result of a 
thorough discussion of the recommendations among participating States. 
For the purpose of fulfilling his mandate, the Personal Representative undertook 
another mission assisted by a staff of two diplomatic advisors and a military team 
of four officers in early December 1992. During the mission’s visit to 
Moscow/Russia, Tbilisi/Georgia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia
168
, the Personal 
Representative negotiated the text of the Memoranda of Understanding between 
the CSCE/OSCE and the Georgian government and between the CSCE/OSCE and 
the authorities of South Ossetia as well as a Protocol on assistance from Russia. 
These documents were to provide the basis for establishing a CSCE/OSCE long-
term mission to Georgia. At the end of the mission, he expressed confidence that 
agreement on all documents would be reached.
169
 With regard to Abkhazia, the 
Personal Representative deemed negotiations between the conflict parties highly 
unlikely at this point in time and considered further military action rather probable 
in the near future.
170
 Shevardnadze expressed the hope that peacekeeping in 
Abkhazia would be implemented within the framework of a United Nations (UN) 
or CSCE/OSCE mandate.
171
 Irrespective of the still pending UN decision on 
whether and how to engage further in Georgia, the Personal Representative met 
with UN representatives and agreed to closely coordinate future activities with 
each other (CSCE Secretariat 1992e). 
CSCE/OSCE Long-Term Mission to Georgia: The CiO utilized the “instrument” 
of his Personal Representative in Georgia to prepare the ground for establishing a 
long-term mission to Georgia. The CSCE/OSCE headquarter approved a 
provisional budget for such a mission under the lead of the Personal 
Representative on 23 November 1992 to cover an initial operating period of three 
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  The Mission was prevented from visiting Abkhazia because of ongoing fighting and the fact 
that Georgian authorities were unable to guarantee the Mission’s safety. 
169
  At the time of the Personal Representative’s report, the Memorandum with the Georgian 
government was finalized, while the Memorandum with the South Ossetian authorities and 
the Protocol with the Russian government still contained some open points to be agreed. The 
MoU with the Georgian government was signed in January 1993, while agreement with the 
South Ossetian authorities was put into force by an exchange of letters in mid-March 1993. 
They had not been willing to sign the MoU because they insisted that they be named 
“Republic of South Ossetia” in the document. 
170
  This assessment proved to be correct, as the fighting between Abkhazian separatist and 
Georgian central government forces would severely escalate again in the summer of 1993 
(see below). 
171
  The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established in August 
1993. It was tasked with verifying compliance with the ceasefire agreement of 27 July 1993 
that re-established the Moscow ceasefire agreement of 3 September 1992 that had never been 
fully implemented. However, fighting erupted again after this new ceasefire agreement and 
despite the UNOMIG presence and resulted in the fall of the regional capital of Sukhumi and 
the subsequent de facto independence of Abkhazia. 
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months. On 3 December 1992, the mission of three civilian and four military 
members arrived in Georgia (see above). Based on the 14-pages interim report of 
the Personal Representative, dated 11 December 1992, the CSO approved the 
“Modalities and Financial Implications for the CSCE Mission of the Personal 
Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for Georgia” on 13 December 1992 
(CSCE 1992b).
172
 In light of the secession conflicts in Georgia, the initial 
responsibilities of the CSCE/OSCE field presence concentrated on beginning 
discussions with the parties to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict and on 
facilitating the creation of a broader political framework in order to induce a 
lasting political conciliation on the basis of CSCE/OSCE principles and 
commitments (see the mandate of the Personal Representative above; CSCE 
1992a; Eiff 1995: 180 ff.; OSCE 2006b: 12 ff.). Initially limited to the duration of 
three months, the mandate has since been repeatedly extended by six months and 
was subsequently expanded in terms of responsibilities.
173
 
Under the lead of the Personal Representative, the CSCE/OSCE long-term 
mission subsequently developed an implementation strategy based on a series of 
meetings with Georgian authorities and representatives of the South Ossetian 
party to the conflict. In recognition of the fact that the positions of the conflict 
parties were so far apart that the initial CSCE/OSCE approach of facilitating 
monthly high-level negotiation meetings that had been discussed with both parties 
turned out not to be feasible. Instead, the Personal Representative proposed 
launching a long-term process with two parallel—at the beginning rather 
sequenced—‘tracks’: one dealing with concrete issues of immediate concern, such 
as South Ossetia’s economic, humanitarian and security situation, the other 
dealing with the political issues, such as the question of South Ossetia’s status 
within the Georgian state (CSCE Secretariat 1993a). Based on regular visits to 
South Ossetia, the mission established three mixed working groups with the 
participation of both sides on economic and financial matters, on a possible 
cooperation in law enforcement, and on humanitarian issues, and agreed on basic 
procedures for these working groups (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993i). 
While the promotion of democracy and human rights were not yet the focus of the 
early CSCE/OSCE engagement in Georgia, the 1994 mandate expansion would 
also include assistance to strengthening democratic institutions and processes (see 
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  Only with a later expansion of the mission’s mandate in March 1994 was a resident head of 
mission appointed (see section 5.2.5). 
173
  Only at the end of 2008, this long-term mission was closed after no consensus could be 
reached on its extension following the military confrontation of Georgia and Russia in August 
2008. 
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chapter 5.2 below) and, with regard to South Ossetia, shift the focus to mediation 
(CSCE 1994c).
174
 
5.2 The OSCE’s utilization of internal prerequisites and response 
to the “rupture” at t1.c.1 in late-1993 
As elaborated in chapter 5.1, the CSCE/OSCE’s initial engagement in Georgia 
after the country’s admission to the organization did not comprise elements of 
democracy promotion—with the exception of the October 1992 election 
monitoring—but was strongly focused on supporting conflict resolution. The 
mandate of the CSCE/OSCE Mission to Georgia was only broadened to include 
the promotion of democratic institutions and processes in March 1994. The 
expansion of the mandate to include the promotion of democratization reflected a 
general policy decision taken by the CSCE/OSCE Ministerial Council at its 
meeting in Rome on 1 December 1993. There, the Council decided to put more 
emphasis on “Human Dimension” issues (see chapter 3.2) and to further integrate 
them in operational CSCE/OSCE endeavors, reiterating that these issues were 
fundamental to the organization’s comprehensive security concept. Whether the 
CSCE/OSCE also identified the reignited warfare in Abkhazia in 
September/October 1993 as a “rupture” in the country’s efforts for political 
stabilization and a change relevant for the CSCE/OSCE to consider adapting its 
country approach and implementation strategy will be analyzed in the following 
sections. 
5.2.1 OSCE field-level reports on developments in Georgia in 
September/October 1993 
The frequency of reporting by the CSCE/OSCE mission in the field was relatively 
high at the time of the reigniting warfare in Abkhazia. In addition to the standard 
routine of bi-weekly activity report, the mission submitted a number of special 
reports with prompt updates on developments regarding this serious situation in 
Georgia. 
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  Only under this expanded mandate and the respective mediation activities within its 
framework would the CSCE/OSCE mission achieve bringing representatives of the Georgian 
and South Ossetian conflict parties to the negotating table for the first time in May 1994 
(König 2004: 242). 
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On 13 September, the CSCE/OSCE mission had reported in its bi-weekly activity 
report for the period 25 August to 13 September 1993 that mission members had 
taken part in the discussions and practical activities of the Joint Commission on 
fulfilment of the 27 July 1993 ceasefire agreement regarding the Abkhazia 
conflict and that the Head of UNOMIG had just arrived in Sukhumi/Abkhazia on 
9 September 1993 (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993f). Only three days later, on 16 
September 1993, the CSCE/OSCE mission sent a special report on the situation in 
Georgia to the Personal Representative and the Office of the CiO drawing their 
attention to a sharp turn for the worse of the military situation in Abkhazia where 
separatist forces had attacked Sukhumi and another town 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993o). The mission considered these rapid and 
radical developments a threat to the peace process as a whole, bringing about the 
dangers of a full-scale war and casting doubt on the existence of a democratic 
government in Georgia. According to the special report, the escalation in 
Abkhazia followed continuing fighting of government forces with forces loyal to 
ex-President Gamsakhurdia in Western Georgia.
175
 The CSCE/OSCE mission 
assessed fighting in Abkhazia and Western Georgia to undermine the credibility 
of the Shevardnadze government as well as of the international community (ibid.). 
On 19 September 1993, the CSCE/OSCE mission sent an urgent telefax 
message to the CSCE/OSCE CiO informing her about the request of the Georgian 
government for the CiO to take immediate action and for calling an extraordinary 
CSO meeting in order to consider the catastrophic situation developing in Georgia 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993m). 
On 21 September 1993, the CSCE/OSCE provided the Personal 
Representative and the Office of the CiO with an update of the situation in 
Georgia in another special report, pointing out that the military situation in 
Abkhazia was further deteriorating. The mission highlighted the extent of the 
danger should Sukhumi fall under the control of the separatist forces and 
Georgian forces massively move against Abkhazia in response. The CSCE/OSCE 
field staff saw the risk of a wider regional war, should this happen. They also saw 
the future of the Georgian democracy as being imperiled and pointed out the 
importance of Shevardnadze, who was in Sukhumi at the time, because Georgia 
would likely be controlled by more extreme, militaristic forces without him 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993o). 
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  The CSCE/OSCE mission suspected that Gamsakhurdia supporters had used the political 
turmoil in Tbilisi to their advantage (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993o). This political turmoil 
had erupted around the parliamentary deadlock over the issue of the cabinet’s structure in 
August and September 1993 as well as Shevardnadze’s resignation, withdrawal of resignation 
and declaration of state of emergency (see page 113). 
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When the war had taken an increasingly savage character, according to reports 
of the CSCE/OSCE mission, a unifying effect on the Georgian side was observed 
by the CSCE/OSCE field staff who reported that Gamsakhurdia supporters, who 
had just been fighting government forces in Western Georgia, joined the 
government forces against the separatists in Abkhazia (CSCE Mission to Georgia 
1993d). Despite these ‘reinforcements’ on the side of the forces loyal to the 
Georgian government, the CSCE/OSCE mission informed the Personal 
Representative and the Office of the CiO about the fall of Sukhumi in a special 
report on 28 September 1993 (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993o). According to the 
report, there were suspicions that expected government reinforcements under the 
command of ex-Minister of Defense Kitovani were deliberately delayed so that 
Shevardnadze would be discredited and Kitovani could make his own move on 
power. Whether true or not, the CSCE/OSCE mission considered any further 
developments impossible to predict and noted that the fall of Sukhumi had been 
portrayed as the end of Georgia by Shevardnadze and other political figures 
before the event actually happened, thereby making grave repercussions for 
Georgian politics likely (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993o). A supplementary 
mission report, dated 30 September 1993, said that the return of ex-President 
Gamsakhurdia to Georgia may bring the country to the brink of civil war. 
According to the report, Gamsakhurdia had called on Shevardnadze to resign and 
announced that all Georgian forces should put themselves under the command of 
the forces loyal to Gamsakhurdia (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993p). 
While the mission informed about the Georgian leadership’s critical view of 
Russia regarding the situation in Abkhazia, where apparently many Russians 
fought on the separatists’ side (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993p), the special 
report of 28 September indicated at the same time that the idea of Georgia’s entry 
into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was gaining greater 
acceptance in political circles (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993o). 
With regard to the relevance of these developments to the existing mandate of the 
CSCE/OSCE mission that aimed at facilitating the creation of a broader political 
framework for lasting conciliation in South Ossetia on the basis of OSCE 
principles and commitments, the CSCE/OSCE mission assessed that the 
atmosphere was now less conducive than before to productive negotiations 
between the Georgian government and South Ossetia’s de facto authorities 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993p). In mid-June 1993, the mission had just 
expressed hopes for a positive change of the unfavorable cost-benefit calculations 
of the South Ossetian “authorities”. These unfavorable cost-benefit calculations 
had been assessed in “a critical analysis of the situation in Georgia and Southern 
Ossetia” by the CSCE/OSCE mission in early 1993 to be rooted in the existence 
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of forces in Georgia, who had developed a personal interest in the prolongation of 
the crisis situation—some who lived directly off of violence, some who lived off 
of the markets of violence. In the view of the mission, this key problem source 
had been exacerbated by the general climate of mistrust, blame and intolerance in 
general and between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides in particular 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993j). The cost-benefit calculations of the South 
Ossetian leadership had, therefore, been considered to be in favor of maintaining 
the status quo and refraining from entering any kind of negotiations with the 
distrusted Georgian side.
176
 The CSCE/OSCE mission’s hopes for a window of 
opportunity in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict in mid-June 1993 resulted, on 
the one hand, from the perception that the desire for a peaceful resolution of the 
conflicts was growing in the population. On the other hand, according to the 
analysis of CSCE/OSCE field staff, a combination of political and economic 
factors was working towards the South Ossetian leadership’s expected realization 
that the expressed goal of independence or unification with Russia’s North 
Ossetia was not likely to materialize in the near future. Economically, South 
Ossetia was considered unable to survive without outside help and, politically, 
Russia increasingly tended towards acknowledging South Ossetia as integral part 
of Georgia according to the aforementioned mission report 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993l).
177
 After the conflict in Abkhazia had severely 
escalated at the end of June 1993 and especially after the regional capital of 
Sukhumi had fallen under the control of the secessionist forces at the end of 
September 1993, the CSCE/OSCE mission considered the window of opportunity 
with regard to South Ossetia to have closed again (CSCE Mission to Georgia 
1993p). 
These developments and the rapid deterioration of the situation brought the 
country to the brink of civil war, in the mission’s view (CSCE Mission to Georgia 
1993p)—giving reason for a reassessment of the situation in Georgia as well as a 
reflection on and a reconsideration of the CSCE/OSCE’s own engagement. It was 
against this background that the Personal Representative of the CSCE/OSCE 
Chairperson-in-Office—at the time also the Head of the CSCE/OSCE mission—
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  The analysis of the CSCE/OSCE mission did not explicitly point out this cost-benefit 
calculation in this way. However, the author of this study interpreted the report in this way 
and considers this interpretation highly plausible. 
177
  After initial fighting in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s, both had successfully 
turned to Russia (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993k). As mentioned above, Georgia initially 
refrained from joining the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
thereby, entering a political confrontation with the large Northern neighbor (e.g. Auch 2004a: 
230). On the role of Russia and her strategies of “controlled stability” and “controlled 
unstabilit” with regard to her neighbors or “near abroad”, especially secessionist regions, see 
among others Tolstrup 2009: 936 ff. 
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traveled together with the ODIHR Deputy Director to Georgia in early October 
1993 in order to (re-) assess the situation and provide the CiO with his 
recommendations before her own planned visit at the end of that same month.  
5.2.2 Reassessment of the situation in Georgia and critical self 
reflection of the Personal Representative of the CiO in Georgia 
in October 1993 
The Personal Representative of the CiO in Georgia submitted his confidential 
report to the Swedish Chairmanship on 22 October 1993. In his very outspoken 
self-reflection, the PRC pointed to the lack of results of the CSCE/OSCE and 
international organizations in Georgia in general, which in his view was the main 
reason for international organizations enjoying hardly any respect in the country. 
The severe escalation of the conflict in Abkhazia had not been prevented after all. 
The PRC was of the opinion that the CSCE/OSCE should have decided upon a 
more courageous country approach, reflecting a higher degree of political will 
among participating States to improve the situation in Georgia. With regard to 
South Ossetia, for instance, he expressed the thought that the CSCE/OSCE should 
have aimed for an integration of international efforts with the Russian efforts from 
the start, seeking an institutionalized cooperation between the CSCE/OSCE and 
Russia in South Ossetia, e.g. through the deployment of CSCE/OSCE military 
observers to monitor peacekeeping troops and a joint body to control and 
supervise peacekeeping activities (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993h). 
With a view to the future, the PRC concluded from his analysis of experiences 
and developments that the CSCE/OSCE should be active in three areas: (1) to 
continue and strengthen the efforts aimed at the resolution of the conflicts in 
Abkhazia (in cooperation with the UN) and South Ossetia; (2) to start 
investigating and contributing to the stabilization of the human rights situation (in 
the conflict regions and the whole of Georgia); and (3) to offer long-term 
assistance to establish institutions of democracy (in cooperation with the ODIHR). 
He underlined with regard to the latter that functioning democratic institutions, the 
elaboration of a democratic constitution, free and fair elections, the rule of law, 
the freedom of the press, and the freedom of association were fundamental for the 
stabilization of the situation and would offer a solution to all problems of the 
country. He even emphasized that conviction to these indispensable elements of 
the CSCE/OSCE concept of democracy should be a precondition for the 
continued involvement of the CSCE/OSCE (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993h). 
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5.2.3 Report by the CSCE/OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on her visit to 
Georgia in late-October 1993 
Informed by the confidential self-reflective assessment and recommendations of 
her Personal Representative in Georgia, the Chairwoman-in-Office visited 
Georgia during turbulent times at the end of October 1993. According to her 
report, she expressed the strong expectation towards Shevardnadze that Georgia 
adheres to CSCE/OSCE commitments and standards of democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law. Shevardnadze, in turn, expressed the desire of the Georgian 
government for intensified CSCE/OSCE assistance to overcome problems. The 
CSCE/OSCE Chairperson considered the promotion of human rights to be a 
priority task in light of the present situation and noted that the state of emergency 
had severely limited civil liberties and political rights. In her view, the 
CSCE/OSCE Mission to Georgia would be well served by a specific mandate to 
assist Georgia in the development of legal and democratic institutions and 
processes with the paramount issue of elaborating the new constitution. The new 
constitution might hold the key to the resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia and more efforts should be undertaken in this regard 
(CSCE Secretariat 1993b). 
5.2.4 Special report of the CSCE/OSCE Personal Representative and 
mission on major developments and problems in Georgia in 
February 1994 
Following the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office (PRC) and 
the Chairperson’s visits and reports, the CSCE/OSCE Ministerial Council took a 
general decision regarding a strengthening of the human dimension in 
CSCE/OSCE operations in December 1993, as mentioned above. The 
CSCE/OSCE Ministerial Council decided upon an action program to implement 
this decision, which included widening the responsibilities of the CSCE/OSCE 
Mission to Georgia to include the promotion of human rights and the development 
of democratic institutions. In order to discuss the implementation of this Rome 
Council decision as well as to discuss the planned expansion of the CSCE/OSCE 
mission mandate with Georgian interlocutors, the PRC travelled to Georgia and 
Russia in February 1994.
178
 With regard to the aim of more deeply examining the 
                                                 
178
  Prior to his visit in February 1994, the Personal Representative of the CSCE Chairman-in-
Office to Georgia had summarized the results of the Rome Council meeting in a letter that the 
CSCE Mission to Georgia had delivered to Georgia’s Head of State, Eduard Shevardnadze, 
on 19 December 1993. 
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possibilities of democracy promotion measures, he was accompanied by an 
ODIHR representative. In his 24-pages report, the PRC gave a thorough analysis 
of the political situation in Georgia and the positions of relevant stakeholders as 
well as clear recommendations and proposals for further CSCE/OSCE assistance 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994k). 
The PRC pointed out that Georgia’s improved relationship with Russia 
changed the cost-benefit calculations of the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994k). Shevardnadze had changed his 
position with regard to relations with Russia and pushed for Georgia’s 
membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the 
disastrous escalation of the conflict in Abkhazia and the loss of control over the 
territory including Sukhumi at the end of September 1993. Furthermore, Georgia 
signed a “Basic Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Mutual Aid” with 
Russia as well as a number of protocols and agreements (some not yet signed) in 
February 1994, the PRC reported. The PRC considered the Georgian government 
to have gained new self-confidence as a result and sees a window of opportunity 
for the conflict resolution processes. South Ossetia, for instance, had to now 
accept that Russia would strictly handle them as part of Georgia and would not 
provide the expected help for its secessionist ambitions. With Russia expecting a 
political settlement of the conflicts as a basis for the treaties, Georgia had new 
incentives to accept an autonomous status of South Ossetia. Nevertheless, he 
cautioned that any rational effort (in terms of cost-benefit calculations) must not 
ignore the emotional elements in the conflicts (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994k). 
Additional incentives for being part of Georgia could, in the PRC’s view, result 
from a more stable, more democratic Georgian state. 
Thus, in terms of human dimension activities, he recommended urging and 
assisting the Georgian government and parliament in working seriously on the 
new constitution as well as on crucial legislation as highest priority. Furthermore, 
he suggested engaging with government organs and local non-governmental 
organizations working in the field of human rights and national minorities, to 
conduct respective training courses and organize seminars on related topics 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994k). 
In addition to the PRC’s comprehensive report and in response to a headquarter 
request, the CSCE/OSCE Mission to Georgia analyzed “major developments and 
problems” of their host country, drawing conclusions for the future engagement of 
the CSCE/OSCE. In the form of a special report, the mission submitted this 
context analysis to the CSCE headquarters in mid-February 1994. In contrast to 
the thorough analysis provided by the PRC basically at the same time, the 
mission’s additional analysis was rather ‘thin’ and did not provide any additional 
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insights. This was likely to have resulted from the different ‘audiences’ of the 
reports—the mission reported to the Permanent Council delegations of all 
participating States, while most of the PRC’s reports were confidential and 
addressed to a much smaller group around the CSCE/OSCE Chairperson.  
Among others, the mission recommended that, in parallel to measures aimed at 
establishing order and stability in the shorter term, a program for supporting the 
development of democratic reforms would need to be initiated with the aim of 
long-term transformation and that quick measures of broadening the mandate of 
the mission should be undertaken (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994l). Already in 
mid-December 1993, shortly after the lifting of the state of emergency, the 
CSCE/OSCE mission had highlighted that despite the indications of a 
normalization of the political processes in the crisis-ridden country, parliament 
was still at a standstill with an unorganized and divided opposition and a 
government reluctant of taking any serious legislative initiative. Therefore, a new 
constitution and the holding of elections were to be considered priorities 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1993e). 
During the weeks that followed the February 1994 analyses, the mission held 
various meetings with different Georgian interlocutors in order to clarify Georgian 
demands for assistance within the “human dimension” after key actors had 
generally agreed to such support.
179
 The need for CSCE/OSCE assistance in 
preparing the new constitution was identified as one important area of 
engagement (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994g).
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  For instance, Shevardnadze had stressed that Georgia was open to any assistance the CSCE 
could provide (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994e). The Chairman of the Georgian government 
Committee on Human Rights and Inter-ethnic Relations had expressed the wish of 
broadening of CSCE/OSCE support, particularly with involvement of the ODIHR 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994f). One of the Vice Prime Ministers had stated that the 
CSCE/OSCE should be even more active, especially in helping draft the constitution 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994g). 
180
  As elaborated above in their context analysis of May 1992 (see pages 136 f.), the 
CSCE/OSCE rapporteurs had already identified with regard to “human dimension” issues the 
need to update and generally revise the partially re-introduced 1921 constitution as well as to 
support legal, judicial and administrative reforms. Nothwithstanding the importance of these 
issues, they had not yet considered these issues areas of engagement for the CSCE/OSCE in 
Georgia, but regarded the immediate support to the resolution of violent political conflict 
and—in the absence of a properly constituted and legitimized parliament—the holding and 
international monitoring of parliamentary election of primary importance at the time. 
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5.2.5 CSCE/OSCE headquarter response to the reported “rupture” 
and radical political context changes in Georgia as well as to 
the critical self-reflection of the CSCE/OSCE field engagment 
Based on the information on the situation in Georgia and the concrete proposal of 
the Personal Representative of an adaptation of the mission mandate, an expanded 
draft mandate was introduced to the Permanent Council by the CSCE/OSCE 
Chairperson-in-Office. The discussion with statements made by several 
delegations of the participating States on 24 and 28 February as well as on 3 
March 1994 yielded four revisions of the draft mandate. The points of debate 
mainly regarded the strengthening of the CSCE/OSCE engagement in South 
Ossetia and whether or not the mandate should comprise tasks of investigating 
ceasefire violations. The fourth revised version of the expanded draft mandate was 
discussed by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) at its 25
th
 meeting on 3 
March 1994. The CSO discussed and expressed appreciation for the activities and 
report of the PRC and adopted a text entitled “situation in Georgia”. Among other 
decisions, the CSO agreed to strengthen the mission’s capabilities and to widen its 
responsibilities to also include the promotion of respect of human rights in the 
whole of Georgia and the rendering of assistance for the development of legal and 
democratic institutions and processes (CSCE 1994a).  
The Permanent Committee, at its 14
th
 meeting on 29 March 1994, adopted new 
modalities for the mission to Georgia that, in relation to Georgia as a whole, 
included the promotion of democratic institutions and processes. The following 
text was adopted (CSCE 1994c): 
“The Mission’s objectives are to promote negotiations between the conflicting 
parties in Georgia, which are aimed at reaching a peaceful political settlement; to 
promote respect for human rights and assist in democratic institution building 
throughout the country; to monitor and promote free media principles; to 
facilitate co-operation with and among the parties concerned and, with their 
consent, to monitor the joint peacekeeping forces established under the Sochi 
Agreement of 24 June 1992, in order to assess whether their activities are carried 
out in conformity with CSCE principles, in particular those mentioned in chapter 
II, 3 of the Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting. 
In relation to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict the Mission is to: 
 Facilitate the creation of a broader political framework, in which a lasting 
political settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict can be achieved on the 
basis of CSCE principles and commitments; 
 Intensify discussions with all parties to the conflict, including through the 
organization of round tables, in order to identify and seek to eliminate 
sources of tension and extend political reconciliation throughout the area of 
conflict. 
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 make recommendations regarding the early convening of an international 
conference under CSCE auspices and with the participation of the United 
Nations, aimed at the resolution of the conflict, including the definition of the 
political status of Southern Ossetia; 
 In pursuit of the monitoring role concerning the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, 
establish appropriate forms of contact with the military commanders of the 
forces within the overall context of the CSCE negotiating efforts, gather 
information on the military situation, investigate violations of the existing 
cease-fire and call local commanders' attention to possible political 
implications of specific military actions; 
 Be actively involved in the reconvened Joint Control Commission in order to 
facilitate co-operation with and among the parties concerned; 
 Establish contact with local authorities and representatives of the population 
and maintain a visible CSCE presence throughout the area. 
In relation to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict the Mission is to: 
 Ensure liaison with the United Nations operations in Abkhazia, in order to 
follow events closely and report regularly to the CSCE, inter alia with a view 
to facilitating the participation of the representative of the Chairman-in-
Office, at the invitation of the United Nations, to the negotiations carried out 
under United Nations auspices. 
In relation to Georgia as a whole to: 
 Promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and assist in the 
development of legal and democratic institutions and processes, including the 
provision of advice on the elaboration of a new constitution, the 
implementation of a legislation on citizenship and the establishment of an 
independent judiciary as well as monitoring elections; 
 Co-ordinate these activities with the CSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities and the ODIHR and to co-operate with the Council of Europe, 
also keeping in touch with other international organizations active in 
Georgia in this field.” 
 
Again, although the mandate text referred to “objectives”, it rather listed tasks and 
did not explicitly mention clear objectives and benchmarks to be reached. Certain 
elements of the mandate with regard to South Ossetia, such as monitoring the 
ceasefire and investigating possible ceasefire violations—tasks that had been 
recommended by the Secretariat based on the 1992 context analysis already for 
the initial mandate of the mission—were now included following the Personal 
Representative’s critical self-reflection and insistent recommendations. 
The CSCE/OSCE further decided to appoint a resident head of mission—a 
function previously covered by the PRC who had not been permanently based in 
Georgia—and to add to the authorized size of the mission team one administrative 
officer and one human rights/legal expert to deal with the mission’s activities in 
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providing advice on issues relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the preparation of the new constitution and the monitoring of elections 
in the area (CSCE 1994a). This were obviously not a lot of resources attributed to 
the challenging tasks of promoting democratic institutions and processes, assisting 
in the constitution-building process, and monitoring the situation regarding human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
5.2.6 CSCE/OSCE field-level response–assistance in drafting the new 
Georgian Constitution181 
In line with the priorities for progress with regard to democratic development in 
Georgia, the CSCE/OSCE mission’s initial focus of “human dimension” activities 
within the framework of the expanded mandate concentrated on technical 
assistance in drafting the new constitution.  
In April and May 1994, constitutional experts of the long-term mission and of 
the ODIHR visited Georgia to review five drafts and to provide suggestions in 
light of OSCE principles. In a meeting of the mission and its constitutional expert 
from Austria with Shevardnadze at the end of April 1994, Georgia’s Head of State 
did not rule out the possibility of a federal solution. The next month, 
Shevardnadze called upon the CSCE/OSCE mission to support the elaboration of 
the new constitution and cooperate particularly on the political status question 
with regard to South Ossetia (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994j). In response and 
with assistance of the visiting constitutional law expert, the mission prepared a 
proposal for South Ossetia’s constitutional status and finalized a first draft for 
initial comments from the parties to the conflict in August 1994 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994a, 1994i). These informal discussions continued 
well into October 1994. After separate colloquia with representatives of Georgia 
and leading academics in Tbilisi in November 1994 and with South Ossetian de 
facto authorities in Tskhinvali in December 1994, the CSCE/OSCE mission 
eventually succeeded in facilitating a roundtable with participants of both sides to 
discuss questions of their future interrelationship in Vladikavkaz/Russia in 
February 1995 (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994c; CSCE Mission to Georgia 
1994b; OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995h). However, as it turned out, prior to the 
adoption of Georgia’s new constitution, none of the sides was willing to start 
actual negotiations on South Ossetia’s status within the Georgian state. 
                                                 
181
  This section on the CSCE/OSCE response at field level only focuses on the human dimension 
area of engagement and does not look into the CSCE/OSCE engagement with regard to South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
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The mission’s assistance in clarifying the political status of South Ossetia 
within the Georgian state along with general questions of territorial structure 
corresponded to the division of labor with the ODIHR that had been agreed in a 
meeting held for this purpose in Warsaw/Poland in early October 1994. The 
ODIHR, in comparison, was to focus its contributions to drafting the constitution 
on the distribution of power between the executive and legislative branches as 
well as on a human rights catalogue (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994d). While the 
CSCE/OSCE mission reports did not indicate any efforts of developing an explicit 
implementation strategy, this agreement on a division of labor was the closest 
element to an implementation strategy that the reports mentioned. In accordance 
with the agreed division of labor, the ODIHR evaluated and commented drafts of 
the constitution and sponsored several discussions between Georgian and foreign 
experts and with Georgian officials in September and December 1994 and January 
1995 regarding selected aspects of the constitution, such as human rights issues, 
the question of a constitutional court, and the division of powers 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995c). A roundtable, co-sponsored by the ODIHR 
and the CSCE/OSCE mission in June 1994, had demonstrated the continued 
dissension between representatives of the government and the ruling party on the 
one hand and of the opposition on the other hand regarding the latter two issues in 
addition to the question of presidential versus parliamentary system 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994m). 
Despite the fact that political status questions for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
let alone the general question of territorial structure, had not been settled, the 
constitutional commission accelerated the drafting process in 1995 according to 
the mission’s activity reports. After weeks of heated debate in parliament, 
Georgia’s new constitution was adopted with an over two-thirds approval on 24 
August 1995. Because of highly controversial questions, especially regarding the 
powers of the presidency, such as the choice of prime minister and cabinet and 
presidential decrees, some international observers—including the CSCE/OSCE 
mission—had expected that a constitution would not be adopted in 1995 but 
instead some constitution-like document (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995b). In 
light of this, the CSCE/OSCE mission gave a very positive and impressed account 
of the political debate in parliament, where, in the mission members’ view, 
controversial issues were openly discussed and compromise sought. The mission 
especially praised Shevardnadze’s skills to facilitate such compromise. The 
mission perceived this debate as a big step in democratic development and in 
stabilizing the country (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995k).  
The provisions for human rights and a potentially powerful constitutional 
court, which had been developed with ODIHR input, remained an integral part of 
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the adopted constitution, while the section on territorial structure that the OSCE 
mission had contributed to was left out in order to avoid parliamentary failure due 
to opposing positions on the issue of federalism. The fact of leaving this section 
blank was seen positive by the mission because it left more room and flexibility 
for the negotiation processes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995g). 
5.3 The OSCE’s utilization of internal prerequisites and response 
to the gradual change in structural conditions at t1.b.1 in 1994-
1995 
While the OSCE field-level response to the increasingly dynamic constitution-
building process in Georgia in 1994, foreshadowing institutional/structural 
changes, has already been analyzed in section 5.2.6 as part of the implementation 
of the revised country approach in response to the “rupture” in late-1993, the 
actual adoption of the constitution in August 1995 provided for new entry points 
for the OSCE as international democracy promoter in the theoretically beginning 
democratic consolidation process.  
The formal introduction of new democratic norms and institutions broadened 
the palette of instruments at the democracy promoters’ disposal as well as the 
potential areas of engagement to support the deepening of the democratization. 
With the reintroduction of elections, election observation as well as electoral 
assistance—a ‘natural’ playing field of the OSCE (see chapter 3.3)—became an 
area of democracy promoters’ engagement again. Also, new institutions were to 
be created under the new constitutional framework, representing new entry points 
for the OSCE to engage in the promotion of democratization at implementation 
level.  
Furthermore, shortly after the constitution’s adoption, the mandate of the 
OSCE long-term mission was up for renewal. Respective discussions in the 
Permanent Council were scheduled for mid-September 1995. This provided a 
window of opportunity to review the implementation strategy at field-level in 
preparation of the input from the field to inform the review of the country 
approach at the political level. 
  159 
5.3.1 The OSCE’s utilization of internal prerequisites and response at 
field-level 
Review of the OSCE implementation strategy and/or areas of engagement at 
field-level 
In order to inform discussions in the OSCE Permanent Council on the renewal of 
the recently expanded mandate of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, the mission 
prepared a report, dated 12 September 1995, on relevant developments in Georgia 
and activities of the mission.  
The report aimed at putting into perspective the recent assassination attempt 
against Shevardnadze that had been committed a few days after the constitution’s 
adoption. The mission expressed concern that this event may give a distorted 
impression of the country and highlighted several positive developments. Among 
these were:  
 the adoption of the constitution and a new election law that the mission 
considered an energetic display of parliamentary democracy;  
 a gradual increase in the authority of the state at the expense of regional 
chieftains;  
 a further improvement in general law and order;  
 the continued silence of the guns; and a visibly reviving economy.  
Notwithstanding these positive points, the OSCE field staff also pointed to the 
fact that state stability had not yet reached a normal level, the societal self-
confidence was still low because of domestic living conditions and the unresolved 
secession conflicts, and the reviving economy was still fragile, mafia-infested and 
heavily dependent on foreign aid (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995k). 
The report highlighted that the OSCE mission played a key role under these 
circumstances and that promotion of democratization and substantial involvement 
in the election processes were expected to assist both in reducing the chances of 
renewed fighting and in strengthening societal self-esteem. The mission 
considered the forthcoming elections, scheduled for 5 November 1995, of 
particular importance in this regard.  
The milestone of the new constitutional framework in Georgia as well as this 
reporting procedure provided for a window of opportunity for the mission to 
review its implementation strategy, instruments and areas of engagement and for 
filling the recently expanded mission mandate with more life in the area of 
democracy promotion at a time of gradual change in the structural political 
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conditions in Georgia. However, the OSCE mission has not fully seized this 
opportunity. 
Although prepared to inform decision-making at headquarters-level, the OSCE 
mission report of September 1995 on political developments in Georgia clearly 
reflected the mission’s analysis of gradual change linked to the adoption of the 
new constitution. The report also pointed out the mission’s priorities.182 However, 
nothing in the report indicated that these were the result of a systematic and 
strategic analysis of new entry points associated with the adoption of the new 
Georgian constitution and the change in structural context conditions. The report 
simply highlighted that the mission had established good working relationships 
with the Chairman of the Georgian State Commission on Human Rights and 
would, in cooperation with the ODIHR, especially engage in the improvement of 
prison conditions and that elections and their monitoring would be a key area 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995k).
183
  
Notwithstanding the very limited resources the OSCE mission had at its 
disposal—especially for human dimension activities—a more systematic and 
analytical approach would have been more fruitful. While having a good grasp of 
political developments in Georgia can be considered a strength of the OSCE 
mission, a systematic ‘translation process’ into a broader picture of what these 
developments meant for international democracy promotion in general and which 
areas the OSCE could make a good contribution to and how was rather lacking. 
                                                 
182
  For instance, with regard to South Ossetia, the mission explained that it was constantly 
looking for new entry points for bringing the two sides into a dialogue, to utilize the meetings 
of the Joint Control Commission to bring positions of the two sides explicitly to the table in 
order to prepare the basis for a separate negotation processes that the mission considered 
sensible to begin at a technical expert level rather than at political level. In order to decrease 
the sense of isolation and to increase the sense of what could be gained from being part of 
Georgia among the South Ossetian population, the mission reported that it had started 
facilitating humanitarian aid by Western European relief agencies. With regard to Abkhazia, 
the mission had started to engage with de facto authorities beyond official negotation sessions 
and visited Sukhumi about every six weeks in order to establish working relationships with 
“officials” and to become involved in human rights issues related to the situation of refugees. 
It considered a joint UN-OSCE human rights office in Abkhazia (or rather to propose this). 
The OSCE headquarter would later decide against such a proposal and agree only to an OSCE 
liason officer at a UN human rights office that would be established in Sukhumi 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995k). 
183
  In December 1994, the mission had highlighted the increased urgency of conducting planned 
seminars on human rights and the rule of law in the wake of the murder of the Head of the 
National Democratic Party without explicitly elaborating the connection between the murder 
and such seminars (CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994b). In April 1995, the mission had 
reported that its work on human rights issues accelerated. Shevardnadze had requested 
support to the penal reform and the mission responded to this by more frequently visiting 
prisons to monitor the conditions and gain an impressions of the weaknesses of the Georgian 
penal system (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995f, 1995a). 
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By being operational on the ground and having good access to key stakeholders of 
Georgia’s political transformation process, the OSCE mission did become aware 
of entry points and engaged, however, this apparently resulted from a rather 
intuitive overall process. In terms of the promotion of democratization, the OSCE 
mission report only referred to an engagement—or rather re-engagement—in the 
area of elections. Not explicitly mentioned in the report was the OSCE’s 
engagement in the area of the Ombudsperson institution. The following section 
will analyze how the OSCE engaged in the 1995 parliamentary and presidential 
elections before the OSCE engagement with regard to Georgia’s Ombudsperson 
on human rights will be analyzed as a new area of engagement. 
OSCE field-level response to the (re-) introduction of democratic elections 
In its analysis of political developments in Georgia that the OSCE mission briefly 
summarized as input to the September 1995 Permanent Council discussion of 
renewing the mission’s mandate, the OSCE mission elaborated its strategic 
choices with regard to the implementation of its mandate (see above and 
OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995k). These elaborations included pointing out the 
significance of the November elections for promoting stability and democratic 
development. 
Following the adoption of the August 1995 constitution, parliament had approved 
a new election law replacing the 1992 law and regulations and paving the way for 
the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 5 November 1995. 
Although the OSCE had apparently not provided inputs to the preparation of this 
law, the OSCE mission was strongly involved in the international coordination 
effort once the November election date had been set by parliament in early July, 
as the analysis of the mission’s bi-weekly activity reports reveals. 
International interest in the elections was high. The OSCE ODIHR and the EU 
conducted a joint electoral needs assessment in July 1995 and the international 
community considered jointly how to monitor all stages and aspects of the 
election process and how to provide technical assistance to Georgian authorities 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995d). Shevardnadze had asked the mission to 
coordinate the short- and long term international monitoring effort. Accordingly, 
the OSCE mission approached the embassies of OSCE participating states 
regarding their contributions and, jointly with the ODIHR, coordinated 120 
international observers, including 81 of the OSCE (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
1995j). In line with its expanded elections mandate for the observation before, 
during and after election day the ODIHR had received at the OSCE Summit in 
Budapest in December 1994, the ODIHR established election offices in Georgia 
for the long-term monitoring, while the EU supported the elections with an 
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election advisor to the Central Election Commission (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
1995d, 1995b).  
The OSCE mission noted that the elections itself took place without violent 
incidents, which the mission considered remarkable after so little time had passed 
after civil war.
184
 The mission rated these elections a major step forward in 
Georgia’s difficult democratization process notwithstanding a number of 
irregularities, insufficiencies and infractions.
185
 While some cases of arresting 
opposition members and political interference in political rallies gave the mission 
rise to concern, it perceived the pre-electoral period as being characterized by a 
relatively open atmosphere for political campaign (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
1995j).  
The joint coordination effort of ODIHR and OSCE Mission to Georgia was 
the first such effort of its kind in election monitoring. Therefore, the mission 
prepared a report on the lessons learned of conducting a long-term election 
monitoring operation and shared it with the ODIHR in December 1995. The 
mission’s main conclusion was that such an operation requires sufficient 
personnel and funds available in time and that the monitoring should also include 
the final counting process and not end with the balloting 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995i). 
Having operational capabilities in Georgia, allowed the OSCE field mission to 
respond to developments on the ground immediately. The analysis of the 
mission’s bi-weekly activity reports shows that the OSCE mission was closely 
following political developments regarding the development of Georgia’s new 
constitutional and electoral framework. As soon as the mission learned in July 
1995 of the date having been set for elections to take place in November, it (re-
)engaged intensively in this area of engagement and in coordinating with the 
ODIHR as well as the international community in Georgia to prepare for 
international monitoring of and technical assistance with regard to the elections. 
                                                 
184
  With an electoral turnout of 70 percent, Shevardnadze won a clear majority with 72.9 percent 
of the votes and was elected president. Only three parties, representing less than 40 percent of 
the electorate, crossed the five percent threshold in the parliamentary elections: the Citizens’ 
Union of Georgia, the National Democratic Party, and the Revival Union (with a regional 
profile focues on Ajara). A second round had to be conducted in 42 districts where candidates 
had remained without absolute majorities. 
185
  Among the shortcomings that the OSCE mission noted were the complicated polling system, 
which allowed 54 parties as well as up to 50 candidates on the majority list to be included in 
the ballot, inaccurate voter lists, and a shortage of voting cabins. Furthermore, some 
uncertainties regarding the fairness of the counting procedures remained because international 
observers were not able to cover all its aspects. 
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OSCE field-level response to the creation of new institutions—the Ombudsperson 
As part of the constitution-making process of 1994-1995, the Georgian authorities 
decided upon the establishment of an Ombudsperson institution on human rights, 
referred to as Public Defender’s Office in Georgia. This section will analyze 
whether and how the OSCE field mission became aware of the beginning 
implementation of this decision and how the OSCE responded at field-level. The 
analysis will cover a period beyond the period of 1994-1995 in order to give a 
more complete account of the OSCE engagement in response to the creation of 
this new institution. 
In its November 1994 activity report, the CSCE/OSCE Mission to Georgia noted 
that Shevardnadze had issued a decree on 4 October that called for the 
development of a government program on human rights and expanded access to 
prisoners. In the mission’s view, the decree was to be seen as Shevardnadze’s 
response to domestic criticism of human rights practices in Georgia and stated that 
this decree would shape the mission’s activities in this field 
(CSCE Mission to Georgia 1994h). Human rights issues had become more 
prominent in domestic debate against the background of the two-month state of 
emergency in late 1993 (see above, page 115) and of what was observed by the 
mission to be an “overall housecleaning effort” of disempowering former 
entrepreneurs of violence and forces opposing Shevardnadze, starting towards the 
end of 1994 and intensifying in 1995.
186
 An overview of internal political 
developments in this regard was provided by the mission in its activity report 
dated 20 March 1995 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995e). In light of numerous 
complaints the OSCE had received from the public concerning human rights 
problems, the mission became concerned at indications that the judicial system 
was being misused to curtail more extreme (but not illegal) forms of political 
dissent and considered activities in the area of human rights all the more urgent 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995d). 
In July 1995, during her visit to Tbilisi, the ODIHR Director discussed these 
concerns with the Chairman of the Georgian government’s Committee on Human 
Rights and Inter-Ethnic Relations, with whom the mission had built good working 
relationships. The Chairman admitted operational problems regarding the 
implementation of the Committee’s task of improving Georgia’s human rights 
situation. In order to address these shortcomings, he said that his Committee was 
preparing legislation on the protection of human rights and the establishment of an 
ombudsman institution to which citizens could address complaints 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1995d). This meeting served as an entry point for the 
                                                 
186
  See footnote 134 above. 
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OSCE to support an institution designed to hold government accountable with 
regard to human rights.  
The draft ombudsman law was shared with the mission at the end of 1995, who 
forwarded it to the ODIHR for comments. In mid-March 1996, the ODIHR 
organized a roundtable seminar on the ombudsman institution with Georgian 
stakeholders. The roundtable constituted a follow-up to ODIHR’s evaluation of 
the draft law with the objective of discussing selected legal issues of the law with 
involved Georgian parties prior to the law’s adoption. The main conclusion of the 
seminar was that while there was no universal or ideal ombudsman institution 
model and a model needed to be found suiting the specific political, social and 
cultural situation, some basic and common elements needed to be adhered to 
(OSCE/ODIHR 1996b: 15ff.).  
After some revision, the draft law was sent to parliament for approval at the 
end of March and was adopted in mid-May 1996. However, notwithstanding 
repeated attempts, none of the proposed candidates for the post of ombudsman 
was able to gain parliamentary approval until October 1997. Only then, an 
ODIHR ombudsman expert visited Georgia in March 1998 in order to conduct an 
assessment of the Public Defender’s Office and to give recommendations 
regarding possible OSCE assistance (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998g). The 
ODIHR assessment concluded that there was a clear need for short-term 
assistance in day-to-day management and organization of the institution 
(OSCE/ODIHR 1998: 14). As a result, an ODIHR consultant started working with 
the Public Defender’s Office in June 1998 in order to develop the ombudsman’s 
and his staff’s capacities as well as to foster a dialogue between the ombudsman 
institution and civil society (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998b). The consultant 
also organized meetings of foreign experts with non-governmental organizations 
in order to explain the Public Defender’s responsibilities and how citizens best 
address human rights complaints to his office (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998f). 
In autumn 1998, the OSCE mission facilitated regular meetings between the 
Public Defender and local non-governmental organizations in order to ensure that 
local organizations specializing in human rights will be able to comment and 
advise on the work of the Georgian Ombudsman (OSCE/ODIHR 1998: 14). In 
May as well as in June and July 1999, the ODIHR expert visiting Tbilisi focused 
on training the public defender’s staff in administering and investigating human 
rights complaints, on helping to establish good working relationships of the 
ombudsman and the constitutional court, and on supporting the introduction of 
mechanisms for regular consultations of the public defender and parliament to 
discuss human rights recommendations relevant to the law-making process 
(OSCE/ODIHR 1999b: 13). 
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The challenges of the institution, however, remained. In various reports, the 
OSCE mission raised concern regarding the ombudsman’s commitment to address 
individual citizens‘ complaints and, at times, gained the impression that the Public 
Defender’s Office focused a great deal of attention on minor activities instead of 
concentrating on its main tasks. In addition, the mission perceived the increased 
tensions in Abkhazia in 1998 to be slowing down all human rights activities in 
Georgia (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998l, 1998b). The ODIHR expert, who 
visited Tbilisi in June and July 1999, however, concluded that the Ombudsman 
institution’s challenges and lack of effectiveness also resulted from the 
institution’s organizational set-up and provided respective recommendations to 
adapt the organizational structure in order to better reflect incoming complaints as 
well as recruiting qualified and motivated personnel (OSCE/ODIHR 1999a: 18).  
Contrasting these assessments of the OSCE mission and the ombudsman 
expert contracted by the ODIHR raise questions regarding the coordination 
between the OSCE mission and the ODIHR and regarding the degree to which the 
mission’s guidance on ‘translating the local context’ to specialized OSCE 
institutions based outside of the host country and short-term experts visiting only 
intermittently. While the ODIHR approach of conducting needs assessments 
before deciding on the kind of support that is going to be provided in a selected 
area of engagement is systematic, it also remains at an exclusively technical level 
not taking into account underlying interests and incentives of key actors, i.e. the 
political economy. Although the OSCE mission analyzed the broader picture in 
the above-mentioned report, it was either apparently unable to successfully 
convey this assessment to the ODIHR and related experts in order for this notion 
to be taken into account in support measures, or the ODIHR expert may have been 
driven by his contract and/or the interest in further assignments. The latter would 
correspond to Sarah Bush’s findings of why international democracy promotion 
has been tamed and become predominantly technical in nature.
187
 
When the Ombudsman resigned in September 1999 in order to run as a candidate 
in the October 1999 parliamentary elections and, again, the post remained vacant 
for several months, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office used her visit in May 2000 
to underscore the importance of this institution and the necessity to appoint a 
candidate in accordance with the criteria of professional competence and 
credibility (OSCE Chairperson-in-Office 2000).  
In June 2000, parliament approved the new Ombudswoman who started a 
major reorganization of her office based on the above-mentioned ODIHR 
recommendations in October of the same year. The OSCE mission and the 
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ODIHR continued their cooperation with the Public Defender’s Office and 
conducted an assessment of the ombudsperson’s functioning in December 2001. 
The aim was to give advice on developing a human rights strategy of the public 
defender’s office and on developing structures for legislative reviews as regards 
compliance of Georgian laws to international standards (OSCE/ODIHR 2001: 19, 
59). In 2001, ODIHR, the OSCE mission and Georgia’s public defender also 
launched a pilot project on unannounced inspection visits to pre-trial detention 
facilities at police stations to check on the detainees’ conditions (ibid.). The joint 
monitoring of detention facilities as well as the OSCE technical assistance to the 
ombudsman institution was continued beyond the “Rose Revolution” 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2003a, 2005). 
5.3.2 The OSCE’s utilization of internal prerequisites and response at 
headquarters-level 
As mentioned above, the gradual change in structural context conditions resulting 
from the adoption of the new constitution and the formal introduction of 
democratic norms and institutions in 1995 coincided with the mission mandate’s 
being up for renewal. On 12 September 1995, the Conflict Prevention Center of 
the OSCE Secretariat distributed the above-mentioned mission report on relevant 
developments in Georgia and priorities of the mission among the delegations of 
OSCE participating States for their consideration in the Permanent Council 
discussion. The draft decision on the renewal of the mandate, prepared by the 
Hungarian Chairpersonship of the OSCE for discussion in the Permanent Council 
only referred to the extension of the mandate until 30 June 1996 and did not 
propose any substantial revisions.  
Given the broad nature of the mandate adopted one-and-a-half years earlier, in 
March 1994, statements and suggestions made by delegations of the participating 
States in the meeting of the Permanent Council on 14 September 1994 all did not 
require an expansion or revision of the mandate’s substance. The statement of 
Spain made on behalf of the EU, for instance, expressed that the EU remained 
convinced of the key role the OSCE mission was and would continue to be 
playing in the process of stabilizing Georgia and agreed with the mission’s 
assessment of the importance of the elections and their international monitoring 
by the ODIHR and the mission. The EU regretted the lack of progress in the 
negotiations on South Ossetia and expressed concern with the still disquieting 
situation in Abkhazia where, in view of the EU, the mission could make a useful 
contribution in the field of democratization and human rights. It considered the 
mission’s reinforcement of the work of Georgia’s Human Rights Commission a 
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key contribution (OSCE/PC 1995). All these elements of the statement were 
covered by the framework of the existing mandate.  
Thus, it is concluded that the mission’s report regarding developments and 
structural change in Georgia were discussed and considered by the Permanent 
Council but did not result in a revision of the mission’s mandate. According to the 
author’s assessment, this cannot be considered a lack of adaptability, however, but 
is considered a conscious context-sensitive (non-)response at the political level 
given that considerations have resulted in the conclusion/decision that the 
mandate did not have to be revised. 
5.4 The OSCE’s utilization of internal prerequisites and response 
to gradual change in actor-centered conditions at t1.a in 1999-
2003 
5.4.1 OSCE field-level reporting on gradual change in actor-centered 
context conditions in 1999-2003 
The OSCE mission utilized its monitoring and reporting procedures to point out 
actor-centered developments regarding repressive measures of the state against 
opposition forces and regarding the government’s effort to coopt opposition forces 
in the period between 1999 and 2003. Most often, these accounts were presented 
in the form of describing individual events that were seldom analyzed in a broader 
political context or put into connection with a self-reflective interpretation what 
they mean for the work of the OSCE. The reports, in a way, represented small 
stones, pieces of a puzzle that only taken together formed a picture or mosaic. 
For instance, an interesting statement was made by the mission in an activity 
report as early as 18 August 1998, but unfortunately not further elaborated: The 
mission assessed long-awaited changes that had been made to the government in 
terms of appointed personalities who did not necessarily represent the 
parliamentary majority that was supporting the president. The report states that, 
apparently, the president and his political party preferred to keep a certain 
institutional distance towards each other (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998h). The 
same report also mentioned that the departure of the head of the CUG’s 
parliamentary group for an academic year abroad led to the promotion of Mikhail 
Saakashvili who was, in view of the mission, one of the driving forces behind the 
legal and institutional reforms (ibid.).  
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In October 1997, the OSCE mission acknowledged the gradual actor-centered 
development of an increasingly dynamic non-governmental organization (NGO) 
and civil society ‘sector’ by attributing five paragraphs to this topic in the activity 
report of 31 October 1997. For instance, the mission took note of the Georgian 
Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) whose current activities included drafting 
legislation, providing free legal consultation for individuals, NGOs and media 
institutions, educating law students and young lawyers, and conducting civics 
classes in secondary school (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1997a). The mission, 
however, did not elaborate at all whether this more dynamic NGO ‘sector’ or 
GYLA in particular had any meaning for the work of the mission. 
Another example is the piece-meal reporting of the OSCE mission on issues 
related to the regional political Revival party of Ajaria. While the OSCE mission 
had reported with regard to the 1999 parliamentary elections that the main axis of 
political rivalry was between the ruling party CUG and the Batumi/Ajaria-based 
alliance Revival, the activity report of 18 February 2000 pointed out that the main 
opposition force of the Revival party had declared that it would not present a 
candidate for the April 2000 presidential elections (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2000a), on 2 March 2000, the mission reported that Shevardnadze, after a visit to 
Ajaria, had submitted a proposal to parliament aimed at defining the political 
status of Ajaria in the constitution as an autonomous republic 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2000d), and, in mid-June 2000, the long-vacated post 
of Ombudsperson was eventually filled with an until-then member of parliament 
of the Revival bloc (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2000e).
188
 All these instances were 
described without analytically considering any connection between these 
developments.  
Another example is the mission’s 17 March 1999 activity report for the period 
of 1 to 15 March that informed about the arrest of Valerii Gabelia on charges of 
high treason in February 1999. Gabelia was the President of the political 
opposition movement Chkondideli (“National Movement”) and former prefect 
under Gamsakhurdia. Before his arrest, he had begun to set up a political bloc 
with the aim of taking part in the 1999 parliamentary elections. 
In 2002 and 2003, the OSCE mission repeatedly reported incidents of violent 
assaults against the offices of non-governmental organizations and opposition 
parties around the time of the local government elections in June 2002 and the 
year of the 2003 parliamentary elections (e.g. OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002b, 
2002g, 2003b). 
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With regard to the important gradual actor-centered change of the ruling party’s 
disintegration, identified in chapter 4.5, the OSCE mission provided a related 
analysis in a spot report on 2 June 2002 and pointed out that the continued 
fragmentation of the Citizens’ Union of Georgia had triggered the emergence of 
new political parties. The mission considered this development to have radically 
changed the political landscape of the country to the extent that there was no 
dominant majority party anymore (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002h)—however, 
without pointing out any conclusions of how the OSCE mission intend to respond 
to this crucial political development. 
Although the analysis shows that the mission did not utilize its reporting 
procedures to analyze Georgia’s political transformation process in broader 
perspective, it provides evidence that the mission was aware of crucial trends in 
Georgia’s political developments. The following section will analyze how the 
mission responded to its own insights. 
5.4.2 OSCE field-level response to gradual change in actor-centered 
context conditions in 1999-2003 
On the one hand, no explicit OSCE field-level response to these gradual actor-
centered changes in the political context conditions in the period between 1999 
and 2003 could be identified from the thorough analysis of primary documents. 
On the other hand, the mission was already engaged in an area relevant with 
regard to repressive state measures—the monitoring of the penitentiary system 
and of trials. While monitoring and reporting measures are considered in this 
study an internal prerequisite for context-sensitivity, it can, at the same time, be 
considered a response. Such a response represents an instrument of socialization 
by means of reporting to participating States as well as to the public, thereby 
increasing the political costs of Georgian authorities for violating democratic 
commitments.
189
 In the period of 1999 to 2003, the OSCE intensified its 
monitoring and reporting activities in existing areas of engagement. For instance, 
as mentioned in section 5.3.1, in 2001, the ODIHR, the OSCE mission and 
Georgia’s public defender jointly launched a pilot project on unannounced 
inspection visits to pre-trial detention facilities at police stations to check on the 
detainees’ conditions (OSCE/ODIHR 2001: 19, 59). Furthermore, the OSCE 
mission’s Human Rights Officer gained more access to detainees and defendants, 
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  The same applies to election monitoring that can also be considered both a prerequisite for 
context-sensitivity as well as an instrument of socialization, i.e. a response. 
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permitting a more concrete impression of the problems still existing in the 
penitentiary system and in criminal procedure. 
In addition, reported activities in this period did reflect an increased 
cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This was the case with 
regard to technical assistance for the Public Defender’s Office regarding to which 
NGOs increasingly became beneficiaries of capacity development support (see 
section 5.3.1). This was also the case for other activities, such as OSCE-hosted 
roundtables on the compliance of Georgian legislation with human rights 
principles with GYLA as a local partner organization in May 2001 and February 
2002 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2001a, 2002d). Nevertheless, there are no 
indications that this ‘adaption’ with regard to beneficiaries and cooperation 
partners had been a conscious decision in response to an increasingly dynamic 
NGO sector. This may have had to do with the fact that the standard monitoring 
and reporting procedures lacked analytical focus—with few exceptions. This may 
also have had to do with the rather small resources available to the OSCE mission 
in the area of democracy promotion. 
5.5 The OSCE’s utilization of internal prerequisites and response 
to gradual change in structural conditions at t1.b.2 in 1999-
2003 
As mentioned above, monitoring and reporting measures may be considered both 
a democracy promoter’s internal prerequisite for context-sensitivity as well as a 
context-sensitive response in the form of an instrument of socialization. This also 
applies to a key area of OSCE engagement in Georgia: monitoring of and 
reporting on elections. The OSCE utilized election monitoring as a prerequisite to 
become aware and gain knowledge of Georgia’s democratic backsliding by means 
of increasing strategic election manipulations in the period of 1999-2003. At the 
same time, OSCE election monitoring served as an instrument of increasing the 
political costs of Georgian authorities for violating democratic election 
standards—one key commitment related to Georgia’s participation in the OSCE. 
Against this background, the following analysis of OSCE election monitoring and 
electoral assistance serves two purposes: analyzing the OSCE’s utilization of its 
prerequisite for adaptability in terms of the OSCE’s identification of increased 
strategic election manipulations through election monitoring and reporting as well 
as analyzing the OSCE response to this element of democratic backsliding in the 
form of intensified monitoring, electoral assistance and political dialogue. This 
chapter is structured according to the various elections in Georgia, starting with 
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the 1998 local elections. Because election assistance and election monitoring is 
the most important area of OSCE democracy promotion, this section will analyze 
this area of OSCE engagement in a rather detailed manner and cover all elections 
from the 1998 local elections to the 2003 parliamentary elections. 
5.5.1 Limited observation of 1998 local elections 
In light of the generally lower international interest in local elections compared to 
national elections, the OSCE Mission to Georgia as well as the international 
community used limited observation of the local election process to gain insights 
and draw lessons with regard to national elections and respective assistance needs.  
Insightful for the mission’s view on Georgia’s democratization process was 
the behavior of the authorities of Ajaria in the context of their parliamentary 
elections in September 1996. The OSCE mission had approached Ajaria 
authorities regarding the monitoring of these elections, but received no response. 
The mission, therefore, agreed with embassies and interested organizations in 
early September that no standard monitoring effort was to be conducted without 
an official invitation but that a number of embassy and mission personnel would 
be dispatched to conduct a political assessment of the elections 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1996b). The mission sent three of its members for this 
purpose. In addition, the mission asked the President of the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly (PA), who was visiting Georgia from 20-23 September, to make a 
public statement regarding Ajaria’s rejection of international election monitoring 
(ibid.). The PA President’s statement resulted in a strong response from the 
spokesperson of Ajaria’s regional government, attacking the OSCE Head of 
Mission of organizing a plot against the elections. In response, the OSCE Head of 
Mission met with Georgia’s Foreign Minister, the Head of Shevardnadze’s 
Chancellery, and subsequently with local media, and found support for his 
clarification that the mission’s request to monitor the Ajaria elections was in 
accord with OSCE commitments and the Copenhagen document. In its activity 
report dated 30 September 1996, the mission noted that Ajaria’s behavior 
illustrated the limits to which democratization in Georgia as a whole was still 
subject (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1996a). 
Against the background of this experience, the Head of the OSCE Mission to 
Georgia visited Ajaria in October 1998 after the date for local elections had been 
set to November 1998. The purpose of this visit was to re-establish contacts with 
the Chairman of the Supreme Council of that region, Aslan Abashidze, and to 
discuss the international presence during the voting that the mission was 
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coordinating (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998c). There had been no high-level 
contacts between the mission and Ajaria since the above-mentioned September 
1996 elections. 
The November 1998 local elections in Georgia were to be held based on two 
new laws that parliament had adopted in October 1997 after heated debate: the 
law on local self-administration and the law on elections for local self-
administration.
190
 The opposition had harshly criticized that, according to the law, 
important posts in the local administration were not up for election but to be 
appointed by the president (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1997b). When 
Shevardnadze, in August 1998, scheduled the local elections for November 1998, 
the OSCE mission was concerned that the date was chosen on the basis of 
political considerations rather than with regard to technical requirements of the 
election process. Due to the shortage of time, Georgia’s Central Election 
Committee (CEC) had to change some rules, for example the time schedule for 
establishing the voter list. Furthermore, the availability of funds for the election 
administration was still unclear (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998d). In light of 
this, the CEC warned of a failure of the elections and international donors 
expressed their concern in a letter to Shevardnadze in September 1998 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998i). Eventually, the government funds were 
allocated to the CEC 42 days before the elections—instead of the legally-required 
90 days—and the CEC assured the international community that the schedule was 
now on track (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998c). 
Because no full-scale international monitoring operation was to be expected, 
the OSCE mission took on the task of coordinating the more limited observation 
efforts.
191
 This was to allow for a more qualified assessment of the local elections 
and to jointly identify elements of the election process that still needed 
strengthening and improvement before the 1999 parliamentary elections. In this 
regard, the OSCE mission organized a series of meetings with and training for 
international observers during the pre-electoral period, facilitated meetings with 
diplomatic missions and local non-governmental organizations, developed a 
deployment plan, and coordinated the briefing on 13 November and the debriefing 
on 16 November 1998 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998j).  
The 89 international observers from 28 countries, accredited with the OSCE 
mission, visited about 17 percent of the polling stations. Thus, the mission clearly 
stated in press statements before and after the elections that no overall assessment 
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  Initially, elections were to be held in the fall of 1997. However, due to the delayed adoption 
of the two laws, the date was scheduled for one year later. 
191
  In general, local elections in Georgia received much less attention from international donors 
than national elections. 
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of the degree to which the local elections have been free and fair or comments on 
violations were to be provided (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998j). Nevertheless, 
the mission noted with concern that some news agencies used the Georgian 
practice of voice-over translations of television transmission to give distorted 
versions of the OSCE press statement. For instance, viewers were told by a state 
TV channel that the OSCE had declared that elections had been held without 
serious violations or by Ajaria’s local TV station that elections had been 
conducted according to the highest international democratic standards 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998e). 
The conclusions that the OSCE mission drew from the debriefing with 
international observers on the 1998 local elections with a view to the upcoming 
1999 parliamentary elections were the following:  
 timely and sufficient funding of elections;  
 strengthening of civic and voter education, including minority languages;  
 improved mechanism of the selection of the Election Commission members, 
their responsibilities and term of office;  
 clearer definitions of the appropriate role of public authorities in the election 
process, including the presence of officials at the polling stations on election 
day;  
 better training and provision of information to all members of the Election 
Commissions;  
 consideration of a unified election code and strengthened provisions for its 
enforcement and penalties (ibid.).  
The OSCE mission proposed initiating a series of round table discussions on these 
election issues in order to initiate a constructive dialogue of the international 
community with Georgian authorities (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998e). 
The following section will analyze whether the OSCE followed-up on and took 
into consideration these recommendations concluded from observing the 1998 
local elections in the assistance to and monitoring of the 1999 parliamentary 
elections. 
5.5.2 Assistance with regard to and monitoring of 1999 
parliamentary elections 
Following the first free local elections in Georgia in November 1998 and in light 
of the above-mentioned conclusions drawn from their limited observation, the 
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ODIHR set up a training program for district-level election administrators in 
cooperation with Georgia’s Central Elections Commission (CEC). The program 
was based on an ODIHR assessment mission in January 1999 that was conducted 
within the framework of a Memorandum of Understanding that had been signed 
between Shevardnadze and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the end of November 
1998.
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 The ODIHR training program for election administrators at district-level 
was implemented between August and October 1999. Based on a request from the 
Georgian authorities, training on the role of security forces on election-day for 
law-enforcement officers was also included in the program (OSCE/ODIHR 
1999b: 20, 1999a: 16). 
With regard to the issue of civic and voter education, the ODIHR launched a 
public awareness project in 1999 in the shape of six radio programs on human 
rights issues, one of which addressing voter’s rights. The radio program on voter’s 
rights was broadcast country-wide in Georgian and Russian language in mid-
October, two weeks before the parliamentary elections (OSCE/ODIHR 1999a). 
At the end of February 1999, the OSCE mission and the ODIHR used the 
occasion of the ODIHR-organized second OSCE election assistance strategy 
meeting on Central Asia and the Caucasus in Warsaw to jointly review and 
discuss the lessons from the 1998 local elections (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
1999d). Some of the issues of concern were also discussed among CEC members, 
political party representatives members of parliament, government 
representatives, representatives of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
as well as international NGOs and organizations at a workshop organized by the 
International Foundation for Election System in March 1999 that the OSCE 
mission attended (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1999b). 
On 25 June 1999, parliament adopted an amended election law, which came into 
force on 3 July. In July 1999, the threshold for parties to enter parliament was 
raised from five to seven percent, with relevant constitutional changes having 
been made. While broadly in line with OSCE commitments, the OSCE mission 
was still concerned with some of the details of the amended election law, such as 
the composition of the election commissions at central- and district-levels and 
voter registration (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1999a). Therefore, the OSCE 
mission and the ODIHR election expert, upon his visit regarding the above-
mentioned training program, were in close contact with the CEC regarding these 
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  Earlier that year, in March 1998, the ODIHR had conducted a joint needs assessment mission 
together with the Council of Europe, the EU Commission, UNHCR, the Soros Foundation 
and the Danish Refugee Council to identify the nature and scope of technical assistance and 
to clarify the division of labor between the different international institutions and to ensure a 
common approach to the various challenges (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998g). 
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concerns (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1999c). These issues were also the topic of 
the second meeting of international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations 
active in the field of technical election assistance that the OSCE mission 
organized in July 1999. While the problem of voter registration was considered 
the primary concern, it was perceived unlikely to be resolved before the October 
parliamentary elections (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1999e). 
On 23 September 1999, the ODIHR established its Election Observation Mission. 
The OSCE election observation team consisted of eight core staff based in Tbilisi, 
twelve long-term observers deployed in the regions, and 177 short-term observers 
from 27 OSCE participating States—including 20 parliamentarians of the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, staff of embassies and representatives of international 
NGOs—deployed on election-day. Observers were deployed in 74 districts 
visiting more than 800 polling stations. With regard to Georgia’s regions, five 
observation teams were dispatched during the first round of elections on 31 
October 1999, two teams with a total of 35 short-term observers during the second 
round on 14 November.
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 The second round was conducted in 20 of the 75 
constituencies where no candidate was able to secure a victory in the first round 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2000b: 1). Following its own lesson drawn from the first joint 
OSCE mission-ODIHR election monitoring in 1995 (see section 5.3.1), the 
ODIHR team stayed until 20 November and included the counting in their 
observation.
194
 
The ODIHR considered the elections “a step towards Georgia’s compliance 
with OSCE commitments” and voters, in the ODIHR’s view, were “mostly able to 
express their will” (OSCE/ODIHR 2000b: 1). Nevertheless, the ODIHR also 
noted that the election process failed to fully meet all commitments and some 
instances of intimidation and violence during the pre-election period and on 
election-days gave rise to concern. The quality of polling varied across regions. In 
Ajaria, polling was unsatisfactory and less than satisfactory in two other regions. 
Voting in Abkhazia and in parts of South Ossetia was not possible. 
Notwithstanding major deficiencies, such as allowing the ruling party to enjoy a 
dominant position at all levels of the election administration, the ODIHR assessed 
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  In light of the above-mentioned challenges in Ajara, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of 
the Autonomous Republic, Aslan Abashidze, had assured the OSCE Head of Mission and an 
ODIHR representative of his full cooperation regarding the OSCE election monitoring upon 
their visited to Batumi in August 1999. 
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  The election results saw the Citizens‘ Union of Georgia at 41.75 percent (56.17 percent 
including the direct majority vote), the Revival party at 25.18 percent (24.68 percent), and 
Industry Will Save Georgia at 7.08 percent (6.38 percent). Curiously, the Labor Party failed 
to cross the new 7 percent threshold by only a tiny margin with 6.69 percent (0.85 percent). 
The National Democratic Alliance, the Third Way, and the People’s Party all received votes 
clearly below the 7 percent threshold. 
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the amended election law sufficient to conduct genuine multi-party elections. 
However, in the observers’ view, the Georgian election administration did not 
always follow the principles of the law during implementation (OSCE/ODIHR 
2000b: 2). Observers also identified an advantage of the ruling party in the media, 
although the media generally provided the electorate with the possibility of 
making an informed choice. The ODIHR concluded that further progress was 
necessary to increase the confidence in the election process in Georgia and urged 
Georgian authorities to investigate violations of the law, to improve the electoral 
legislation and to address the shortcomings of the electoral administration 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2000b: 3). 
5.5.3 Assistance with regard to and monitoring of 2000 presidential 
elections 
Within the short timeframe between the second round of parliamentary elections 
in November 1999 and the presidential elections scheduled for April 2000, the 
OSCE—through its various structures—followed-up on ODIHR 
recommendations.  
In early 2000, the ODIHR approached the Georgian CEC in offering technical 
assistance prior to the April 2000 presidential elections, but did not receive a 
timely response (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2000a). In his meetings with Georgian 
interlocutors, the OSCE Secretary General underlined the importance of following 
up on ODIHR recommendations during his visit to Georgia on 20 and 21 March 
2000 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2000f). Another OSCE visit highlighted the 
importance the OSCE attributed to democratic developments in Georgia: On 23 to 
27 April, the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly met with President 
Shevardnadze, Georgian parliamentarians, representatives of the CEC and 
government bodies as well as with members of the Supreme Court. The main 
focus of her visit was on the implementation of OSCE recommendations 
regarding the legislative framework of elections (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2000g). Parliament, indeed, addressed the ODIHR recommendations provided 
after the 1999 elections and amended the election law shortly before the 
presidential elections were held (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2000d, 2000b). 
Reportedly having some issues with the electoral law, the Revival bloc—the main 
opposition force—did not to present a candidate for the presidential elections 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2000a).
195
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  The Revival party was an influential member of the Revival bloc and has a regional profile 
with a focus on Ajara. Interesting with regard to the Rivival bloc not bringing a candidate into 
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Regarding the monitoring, the ODIHR had dispatched a needs assessment team on 
29 February and launched an ODIHR Election Observation Mission in March 
2000. The election process was monitored by 18 long-term observers and election 
experts and 147 short-term observers from 24 OSCE participating States. On 
election-day, observers visited 742 of the 2,580 polling stations in 72 of the 76 
election districts. According to the findings consolidated in the ODIHR report 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2000a), “fundamental freedoms were generally respected during 
the election campaign and candidates were able to express their views”. However, 
again, the ODIHR noted that further progress was necessary for Georgia to fully 
meet its commitments as OSCE participating State. Problems were identified 
particularly in the areas of state authorities interfering in the election process, 
deficient election legislation, a not fully representative election administration, 
and unreliable voter lists. Although the substantial number of amendments to the 
election law had addressed some OSCE concerns raised previously, other 
concerns had not at all been or only partially addressed, while additional issues 
resulted from amendments that enhanced the powers of Chairpersons of election 
commissions at all levels. Again, the CEC applied legal provisions selectively 
according to the ODIHR report. During the campaign, no clear dividing line 
between state affairs and the incumbent’s campaign could be observed giving the 
incumbent a clear advantage. While the atmosphere during voting remained 
generally calm, the election process deteriorated after the close of polls. Counting 
procedures lacked uniformity and, at times, transparency.
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 While in some 
polling stations the law was properly implemented, in others it became apparent 
during the counting that ballot box stuffing had taken place. The ODIHR report 
emphasized the need to address these problems and recommended in particular: 
                                                                                                                                     
the presidential race are the following developments according to reports of the OSCE 
Mission to Georgia: On 28 February 2000, during the run-up to the April presidential 
elections, Shevardnadze submitted a proposal to parliament aimed at defining the political 
status of Ajara as an autonomous republic in the Georgian constitution 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2000d). Furthermore, the long-vacated post of Ombudsperson was 
eventually filled with an until-then member of parliament of the Revival bloc in mid-June 
2000 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2000e). Only two years earlier, tensions between 
Batumi/Ajara and Tbilisi had been observed: The leadership of the Autonomous Republic of 
Ajara accused central authorities of interfereing in Ajaran internal affairs and Ajaran officials 
claimed that certain clauses of the 1995 constitution infringed upon Ajara’s autonomy. The 
central Georgian side expressed dissatisfaction with unilateral changes in Ajara’s constitution 
that might possibly contradict the Georgian constitution and that were made without the 
formally required approval by the central government. Shevardnadze made efforts of 
diffusing the situation, apologizing in a radio interview on 30 March 1998 for any remarks 
that may have been made against Ajara’s autonomy (OSCE Mission to Georgia 1998g). 
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  Official election results saw the incumbent Shevardnadze at 79.82 percent and his opponent, 
Jumber Patiashvili, at 16.66 percent. The four other candidates all received votes below 1 
percent. 
  178
 to initiate sanctions against those who breached the law during presidential 
elections;  
 to establish a comprehensive electoral code before the 2001 local elections; 
 to amend the composition of the CEC to make it a fully multi-party body; 
 to implement a comprehensive review and update of voter registers. 
Against the background of these findings that the ODIHR Election Observation 
Mission had already summarized in its preliminary statement, the OSCE 
Chairperson-in-Office visited Georgia in early May 2000, noted that ODIHR 
criticism regarding the elections was constructive, and emphasized the need of 
continued cooperation of Georgia and the ODIHR in the “human dimension”. The 
final observation report was presented by the ODIHR Director upon his visit in 
June 2000. According to the OSCE mission’s activity report, Georgian 
interlocutors were critical to the election observation report but assured that they 
were open to the assistance offered by the ODIHR (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2000c). 
5.5.4 Monitoring of 2002 local elections 
Following the 2000 presidential elections, Georgia adopted a new unified election 
code. On 21 August 2001, President Shevardnadze signed the election code as 
well the law on elections of self-government bodies stipulating that mayors and 
heads of regional administrative bodies be elected instead of appointed. 
Shevardnadze also set the date for local elections to be held on 4 November 2001. 
The OSCE mission considered the amended election law to fall short of the 
ODIHR recommendations that had been provided after the 1999 parliamentary 
and the 2000 presidential elections—specifically with regard to the composition 
of the CEC (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2001c). 
From 18 to 22 September 2001, the ODIHR conducted a needs assessment 
mission in Georgia that recommended deploying a small advance team of experts 
to be followed by additional experts to monitor local elections. The advance team 
was deployed in the first week of October. However, the ODIHR mission was 
closed again on 17 October when it became apparent that the local elections 
would not be held in November (OSCE/ODIHR 2001: 10). No explicit decision 
on postponing the elections had been made. However, only shortly before the 
scheduled election date, parliament extended the mandate of the local self-
administration bodies until June 2002 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2001d). 
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This development unfolded against the background that the parliamentary 
opposition had already boycotted the 2 August 2001 parliamentary session when 
the two above-mentioned laws had been passed. This reflected the fragmentation 
in parliament that had intensified over recent months, resulting in the absence of a 
clear majority in parliament. Until October 2001, more than 60 amendments to the 
new election law had been tabled. In light of this, the majority of CEC members 
had recommended to postpone elections by one year due to the lack of political 
support for the election law and of funding (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2001b). 
Furthermore, on 1 November 2001, Shevardnadze dismissed the entire 
government by decree. This step followed several days of large demonstrations in 
front of the parliament building and the resignation of the Minister of Security, the 
Minister of Interior and the Prosecutor General that had been demanded by 
demonstrators in protest against infringements on the freedom of the press. The 
Chairman of Parliament, Zurab Zhvania, also resigned and was replaced by Nino 
Burjanadze shortly after (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2001d). 
At the end of March 2002, Shevardnadze set the new date for local elections for 2 
June 2002 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002f). The OSCE mission noted that no 
budget line for the elections had been included in the 2002 state budget adopted 
on 31 January (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002a). Only on 16 April, the necessary 
funds for the election administration were allocated by presidential decree. On 25 
April, parliament amended the law on local self-governance, increasing the 
number of elected deputies at local level, and the unified election code 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002e). According to the OSCE mission, the amended 
election code represented an improvement over previous legislation, incorporated 
a number of ODIHR recommendations, and provided an adequate framework for 
the conduct of democratic elections. However, again, the implementation revealed 
shortcomings (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002h). 
Based on the invitation from the Georgian government, the ODIHR sent three 
election experts to Georgia in mid-May to assist the OSCE mission in conducting 
a political assessment of the local elections. On election-day, the OSCE mission 
dispatched two teams to follow the election process at 14 polling stations in four 
cities, including the vote counting. Before and after the elections, the OSCE 
mission facilitated the exchange with the embassies of OSCE participating States 
and international organizations. The mission highlighted the importance of these 
local elections with regard to the 2003 parliamentary elections, especially in light 
of the continued fragmentation of the ruling party that triggered the emergence of 
new political parties, radically changing Georgia’s political landscape 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002h). 
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According to the assessment of the OSCE mission, the media limited its main 
coverage to four political parties. The friction and split within the Citizens’ Union 
of Georgia was widely covered. The OSCE mission noted instances of violence; 
ballot papers were destroyed or stolen by armed men in several constituencies. 
The overall impression, expressed in the OSCE mission’s spot report on the 
elections, was that the election process took place in an atmosphere of uncertainty. 
The CEC did neither enjoy the trust of political parties nor public confidence. In 
the mission’s view, the uncertainties exacerbated political tensions during 
elections (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002h). In two cities, the elections had to be 
cancelled after ballot papers had been stolen or never arrived in the first place. 
The polls there were rescheduled to 16 June 2002. The election results in a 
number of constituencies remained controversial and were investigated. 
Some results were annulled by the CEC; in some districts, by-elections were 
held; in several districts, recounts were conducted, for instance in Tbilisi. In July 
2002, the Temporary Parliamentary Commission for Investigation of Reasons for 
Violations of Electoral Procedures was established and mandated (1) to 
investigate reported violations during every election since the 1999 parliamentary 
elections; (2) to name responsible persons; (3) to conduct a legal assessment of 
the elections; (4) to elaborate recommendations on amending relevant election, as 
well as criminal and administrative legislation. The Commission’s investigations 
in one of the regions identified the most common electoral violations as (1) 
absence of signatures on special envelopes; (2) inaccurate voter lists, and (3) 
discrepancies between the results given in precinct protocols on election-day and 
those received at the end of the recount. However, according to the Commission, 
identification of those officials responsible for violations was difficult due to 
unclear tasks and responsibilities. On 23 September 2002, the Commission 
announced a number of recommendations for amendments to the Unified Election 
Code, including a requirement that district-level election commissions store 
ballots for a minimum of five years after an election as well as the definition of 
“significant election violations” as such that necessitate the cancellation of 
election results. Furthermore, the proposed amendments extended to the 
Commission the right to initiate an appeal to the Supreme Court to contest 
election results when it has determined that violations could have affected the 
final results (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002c). 
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5.5.5 Assistance related to and monitoring of the 2003 
parliamentary elections 
As mentioned above, the OSCE mission had emphasized the significance of the 
2002 local elections for the 2003 parliamentary elections—especially in light of 
the changed political landscape with splits in the ruling party and new opposition 
movements. The political tensions that had increased in the context of local 
elections continued in the run-up to parliamentary elections. The OSCE mission, 
in its regular activity reports, noted several incidents of assaults against non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and opposition parties.
197
 
Against the background of these political tensions and in light of the observed 
decrease in the quality of the election process, the international community in 
Georgia jointly entered preparations for their engagement regarding the 2003 
parliamentary elections at an early stage. The coordination was structured into two 
groups: the Ambassadorial Working Group (AWG) for a high-level political 
dialogue with the Georgian government on election issues and the Technical 
Working Group (TWG) of working-level representatives of bilateral diplomatic 
missions, donor organizations and technical assistance providers that provided the 
AWG with technical expertise, coordinated election-related support activities, and 
was chaired by the OSCE Mission to Georgia.  
The TWG identified three priority needs at the end of 2002 that were adopted by 
the AWG and discussed with the Foreign Minister of Georgia in December 2002, 
the State Minister in January 2003 and with the President in May 2003: (a) 
accurate voter data; (b) trusted election administration; (c) transparency of the 
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  For instance: Only shortly after the local elections, in July 2002, ten strongmen assaulted staff 
and destroyed equipment in the office of the Liberty Institute, a local NGO monitoring human 
rights developments in Georgia. Following the assault, several NGOs signed a joint statement 
condemning the attack, in which they held the government responsible 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002b). A few days later, the car of an NGO observing local 
elections in one city where the vote had to be postponed was stolen and unidentified persons 
broke into the NGO’s regional office and stole computer equipment 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2002g). In February 2003, a large group of armed men broke into 
the offices of the New Rights Party and physically attacked the party leader and destroyed 
equipment and furniture. After the incident, nine opposition parties signed a statement of 
protest against election violence (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003b). In August 2003, 
members of the youth movement “Enough” (Kmara) were injured during protests in an 
incident involving the police. The movement had attracted attention for its growing number 
of civil protests (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003a). In September 2003, campaigners of the 
opposition party National Movement clashed with local government representatives, police 
and supporters of the pro-governmental bloc in Eastern Georgia (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2003j). And closer to the election date, another such incident took place when security forces 
in Ajara reportedly prevented the National Movement from campaigning, using force and 
raiding the opposition party’s offices, burning campaign materials (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2003i). 
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election process and prosecution of violations (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003s). 
These points of concern translated into the following key assistance priorities 
identified by the TWG in a unified elections assistance plan at the end of January 
2003: the voter registration system, the certification and training of election 
administration officials and election monitoring (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2003k).  
The AWG representatives, who met with the President in May 2003, particularly 
highlighted the urgency of possible presidential initiatives that could help prevent 
election fraud, such as political and administrative support for a voter registration 
system, that would stimulate a national consensus on the composition of a new 
Central Election Commission (CEC), measures to promote election transparency 
and long-range election planning. They also stressed that a unified election budget 
was necessary before the international community could provide election-related 
technical assistance (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003f).  
Two of the above AWG points of concern were taken up by the Georgian 
government in the form of a presidential ordinance “On Improvement of Electoral 
System of Georgia and Measures to Ensure the Conduct of 2003 Parliamentary 
Elections” signed on 26 February 2003: the need for greater transparency in the 
pre-election process and the need to improve voter data. An election budget was 
submitted by the CEC to the Ministry of Finance on 22 May. And, in a 
government initiative to compile accurate voter information, the Ministry of 
Interior completed a review of voter data in June 2003 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2003s). The AWG suggestion of a presidential initiative to stimulate national 
consensus related to the parliamentary deadlock on the decision of CEC 
composition. This parliamentary controversy came to its peak on 3 June when 
opposition leaders rallied supporters to demonstrate in front of parliament and 
seven of the 18 CEC members, including the chairman, resigned 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003h). When parliament was also unable to achieve 
an agreement in the debate of amending the Unified Election Code, the 
international community intervened: 
In early July 2003, the former US Secretary of State, James Baker, visited 
Georgia, met with representatives of six opposition parties and President 
Shevardnadze, outlined main principles for the work on the new unified election 
code, and proposed that government could nominate five and the opposition nine 
members of election commissions at all levels while the chairperson would be 
appointed by the OSCE (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003g). The OSCE mission 
considered this an unprecedented degree of involvement of the international 
community in a domestic process. However, in its analysis provided in a 
confidential spot report in early August, the OSCE mission elaborated that 
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introducing a neutral voice into the process may be the only way to break the 
parliamentary deadlock on the CEC composition that parliament had faced since 
August 2001 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003q). The Head of the OSCE Mission 
to Georgia and ODIHR representatives, therefore, met with Shevardnadze, 
Georgia’s Foreign Minister and the Speaker of Parliament in mid- and end-July 
and informed them that the OSCE was prepared to set up an ad-hoc committee of 
prominent international figures, which could identify a short list of candidates for 
the CEC chairmanship in dialogue with Georgian authorities, parliament and civil 
society (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003g, 2003m, 2003o). 
In a first parliamentary reading of respective amendments to the Unified Election 
Code on 24 July 2003, it appeared that comprise would be reached along the lines 
of the “Baker formula”. However, when the amendments were passed in further 
parliamentary readings in August, the decision on CEC composition broke from 
the “Baker formula” in spirit when the pro-governmental block joined forces with 
the Revival party and the Industrialists forging a controlling majority on the 
election commissions. The role of the CEC Chairperson, to be identified with 
OSCE assistance, would no longer be that of a broker between political forces. In 
the OSCE mission’s view, the new election law raised doubts on the political will 
for democratic elections and there was no reason to believe that the election 
commission would be allowed to fulfil its function without political interference 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003p). On the positive side, the amendments also 
included a range of technical anti-fraud measures that had been suggested by the 
AWG, including voter marking, improved voter lists and transparency measures 
such as the posting of precinct and district aggregate results in public and on the 
internet (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003p). 
Following the adoption of the new election law, the international community 
discussed whether the OSCE would be risking its credibility if it were to vet a 
CEC Chairperson under the changed circumstances and thereby providing some 
sort of political cover to a new CEC that would likely be controlled by the 
government. The OSCE mission, therefore, sought the guidance of the OSCE 
Chairperson and the Head of the OSCE Task Force regarding this question 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003n). The OSCE decided in favor of the OSCE’s 
involvement—through a Representative of the OSCE Chairperson in Office: On 
27 August, the “Ad-hoc Advisory Commission” began the selection process for a 
shortlist of candidates for the CEC Chairmanship. This advisory commission 
consisted of the Representative of the OSCE Chairperson in Office and the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. At the 
beginning of the selection process, they reiterated that the upcoming elections 
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were to be seen as a test for democracy in Georgia and a signal within Georgia as 
well as the international community (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003v). 
The selection process was defined to be completely transparent.
198
 Following a 
public appeal, 25 individuals submitted their names as candidates 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003v). The advisory commission consulted with the 
seven political parties, with civil society, with Shevardnadze and Georgia’s 
Foreign Minister as well as with the Embassies of OSCE/Council of Europe 
participating/member States. As a result of consultations, three additional 
candidates were added to the list. The list of candidates was made available to the 
media on 28 August. In light of the selection criteria, most candidates lacked even 
the most basic qualifications; four were considered candidates meeting the 
criteria, of which two were expected to have public support in the OSCE 
mission’s view (ibid.).199 On 30 August, the advisory commission presented a list 
of three names to President Shevardnadze that, in the opinion of the commission, 
came closest to meeting the criteria and would be able to engage broader support. 
Two days later, Shevardnadze appointed the incumbent Public Defender of 
Georgia to become CEC Chairperson (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003u). 
Responding to a key ODIHR recommendation, the new Georgian Unified 
Election Code no longer allowed for the use of supplementary voter lists. This 
means that voters would not be eligible to vote in November without a court order 
if they were not on the lists before 22 October 2003. It was therefore very 
important that voters checked their names on the list—to correct mistakes, to 
eliminate different kinds of voter fraud, and to protect their right to vote. 
Therefore, the OSCE mission launched a public education project with broadcasts 
and posters in mid-September to inform Georgian voters about the new voter lists 
and to encourage them to participate in improving the data. For the first time, 
there was a centralized voter registry available to the public for review 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003j). 
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  The following guidelines for the selection process were established: transparency of the 
selection process without any decision behind closed doors; presentation of the candidate list 
to the public and other stakeholders and consultations with political parties and civil society; 
stakeholders are to explain why a candidate was unacceptable to them; stakeholders may 
suggest additional candidates (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003v). 
199
  The following selection criteria were established: As the head of the election administration, 
the CEC Chairperson must be able and willing to lead the CEC to fulfil its role, be committed 
to impartiality in the election administration while dealing with diverse and mutually-hostile 
political party-appointed CEC members, to timeliness in decision-making while the late 
appointment of the CEC and changes to election legislation exacerbate time pressure for the 
election administration, and to transparency and public trust in order to earn the confidence of 
the Georgian public against a background of suspicion against the election administration 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003v). 
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The AWG’s political dialogue with the Georgian government on election issues 
was complemented by a number of visits of OSCE representatives:  
In mid-June 2003, shortly before the ODIHR needs assessment mission (see 
below), the ODIHR Director visited Georgia. The November parliamentary 
elections were one of the main topics discussed with President Shevardnadze 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003l). 
In early September 2003, the Head of the OSCE Task Force visited the South 
Caucasus country and held meeting with a number of high-ranking Georgian 
interlocutors, including President Shevardnadze, to discuss elections preparations. 
The CEC Chairperson used the meeting to request assistance, such as the 
provision of transparent ballot boxes, voter marking equipment, and specially 
marked ballot paper (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003e). The OSCE Mission to 
Georgia raised in-kind contributions and funding in the form of extra-budgetary 
contributions in this regard and handed over voter marking equipment to the CEC 
on 21 October, provided under the project “Support for voter marking in the 
Georgian parliamentary elections”. Shortly after, the OSCE mission facilitated the 
handover of 1,000 ballot boxes belonging to the Armenian CEC. In addition, the 
OSCE supported the televised broadcasting of public service announcement and 
the dissemination of posters on voter marking in Georgian and Russian language 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003i). 
On 21 and 22 October 2003, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office himself 
underlined the importance of free and transparent elections in Georgia upon his 
visit to Tbilisi (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003t). 
Prior to the launch of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission, the ODIHR had 
become already involved since April 2003. It had received the official invitation 
to observe the November parliamentary elections on 1 April. Two ODIHR 
election experts conducted a pre-assessment mission in early April to review 
election preparations (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003f). Upon initiative of the 
OSCE Mission to Georgia, the ODIHR became involved in the pre-election period 
with monthly visits of an ODIHR election advisor so as to ensure coordination of 
ongoing pre-election activities with the planned Election Observation Mission in 
light of the extraordinary significance of the elections (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2003c). From 19 to 24 June 2003, the ODIHR conducted a needs assessment 
mission that concluded that the political situation in Georgia was characterized by 
a high level of distrust and frustration among the electorate and recommended the 
deployment of the Election Observation Mission at the end of September. 
Furthermore, the needs assessment mission called upon parliamentary factions to 
urgently find a compromise on the CEC composition, urged political parties to 
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commit publicly to a peaceful election process, and called on the Georgian 
population to scrutinize voter lists as soon as they were available (OSCE/ODIHR 
2003b). 
The ODIHR Election Observation Mission opened in Tbilisi on 9 September 
2003 with 34 election experts and long-term observers deployed in the capital and 
six regions. The short-term observation of the November parliamentary elections 
was conducted within the framework of the International Election Observation 
Mission, a joint undertaking of the ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the European 
Parliament. This international observation mission deployed some 450 short-term 
observers from 43 OSCE participating States, including 21 parliamentarians from 
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 21 from the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, and three from the European Parliament. The polling and vote 
count in more than 1,200 out of 2,893 polling stations throughout the country was 
observed. The international effort also observed the tabulation of results in over 
30 district election commissions. 
In its preliminary conclusions, published on 3 November 2003 prior to the 
tabulation and announcement of official election results, the International Election 
Observation Mission stated that “the 2 November parliamentary elections fell 
short of a number of OSCE commitments and other international standards for 
democratic elections. Inaccuracies in the voter list seriously challenged the 
fundamental guarantee of universal and equal suffrage, and lessened voters’ 
confidence in the State administration.” (OSCE/ODIHR 2003c: 1). In the 
observation mission’s view, the persistent delays of election preparations forced 
the election administration to take a number of improvised decisions due to severe 
time constraints and raised questions about the willingness and capacity of 
Georgian governmental and parliamentary authorities (ibid.). While the 
composition of election commissions at all levels was still dominated by the pro-
presidential bloc, the preliminary statement acknowledged the efforts of the CEC 
Chairperson that resulted in the new CEC conducting itself with substantially 
greater transparency compared to previous elections (ibid.). However, as in 
previous elections, the pro-presidential bloc failed to distinguish between political 
party and state resources during the campaigning period. The observers noted 
serious acts of violence during campaign events. On election-day, region-specific 
serious irregularities such as ballot stuffing, the use of pre-marked ballots, 
multiple voting, and the destruction of ballot boxes were either observed or 
reported (OSCE/ODIHR 2003c: 2-3). 
In response to this critical international statement, President Shevardnadze stated 
on TV one day later: “I’m not interested in the opinion of observers. I can affirm 
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that these are the most democratic, free and transparent elections that have ever 
been held in Georgia.” While all opposition parties had run separate campaigns 
according to OSCE mission reports, three of them joined forces after the elections, 
picked up international criticism of the elections, and called for rallies in protest 
against the conduct of elections and in response to the mistrust in the vote 
tabulation: the National Movement, the Burjanadze-Democrats, and the Political 
Association Ertoba. Several thousand demonstrators marched to a central square 
in Tbilisi where Mikheil Saakashvili delivered an ultimatum to government on 
either acknowledging the opposition’s election victory or dismissing President 
Shevardnadze (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003r). Because of further delays in 
publishing election results and allegations of election fraud, the opposition 
protests in Tbilisi and in the regions continued on a daily basis with as many as 
10,000 participants observed by the OSCE mission at peak times 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003d).  
In what would become known as the “Rose Revolution”, the street protests 
and the atmosphere of instability eventually resulted in President Shevardnadze’s 
resignation on 23 November 2003. Nino Burjanadze, the Speaker of Parliament, 
became Interim President and called for an extraordinary presidential election on 
4 January 2004. A government restructuring took place with Zurab Zhvania 
appointed as State Minister and eight out of nine regional governors resigning and 
being replaced by National Movement and Burjanadze-Democrat supporters. On 
25 November 2003, the Supreme Court annulled the results of the proportional 
component of the parliamentary elections. In marked contradiction to this 
decision, the majoritarian component of these elections was permitted to stand 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2003w; OSCE/ODIHR 2004a: 4). The partial 
cancellation of the November results meant that 58 elected members of parliament 
did not immediately take their seats. Consequently, the parliament elected in 
November 1999 was reconvened. As a further consequence, four reruns and 
eleven second round majoritarian elections would be held on 4 January 2004. And 
on 9 January, the Interim President would set 28 March 2004 as the date for the 
re-run of the proportional contest for 150 parliamentary seats (OSCE/ODIHR 
2004a: 4). 
5.6 The OSCE’s utilization of internal prerequisites and response 
to the “rupture” in Georgia at t1.c.2 in late-2003 
As the last paragraphs of the previous section 5.5.5 on the assistance related to 
and monitoring of the 2003 parliamentary elections has shown, the OSCE field 
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mission closely monitored events and rapid political developments around the 
November 2003 “Rose Revolution”. In a serious of almost daily confidential spot 
reports, the OSCE field staff ensured that the OSCE Troika and the OSCE Task 
Force on Georgia were being kept up-to-date on the situation on the ground. This 
dense information base certainly enabled the OSCE Chairpersonship to be well-
informed while responding quickly. After the November 2003 events, the 
immediate focus of the OSCE and the international community was on the 
upcoming extraordinary presidential election in January 2004 and repeat 
parliamentary elections in March 2004, before Bulgaria’s OSCE Chairmanship in 
2004 declared support for democratization in Georgia to be a priority of the OSCE 
(OSCE 2004b: 86).  
5.6.1 Immediate OSCE response to the “rupture” at political level 
At the end of 2003, the OSCE responded to Georgia’s calls for assistance to the 
presidential and parliamentary election processes. The OSCE participating states 
pledged some six million Euro at a donors’ meeting convened by the Netherlands 
Chairmanship of the OSCE in the fringes of the Maastricht OSCE Ministerial 
Council on 1 December 2003 (OSCE 2004a: 91). Many OSCE delegations 
requested that the funds be channeled through the OSCE. As follow-up, the OSCE 
Task Force on Georgia met on 3 December 2003 and reviewed different options 
for managing the pledges. The Task Force decided to establish a Georgia 
Elections Assistance Program (GEAP) and the Head of the OSCE Mission to 
Georgia was tasked with overseeing it (OSCE Secretariat 2003b).
200
 In order to 
ensure proper support for the extra-budgetary GEAP, the OSCE mission was 
mandated to employ additional short-term staff (OSCE Secretariat 2003a). The 
ODIHR promised to suggest possible candidates for the international election 
advisor post by 4 December and other OSCE organs and participating States were 
also asked to propose candidates for the various posts (OSCE Secretariat 2003b). 
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  Out of six million Euro that had been pledged, two million Euro from the European 
Commission were channeled through the United Nations Development Program, leaving four 
million Euro to be managed by the OSCE. 
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5.6.2 Immediate OSCE response to the “rupture” at implementation 
level 
Election-related assistance—first phase 
The GEAP was rapidly set up and delivered its first progress report as early as 18 
December 2003. Until then, the OSCE Mission to Georgia had already formed a 
special Elections Assistance Group with six international and two local experts for 
the purpose of managing the GEAP together with core mission staff. One 
additional international expert was expected to arrive at the end of December 
2003 (OSCE Georgia Election Assistance Programme 2003a). Nine projects were 
planned within the GEAP framework, providing financial support to the Georgian 
government to ensure that the election administration had sufficient resources, 
supporting the CEC with a public information campaign, training the election 
administration, supporting the CEC with regard to voter marking, supporting 
domestic election monitoring and parallel vote tabulation, supporting voter 
education and community-based voter education, and assisting with door-to-door 
voter motivation (ibid.). All projects were aimed at promoting the confidence of 
the public in the electoral process. On 19 December 2003, Georgia’s Minister of 
Finance and the Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia signed an agreement on 
financial support to the government for the presidential elections. By 22 
December 2003, all agreements had been signed with implementing partners of 
the above-mentioned projects, project activities had started, and the focus of the 
OSCE mission’s activities shifted from preparing the projects to actively 
supporting and monitoring the progress of their implementation 
(OSCE Georgia Election Assistance Programme 2003b). The monitoring of 
project implementation mainly focused on visiting 25 polling stations in and 
around Tbilisi and collect feedback on the progress from implementing partners 
(OSCE Georgia Election Assistance Programme 2004c). 
In Georgia, international coordination continued on a weekly basis at working 
level in the TWG and regarding policy issues in the AWG. The OSCE Secretariat 
in Vienna convened periodic meetings with delegations of states that had pledged 
funds for the GEAP to keep them informed about the implementation (ibid.). 
Observation of January 2004 extra-ordinary presidential election: These initial 
activities within the GEAP framework were conducted in parallel to the ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the extraordinary presidential election, 
scheduled for 4 January 2004. The EOM consisted of 38 election experts and 
long-term observers as well as of national experts and support staff, deployed in 
Tbilisi and ten regions for about eight weeks. In addition to observing all aspects 
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of the preparations, the campaign, the polling, and the post-election processes of 
the extraordinary presidential elections, the EOM also monitored the re-runs and 
second round elections of the November 2003 parliamentary elections in 15 
single-seat constituencies. Again, on election-day, the International Election 
Observation Mission (IEOM) was formed by the ODIHR EOM and 
representatives of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European 
Parliament. This IEOM deployed some 450 short-term observers from 38 OSCE 
participating states, including 22 parliamentarians of the OSCE PA, 13 of the 
PACE, and three from the European Parliament. The Secretariat of the Council of 
Europe deployed additional 23 observers. The IEOM observed the voting and 
counting in 1,315 of 2,850 polling stations and the tabulation of election results in 
42 of 75 district election commissions (OSCE/ODIHR 2004a: 3). 
According to the ODIHR EOM report, the political environment in the run-up 
to the extraordinary presidential election had shifted dramatically, as parties that 
had led the November 2003 events—the National Movement and the Burjanadze-
Democrats—have consolidated their executive power, while most other parties 
appeared to struggle to adjust to the new political realities and national leadership. 
The pro-Shevardnadze coalition “For New Georgia” had broken apart and the 
organizational structure of the once-dominant Citizens Union of Georgia had 
dissolved. Several previously influential parties, including the Labor Party and 
New Rights, had lost support after distancing themselves from the November 
2003 events of the “Rose Revolution”. The Revival Union continued to wield 
some influence, largely in Ajaria (OSCE/ODIHR 2004a: 4). The presidential 
election on 4 January 2004 itself demonstrated, in the eyes of the ODIHR EOM, 
“notable progress over previous elections and in several respects brought the 
country closer to meeting OSCE commitments and other international standards 
for democratic elections.” (OSCE/ODIHR 2004a: 1). The report highlighted, in 
particular, the establishment of a new voter register as significant as well as the 
general display of political will to conduct a more genuine democratic election 
process (ibid.). However, the ODIHR also noted that the extraordinary 
presidential election was not held in a truly competitive environment and that, 
therefore, the repeat parliamentary elections on 28 March 2004 would be a better 
indicator of Georgia’s commitment to democratic elections. In the ODIHR’s view, 
the serious time constraints of the presidential election had limited the scope of 
administrative improvements. Furthermore, reason for serious concern was seen 
in the continuing lack of separation between state administration and political 
party structures as well as the persistent tendency to misuse state administration 
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resources (ibid.). Again, region-specific irregularities, such as ballot box stuffing 
and tampering with protocols were reported (OSCE/ODIHR 2004a: 2). 
The election results showed a sweeping victory with 96.05 percent of the votes 
for Mikheil Saakashvili, joint candidate of the National Movement and the 
Burjanadze-Democrats. All five other candidates lagged far behind. In the OSCE 
mission’s view, if the Georgian public was to fully restore its confidence in 
election administration bodies and procedures, significant improvements on a 
number of procedural and administration issues would still need to be achieved 
before the March 2004 parliamentary elections that would have a much more 
distinct political nature compared to the almost uncontested presidential race 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004a).  
Election-related assistance—second phase 
Among the major fields for improvement, the creation of an accurate voter 
registration system, a clear division between state administration resources and 
political campaign purposes, and the political imbalance at election commissions 
at all levels remained high on the agenda. In light of these, the OSCE mission 
prepared the projects to be implemented under the second GEAP phase building 
on the projects undertaken for the presidential election while adding new projects 
that aimed at building the capacities of the CEC and civil society (ibid.; 
OSCE Georgia Election Assistance Programme 2004b). These next steps were 
presented by the Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia to OSCE delegations in 
Vienna on 16 January 2004 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004e).  
The projects under the second GEAP phase were concluded with election-day. 
The GEAP team deployed seven teams to observe around sixty election 
commissions in 13 districts covering several regions in order to monitor the 
GEAP projects’ effectiveness. According to the GEAP progress report of 1 April 
2004, particularly noteworthy was “the impact” of project activities on the 
functioning of the CEC and of precinct election commissions, the public 
information campaign, the conduct of police officers and the application of voter 
marking (OSCE Georgia Election Assistance Programme 2004a). However, no 
strict evaluation methodology had been applied to this evaluation approach and 
observed improvements in the election process were simply attributed to the 
GEAP projects. 
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5.6.3 OSCE response beyond ad-hoc measures: strengthened 
support for democratization in Georgia after the “Rose 
Revolution”? 
Upon his visit to the inauguration ceremony of President Mikheil Saakashvili on 
24/25 January 2004, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, in his separate meetings with 
Saakashvili, State Minister Zurab Zhvania, and then Acting President Nino 
Burjanadze, stressed the OSCE commitment to supporting the democratic 
development of Georgia and stated that the OSCE efforts in the field of elections 
could be considered proof of the organization’s ability to respond rapidly to need 
identified. 
Along similar lines of argument, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia 
concluded his presentation to the OSCE Permanent Council in early April 2004 
with self-reflectively stating that the GEAP had demonstrated the remarkable 
ability of the OSCE to rapidly respond to urgent needs under significantly 
changed context conditions. However, this rapid response, in his view, also had 
the character of a “sticking plaster” operation that did not sufficiently address the 
underlying structural challenges (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004s). Therefore, 
the OSCE mission had commissioned a needs assessment for post-parliamentary 
election assistance already in mid-February 2004 that recommended more long-
term measures of legislative, administrative and structural electoral reforms. As a 
result of the needs assessment, the OSCE mission outlined a respective extra-
budgetary project for which additional funding would be needed (ibid.). 
Furthermore, the Head of Mission elaborated to the OSCE Permanent Council that 
the OSCE mission had also been required to reassess its activities under its core 
mission budget in order to be in a position to respond to the new and rapidly 
moving environment: While certain ongoing activities of the mission shall be 
maintained—such as the monitoring of the human rights situation, the capacity-
building of the public defender’s office with regard to handling human rights 
complaints, and the support with regard to the prison reform—the changed 
circumstances after the “Rose Revolution” provided greater opportunities in 
supporting democratization in additional areas than before. The Head of the 
OSCE mission highlighted in this regard: assistance to democratic 
decentralization and local self-government reform as well as to parliamentary 
reform (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004s). Both, the review of ongoing support as 
well as the needs assessment can be considered ‘strategic adaptation’ insofar as 
the OSCE mission reviewed its implementation approach. 
Support to parliamentary reform: On 24 February 2004, the OSCE mission had 
attended a presentation of parliament’s reform plans aimed at strengthening its 
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organizational capacity to develop parliamentary statutes as well as the 
transparency and effectiveness. After discussions with the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly on ways of supporting this reform, the OSCE mission funded a project 
in 2004, implemented by Transparency International, which aimed at creating a 
forum for members of parliament for drafting the legal provisions of a code of 
ethics for members of parliament and establish appropriate monitoring 
mechanisms (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004b). This code of ethics was approved 
and signed on 12 October 2004 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004d). In addition, 
the OSCE mission facilitated a needs assessment visit on parliamentary reform by 
two experts of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in December 2004 that would 
serve as a guideline for future mission activities in this area 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2005b). As a result of this needs assessment, 
implementation of a two-year ODIHR-financed project to establish a Center for 
Parliamentary Reform started in autumn 2005. The aim of that project was to 
provide expert and technical assistance to the speaker, the vice speakers and the 
administration of parliament on parliamentary reform, to strengthen parliament’s 
capacity to monitor its own reform process and coordinate projects and donor aid, 
and to identify reform goals by organizing parliamentary debates on its own 
reform strategy in particular with regard to its role in society, relations to citizens 
and institutions, transparency and ethics (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2005a). 
Support to democratic decentralization reform: The OSCE mission commissioned 
a Georgian NGO, Civitas Georgica, with conducting a local governance needs 
assessment with the objective of identifying relevant activities to enhance citizen 
participation and the effective functioning of local democratic decision-making 
bodies in Georgia. The findings of this needs assessment were presented and 
discussed at a conference in Tbilisi on 25 February 2004 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004f). As a result, the OSCE mission set up a joint 
project with the Council of Europe supporting six regional workshops on local 
self-governance to take place between May and August 2004. The project aimed 
at supporting a demand-driven agenda of local self-government reform through a 
dialogue involving the central government, the association of regional and local 
authorities and representatives of local self-governing bodies 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004c). Furthermore, the OSCE mission launched the 
pilot project “Budget in Brief” in September 2004 aimed at providing Tbilisi 
residents with information about the Tbilisi city budget and its implementation 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004g). 
While these additional areas of OSCE engagement in support of Georgia’s 
democratization as a result of the review of the OSCE’s implementation approach 
as well as an increase of allocations to “human dimension” activities in the OSCE 
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mission budget
201
 confirm the OSCE’s strategic adaptability, the actual 
implementation of the OSCE’s declared priority focus on democratization support 
was diverted because of other developments that took center stage throughout 
2004. The Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia referenced developments in the 
Autonomous Republic of Ajaria and in the conflict region of South Ossetia as 
reasons why the above-mentioned extra-budgetary project on more structural and 
long-term assistance to electoral reform, proposed in April 2004, had not yet 
materialized in October 2004 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004t). The following 
rapid developments had inevitably become a main OSCE focus:  
Between March and May 2004, a confrontation erupted between the central 
government in Tbilisi and the local authorities in Georgia’s south-western 
Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, which was under the authoritarian rule of Aslan 
Abashidze. Mediation by Russia eventually resolved the precarious situation and 
Abashidze fled into exile on 6 May.
202
 Following this crisis, the OSCE mission 
conducted a fact-finding mission in Ajaria from 6 to 9 May 2004 and identified a 
number of key issues for further OSCE engagement, such as addressing human 
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  In total numbers, the allocations to “human dimension” activities within the budget of the 
OSCE Mission to Georgia rose from 860,600 Euro in 2003 (4.1 percent of the 2003 budget) 
to 1,189,000 Euro in 2004 (5.6 percent of the 2004 budget). Between December 2003 and 
April 2004, the OSCE mission also handled some 4,000,000 Euro for the GEAP. 
202
  Since the January 2004 presidential elections, the Ajaran authorities and opposition groups 
had been coming increasingly into conflict with isolated incidence of violence, the 
establishment of the state of emergency in Ajara, and serious violations of human rights and 
the freedom of the media (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004o). The opposition to the local 
leadership demanded a resignation of the Head of the Autonomous Republic and new 
elections to the local parliament in parallel to Georgia’s partial repeat parliamentary elections 
in March 2004 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004j, 2004k). In mid-March 2004, President 
Saakashvili, accompanied by the Minister of Internal Affairs and about 400 members of the 
Special Forces of the Ministry of Interior, was prevented from entering the territory of the 
Autonomous Republic by armored vehicles, soldiers and civilians (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2004q). On 14/15 March 2004, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office held meetings with President 
Saakashvili and Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and talked with Abashidze on the phone, 
urging them to end the standoff by peaceful means. On 17 March, the EU Representative for 
the South Caucasus met with the Ajaran leader, Aslan Abashidze, in Batumi and paved the 
way for a meeting of Abashidze and the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, Nino 
Burjanadze, and eventually for extensive negotiations between Abashidze and Saakashvili. 
When Saakashvili announced that an agreement had been reached, the crisis appeared to be 
resolved (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004i). However, tensions intensified again around the 
issue of disarming Ajaran paramilitary groups and reached a peak when in early May 2004 
two key bridges linking Ajara with other parts of Georgia were blown up by Ajaran 
authorities. In response, large-scale demonstrations protested against the Ajaran leadership in 
Batumi (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004r, 2004h). On 6 May, the Abashidze clan fled into 
exile in Moscow following Russian mediation (Halbach 2005: 8). After Abashidze’s 
departure, President Saakashvili nominated twenty members of an Interim Council chaired by 
the Presidential Representative for temporary administration of Ajara and set the date for 
elections of the Supreme Council of Ajara for 20 June 2004 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 
2004l). 
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rights violations that had occurred, supporting the development of the freedom of 
the media and of the non-governmental sector, and providing human rights 
education (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004p).  
The South Ossetia conflict almost escalated to open warfare, as Tbilisi 
deployed Special Forces of the Ministry of Interior to the zone of conflict on 31 
May 2004 under the pretext of combating smuggling without informing the Joint 
Control Commission (JCC). Heavy fighting broke out in August. The OSCE 
mission, as part of the JCC, contributed to the mediation of the ceasefire that was 
brokered in mid-August.
203
 The OSCE subsequently supported demilitarization as 
agreed by the conflict parties (OSCE 2006a: 20)—however, with limited success 
as it turned out in the August 2008 war.  
Against this background, in October 2005—outside the period under review in 
this study—the OSCE Head of Mission would conclude that conflict resolution 
must be at the forefront of the mission’s attention, although there was a great deal 
to be done in all other areas of the mandate. “Human dimension” activities had at 
that point shifted to the regions and to developing the capacities of local self-
government against the background of constant changes in the reform approaches 
of central government and in the composition of the central state administration in 
Tbilisi (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2005c). 
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  In August 2004, the conflict in South Ossetia reignited when heaving firing between the 
northern part of Tskhinvali and a Georgian village broke out and continued despite a ceasefire 
with high-level political endorsement on both sides. However, the military commands of 
Georgia and South Ossetia continued to meet within the framework of the Joint Control 
Commission. However, the bulk of “unauthorized” formations on the ground were deployed 
by the Ministries of Interior. The ceasefire only began to hold when Saakashvili announced 
the withdrawal of all Georgian armed forces from the zone of conflict on 19 August. 
Nevertheless, tensions remained because not all Georgian armed forces were withdrawn 
(OSCE Mission to Georgia 2004m, 2004n, 2004v, 2004u).  
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6. Systematic synthesis: Context-sensitive adaptation—the 
interactive contribution of the target country’s domestic 
political context conditions and the democracy promoter’s 
internal prerequisites 
As elaborated in the first chapters of this study, context-sensitive approaches are 
largely considered more promising to be successful than blueprints designed 
irrespective of specific country conditions (“one size fits all”) in the more recent 
literature on international democracy promotion and norm diffusion (e.g. 
Zimmermann forthcoming; Bridoux and Kurki 2014; Leininger 2010c; Reiber 
2009; Hobson 2009; Jawad 2008). Scholars, however, have neither ‘translated’ 
this general notion into a systematic clarification of the context conditions that 
context-sensitive democracy promoters are expected to be sensitive to—with very 
few exceptions, nor into a clarification of how democracy promoters are enabled 
to become aware of the specific and changing context conditions in target 
countries and to adapt their engagement in response.  
In order to contribute to filling these research gaps, firstly, two types of change in 
target countries’ political context conditions and corresponding types of 
adaptation of democracy promoters’ engagement were conceptualized in chapter 
2.2: 
 rapid and radical change (“ruptures”) in the political context conditions 
across a broad range of institutions or in the political positioning and/or cost-
benefit calculation of key political actors as the result of coups d’état or 
violent conflicts; and  
 gradual change in the political transformation process. This type of change 
was further differentiated into gradual change in structural context 
conditions, such as change in the democratization process in terms of a 
deepening of democratization or of a backsliding into authoritarian measures 
by means of strategic election manipulations or executive aggrandizement, 
and gradual change in actor-centered context conditions, such as change in 
the number and strength of opposition forces, in the degree of unity among 
the ruling elite, and/or in the ownership for a certain reform area.  
These types of change are argued to differ in the degree of political pressure 
on the democracy promoter to adapt its engagement in response as well as in the 
political costs of the respective corresponding type of adaptation. Accordingly, it 
is presumed that the likelihood of context-sensitive adaption differs with regard to 
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the different types of political change. It is expected that context-sensitive 
adaptation is more likely in response to “ruptures” than it is in response to gradual 
types of change.  
The following hypotheses on the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation in 
response to “ruptures” and to gradual types of change in the political 
transformation process were developed in chapter 2.2: 
(1) If the change in the target country’s political context conditions is 
rapid and radical, the international democracy promoter is more likely 
to adapt than to gradual change because the political costs of non-
adaptation and the political ‘pressure’ to adapt are relatively high. 
(2) If the change in the target country’s political context conditions is 
gradual, the international democracy promoter is less likely to adapt 
than to “ruptures” because the political ‘pressure’ to adapt is relatively 
low to moderate. 
In order to enable a democracy promoter to ‘overcome’ the presumed differing 
likelihood of adaptation, secondly, internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity 
and adaptability were conceptualized. They are presumed to interact with the 
domestic political context conditions in such a way as to increase the likelihood of 
context-sensitive adaptation in response to even those types of change with regard 
to which adaptation is considered to be less likely. This is expressed in the 
following third hypothesis: 
(3) If the democracy promoter possesses and utilizes the internal 
prerequisites (i.e. adaptability) summarized in Table 3, Table 4 and 
Table 5, then adaptation becomes likely in response to the domestic 
political context conditions in target countries—even in response to 
gradual types of change regarding which adaptation is likely than in 
response to rapid and radical change. 
Based on the empirical analysis of the OSCE’s democracy promotion in 
Georgia between 1992 and 2004, this chapter seeks to test the hypotheses on the 
likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation in response to “ruptures” and to gradual 
types of change in the political transformation process (see chapter 2.2, pages 55 
f. and 69) in the remainder of this chapter. It will synthesize how the target 
country’s domestic political context conditions and the international democracy 
promoter’s internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity and adaptability 
interactively contribute to the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation of the 
engagement and, thus, to successful international democracy promotion. This 
applies both to context-sensitive adaptation of the democracy promoter’s 
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engagement at the outset as well as to types of change in the political context 
conditions over time. The findings on the international democracy promoter’s 
initial context-sensitivity will be synthesized in the following section. After that, a 
systematic synthesis of the likelihood of adaptation in response to “ruptures” and 
in response to types of gradual change in political context conditions will follow, 
before the interactive contribution of the democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites with these types of change receive attention. 
6.1 Context-sensitivity of the international democracy promoter 
at the outset of the engagement in the target country at t0 
As elaborated in chapter 2.2, for a democracy promoter to be capable of 
developing the country approach and implementation strategy at the outset of the 
engagement at t0 tailored to the specific political context conditions of the country 
in question, it needs internal prerequisites that enable it to gain a sound knowledge 
of the context. In this regard, it is essential to provide for organizational 
procedures for conducting a context analysis at the outset of the international 
organization’s engagement. Only if such a context analysis is available in time, an 
informed political decision on the country approach and, at field-level, on the 
implementation approach, the instruments, areas of engagement, and addressees 
of support is to be expected. Thus, such a context analysis at t0 serves as a proxy 
for the organization’s context-sensitivity, that is the capability of the democracy 
promoter to be aware of the target country’s specific conditions—the 
organizational prerequisite for an intervention that is adapted to the political 
country context. In light of this, the OSCE will be considered context-sensitive at 
t0, if the OSCE’s initial decision on how to engage with and whether to promote 
democratization in Georgia—that is at the political level on the country approach 
and at the operational/field-level on the approach to implementation—correspond 
to an initial context analysis of the political context conditions in the target 
country Georgia. 
In 1992, the CSCE/OSCE Council of Ministers decided to establish a standard 
procedure for assessing progress of newly admitted countries towards full 
implementation of CSCE/OSCE commitments across the organization’s three 
dimensions, including the human dimension: rapporteur missions. The reports of 
such rapporteur missions are considered here a proxy for the CSCE/OSCE’s 
capability to become aware of the target country’s specific political conditions. 
Thus, the CSCE/OSCE generally possesses the internal prerequisites and is 
capable to be context-sensitive. With regard to Georgia, the CSCE/OSCE utilized 
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this standard procedure to analyze the political context conditions and considered 
the findings at headquarter-level before taking further decisions and action, as 
Table 7 shows. Table 7 systematically synthesizes the findings of the analysis of 
the OSCE’s context-sensitivity at t0 in 1992 structured into responses at field- and 
at headquarters-level. 
While perceiving real political will of the transitional authorities to reform 
institutions and substantive legislation, the rapporteurs expressed the view that the 
political climate in Georgia was still highly confrontational and not conducive to 
democracy, respect of human rights and observance of the rule of law, giving rise 
to grave concern and disquiet. This climate was characterized by mutual 
recriminations and accusations, by a partial boycott of the institutions, by a total 
lack of understanding, tolerance and will to cooperation among the main 
protagonists. In light of this, the rapporteurs raised concern that martial law might 
be upheld, resulting in another postponement of parliamentary elections that had 
initially been scheduled for May/June 1992 and were then planned for October 
1992 and that the rapporteurs considered predominantly important for the 
restoration of legitimacy. Otherwise, six out of nine main conclusions and 
recommendations addressed political conflicts and minority problems. 
In response to the political context conditions in Georgia, as analyzed by the 
rapporteurs, the CSCE/OSCE ODIHR coordinated the observation and final 
assessment of the October 1992 parliamentary elections. With regard to the 
resolution of conflicts in Georgia, the CSCE/OSCE dispatched a fact-finding 
mission to the secessionist region of South Ossetia. In response to the initial as 
well as this follow-up context analysis, the CSCE/OSCE Chairperson-in-Office 
(CiO) appointed a Personal Representative for Georgia (PRC) who prepared the 
basis for establishing a long-term mission in the field. The mandate of the 
Personal Representative and of the long-term mission focused on the secession 
conflicts and was the result of the CSCE/OSCE Committee of Senior Official’s 
(CSO) thorough consideration of the observations, analysis and recommendations 
of the rapporteur and fact-finding missions. The long-term mission under the lead 
of the Personal Representative subsequently developed an implementation 
strategy that structured the efforts of mediating between the conflict parties in 
South Ossetia into two ‘tracks’ concerned with immediate issues on the one hand 
and the political issues, such as the future status of South Ossetia as part of 
Georgia, on the other hand. 
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Table 7: OSCE context-sensitive adaptation in Georgia at t0 in 1992 
CSCE/OSCE context 
analysis 
CSCE/OSCE field-level 
response 
CSCE/OSCE headquarters-
response 
Rapporteur Mission 
in May 1992 
recommends: 
 monitoring the 
October 1992 
parliamentary 
elections 
 engage in conflict 
resolution 
 
Fact-finding missions 
of July and October 
1992 recommend 
 military observers 
for South Ossetia 
ceasefire 
 long-term mission 
to monitor and 
investigate and 
integrate joint 
peacekeeping 
forces in activities 
 Various delegations of 
CSCE/OSCE participating 
States observe Oct. 1992 
elections 
 ODIHR coordinates 
CSCE/OSCE election 
observers and collects final 
assessments in Oct. 1992 
 
 fact-finding mission in 
late-July 1992 
recommends dispatching 
observer team to South 
Ossetia to work in close 
cooperation with the Joint 
Control Commission 
 Recommendations of the 
PRC to CPC based on fact-
finding mission in mid-
October 1992 
 CSO proposes to dispatch a fact-
finding mission to South Ossetia 
that was dispatched on 25 July 
1992 
 CiO appoints a Personal 
Represent. for Georgia (PRC) in 
October 1992 
 Oct. 1992 CPC 
recommendations to the CSO to 
dispatch a PRC mission to 
monitor and investigate the 
ceasefire arrangement in South 
Ossetia 
 CSO discusses CPC 
recommendations in early-Nov. 
1992 and mandates the PRC 
with beginning discussions with 
the conflict parties etc. 
 PRC long-term mission is 
dispatched to Georgia in 
early-December 1992 
 long-term mission 
subsequently develops an 
implementation strategy 
based on two tracks: 
immediate issues; political 
issues 
 on 23 Nov. 1992, approval of 
provisional budget for PRC 
mission to cover an initial 
operating period of three months 
 on 11 December 1992, CSO 
approval of PRC long-term 
mission 
Source: own account 
To conclude, the CSCE/OSCE has indeed analyzed the political context 
conditions in Georgia before taking a decision on whether and how to engage in 
this newly admitted CSCE/OSCE participating State. The respective 
recommendations made by the initial rapporteur as well as subsequent fact-finding 
missions were thoroughly discussed by decision-making bodies at headquarters 
before taking the decision on how to engage in Georgia. Although the mandate of 
the CiO’s Personal Representative and his long-term mission did not fully follow 
the recommendations, the decision-making process considered them. While the 
headquarters’ decision consisted in a mandate that appeared “explorative” to some 
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extent with a list of tasks but no clear objectives or benchmarks, the 
implementation strategy developed at field-level was somewhat clearer with 
specific steps identified in recognition of the challenging context conditions and 
experienced realities on the ground. The OSCE is, therefore, considered context-
sensitive at t0. 
Whether and how international democracy promoters can be enabled to remain 
context-sensitive over time and adapt their engagement to changing political 
context conditions will be addressed in the following. 
6.2 Context-sensitive adaptation of the democracy promoter’s 
engagement in response to different types of change in the 
target country’s domestic political context conditions 
In light of scholars’ claim that international democracy promoters often apply 
“one size fits all” approaches to various different political country contexts of 
their engagement, the assessment of the previous section that the OSCE adapted 
its country and implementation approach sensitive to the political context 
conditions in Georgia at t0 can as such already be considered promising. However, 
as has been elaborated, political transformation and democratization processes are 
‘moving targets’ and political context conditions in target countries of democracy 
promotion change over time—not least by contribution of the democracy-
promoting intervention itself. Nevertheless, research on international democracy 
promotion has largely neglected the process dimension of democratization and its 
promotion (Carothers 1997: 119). By developing types of change in the political 
context conditions, this study aims at systematizing the domestic context of 
democracy promotion with a strong focus on the process dimension: gradual 
change and “ruptures”.204 A context-sensitive adaptation of the democracy 
promoter’s engagement is considered to be more likely in response to “ruptures” 
than in response to gradual change because “ruptures” (see hypotheses (1) and (2) 
above). 
The empirical analysis of the domestic context conditions of OSCE democracy 
promotion in Georgia in the period from 1991 to 2004 in chapter 4 identified five 
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  Furthermore, this study argues that sensitivity for the specific country situation also requires 
internal prerequisites and capabilities of the democracy promoter to know of changing 
circumstances and to ‘process’ this knowledge (‘adaptability’) as a basis for considerations to 
adapt efforts in response to change and/or new insights. However, the interaction of the 
democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites with the types of change in the target country’s 
political context conditions will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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developments matching the conceptual types of rapid and radical change 
(“ruptures”) and of gradual change: two “ruptures” in Georgia’s political 
transformation process in 1993 and 2003 and three developments of gradual 
change in 1994/1995 and from 1999 to 2003—with two overlapping gradual 
changes during the same period from 1999 to 2003. The following section will 
synthesize the empirical findings on the likelihood of adaptation in response to 
“ruptures” before the likelihood of adaptation in response to gradual change will 
be analyzed in section 6.2.2. 
6.2.1 Context-sensitive adaptation in response to “ruptures” (t1.c) 
Two “ruptures” were identified in the context analysis of political developments 
in Georgia in the period from 1991 to 2004: t1.c.1 in 1993 and t1.c.2 in 2003/2004. 
As elaborated in the conceptual framework, ideal responses to “ruptures” are 
considered to be  
 political ad-hoc measures and/or a general adaptation/reconsideration of the 
country approach at headquarters-level and/or  
 a shift of the implementation focus to ad-hoc measures in response to 
pressing problems and/or the strategic adaptation of instruments, areas of 
engagement and/or the implementation strategy at field-level. 
This section aims to answer whether and how the OSCE has responded to each of 
the two “ruptures” at headquarters- and/or field-level. 
Table 8 shows that, in both cases, the OSCE responded to the “ruptures” with 
adaptation. The respective responses were in line with the ideal responses to 
“ruptures” conceptualized in chapter 2.2 (see Table 1, page 54). 
Adaptation of the OSCE engagement to the “rupture” in Georgia’s political 
transformation at t1.c.1 in 1993 
The 1993/1994 “rupture”: The efforts of Eduard Shevardnadze’s provisional 
government to overcome the turbulence of the early transition phase and to 
stabilize the country politically were rapidly and radically interrupted by warfare 
in the fall of 1993 (see pages 114 f.). The fighting between government forces and 
supporters of ousted former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Western Georgia 
severely escalated against the backdrop of political turmoil in Tbilisi and renewed 
warfare raged in Abkhazia resulting in the loss of Tbilisi’s control of Abkhazia’s 
capital Sukhumi. Faced with imminent state collapse and in shock over “the fall” 
of Sukhumi, Shevardnadze radically changed his position regarding Russia. 
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Despite heavy political resistance in Georgia, Shevardnadze aimed at mending 
relations with Russia. In exchange for Russia’s promise to secure Georgia’s 
territorial integrity and to defend its borders (Slider 1997: 157), he accepted 
Russia’s military presence in Western Georgia and peacekeeping role in Abkhazia 
in October 1993, and strived for Georgia’s membership in the Russia-dominated 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This rapid and radical change of 
Georgia’s position regarding Russia’s role fundamentally changed the 
‘parameters’ of international engagement and resulted in a division of political 
forces in Georgia that was met by strong authoritarian measures against any 
opposition to Shevardnadze’s chosen course. Because of such fundamentally 
changed ‘parameters’ of international engagement as well as the resulting changes 
to the political context conditions, a new context analysis and a related rethinking 
of country and implementation approaches would represent the ideal response of a 
context-sensitive international democracy promoter, i.e. in general/political 
adaptation and specific/strategic adaptation (see pages 51 f.). 
The OSCE response to the 1993 “rupture”: Following “the fall of Sukhumi” in 
September 1993 as a result of the war in Abkhazia, The CiO’s Personal 
Representative (PRC) and the ODIHR Deputy Director traveled together to 
Georgia in early October 1993 in order to reassess the situation and provide the 
CiO with his recommendations (i.e. ‘ad-hoc response at implementation-level’) 
before the CiO’s own planned visit at the end of that same month (i.e. ‘ad-hoc 
political response’). In March 1994, informed by reports of high-level 
CSCE/OSCE visits to Georgia and field-level consultations with representatives 
of the Georgian government, political elite and other stakeholders, the mission 
mandate was revised to include new modalities and expanded to include the 
promotion of democratization (i.e. ‘general/political adaptation’). At field-level, 
the implementation approach was ‘specifically adapted’ by engaging with the 
instrument of knowledge transfer, i.e. technical assistance, in the new area of 
supporting Georgia’s constitution-building process and by agreeing on a division 
of labor between OSCE mission and ODIHR in October 1994.  
To sum up, the CSCE/OSCE reacted quickly and in line with the ideal responses 
to the 1993 “rupture” and adapted both in an ad-hoc manner at field- and 
headquarters-levels as well as generally/politically and specifically/strategically. 
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Table 8: OSCE adaptation in response to "ruptures" in Georgia's political 
transformation process 
DOMESTIC CONTEXT  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
type of 
change in 
context 
conditions 
“rupture” in 
Georgia 
 
OSCE response at field-
level (implementation-/ 
micro-level) 
OSCE response at 
headquarters-level (political/ 
macro-level)  
rapid and 
radical 
political 
change of 
a wide 
scope (t1.c) 
 t1.c.1: late-
1993 
warfare and 
changed 
positioning 
towards 
Russia 
 ad-hoc response: 
 PRC visits Georgia in 
Sept. and Oct. 1993 
specific adaptation: 
 new instruments and area 
of engagement: in Apr. 
1994, mission and ODIHR 
start technical assistance 
in constitution-building 
process  
 agreement on division of 
labor between mission and 
ODIHR in technical 
assistance in constitution-
making process in Oct. 
1994 
ad-hoc response: 
 CiO visit in Oct. 1993 
general/political adaptation: 
 reconsideration of country 
approach: in March 1994, 
mission mandate is 
expanded to include 
democracy promotion  
 t1.c.2: 2003-
2004 “Rose 
Revolution” 
and change 
to reform-
oriented 
government 
 ad-hoc response: 
 rapid set-up of GEAP with 
technical assistance 
projects on the ground in 
Dec. 2003 
strategic adaptation: 
 review of general 
implementation approach 
and needs assessment in 
mid-February 2004 
 shift of implementation 
focus to democratic 
decentralization and 
parliamentary reform in 
2004 
ad-hoc response: 
 OSCE Chairpersonship 
convenes donor conference 
on 1 Dec. 2003 
 OSCE Task Force decides 
to establish GEAP to be 
managed by the OSCE 
mission on 3 Dec. 2003 
general/political adaptation: 
 OSCE Chairpersonship in 
2004 declares support for 
democratization in Georgia 
to be an OSCE priority 
 Increased 2004 budget 
allocations to human 
dimension activities of the 
OSCE mission 
Source: own account 
Adaptation of the OSCE engagement to the “rupture” in Georgia’s political 
transformation at t1.c.2 in 2003/2004 
The 2003/2004 “rupture”: The “Rose Revolution” of November 2003 was the 
first peaceful change of government since the violent ousting of former President 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia (see pages 130 f.). The change of government was not 
directly brought about by democratic elections. President Shevardnadze resigned 
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from office as a result of massive public protests against alleged election fraud 
and demands for him to step down despite the fact that he had not been up for 
vote in the parliamentary elections. A heterogeneous alliance of opposition parties 
had formed and mobilized public protest giving voice to people’s dissatisfaction 
with the devastating economic situation, the lawlessness of the political 
leadership, and the non-delivery of state services to citizens. Shevardnadze’s 
resignation and the rapidly organized extraordinary presidential elections of 
January 2004 that brought a dynamic reform government under President Mikheil 
Saakashvili into office radically changed the style of governance from a 
government of an old, corrupt elite based on a neopatrimonial system and an 
ambiguous legal framework not directed at any sort of reform and democratic 
process to a new dynamic government of young reform-oriented politicians with 
the political will to democratic reform. With the political commitment of the new 
government and citizens’ hopes for improved governance and living conditions 
running high, developments triggered by the “Rose Revolution” rapidly opened a 
window of opportunity for progress in democratization and, thus, for ‘external’ 
democracy promoters in Georgia. 
The OSCE response to the 2003/2004 “rupture”: After mass protests and the 
resignation of then-President Eduard Shevardnadze on 23 November 2003, the 
OSCE Chairpersonship responded by rapidly convening a donor conference on 
the fringes of the Maastricht OSCE Ministerial Council meeting on 1 December 
2003, at which OSCE participating States pledged some six million Euro to 
support and assist the extraordinary presidential and repeat parliamentary election 
processes (see pages 187 f.). On 3 December, the OSCE Task Force on Georgia 
decided to establish the “Georgia Election Assistance Program” (GEAP) as an ad-
hoc extra-budgetary measure that was to be managed by the OSCE long-term 
mission to Georgia. In early 2004, the OSCE Chairpersonship declared support 
for democratization to be an OSCE priority in Georgia, reflected also in increased 
budget allocations to human dimension activities of the OSCE mission. 
This may be considered ‘political adaptation’ in the priorities of the country 
approach. GEAP was quickly set-up at field-level with technical assistance 
projects being implemented on the ground already in December 2003. In mid-
February 2004, the OSCE mission generally reviewed its implementation 
approach, i.e. ‘specific/strategic adaptation’, shifting the human dimension focus 
to democratic decentralization and parliamentary reform. Thus, the OSCE adapted 
quickly and in line with the ideal responses to the 2003 “rupture”. 
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6.2.2 Context-sensitive adaptation in response to gradual change (t1.a 
and t 1.b) 
Three developments were identified in the context analysis of political 
developments in Georgia in the period from 1991 to 2004 that matched the 
conceptual type of gradual change. Two of these constituted gradual 
developments in the structural political context conditions of Georgia: t1.b.1 in 
1994/1995 and t1.b.2 from 1999 to 2003; one development parallel to the latter 
constituted gradual change in actor-centered political context conditions: t1.a.1 
from 1999 to 2003. As elaborated in the conceptual framework (see pages 52 f.), 
 the practical adaptation of field-level activities within existing areas of 
engagement are considered an ideal response to gradual change in actor-
centered context conditions; 
 the specific/strategic adaptation of the implementation approach, i.e. of the 
strategy, instruments and/or areas of engagement, and/or the general/political 
adaptation of reconsidering the country approach at headquarters-level are 
considered ideal responses to gradual change in structural context conditions. 
This section will aim to answer whether and how the OSCE has responded to each 
of the three developments of gradual change in political context conditions in 
Georgia, structured into a synthesis of empirical findings on OSCE responses to 
gradual change in structural conditions and in actor-centered conditions. 
The empirical analysis in chapter 5 draws a mixed picture, summarized in Table 
9. In all of the situations of gradual change, adaptation on the part of the OSCE 
was observed to some degree:  
 While an adaptation in terms of engaging in new areas—i.e. ‘specific 
adaptation’—was observed against the background of the constitution-
making process in 1994/1995 that gradually changed the structural political 
conditions in Georgia, the OSCE did not engage in a strategy development 
process. Also, the mandate of the OSCE mission was up for discussion in the 
Permanent Council and was extended but not changed. This conscious 
decision to extend the mandate unchanged may be understood as ‘general 
adaptation’.  
 While the OSCE neither reconsidered the implementation strategy nor the 
country approach in response to Georgia’s democratic backsliding from 1999 
to 2003, the OSCE institutions did utilize a broader palette of democracy 
promotion instruments in the area of elections and engaged in an increasingly 
strong and systematic international cooperation and coordination of election 
monitoring and assistance (i.e. specific adaptation) and the CiO tasked a 
representative to operationally intervene in Georgia’s sovereign process of 
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selecting the Chairperson of the Central Election Commission in August 2003 
(i.e. political response). 
Table 9: OSCE adaptation in response to gradual change in Georgia's 
political transformation process 
DOMESTIC CONTEXT  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
type of change 
in context 
conditions 
gradual change 
in Georgia 
 OSCE response at field-
level (implementation-/ 
micro-level) 
OSCE response at 
headquarters-level 
(polit./ macro-level) 
G
R
A
D
U
A
L
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
gradual 
change of 
structural 
context 
conditions 
(t1.b) 
 t1.b.1: 1994-
1995 
constitution-
building and 
formal 
introduction of 
democratic 
statehood 
 Specific/strategic 
adaptation:  
 No systematic strategy 
development but rather 
intuitive (adaptation of 
the) engagement 
 (re-)engagement in the 
area of elections and the 
Ombudsperson 
institution 
general/political 
adaptation:  
 PC decision to not 
revise but to 
renew/extend the 
existing mandate 
 t1.b.2: 1999-
2003 
democratic 
backsliding 
and increased 
strategic 
election 
manipulations  
  Specific/strategic 
adaptation:  
 No systematic strategy 
development but rather 
intuitive (adaptation of 
the) engagement 
 increasingly strong and 
systematic international 
cooperation and 
coordination 
 utilization of additional 
instruments: 
socialization, technical 
assistance, political 
dialogue, and 
operational intervention 
general/political 
adaptation:  
 no reconsideration of 
country approach,  
but, instead, 
operational 
intervention of 
Representative of the 
CiO in selection 
process of CEC 
Chairperson in 
August 2003 
gradual 
change of 
actor-
centered 
context 
conditions 
(t1.a) 
 t1.a: 1999-2003 
disintegration 
of the ruling 
party and 
strengthening 
of opposition 
forces and 
civil society 
 practical adaptation: 
 no explicit response, but 
intuitive increase of 
cooperation with NGOs 
and intensified 
monitoring activities in 
existing areas of 
engagement 
 
Source: own account 
 The analysis of weekly activity reports of the OSCE mission showed an 
increase of activities with involvement of domestic non-governmental 
organizations within the OSCE’s existing areas of engagement during the 
time of strengthening of opposition forces and civil society in parallel to a 
disintegration of the ruling political party in Georgia between 1999 and 2003. 
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Adaptation of the OSCE engagement in response to gradual change in the 
structural conditions of Georgia’s political transformation process at t1.b.1 in 
1994/1995 
The 1994/1995 gradual change in structural conditions: The process of 
developing a new constitution for Georgia had long been stalled because of the 
status issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and a deadlock in parliament before it 
gained a new dynamic in 1994 (see pages 118 f.). Together with the presidential 
and parliamentary elections of November 1995, the new constitution, adopted in 
August 1995 after heated debates in parliament, represented an important 
milestone in the democratization process of the country, theoretically marking the 
beginning of the democratic consolidation phase (e.g. O´Donnell et al. 1986). This 
milestone initiated institutional reforms and introduced democratic norms that 
created new entry points for international democracy promoters to support the 
deepening of reforms and to ‘influence’ behavior and attitudes of political elites 
and population in terms of newly introduced democratic norms (Leininger 2010c: 
166 ff.), i.e. to engage in new areas and/or to utilize new instruments of 
democracy promotion. According to the conceptualization of types of change in 
the context conditions provided in chapter 2.2 (see Table 1, page 54), the ideal 
response of a context-sensitive democracy promoter to such a change in the 
democratization phase would consist in a ‘general/political adaptation’ of the 
engagement by reconsidering the country approach and/or in ‘specific/strategic 
adaptation’ by reviewing the implementation strategy and/or adapting the 
instruments and/or areas of engagement of democracy promotion. 
The OSCE response to the 1994/1995 gradual change in structural conditions: As 
soon as the new election law was adopted and the election date set for November 
in mid-1995, the OSCE (re-)engaged in the area of election monitoring and began 
preparations (see pages 161 f.). Furthermore, the OSCE started engaging in the 
area of institutional development and strengthening when the Georgian authorities 
began preparing legislation on an Ombudsperson on human rights in July 1995 
(see pages 163 f.). The OSCE provided technical assistance as well as capacity 
development support. The engagement in new areas is considered ‘specific 
adaptation’. Despite Georgia’s entering a new phase in its democratization 
process, the empirical findings, however, do not provide any evidence of OSCE 
strategy development at implementation level (see pages 159 f.). The Permanent 
Council reviewed the mission’s mandate in September 1995 and extended it 
without changes (see pages 166 f.). This is considered a conscious decision to not 
adapt the country approach and, therefore, ‘general adaptation’.  
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Thus, although the OSCE did not fully grasp the opportunity of systematically 
reviewing its implementation approach, it adapted its areas of engagement to the 
gradual change in political context conditions. 
Adaptation of the OSCE engagement in response to gradual change in the 
structural conditions of Georgia’s political transformation process at t1.b.2 in 1999-
2003 
The 1999-2003 gradual change in structural conditions: Gradual actor-centered 
change in the political context conditions of Georgia, to be dealt with in the 
following section—namely, a strengthening of political opposition forces and civil 
society organizations in parallel to a power struggle and increasing disintegration 
of the ruling political party as well increasing public protests against socio-
economic conditions—contributed to a decreasing authority of then-President 
Shevardnadze’s and the destabilization of his neopatrimonial system (see pages 
125 f.). Shevardnadze became desperate to hold on to power by means of 
increasingly authoritarian and repressive measures and a sharp increase of election 
manipulations. While none of the elections conducted during the Shevardnadze 
era fully met international standards, election manipulations were intensified at 
the end of the 1990s, causing a rapid loss of democratic legitimacy and resulting 
in the gradual change in structural context conditions that Nancy Bermeo has 
referred to as “democratic backsliding” (Bermeo 2016: 6). Shevardnadze had 
established a constitutional democracy façade during his presidency. Georgia at 
the end of his presidency may be categorized as an “electoral authoritarian 
regime” following Andreas Schedler’s concept of this “modal type of political 
regime” and “new form of authoritarianism behind electoral façades“(Schedler 
2006; Jawad 2012). The ideal response to democratic backsliding, according to 
the conceptual framework, would consist in the ‘specific adaptation’ of the areas 
of engagement and democracy promotion instruments, an adaptation of the 
implementation strategy, and/or a review of the country approach. 
The OSCE response to the 1999-2003 gradual change in structural conditions: As 
already briefly summarized above, the OSCE neither reviewed its country 
approach nor initiated a strategy development process at implementation level in 
response to the deterioration of democratic governance in Georgia. However, the 
empirical findings show that the OSCE field mission and the ODIHR engaged in 
an increasingly strong and systematic cooperation and coordination of the 
international community in the area of election monitoring and electoral 
assistance in Georgia and the OSCE institutions utilized an increasingly broad 
palette of democracy promotion instruments in the area of elections, ranging from 
socialization, technical assistance, political dialogue, and, in 2003, even 
  211 
operational intervention (see pages 170 f.). Although the OSCE headquarters did 
not politically adapt the country approach, the OSCE did respond to reports on 
increased strategic election manipulations by complementing field-level 
instruments and measures with a stronger involvement of the OSCE’s political 
level in dialogue. Around the time of the April 2000 presidential election, visits of 
the OSCE Secretary General, the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 
and the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office underlined the importance the regional 
organization gave to democratic elections. Although a United States’ initiative, 
the rather far-reaching intervention in domestic processes when the OSCE 
Chairperson appointed a representative to organize and steer the selection process 
of the new Chairperson of Georgia’s Central Election Commission was 
nevertheless remarkable and unusual for the OSCE democracy promotion 
engagement in Georgia and is, therefore, considered a political response. 
Thus, the OSCE responded politically and adapted the instruments of promoting 
democratization, i.e. ‘specific adaptation’, however, without engaging in a 
systematic review of implementation strategy and/or country approach. 
Adaptation of the OSCE engagement in response to gradual change in the actor-
centered conditions of Georgia’s political transformation process at t1.a in 1999-
2003 
The 1999-2003 gradual change in actor-centered conditions: By the end of the 
1990s, the population’s growing dissatisfaction with developments in Georgia had 
increasingly become visible, especially in the form of protests against the 
disastrous economic situation and the energy-supply crisis in particular as well as 
a dramatic gain in votes for opposition parties in the October 1999 parliamentary 
elections (see pages 125 f.). Shevardnadze responded by frequently replacing 
ministers as well as by trying to co-opt representatives of opposition parties. The 
growing strength of opposition forces was paralleled by the split of the ruling 
party into a reform wing and a group of presidential loyalists in 1999 as well as by 
an internal power struggle within the ruling party to succeed Shevardnadze that 
became particularly fierce after the April 2000 presidential elections. 
Shevardnadze’s decreasing authority, the disintegration of his ruling party 
coalition, the relative strengthening of opposition forces, and increasing public 
protests against socio-economic conditions were all elements of a gradual change 
in actor-centered political context conditions in Georgia. Ideally, one would 
expect an international democracy promoter to respond with a practical adaptation 
of activities within existing areas of engagement (see Table 1, page 54). 
The OSCE response to the 1999-2003 gradual change in actor-centered 
conditions: The thorough analysis of primary documents could, on the one hand, 
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not substantiate any explicit OSCE field-level response to the gradual actor-
centered change in the political context conditions in the period between 1999 and 
2003 (see pages 167 f.). On the other hand, the empirical analysis showed that the 
OSCE intensified its monitoring and reporting activities in existing areas of 
engagement in the period of 1999 to 2003, such as with regard to inspection visits 
of the Ombudsperson on human rights to pre-trial detention facilities at police 
stations. In addition, reported activities in this period reflected an increased 
cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This was the case with 
regard to technical assistance for the Public Defender’s Office regarding to which 
NGOs increasingly became beneficiaries of capacity development support (see 
pages 163 f.). This was also the case for other activities, such as OSCE-hosted 
roundtables on the compliance of Georgian legislation with human rights 
principles with GYLA as a local partner organization in May 2001 and February 
2002 (OSCE Mission to Georgia 2001a, 2002d).  
One may consider the increased cooperation with NGOs in existing areas of 
engagement and intensified monitoring activities in the area of human rights 
‘practical adaptation’. 
6.2.3 Testing hypotheses (1) and (2): the likelihood of adaptation in 
response to “ruptures” and to gradual types of change 
Which conclusions can now be drawn from the above synthesis of the findings on 
the adaptation of the OSCE’s engagement in response to the two “ruptures” and 
the three developments of gradual change in Georgia’s political context conditions 
with regard to differences in the likelihood of adaptation? 
A clear picture could only be drawn with regard to “ruptures”. Although the 
period under review has provided only two situations of such rapid and radical 
change to the political context conditions in Georgia, the empirical findings 
regarding OSCE responses are clear-cut: the OSCE displayed and explicitly 
responded with the whole ‘spectrum’ of ideal responses conceptualized in chapter 
2.2. Both, in 1993/1994 as well as in 2003/2004, the OSCE responded quickly 
with initial ad-hoc measures at the political and the implementation levels 
followed by a general adaptation of the country approach or priorities as well as a 
specific/strategic adaptation of the implementation approach. The likelihood of 
adaptation in response to “ruptures” may, therefore, be concluded to be high and, 
thus, supports the first hypothesis. 
How does this likelihood of adaptation of the democracy promoter’s engagement 
in response to “ruptures” compare to the likelihood of an adapted engagement in 
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response to the types of gradual change? The picture drawn by the above-
synthesis of empirical findings regarding OSCE responses to political 
developments of gradual change is less clear than that regarding “ruptures”; it is a 
rather mixed picture. 
In none of the situations of gradual change in structural conditions did the 
OSCE display the full ‘spectrum’ of ideal responses. With regard to neither of 
these two developments, did the OSCE respond with broader strategic 
considerations. Only a ‘specific adaptation’ of the OSCE’s areas of engagement 
and/or utilized instruments of democracy promotion could be observed. In only 
one of the two cases, the Permanent Council discussed recent political 
developments when deciding upon the renewal of the mandate in 1995 but 
extended the mandate, i.e. the country approach, without changes. Whether this 
constitutes ‘general/political adaptation’ may surely be disputed. It is, however, 
considered ‘general/political adaptation’ in this one of two cases here because this 
type of adaptation has been conceptualized as the “(consideration of) adapting the 
country approach” (see Table 1, page 54). 
In the only situation of gradual change in actor-centered conditions that, 
moreover, paralleled the second development of structural change from 1999 to 
2003, ‘practical adaptation’ in the form of an increased engagement with domestic 
NGOs with existing areas as well as intensified monitoring activities with regard 
to the human rights situation were observed. 
By contrasting the clear evidence of the OSCE engagement’s adaptation in 
response to “ruptures”, fully matching the ideal responses of the conceptual 
framework, with the rather mixed evidence regarding adaptation of the OSCE’s 
engagement in response to gradual types of change, the hypotheses (1) and (2) 
(see pages 55 f.) have been substantiated by empirical findings. 
6.3 Interactive contribution of the democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites for context-sensitivity and types of change in 
the domestic political context to adaptation 
This chapter systematically synthesizes the empirical findings of the OSCE 
engagement in Georgia in the period from 1992 to 2004 with regard to the 
OSCE’s utilization of intra-organizational prerequisites for adaptability. More 
specifically, this chapter synthesizes whether the OSCE has utilized the internal 
prerequisites that interact with the respective type of change so as to enhance the 
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chances for adaptation. These internal prerequisites have been developed in the 
conceptual framework (see Table 4 and Table 5 on pages 66 f.). 
As elaborated in chapter 2.1, scholars of international democracy promotion and 
of norm diffusion research widely agree that context-sensitive approaches are 
more promising to be successful than “one size fits all” approaches that do not 
take the specific context conditions of the target country in question into account 
(see pages 36 f.). The domestic context conditions that international democracy 
promoters ideally adapt to in order to be context-sensitive and successful have 
been conceptualized as the domestic political context conditions at the outset and 
as different types of change (see chapter 2.2, pages 48 f.).  
Conceptualizing the domestic political context by developing specific types of 
change acknowledges that political transformation processes that democracy 
promoters engage in are ‘moving targets’. This process dimension had long been 
largely neglected by research (e.g. Carothers 1997: 119; Leininger 2010c). To be a 
context-sensitive and successful democracy promoter, therefore, means to not 
only adapt the engagement to the specific political situation of the target country 
at the outset of the engagement, but to also adapt the engagement in a context-
sensitive manner over time, i.e. in response to the types of change in the political 
conditions.  
It has been argued in the conceptual framework that the likelihood of an adapted 
response differs with regard to the different types of change (see pages 50 f.). This 
argument, which was confirmed by the synthesis of empirical findings in chapter 
6.2, was based on the differing nature of the types of change, i.e. of gradual 
change versus “ruptures”: The latter is considered a development that erupts 
rapidly and that is easier to ‘detect’ because of the radical nature of this type of 
change and because the pressure on the international democracy promoter to adapt 
as well as the political costs of non-adaptation can be expected to be high. The 
former type, i.e. gradual change, is neither radical nor rapid in nature but evolves 
incrementally over a period of time.  
The anecdote of the frog in boiling water may help to contrast the different 
natures of the types of change and the expected likelihood of the engagement’s 
adaptation: If a frog is suddenly put alive into a pot of boiling water, it will jump 
out; if a frog is put into a pot of cold water, which is then slowly brought to a boil, 
it will be cooked to death.
205
 Suddenly confronted with radical change, an 
international democracy promoter is inclined to react in response to the ‘shock’. It 
is much more difficult to realize the extent of the change that evolves gradually 
                                                 
205
  Note that the premise is false according to contemporary biologists. 
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over a longer period of time and to become aware of the point in time when 
adaptation would be wise.  
In order for the frog to run less risk of being cooked to death in a pot of water 
with a gradually increasing temperature and to realize that the water is becoming 
(too) hot to survive without negative consequences, it needs better and more 
sensitive ‘thermal sensors’. To translate this anecdote into the language of the 
topic of the present study: to become aware of gradual change is more demanding 
for international democracy promoters’ internal prerequisites for adaptability 
conceptualized above (see pages 64 f.) than it is to become aware of “ruptures”. 
The author argues that such internal prerequisites, if utilized, interact with the type 
of change in the target country’s political development, increasing the likelihood 
of context-sensitive adaptation—even in response to gradual types of change in 
response to which adaptation is generally less likely than in response to “ruptures” 
(see hypothesis (3), page 69): 
(3) If the democracy promoter possesses and utilizes the internal 
prerequisites (i.e. adaptability) summarized in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 
5, then adaptation to the domestic political context conditions in target 
countries becomes likely, even in response to gradual types of change 
regarding which adaptation is less likely than in response to rapid and 
radical change. 
6.3.1 Interactive contribution of internal prerequisites and 
“ruptures” to the likelihood of adaptation 
According to the conceptual framework (see Table 4 on page 65), the following 
internal prerequisites are considered to enable the democracy promoter to interact 
with “ruptures” in such a way as to ideally respond with different types of 
adaptation—namely, ad-hoc measures and/or specific/strategic adaptation at field-
level and/or ad-measures and/or general/political adaptation at headquarters-level: 
  
  216
DOMESTIC 
CONTEXT  
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
type of change in 
context conditions  
Democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites for adaptability 
(‘proxies’)  
democracy promoter’s 
context-sensitive 
adaptation / ideal 
response to change 
R
U
P
T
U
R
E
 
rapid and 
radical 
political 
change of a 
wide scope 
(t1.c) 
  operational capabilities on the 
ground (field mission); 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s) (expert staff); 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s) (head of 
mission) 
 ad-hoc measures at 
field-level: 
 shift of implementation 
focus to ad-hoc 
measures in response 
to pressing problems 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s) (expert staff and/or 
context analysis); 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s) (head of 
mission) 
 strategic adaptation at 
field-level: 
 (considering the) 
review of 
implementation 
strategy and/or  
 (consideration of) 
adaptation of 
instruments and/or 
areas of engagement 
 analytical capacities of / expert staff 
in headquarters’ bureaucracy 
(secretariat and/or context analysis); 
 decision-making body can convene 
on ad-hoc basis 
 political ad-hoc 
measures: 
 launching of ad-hoc 
political measures in 
response to pressing 
problems and/or 
 analytical capacities of / expert staff 
in headquarters’ bureaucracy 
(secretariat and/or context analysis); 
 decision-making body convene on a 
regular basis 
 general/political 
adaptation: 
 reconsideration of 
country approach 
Source: Table 4: Proxies for adaptability—democracy promoter's internal prerequisites and ideal response at different 
organizational levels to “ruptures”, page 66. 
As synthesized in chapter 6.2, the OSCE responded to the two “ruptures” with 
ideal responses of adaptation (see Table 8 on page 205). The following two 
sections will show that the OSCE, in order to respond in this ideal manner, has 
utilized all internal prerequisites developed in the conceptual framework to 
interact with “ruptures” (see Table 4 on page 65) with one exception: In the case 
of ad-hoc responses at the political level, the OSCE did not utilize analytical 
capacities of the headquarters’ bureaucracy (see Table 10 and Table 11). This may 
be interpreted as follows: For the OSCE to decide upon political ad-hoc responses 
to “ruptures”, in both cases that were analyzed in this study, the OSCE decision-
making body at headquarters was able to rely on the sound information base 
already available through the regular and case-based reporting of the OSCE 
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mission. Additional analyses by the headquarters bureaucracy were, therefore, 
apparently not necessary for the initial political ad-hoc response of the 
organization. 
Thus, the empirical findings substantiate that only a ‘minimum’ is required 
from a democracy promoter in terms of internal prerequisites in order to quickly 
respond on an ad-hoc basis at the political level to rapid and radical change in 
target countries. This ‘minimum’ basically consists in the existence of functioning 
structures, i.e. at the political level, a decision-making body that is able to 
convene on an ad-hoc basis when needed. At field-level, the findings are more 
mixed with regard to ad-hoc responses. Equivalent to the political level, 
operational capabilities on the ground with a sufficient degree of autonomy that 
provides for the authority to decide on an ad-hoc response constitute a minimum. 
With regard to the field-level ad-hoc response of quickly setting up technical 
assistance projects under the GEAP, it is likely that the OSCE mission utilized its 
own analytical capacities as well as that of the ODIHR by drawing from existing 
knowledge of the political election context in Georgia. The other types of 
adaptation conceptualized as ideal response to “ruptures”, namely, 
specific/strategic adaptation and general/political adaptation basically result from 
the fact that the radical nature of the change, in a way, ‘rewinds the clock’ of the 
international democracy promoter’s engagement to another t0, ideally resulting in 
a ‘fresh start’ by reassessing the political context and developing the 
implementation approach on the basis of this new context analysis. 
Internal prerequisites utilized by the OSCE in interaction with 1993 “rupture” 
Regarding critical developments leading up to the September/October 1993 
“rupture”, the CSCE/OSCE mission utilized its standard reporting procedures at 
field-level (see pages 104 f.). The frequent and analytical reporting showed that 
field staff was aware of and closely followed events and ensured that the 
Secretariat and decision-making bodies at headquarters were being kept up to 
date. 
Confronted with the war in Abkhazia, that had escalated despite international 
monitoring of ceasefire agreements, as well as with “the fall of Sukhumi”, that, in 
the CSCE/OSCE mission’s view, risked an escalation into a regional violent 
conflict, the CSCE/OSCE re-assessed the situation. The reassessment may be 
considered as, both, an ad-hoc response at field-level as well as a proxy for 
adaptability in the form of a new context analysis in light of a radically changed 
political situation: The CiO’s Personal Representative (PRC) and the ODIHR 
Deputy Director traveled together to Georgia in early October 1993 in order to 
provide the CiO with his recommendations before her own planned visit at the 
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end of that same month. This visit resulted in the PRC’s unusually frank and self-
reflective report, in which he recommended generally adapting and revising the 
country approach, i.e. the mission mandate. The CiO herself visited Georgia 
shortly after (i.e. political ad-hoc response).  
The new context analysis—in addition to the reports on these visits and the 
regular and special mission reports—informed the headquarters’ discussion on the 
expansion of the mandate as well as the ‘specific/strategic adaptation’. The latter 
refers to, firstly, engaging in a new area of engagement (i.e. support to the 
constitution-making process) with a new instrument of democracy promotion, i.e. 
knowledge transfer, and, secondly, to agreeing on a division of labor between the 
field mission and the ODIHR.  
Prior to the decision to revise the country approach, the field mission staff had 
held field-level consultations with representatives of the Georgian government, 
political elite and other stakeholders in early 1994 in order to gain insights into 
support needs and their views on the intended expansion of the mandate. 
Such consultation regarding an adaptation of the mandate constitutes a procedure 
that had not been included in the proxies for adaptability in Table 4 of the 
conceptual framework but should certainly be considered a good and necessary 
practice when ‘intervening’ in a sovereign state. In the case of the OSCE, given 
the consensus principle and the fact that the mission’s host country is also a 
participating State of the OSCE, the consent of Georgia to adopting or changing 
the mandate is mandatory anyhow. However, consulting Georgian authorities on 
the ground and taking their views and demands into account beforehand cannot be 
replaced by Georgia’s participation in OSCE decision-making at headquarters. 
Table 10 provides an overview of the internal prerequisites the OSCE utilized in 
interactive contribution with the 1993 rapid and radical change in Georgia’s 
political development to the OSCE adapted response. It shows that all proxies for 
adaptability, i.e. all internal prerequisites, conceptualized in Table 4 (see page 66) 
were utilized by the OSCE, contributing to the OSCE’s ideal response to the 1993 
“rupture” at all organizational levels. The findings empirically substantiate that 
ad-hoc responses to “ruptures” are not demanding in terms of elaborate internal 
prerequisites that interact with this type of change. 
Rather, the autonomous and flexible decision-making authority of the 
respective organizational structure is the only organizational prerequisite to yield 
organizational ad-hoc responses to “ruptures”. Only when it comes to the longer-
term responses of general/political and specific/strategic adaptation, more 
demanding internal prerequisites, such as analytical capacities, become relevant. 
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Table 10: Georgia's 1993 "rupture": internal prerequisites utilized by the 
OSCE and OSCE response 
Georgia  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
Interaction of domestic context and democracy promoter  
OSCE response to 
change 
type of change 
in Georgia  
Internal prerequisites for adaptability 
(‘proxies’) utilized by the OSCE  
R
U
P
T
U
R
E
 
t1.c.1: late-
1993 
warfare 
and 
changed 
positionin
g towards 
Russia 
  operational capabilities on the ground: 
not utilized for ad-hoc response at field-
level 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s): not utilized for ad-hoc 
response; instead analytical reassessment 
represents the ad-hoc measure 
 decision-making authority of 
operational capabilities: Head of 
Mission (PRC) decides to visit Georgia in 
Sept. and Oct. 1993 
 ad-hoc measures at 
field-level: 
 PRC reassesses the 
situation in Oct. 1993 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s) / new context analysis: 
unusually frank and self-reflective 
reassessment of the situation with 
recommendations to revise the mission 
mandate by the PRC who visited Georgia 
together with the ODIHR Deputy Director 
in Oct. 1993; 
 Mission consults with Georgian 
stakeholders on expansion of the mandate 
in early 1994 to prepare for new areas of 
engagement; 
 Decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s): mission and 
ODIHR coordinate autonomously to agree 
on division of labor in constitution-
making area of engagement 
 specific/strategic 
adaptation at field-
level: 
 OSCE engages in addit. 
areas and with 
additional instruments: 
in Apr. 1994, mission 
and ODIHR start 
technical assistance in 
constitution-building 
process 
 agreement on division 
of labor between 
mission and ODIHR in 
technical assistance in 
constitution-making 
process in Oct. 1994 
 analytical capacities at headquarters: 
not utilized 
instead, mission reporting on critical 
developments leading up to the 
September/October 1993 “rupture” and 
Oct. 1993 Head of Mission analytical 
report with recommendations informs CiO 
 Mission consults with Georgian 
stakeholders on expansion of the mandate 
in early 1994 to prepare for mission 
expansion 
 No extra-ordinary meeting of decision-
making body for political ad-hoc 
response, but decision-making in regular 
meeting in March 1994 with regard to 
general/political adaptation 
 political ad-hoc 
measures: 
 CiO visit in Oct. 1993 
 general/political 
adaptation: 
 reconsideration of 
country approach: in 
March 1994, mission 
mandate is expanded to 
include democracy 
promotion 
Source: own account 
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Internal prerequisites utilized by the OSCE in interaction with 2003 “rupture” 
When the OSCE was confronted with the rapid and radical developments at the 
end of November 2003, the OSCE Chairperson used the occasion of the OSCE 
Ministerial Council meeting to convene representatives of the participating States 
for a donor meeting that yielded pledges of 6 million Euros for ad-hoc assistance 
to Georgia’s upcoming extraordinary and repeat election processes. The OSCE 
Task Force on Georgia quickly decided how these extra-budgetary funds were to 
be used and decided that the “Georgia Elections Assistance Program” (GEAP) 
was to be set up, tasking the OSCE Head of Mission to manage it.  
The decision to task the Head of Mission with managing the GEAP enabled the 
OSCE to utilize the OSCE’s existing operational capabilities on the ground as 
well as additional operational staff that the mission was mandated to employ to 
quickly get the GEAP up and running on the ground. Furthermore, the Head of 
Mission was able to utilized existing knowledge on the shortcomings of Georgia’s 
election administration and process when planning the GEAP projects. The Head 
of Mission’s decision-making authority in the field enabled the OSCE mission to 
quickly select and contract NGOs in Georgia to implement technical assistance 
projects under the umbrella of the GEAP as ad-hoc measure. The project 
implementation began as early as December 2003. 
In mid-February 2004, the OSCE utilized its analytical capacities in the field in 
the person of the Head of Mission to critically reflect that the ad-hoc response 
was important but could not be more than a “sticking plaster” operation that was 
not able to help overcome structural deficits in Georgia that had been pointed out 
by ODIHR election monitoring reports, for instance. Furthermore, the Head of 
Mission initiated a reassessment of the mission’s implementation program in light 
of the rapidly changing political environment of Georgia and used his decision-
making authority to adapt the general implementation approach and shift the 
mission’s focus to new areas of engagement, namely democratic decentralization 
reform and parliamentary reform (see page 192 f.). 
Table 11 provides an overview of the internal prerequisites that the OSCE 
utilized to interact with Georgia’s 2003 “rupture” in its political transformation 
process. It shows that all proxies for adaptability, i.e. all internal prerequisites, 
conceptualized in Table 4 (page 66) were utilized by the OSCE, contributing to 
the OSCE’s ideal response to the 2003 “rupture” at all organizational levels, with 
one exception: the OSCE did not utilize analytical capacities of the headquarters’ 
bureaucracy to respond at the political level. 
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Table 11: Georgia's 2003 "rupture": internal prerequisites utilized by the 
OSCE and OSCE response 
Georgia  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
Interaction of domestic context and democracy promoter  
OSCE response to 
change 
type of change in 
Georgia  
Internal prerequisites for adaptability 
(‘proxies’) utilized by the OSCE  
R
U
P
T
U
R
E
 
t1.c.2: 2003-
2004 “Rose 
Revolution” 
and change to 
reform-oriented 
government 
  operational capabilities on the 
ground (field mission): OSCE mission 
was mandated to employ additional 
short-term staff in order to ensure 
proper support for the extra-budgetary 
GEAP; 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s): ODIHR election 
observation reports and existing 
knowledge of mission on shortcomings 
in the election administration and 
process 
 decision-making authority: Head of 
Mission was tasked with managing 
extra-budgetary GEAP, which enabled 
the selection and contracting of NGOs 
to implement GEAP projects 
 ad-hoc measures at 
field-level: 
 rapid set-up of 
GEAP with 
technical assistance 
projects on the 
ground in Dec. 2003 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s):  
-critical reflection of Head of Mission 
on ad-hoc measures (i.e. GEAP) as 
“sticking plaster” operation;  
- ODIHR election observation reports 
with analysis of shortcomings in 
election process and administration  
-needs assessment for post-
parliamentary election assistance; and  
-reassessment of existing 
implementation approach of the OSCE 
in light of rapidly changing domestic 
political context 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s): Head of 
Mission decides upon shifting the 
implementation focus to democratic 
decentralization and parliamentary 
reform 
 specific/strategic 
adaptation at field-
level: 
 review of general 
implementation 
approach in mid-
February 2004 
 shift of 
implementation 
focus to democratic 
decentralization and 
parliamentary 
reform in 2004 
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Georgia  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
Interaction of domestic context and democracy promoter  
OSCE response to 
change 
type of change in 
Georgia  
Internal prerequisites for adaptability 
(‘proxies’) utilized by the OSCE  
 analytical capacities at headquarters: 
not utilized; 
 decision-making body can convene on 
ad-hoc basis: OSCE Chairpersonship 
convenes participating States for a 
donor conference on the fringes of the 
Ministerial Council meeting on 1 Dec. 
2003 
 political ad-hoc 
measures: 
 OSCE donor 
conference on 1 
Dec. 2003 pledges 6 
million Euro in 
extra-budgetary 
support to Georgia 
 OSCE Task Force 
decides to establish 
GEAP to be 
managed by the 
OSCE mission on 3 
Dec. 2003 
 general/political 
adaptation: 
 OSCE 
Chairpersonship in 
2004 declares 
support for 
democratization in 
Georgia to be an 
OSCE priority 
 Increased 2004 
budget allocations 
to human dimension 
activities of the 
OSCE mission 
Source: own account 
6.3.2 Interactive contribution of internal prerequisites and gradual 
types of change to the likelihood of adaptation 
The hypotheses on the likelihood of adaptation in response to gradual types of 
change and to “ruptures” in target countries’ political transformation process have 
been substantiated by the empirical findings, as analyzed in chapter 6.2 of this 
systematic synthesis (see pages 212 f.). According to this, context-sensitive 
adaptation of an international democracy promoter’s engagement is more likely in 
response to “ruptures” than it is in response to gradual change. This supports the 
presumption—expressed in the metaphor of the frog in a pot of water that is being 
slowly brought to a boil and is slowly cooked to death unless it has better thermal 
sensors—that an international democracy promoter that possesses and utilizes a 
more elaborate set of organization-internal prerequisites is more likely to adapt to 
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even gradual change. This chapter aims at shedding more light on this 
presumption by taking a closer look at the mixed picture of adaptation in response 
to gradual change drawn in the synthesis of section 6.2.2. Which internal 
prerequisites were utilized by the OSCE and interacted with the different political 
developments of gradual change in Georgia in such a way as to respond with 
certain types of adaptation? With regard to the types of adaptation that did not 
constitute an observed OSCE response, did the OSCE not utilize the internal 
prerequisites, developed in the conceptual framework, thereby suggesting their 
relevance? 
According to the conceptual framework (see Table 5 on page 66), the following 
internal prerequisites are considered to enable the democracy promoter to interact 
with gradual types of change in such a way as to ideally respond with different 
types of adaptation—namely, with practical adaptation at field-level, with 
specific/strategic adaptation at field-level, and/or with general/political adaptation 
at headquarters-level: 
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DOMESTIC 
CONTEXT  
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
type of change in 
context conditions  
Democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites for adaptability 
(‘proxies’) 
 
democracy 
promoter’s context-
sensitive adaptation / 
ideal response to 
change 
G
R
A
D
U
A
L
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
gradual 
change of 
actor-
centered 
context 
conditions 
(t1.a) 
  operational capabilities on the ground 
(field mission); 
 monitoring and reporting procedures 
(regular reports on political 
developments); 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s) (expert staff); 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure (head of mission) 
 practical adaptation 
at field-level: 
 (consideration of) 
adapting activities 
within existing areas 
of engagement 
gradual 
change of 
structural 
context 
conditions 
(t1.b) 
 
 monitoring and reporting procedures 
(regular reports on political 
developments); 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s) (expert staff); 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s) (head of 
mission) 
 strategic adaptation 
at field-level:  
(consideration of)  
 review of 
implementation 
strategy and/or  
 adaptation of 
instruments and/or 
areas of engagement 
  monitoring and reporting procedures 
(regular reports on political 
developments); 
 analytical capacities of / expert staff in 
headquarters’ bureaucracy 
(secretariat); 
 regular meetings of decision-making 
body 
 general/political 
adaptation at 
headquarters-level:  
 reconsideration of 
country approach 
Source: Table 5: Proxies for adaptability—democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites and ideal response at different 
organizational levels to gradual change, page 67. 
The synthesis of empirical findings, elaborated in the following sections, 
substantiates that the OSCE has utilized all internal prerequisites in interaction 
with gradual types of change as conceptualized in Table 5 (see page 67)—with the 
exception of analytical capacities of the headquarters’ bureaucracy. The latter 
confirms the finding synthesized with regard to “ruptures”: that own analytical 
capacities are not necessary at headquarters when headquarters can draw from 
field-level analyses.  
Despite the utilization of all of these intra-organizational prerequisites for 
adaptability, the synthesis of empirical findings in chapter 6.2 has shown that the 
record of the OSCE’s adaptation in response to gradual change in Georgia’s 
political transformation process has been a mixed one. Thus, the conceptualized 
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internal prerequisites that were utilized by the OSCE did not interact with gradual 
types of change in Georgia in a way that resulted in fully ideal responses. A closer 
look at the findings is therefore necessary in order to draw conclusions with 
regard to the intra-organizational prerequisites.  
The empirical findings do not provide clear evidence on differences in the 
likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation in response to gradual change in 
structural or actor-centered domestic context conditions. Rather, the following 
sections clarify that a common main weakness in OSCE responses to gradual 
types of change has consisted in the inability to systematically translate the OSCE 
operational structures’ good insights into and knowledge of the target country’s 
political developments into targeted responses. Apparently, the internal 
prerequisites of monitoring and reporting procedures, decision-making authority, 
and analytical capacities of OSCE operational structures were not sufficient in this 
regard. Thus, the conclusion is drawn that the OSCE would benefit from 
methodological procedures for systematic and strategic planning of 
implementation approaches and activities in order to further strengthen the 
regional organization’s context-sensitivity and enhance its chances for successful 
democracy promotion. This conclusion applies to OSCE responses to gradual 
change in structural as well as to actor-centered political context conditions. 
Internal prerequisites utilized by the OSCE in interaction with 1994/1995 gradual 
change in Georgia’s structural political context conditions 
The gradual change in Georgia’s structural conditions in 1994/1995 was initiated 
by an increasingly dynamic constitution-making process that resulted in the 
adoption of the new constitution in August 1995, thereby providing Georgia’s 
democratization process as well as international democracy promoters a new 
framework of democratic norms and of new institutions to be developed. This 
marked an important milestone, creating an entry point for international 
democracy promoters to revisit their implementation and country approaches. 
Shortly after the constitution’s adoption, the OSCE Mission to Georgia utilized its 
reporting routines—in this case, the procedure of the Head of Mission reporting 
to the Permanent Council on the occasion that the mission mandate was up for 
renewal—to elaborate and analyze recent key political developments. The report 
also highlighted that the OSCE mission played a key role under these 
circumstances and that promotion of democratization was expected to assist both 
in reducing the chances of renewed fighting and in strengthening societal self-
esteem. However, the report then only mentioned the mission’s intention to get 
substantially involved in the election processes. And this is what the mission, in 
close cooperation, with the ODIHR did: re-engage in the area of elections.  
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The OSCE’s operational capabilities on the ground in the shape of the long-term 
mission enabled the OSCE to closely follow and to early-on become aware of 
developments, such as the setting of the elections date and the adoption of the new 
election law. This allowed responding to such developments rather quickly. As 
soon as the elections date had been set, the ODIHR and the EU conducted a joint 
electoral needs assessment in July 1995, analyzing the technical assistance needs 
and providing the basis coordinating monitoring activities. 
The OSCE, however, did not engage in any systematic process to consider 
general entry points for international actors in democracy promotion and the 
specific contributions the OSCE could make in the ‘concert’ of democracy 
promoters beyond elections. The mission has, therefore, not fully seized the 
opportunities of the new constitutional framework and did not respond 
systematically to the structural change.  
The political level of the OSCE utilized its regular meetings to consider and 
discuss the political developments, reported by the OSCE Head of Mission, before 
taking the decision on the mandate’s renewal but did not find it necessary to adapt 
the mandate. 
In light of this, the OSCE’s engagement in another new area was not the result of 
a systematic strategy development process in the field, but followed a more 
reactive and intuitive logic. By utilizing regular reporting procedures, the OSCE 
mission had pointed out concerns regarding the human rights situation in Georgia. 
The ODIHR Director took this up in her dialogue with representatives of 
Georgian state institutions upon her visit in July 1995, was informed by the plans 
to develop legislation for establishing an Ombudsperson institution on human 
rights, and offered ODIHR assistance. This marked the entry point for OSCE 
technical assistance and capacity development support in this new area of 
engagement. The ODIHR provided technical comments to and facilitated 
discussions to the draft law in early 1996. Only when the law was approved, the 
ODIHR conducted an assessment on assistance needs of the institution. 
Table 12 shows that, again, analytical capacities at OSCE headquarters were 
apparently not necessary in order to have good information base on political 
development in the target country because this was provided by the OSCE’s 
operational capabilities on the ground through reporting routines. While, in 
general, one may wonder whether the utilization of analytical capacities at 
headquarters may help in compensating weak capacities of the field mission for 
analyzing the ‘broader political picture’ in the target country, this was not 
necessary with regard to reviewing the OSCE country approach for Georgia in 
1995 given the broad nature of the existing mandate with regard to the promotion 
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of democratization. Having operational capabilities on the ground with regular 
reporting routines certainly ensures that OSCE decision-making bodies at 
headquarters and implementing structures are always equipped with up-to-date 
information on political developments in host countries. However, based on the 
empirical findings on the 1994/1995 type of change, with regard to ‘strategic 
adaptation’ as the most crucial response to gradual change in structural conditions, 
neither the analytical depth of bi-weekly activity reports has been sufficient, nor 
were procedures in place enabling the organization to systematically develop an 
implementation strategy. 
Table 12: 1994/1995 gradual change in Georgia: internal prerequisites 
utilized by the OSCE and OSCE response 
Georgia  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
Interaction of domestic context and democracy promoter  
OSCE response to 
change 
type of change in 
Georgia  
Internal prerequisites for 
adaptability (‘proxies’) utilized by 
the OSCE 
 
R
U
P
T
U
R
E
 
t1.b.1: 1994-
1995 
constitution-
building and 
formal 
introduction 
of democratic 
statehood 
  monitoring and reporting 
procedures: Sept. 1995 analytical 
mission report on political 
developments; regular activity 
reports point out concerns with 
human rights situation 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s): brief analysis of 
political developments by Head of 
Mission in Sept. 1995, but no 
broader analysis what new 
constitutional framework means for 
OSCE support to democratization 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s): ODIHR 
Director offers support to 
Ombudsman institution 
 specific/strategic 
adaptation at field-
level: 
 No systematic 
strategy development 
but rather intuitive 
(adaptation of the) 
engagement 
 (re-)engagement in 
the area of elections 
and the 
Ombudsperson 
institution 
 monitoring and reporting 
procedures: Head of Mission report 
of Sept. 1995 on political 
developments and mission priorities; 
 analytical capacities of / expert 
staff in headquarters’ 
bureaucracy: not utilized; 
 regular meetings of decision-
making body: PC meeting on 12 
Sept. 1995 
 general/political 
adaptation: 
 PC decision to not 
revise but to 
renew/extend the 
existing mandate 
Source: own account 
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Internal prerequisites utilized by the OSCE in interaction with 1999-2003 gradual 
change in Georgia’s structural political context conditions 
The key area of the OSCE democracy promotion engagement in Georgia—
namely, election monitoring and reporting—served both as an intra-organizational 
prerequisite to become aware of and analyze developments, progress and deficits 
in Georgia’s election processes, administration and legal framework as well as a 
response to shortcomings, such as election manipulations. Monitoring and 
reporting procedures as such can serve as instruments of socialization, increasing 
the political costs of malpractice by publicly naming them. The empirical analysis 
in chapter 5 has shown that the OSCE used its election monitoring and reporting 
activities with both purposes with regard to the 1999 to 2003 gradual change in 
structural political context conditions: The OSCE utilized election monitoring as a 
prerequisite to become aware and gain knowledge of Georgia’s democratic 
backsliding by means of increasing strategic election manipulations in the period 
of 1999-2003. At the same time, OSCE election monitoring served as an 
instrument used in response to democratic backsliding by increasing the political 
costs of Georgian authorities for violating democratic election standards—one key 
commitment related to Georgia’s participation in the OSCE. 
As the empirical analysis in chapter 5.5 shows, the OSCE has utilized the 
regular reporting procedures of the OSCE mission, the elections observation 
reports of the ODIHR as well as situation-specific spot reports of the OSCE 
mission in such a way as to create a wealth of information on developments 
regarding the area of elections and not limited to reports on the polls as such, but 
also on developments regarding the election administration and the legal 
framework between elections (see Table 13). This ensured that OSCE operational 
structures and decision-making bodies as well as the public were aware of the 
deteriorating performance of Georgian authorities in this regard. 
Thus, the analysis of increasingly strategic election manipulations as one element 
of democratic backsliding in 1999-2003 was rather systematic. Election 
monitoring and assistance constitutes a key area of OSCE engagement as well as a 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis other democracy promoters. The ODIHR has 
developed a comprehensive methodology of election monitoring that was applied 
in Georgia.  
However, while the comprehensive election observation reports identified 
procedural as well as structural problems, the analyses were not used as a basis for 
strategy development in broader political perspective. The nature of 
recommendations was technical. In light of this, it is unlikely that the 2003 
strategic adaptation of election assistance, i.e. the systematic and structured multi-
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level international coordination and cooperation approach as well as the strong 
intervention in the selection process of the Chairperson of Georgia’s Central 
Election Commission (CEC), resulted from an OSCE initiative. It is more likely 
that a bilateral donor, such as the Embassy of the United States of America—an 
OSCE participating State—has initiated the international community’s 
coordinated and multi-level approach.  
Table 13: 1999-2003 gradual structural change in Georgia: internal 
prerequisites utilized by the OSCE and OSCE response 
Georgia  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
Interaction of domestic context and democracy promoter  
OSCE response to 
change 
type of change in 
Georgia  
Internal prerequisites for adaptability 
(‘proxies’) utilized by the OSCE  
R
U
P
T
U
R
E
 
t1.b.2: 1999-
2003 
democratic 
backsliding 
and increased 
strategic 
election 
manipulations 
 
 monitoring and reporting 
procedures: standard mission activity 
reports inform about political 
developments, including the election 
framework and practice; increasingly 
critical assessment pointed out in 
ODIHR election observation report 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s): ODIHR election 
observation reports analyze progress 
and shortcomings of legal framework, 
administration and process of elections; 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure(s): ODIHR and 
mission have the authority to decide on 
the approach and extent of activities 
and on how to engage with stakeholders 
 specific/strategic 
adaptation at field-
level: 
 No systematic 
strategy 
development but 
rather intuitive 
(adaptation of the) 
engagement 
 increasingly strong 
and systematic 
international 
cooperation and 
coordination 
 utilization of 
additional 
instruments: 
socialization, 
technical assistance, 
political dialogue, 
and operational 
intervention 
 monitoring and reporting 
procedures: standard mission activity 
reports inform about political 
developments, including the election 
framework and practice; increasingly 
critical ODIHR election observation 
report 
 analytical capacities of / expert staff 
in headquarters: not utilized; 
 regular meetings of decision-making 
body: took place 
 general/political 
adaptation: 
 no reconsideration 
of country approach,  
but, instead, 
operational 
intervention of 
Representative of 
the CiO in selection 
process of CEC 
Chairperson in 
August 2003 
Source: own account 
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Thus, again, the ‘translation’ of analytical information on political developments 
into a more strategic approach to ‘filling the mandate with life’ at the 
implementation level is identified as a major weakness of OSCE democracy 
promotion in Georgia. A possible interpretation of this finding is that analytical 
capacities of the operational structure(s) are not sufficient in order to successfully 
interact with gradual types of change in structural context conditions in such a 
way as to respond with strategic adaptation of the democracy promotion 
engagement. Rather, procedures of the operational structure(s) for a systematic 
strategy development process may constitute a fruitful addition to democracy 
promoters’ internal prerequisites for adaptability. 
Internal prerequisites utilized by the OSCE in interaction with 1999-2003 gradual 
change in Georgia’s actor-centered political context conditions 
The OSCE mission utilized its monitoring and reporting procedures to point out 
actor-centered developments regarding repressive measures of the state against 
opposition forces, regarding the government’s effort to coopt opposition forces, 
and regarding an increasingly dynamic NGO ‘sector’ in the period between 1999 
and 2003. Although these accounts were most often presented in the form of 
describing individual events, at times, they reflected the analytical capacities 
utilized by the mission regarding the respective event. The reports, in a way, 
represented small stones, pieces of a puzzle that only taken together formed a 
picture or mosaic. However, even the analytical elements of some of the regular 
reports seldom consisted in analyses in a broader political perspective or were 
hardly put into connection with a self-reflective interpretation what they mean for 
the work of the OSCE. Analyses were not systematically ‘translated’ into practice.  
This lack of strategic capacities is likely to be the reason why the OSCE 
response to all the reported insights from the field during the period of change in 
actor-centered context conditions consisted in a rather intuitive and not very 
targeted increase in OSCE activities with NGO participation. 
Interesting with regard to the gap between the analysis of developments and 
systematically adapted engagement is another empirical finding that was 
elaborated in chapter 5.3 (see pages 163 f.)
206
: It shows that the permanent 
presence of the OSCE mission on the ground results in an excellent knowledge 
and reliable assessments of political context conditions on the ground—especially 
in contrast to short-term experts coming to the country on intermittent visits: In 
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  Because this example related to the OSCE support to the Ombudsperson, it was analyzed as 
part of a chapter dedicated to the OSCE response to gradual change in structural conditions in 
longer perspective. The example, however, pointed at actor-centered change. 
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1998, the OSCE mission has increasingly expressed doubts regarding the political 
commitment of the Ombudsperson in its bi-weekly activity reports. The ODIHR 
short-term expert, however, who visited Georgia in the summer of 1999, analyzed 
the deficits in the Ombudsperson’s performance to be rooted in the institution’s 
organizational set-up and, correspondingly, recommended a technical response. 
Within the scope of this study, it has not been possible to research the reasons for 
why the more sensible assessment of the mission did not prevail over the more 
superficial analysis of the ODIHR expert. However, the finding, again, points to a 
gap between the OSCE’s strength of having an excellent knowledge of 
developments in host countries and the weakness of lacking the ability to use this 
knowledge for more systematic, strategic and targeted responses. 
Table 14: 1999-2003 gradual actor-centered change in Georgia: internal 
prerequisites utilized by the OSCE and OSCE response 
Georgia  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
Interaction of domestic context and democracy promoter  
OSCE response to 
change 
type of change in 
Georgia  
Internal prerequisites for adaptability 
(‘proxies’) utilized by the OSCE  
R
U
P
T
U
R
E
 
t1.a: 1999-
2003 
disintegration 
of the ruling 
party and 
strengthening 
of opposition 
forces and 
civil society 
  operational capabilities on the 
ground: field mission 
 monitoring and reporting 
procedures: regular activity reports 
provide frequent, dense and up-to-date 
information on political developments 
 analytical capacities of operational 
structure(s): regular mission reports 
occasionally provide analytical 
information but offer no interpretation 
of meaning for own activities 
 decision-making authority of 
operational structure: Head of 
Mission and ODIHR enjoy autonomy in 
deciding upon activities 
 practical adaptation: 
 no explicit response, 
but intuitive 
increase of 
cooperation with 
NGOs and 
intensified 
monitoring 
activities in existing 
areas of engagement 
Source: own account 
Table 14 provides an overview of the internal prerequisites the OSCE utilized. 
6.3.3 Testing hypothesis (3): the interactive contribution of internal 
prerequisites and type of change to the likelihood of 
adaptation 
Which conclusions can now be drawn from the above synthesis of the findings on 
the interactive contribution of international democracy promoters’ intra-
organizational prerequisites and target countries’ domestic political context 
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conditions to the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation of democracy 
promoters’ engagement? Does context-sensitive adaptation become likely in 
response to domestic political context conditions—even gradual types of 
change—when these interact with certain organizational prerequisites of the 
democracy promoter? 
The synthesis of empirical findings in chapters 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 has largely 
substantiated the interactive contribution of conceptualized intra-organizational 
prerequisites of the international democracy promoter with the target country’s 
domestic political context conditions. Only with regard to the types of change, the 
following specifications that result from the empirical analysis amend the 
conceptual relationship laid out in chapter 2.2. The synthesis of findings, in this 
regard, 
 substantiates that the democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites that interact 
with “ruptures” so as to result in the democracy promoter’s ideally adapted 
response are less demanding than those that interact with gradual types of 
change; 
 suggests that analytical capacities of the democracy promoter’s organizational 
structures at headquarters do not constitute a necessary internal prerequisite in 
order to respond with context-sensitive adaptation to all types of domestic 
political change in the target country when analytical capacities and reporting 
procedures of the organization’s operational structure(s) are being utilized; 
 suggests that utilized analytical capacities of the democracy promoter’s 
operational structures are not a sufficient internal prerequisite for the 
democracy promoter to translate knowledge of political developments into 
systematic considerations of targeted responses. 
This last point is important: If a democracy promoter aims at being successful, 
it needs to fully grasp opportunities and entry points and address the challenges 
that political change in the target country of its engagement bring about. Having 
and utilizing intra-organizational prerequisites that enable a democracy promoter 
to become aware and know of political developments can be considered a 
precondition of context-sensitive adaptation. An adapted response of the OSCE 
was observed with regard to all identified types of change in Georgia’s political 
transformation process in the period between 1992 and 2004. However, empirical 
evidence has also shown that the insights the OSCE had into the political 
developments on the ground, highlighting some of these as critical, did not fully 
match the OSCE response that followed. The OSCE’s adapted responses to 
gradual types of change were mostly intuitive and did not follow a systematic 
approach with which the OSCE considered how to translate knowledge of 
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political developments into targeted responses in the concert with other 
democracy promoters. 
While the findings substantiate that the democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites and the target country’s domestic political context conditions 
interactively contribute to enhancing the chances for context-sensitive adaptation 
of the democracy promotion engagement, thereby supporting hypothesis (3), an 
additional intra-organizational prerequisite would likely enhance the quality of 
responses: methodological procedures for systematic and strategic planning of the 
engagement. 
In sum, the empirical analysis shows that the OSCE is a regional organization, 
equipped with a solid set of intra-organizational prerequisites that enable the 
OSCE to be sensitive to the political context conditions of its host countries at the 
engagement’s outset as well as over time. The OSCE may be considered an 
adaptable international democracy promoter, according to the above definition 
(see page 70), as it possesses and has utilized internal prerequisites to interact with 
the types of change in Georgia’s political transformation process. However, the 
OSCE has not yet lived up to its full potential in using the remarkable extent of 
insights it gains through its operational capabilities on host countries’ grounds for 
systematic, strategic and targeted responses and, thus, for its efforts to 
successfully promote democratization in its region. In order to be a successful 
democracy promoter, the OSCE needs to close this gap and translate sound 
knowledge of political developments into systematic responses. Adding structured 
planning tools to its set of utilized intra-organizational prerequisites may be 
fruitful in this regard. 
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7. Conclusion 
This chapter aims at bringing the systematic synthesis of this study’s empirical 
findings on the OSCE as democracy promoter in Georgia in the period between 
1992 and 2004 into broader perspective. The results of testing the “one size fits 
all” claim that international democracy promoters select and implement their 
approaches in target countries irrespective of the specific political country 
situation will be discussed—also with a view to the generalizability of findings 
from analyzing the OSCE’s engagement in Georgia. The findings’ theoretical and 
praxeological added value will be elaborated, providing suggestions for further 
research in the field of international democracy promotion. 
At the center of this study’s research interest were the conditions under which 
international democracy promotion is successful. In this regard, the author built 
on scholars’ vast consensus that a context-sensitive engagement of democracy 
promoters is more promising to be successful than “one size fits all” approaches, 
for which democracy promoters have been widely criticized. She pointed out that 
regardless of this wide consensus in international democracy promotion and norm 
diffusion research as well as notwithstanding its praxeological relevance, the 
scholarly literature has 
 not yet sufficiently tested and empirically validated the “one size fits all” 
claim,  
 hardly helped to systematize the target countries’ domestic context conditions 
that international democracy promoters are expected to be sensitive to, and  
 not yet shed any light on democracy promoters’ inner workings that enable 
them to be context-sensitive.  
With the objective of contributing to filling these gaps in research, this study 
focused on the interactive contribution of the target country’s domestic political 
context and the international democracy promoter’s organization-internal 
prerequisites for context-sensitivity to increasing the likelihood of adapting the 
democracy-promoting engagement in response. In short: The empirical analysis 
addressed the research question which intra-organizational prerequisites of the 
international democracy promoter contribute to increasing the likelihood of 
adapting the engagement sensitive to the target country’s domestic political 
context conditions, thereby enhancing the chances of successful democracy 
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promotion. In order to answer this research question, this study proceeded in 
several steps: 
 Based on an analysis of the state of the art of the research on democratization, 
international democracy promotion, and international organizations, the 
author elaborated several presumptions that this study’s conceptual 
framework rests upon (chapter 2.1): democracy and its promotion are per se 
desirable goals; international actors can only contribute to and not determine 
democratization as a process that is genuinely driven by domestic factors; 
context-sensitivity increases the potential success of international democracy 
promotion; international organizations are self-contained actors that develop 
objectives, strategies and programs of their own; regional organizations are 
generally more sensitive to the domestic context conditions of their member 
states than other international organizations; and international organizations 
with internal prerequisites that enable them to gain and maintain a good 
knowledge of target countries’ political context conditions make better-
informed decisions and are more likely to be context-sensitive. 
 By drawing from democratization, international democracy promotion and 
norm diffusion literature, the author conceptualized the domestic political 
context by developing specific types of change, thereby acknowledging that 
political transformation processes that democracy promoters engage in are 
‘moving targets’ (section 2.2.1). This process dimension had long been 
largely neglected by research. To be a context-sensitive and successful 
democracy promoter, therefore, means in this study to not only adapt the 
engagement to the specific political situation of the target country at the 
outset of the engagement, but to also adapt the engagement in a context-
sensitive manner over time, i.e. in response to change in the domestic political 
dynamics.  
 The plausible argument was made in the conceptual framework that the 
likelihood of an adapted response differs with regard to the different types of 
change (see pages 50 f.). This argument was based on the differing nature of 
the types of change, i.e. of gradual change versus “ruptures”: The latter is 
considered a development that erupts rapidly and that is easier to ‘detect’ 
because of the radical nature of this type of change and because the pressure 
on the international democracy promoter to adapt as well as the political costs 
of non-adaptation can be expected to be high. The former type, i.e. gradual 
change, is neither radical nor rapid in nature but evolves incrementally over a 
period of time, thereby being more demanding for a democracy promoter to 
‘detect’, become aware of, and adapt to. Context-sensitive adaptation of the 
democracy promoter’s engagement is, thus, considered to be more likely in 
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response to “ruptures” than in response to gradual change. Two hypotheses as 
‘two sides of the same coin’ were formulated in this regard to be tested by the 
empirical analysis: (1) “If the change in the target country’s political context 
conditions is rapid and radical, the international democracy promoter is more 
likely to adapt than to gradual change because the political costs of non-
adaptation and the political ‘pressure’ to adapt are relatively high.” and (2) “If 
the change in the target country’s political context conditions is gradual, the 
international democracy promoter is less likely to adapt than to “ruptures” 
because the political ‘pressure’ to adapt is relatively low to moderate.”.  
 For an international democracy promoter to be capable of gaining and 
maintaining a sound knowledge of its target country’s political context 
conditions that change over time, the author conceptualized organization-
internal prerequisites that interact with the differing nature of the types of 
change (section 2.2.2). Because it is arguably more demanding for 
international democracy promoters to become aware of gradual change and 
identify the point in time when adaptation would be wise, the respective 
internal prerequisites are also more demanding than those conceptualized to 
interact with “ruptures”. The author argues that such internal prerequisites, if 
utilized, interact with the type of change in the target country’s political 
development in such a way as to increase the likelihood of context-sensitive 
adaptation—even in response to gradual types of change in response to which 
adaptation is considered less likely than in response to “ruptures”. A third 
hypothesis was formulated with regard to this interactive contribution: (3) “If 
the democracy promoter possesses and utilizes the internal prerequisites (i.e. 
adaptability), conceptualized in section 2.2.2, then adaptation to the domestic 
political context conditions in target countries becomes likely, even in 
response to gradual types of change regarding which adaptation is less likely 
than in response to rapid and radical change.”. 
 The analysis of the selected “tough case” of an international democracy 
promoter, which was likely to be context-sensitive and not expected to 
support the “one size fits all” claim, showed that the OSCE has developed a 
unique set of organization-internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity at the 
engagement’s outset and for adaptability over time (chapter 3). As a regional 
organization, the OSCE is generally expected to be more familiar with and 
sensitive to the domestic political context conditions in its participating 
States. Decision-making structures at headquarters, supported by a 
Secretariat, and being able to convene on an ad-hoc basis in addition to 
weekly regular meetings, operational capabilities with specialized institutions 
and field missions, and standard procedures to assess domestic context 
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conditions in OSCE participating States and to frequently report on political 
developments in host countries add to and strengthen this general expectation 
of the OSCE’s context-sensitivity and adaptability. 
 The empirical analysis of the OSCE’s democracy-promoting engagement in 
Georgia in the period between 1992 and 2004 (chapter 5) aimed at exploring 
whether the OSCE utilized this unique set of internal prerequisites, thereby 
living up to the general expectation that the OSCE is a context-sensitive and 
adaptable international promoter of democratization. The analysis also 
explored whether the OSCE adapted its engagement in response to different 
types of change, i.e. “ruptures” and gradual types of change in Georgia’s 
political transformation process, that were identified in the analysis of the 
country context (chapter 4). 
 The findings from the empirical analysis of the OSCE’s democracy 
promotion in Georgia between 1992 and 2004 were systematically 
synthesized with regard to the international democracy promoter’s initial 
context-sensitivity at the outset of the engagement, the relative likelihood of 
context-sensitive adaptation in response to “ruptures” and to gradual types of 
change in the political transformation process, and the contribution of the 
democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites to context-sensitive adaptation 
(chapter 6). This systematic synthesis of empirical findings, thereby, tested 
the three hypotheses, ‘distilling’ the ‘essence’ of the empirical analysis. 
 Hypotheses (1) and (2) on the greater likelihood of the engagement’s context-
sensitive adaptation in response to “ruptures” compared to the lesser 
likelihood in response to gradual types of change were substantiated by the 
empirical findings. The clear evidence of the OSCE adapted responses to 
“ruptures”, fully matching the ideal responses of the conceptual framework, 
stood in contrast to the rather mixed evidence regarding adaptation of the 
OSCE’s engagement in response to gradual types of change. With regard to 
both of the two situations of rapid and radical change to the political context 
conditions in Georgia in the period under review, the OSCE displayed and 
explicitly responded with the whole ‘spectrum’ of ideal responses 
conceptualized in chapter 2.2. The OSCE responded quickly to, both, the 
1993/1994 Abkhazia war and the 2003/2004 “Rose Revolution” with initial 
ad-hoc measures at the political and the implementation levels, followed by a 
general adaptation of the country approach as well as a specific/strategic 
adaptation of the implementation approach. The likelihood of adaptation in 
response to “ruptures” may, therefore, be concluded to be high and, thus, 
supports the first hypothesis. While an OSCE response could be observed 
with regard to all types of gradual change identified in Georgia’s political 
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transformation process in the period between 1992 and 2004, none of the 
responses to structural change reflected the whole ‘spectrum’ of ideal 
responses. Neither in response to the 1994/1995 structural change as a result 
of the constitution-making process, nor in response to the 1999-2003 
democratic backsliding with increasing strategic election manipulations did 
the OSCE systematically review its implementation strategy. The OSCE 
responded to the actor-centered change of an increasingly strong political 
opposition, an increasingly dynamic civil society, and a disintegrating ruling 
party in the period from 1999 to 2003 with the practical adaptation of 
increasingly involving domestic NGOs in its activities—an adaptation that, 
based on the thorough analysis of mission documents, can be considered a 
rather intuitive response. 
 Hypothesis (3) on the interactive contribution of the target country’s domestic 
political context conditions and the democracy promoter’s internal 
prerequisites for context-sensitivity to increasing the likelihood of the 
engagement’s adaptation was supported by the empirical findings. With 
regard to all types of change in Georgia’s political transformation process in 
the period from 1992 to 2004, the OSCE had utilized its internal prerequisites 
and responded with adaptation. However, as mentioned, with regard to 
gradual change in structural conditions in a not fully ideal manner and with 
regard to the gradual change in actor-centered conditions in a rather intuitive 
manner. In this regard, it is concluded that the OSCE’s observed weakness of 
lacking the ability to translate its unique insights into and good knowledge of 
its host country’s political developments into a systematically-considered 
response suggest that an additional intra-organizational prerequisite would 
likely enhance the quality of responses: methodological procedures for 
systematic and strategic planning of the engagement. 
The remainder of this chapter will present the conclusions with regard to this 
study’s added value for the state of the art and future agenda of international 
democracy promotion research as well as for the practice of international 
democracy promotion. 
7.1 Added value for the state of the art and future agenda of the 
research on international democracy promotion 
In order to conclude whether and how this study has added value to the research 
on international democracy promotion, a closer look at the findings through the 
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lens of the three research gaps, identified in the introduction to this study, is in 
order. These were the lack of sufficient empirical testing of the “one size fits all” 
claim, the lack of systematizations of target countries’ political context 
conditions—especially with regard to acknowledging the process dimension of 
democratization, and a lack of attention to democracy promoters’ inner 
workings—especially with regard to organization-internal prerequisites that 
enable them to be context-sensitive. These three research gaps structure the 
remainder of this chapter. 
7.1.1  “One size fits all” in international democracy promotion? 
With the OSCE in Georgia in the period between 1992 and 2004, a “tough case” 
(as opposed to “easy case”) was selected in this study to probe the “one size fits 
all” claim (see section 2.3), i.e. the predominant notion of scholars that 
international democracy promoters do not adapt “the size” of their intervention to 
fit the specific domestic country context of the respective intervention.  
In light of the vast consensus in international democracy promotion and norm 
diffusion research that context-sensitive approaches are more promising to be 
successful than “blueprint” approaches, the “one size fits all” claim is of high 
practical relevance and, thus, for a practice-oriented research agenda. 
Nevertheless, the claim has neither yet been sufficiently tested, nor have scholars 
provided sufficient answers to the questions how international democracy 
promoters can ensure being aware of and sensitive to domestic political contexts 
and what exactly it is in the domestic political context they are expected to adapt 
their engagement to in order to be successful.  
In general, the strongest possible supporting evidence for a theory is a case 
that is least likely for that theory but most likely for all alternative theories, and 
one where the alternative theories collectively predict an outcome very different 
from that of the least-likely theory.
207
 […] Theories that survive such a difficult 
test may prove to be generally applicable to many types of cases […]” (George 
and Bennett 2004: 121). A “tough case” is least likely to support the thesis, i.e. a 
democracy promoter that is expected to be context-sensitive. If the “one size fits 
all” thesis holds against this tough empirical test, it is strongly reinforced. If the 
empirical case does not support the thesis, the test may help in differentiating the 
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  Note that the “one size fits all“ thesis has not been attributed the status of a theory here. This 
study, nevertheless, followed the logic of a tough case in light of the relevance of this 
predominant scholarly notion. 
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claim and specifying the conditions under which democracy promoters are 
sensitive to target countries’ domestic context conditions. 
The empirical case of the OSCE as international democracy promoter in Georgia 
in the period of 1992 to 2004 has not supported the “one size fits all” notion. The 
OSCE has proven to be context-sensitive to the domestic political situation at the 
outset of its engagement in the South Caucasus country at t0 in 1992 as well as 
adaptable by utilizing organization-internal prerequisites to become aware of and 
adapt to changes in the domestic political transformation process over time at t1.x. 
The “one size fits all” claim was not strongly reinforced by the empirical analysis 
of the “tough case”. What does this mean for the research agenda on international 
democracy promotion? The findings indicated that there are certain conditions 
under which international democracy promoters are sensitive to the domestic 
context of the target country they engage in. The empirical findings from the 
OSCE’s democracy-promoting engagement in Georgia in the period from 1992 to 
2004 provided new insights in this regard. These insights on the types of dynamic 
context conditions and inner workings of the international democracy promoter 
differ in the degree to which they are generalizable to other cases; they will be 
specified in in the following chapters. 
7.1.2 Taking the process dimension of democratization into 
consideration: a systematic approach to the domestic political 
context of international democracy promotion’s target 
countries 
The emphasis that scholars of international democracy promotion and norm 
diffusion research have widely placed on the relevance of context-sensitive 
interventions for the success of these interventions stands in stark contrast to the 
lack of systematic clarification which domestic context conditions international 
democracy promoters shall be sensitive to in order to be successful. Existing 
studies have mainly taken broader categories as a basis, such as regime type (see 
pages 37 f.), or focused on the ‘space’ dimension only, largely neglecting the 
process dimension of democratization and its promotion (e.g. Carothers 1997: 
119; Leininger 2010c: 88, 244). 
Democratization processes, however, are moving targets, as the analyzed case of 
Georgia with “ruptures” and gradual developments of change has demonstrated. 
Therefore, the author considers the integration of the process dimension into the 
analysis of international democracy promotion to be generally indispensable for 
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learning more about context-sensitivity. The conceptual framework of this study 
has contributed to filling this gap by introducing a systematic approach to the 
domestic context conditions that takes the long-neglected process dimension of 
democratization into consideration.  
Drawing from democratization and international democracy promotion 
literature, specific types of change in the target country’s political transformation 
process were developed: (1) rapid and radical change (“ruptures”) and (2) gradual 
types of change (a) in structural context conditions; (b) in actor-centered context 
conditions. This systematic approach may be built upon by further research on 
international democracy promotion and its context-sensitivity in particular. It is 
applicable to the analysis of international democracy promotion in countries 
undergoing a political transformation process. Especially in light of the recent 
trends of a global stagnation of democracy, blurred lines between democracy and 
autocracy in today’s regimes, and authoritarian strategies of survival, this study’s 
process-oriented approach may be of great value as a basis for further research 
(see below). 
The empirical findings of this study substantiated that the two types of change—
that is “ruptures” and gradual change—matter for democracy promoter’s 
adaptability (i.e. the time dimension of context-sensitivity) insofar as the 
democracy promoter is more likely to adapt its engagement in response to 
“ruptures” than in response to gradual types of change. Further research could 
explore the reasons for the differing likelihood of adaptation. Such insights may 
help in developing further strategies on how the likelihood of context-sensitive 
adaptation and, thus, the chances of successful democracy promotion can be 
increased. This study offers own answers in this regard by focusing on democracy 
promoters’ internal prerequisites for context-sensitivity and adaptability that 
interact with the types of change in target countries’ domestic political context 
conditions, thereby increasing the likelihood of adaptation (see the following 
section).  
In terms of the responses to change, this study developed specific types of 
adaptation conceptualized as ideal responses to the respective types of change, 
giving orientation with regard to which political developments in the target 
country to look out for and to consider whether to adapt at the level of activities, 
of areas of engagement, of instruments, of implementation strategy, or of country 
approach in response. However, this did not aim at exploring which specific areas 
of engagement—for instance, civil society or elections—and which specific 
instruments of democracy promotion—for instance, socialization, political 
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dialogue, capacity development—are most promising to be successful under 
which types of domestic political dynamics.  
Finding answers to the question of which specific areas and instruments of 
engagement best match certain domestic political dynamics requires further 
systematic research. In line with the current research agenda on “democracies in 
decline”, “democratic backsliding” and “autocracies on the rise”, the priority of 
such systematic research efforts must focus on democracy promoters’ strategies 
and internal prerequisites that most fruitfully interact with gradual change in the 
structural conditions of target countries’ political context dynamics. According to 
this study’s conceptual framework, the areas of engagement and the instruments 
of international democracy promotion—along with the consideration to revise the 
country approach as such—constitute the ideal response to gradual change in 
structural context conditions, such as democratic backsliding, as well as the 
longer-term ideal response (after initial ad-hoc responses) to “ruptures”. As 
elaborated, the response of such ‘specific adaptation’ is ideally the result of a 
systematic strategy development process for which, the empirical findings of this 
study suggest, the democracy promoter’s internal prerequisites of operational 
structures’ analytical capacities as well as of procedures for systematic planning 
and/or strategy development are most promising to interact fruitfully with 
structural change (and “ruptures”). The reason for this clear priority-setting of 
further research on gradual change in domestic structural conditions is rooted in 
the clear trend observed in the ‘state’ of global democracy over the course of the 
last decade. Whether this trend is referred to as “democracy in decline”, 
“democratic recession”, a “crisis and transition of democracy” or a “global 
stagnation of democracy” (see page 27 ff.), the “[f]ormerly clear boundaries 
between protypical democracies and dictatorships have grown increasingly 
blurred” (Merkel 2017), as the scholarly debate on “hybrid regimes” and “grey 
zones” has already highlighted. Outright authoritarian and “hard” repressive 
measures have become less common strategies of authoritarian leaders, rather 
“softer” strategies of democratic backsliding are at the forefront and have 
statistically proven successful in stabilizing dictatorships, as the findings of a 
recent research project (2011-2014) at the Berlin Social Science Center 
(Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, WZB) showed.  
The case of Georgia exemplifies this trend from “hard repression” to “soft 
repression” or a combination of both: While hard authoritarian measures were 
increasingly observed during the Shevardnadze era at the end of 1990s, such as 
arresting representatives of opposition forces, extra-judicial killings, police 
torture, death threats against journalists from state officials, and the harassment of 
politically active NGOs, these were combined with softer methods in the form of 
  244
strategic election manipulations towards the end of his presidency. 
Shevardnadze’s successor, Saakashvili, though praised with high hopes for an 
advance in democratization shortly after the 2003 “Rose Revolution”, during the 
early years of his rule, invested in measures of what Nancy Bermeo (2016) calls 
executive aggrandizement by introducing changes to the legal and institutional 
framework that hampered the power of opposition forces to challenge executive 
preferences and concentrated powers in the presidency (Timm 2012: 174 ff.; 
Jawad 2012a: 149 ff., 2005).  
Because such soft democratic backsliding trends with strategic election 
manipulations, executive aggrandizement, and shrinking spaces of civil society 
can be observed in many places of the world today, international democracy 
promoters are under pressure to find suitable strategies and instruments to deal 
with the challenges this gradual change in structural context dynamics pose for 
democratization. Academic research is to provide answers. Only when scholars 
offer meaningful answers to these additional questions can international 
democracy promoters make use of the full potential of context-sensitive 
engagement for the success of the democracy promotion effort. 
7.1.3 Opening-up the “black box” of international democracy 
promoters: organization-internal prerequisites for context-
sensitivity and adaptability 
Opening-up the “black box” of international democracy promoters by bringing 
together the research on international democracy promotion, studies on 
International Organizations, and organizational theory in an innovative approach 
and by conceptualizing and analyzing democracy promoter’s organization-internal 
prerequisites for context-sensitivity and adaptability constitutes a complete 
novelty to the research on international democracy promotion. The findings add to 
the research agenda new insights into the ‘configurations’ that enable an 
international democracy promoter to be context-sensitive over ‘space’ and ‘time’, 
to gain and maintain a good knowledge of the domestic political circumstances it 
operates in and aims at contributing to change in terms of furthering 
democratization. 
Although the organization-internal prerequisites have been conceptualized to 
be generally applicable to international democracy promoters, more specifically 
multilateral organizations, the empirical findings from analyzing the OSCE in 
Georgia in the period from 1992 to 2004 only permit a limited level of 
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generalization and require further empirical research in order to be substantiated 
in more general terms: 
 Having a field-mission on the ground constitutes a meaningful internal 
prerequisite for the democracy promoter’s context-sensitivity and 
adaptability, as the findings from the OSCE engagement in Georgia have 
shown. Such a permanent presence with well-established and frequent 
contacts with key stakeholders of a country’s political transformation process 
allows the democracy promoter insights that would be difficult to gain 
without such a permanent presence. This intimate knowledge and deeper 
understanding of political dynamics, in combination with a certain degree of 
autonomy as regards decision-making authority on implementation matters, 
enables a democracy promoter to flexibly adapt at field-level. 
 Combining a democracy promoter’s permanent prensence on the ground with 
regular and frequently-utilized monitoring and reporting procedures that 
ensure that headquarters is being kept up-to-date on developments, such a 
field presence enables a democracy promoter to intervene and adapt at, both, 
the operational and political level in a complementary way when needed, as 
could be observed in Georgia in 2003. This is particularly meaningful in 
situations of limited operational resources, as is often the case in small field 
missions, but also in situations in which the field mission would like to avoid 
straining working relationships on the ground by utilizing ‘stronger’ 
instruments of intervention, such as critical public statements on sensitive 
matters or intervening operationally in sovereign tasks of the country in 
question. For instance, the latter was the case with the OSCE’s taking-over in 
the selection process of the Central Election Commission’s Chairperson in 
Georgia in August 2003 when the OSCE Head of Mission turned to 
headquarters for political guidance and the CiO tasked a representative with 
the matter in response in order to avoid a difficult situation for the mission. 
 Decision-making authority of the organizational structure at the respective 
level of the democracy promoter (i.e. headquarters- or field-level) was 
substantiated to interactively contribute with all types of change to adaptation.  
 The interactive contribution of monitoring and reporting procedures at field-
level with all gradual types of change to the respective types of adaptation 
was supported by the findings. 
 The interactive contribution of analytical capacities of the operational 
structure(s) with all types of change to all types of adaptation—with the 
exception of ad-hoc responses to “ruptures”—was substantiated by the 
findings. 
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 The interactive contribution of operational capabilities on the ground with 
gradual change in actor-centered conditions to practical adaptation and with 
“ruptures” to ad-hoc responses at field-level was supported by the findings. 
 The findings suggest that an additional intra-organizational prerequisite 
would likely enhance the quality of all types of adaptation (with the exception 
of ad-hoc responses): methodological procedures for systematic and strategic 
planning of the engagement (including the activity-level). 
In order to increase the generalizability of the above-findings, the following 
questions and topics should be added to the future research agenda: 
Further research on OSCE democracy promotion would help to further 
substantiate the findings from the OSCE’s engagement in Georgia. The number of 
“ruptures” and of developments of gradual change in Georgia was limited. 
Furthermore, certain internal prerequisites, such as a permanent operational 
presence on the ground, were given over the entire period under review, therefore 
not allowing conclusions on whether such a presence is a necessary condition with 
regard to their interaction with certain types of change, for instance.  
In addition, further comparative research should explore the question whether 
(a) other regional organizations; (b) other multilateral organizations; (c) other 
international democracy promoters have utilized similar organization-internal 
prerequisites as the ones analyzed in the present study and how, or whether they 
utilized different means to adapt to changing political context conditions. In 
particular, research must further substantiate whether the sets of internal 
prerequisites for context-sensitive policy-making differ due to diverging regional 
norms, different mandates and decision-making processes of different 
organizations. 
How can international democracy promoters make the most effective use of 
field presences in terms of context-sensitive adaptation? Which internal 
prerequisites enable the democracy promoter’s operational structure(s) on the 
ground to systematically utilize their intimate knowledge of the political context 
dynamics for targeted responses of practical and specific/strategic adaptation? 
This would help further substantiate the last bullet point above. In addition: How 
can the democracy promoter’s decision-making structure at headquarters-level be 
enabled to more effectively utilize the information from the field for most-
effective political responses complementing field-level responses? What role can 
and should the headquarters’ bureaucracy play in this regard? Exploring this 
question further should also build on existing research on international 
bureaucracies and on organizational learning (see section 2.1.2, pages 45 ff.). 
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Another question which deserves further attention relates to general/political 
adaptation: How can a democracy-promoting multilateral organization overcome 
possible political resistance among the members of the decision-making body? 
This question is of particular importance for consensus-based organizations, such 
as the OSCE that has been in a crisis for many years now for particular this reason 
of political dissent among participating States. It was also the fate of the OSCE 
mission to Georgia at a later time than this study’s period under review that the 
mission mandate was not extended due to the veto of Russia in the OSCE 
Permanent Council. The mission had to be closed despite its mandate not yet 
having been fulfilled. The question of how a democracy-promoting multilateral 
organization can overcome possible political resistance among the members of the 
decision-making body has generally received importance in light of the 
observable recent trend of democratic norms being openly challenged by 
autocratic leaders in international fora (see pages 27 ff. and footnote 27) and the 
academic debate on autocracy promotion (e.g. Bader et al. 2010; Burnell 2010b; 
Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Tansey 2016). This question is highly relevant 
with regard to gradual change in structural political context conditions: A political 
response at headquarters-level, complementing specific/strategic adaptation at 
field level, is considered ideal; however, the political pressure on democracy 
promoters to adapt is relatively low—especially at the headquarters-level where 
the political costs of adaptation are higher than at field-level because more players 
sit at the table. Furthermore, in light of the increasing trend of “soft” democratic 
backsliding strategies of authoritarian leaders/regimes, the question of fruitful 
internal perquisites to interact with this type of gradual change has become all the 
more pressing for democracy promoters and, thus, for researchers to offer answers 
and guidance in addition to the above-mentioned need of finding suitable 
strategies, instruments and areas of engagement. 
7.2 Praxeological relevance: the conditions under which 
international democracy promoters are sensitive to the target 
country’s domestic political context 
This chapter aims at elaborating the specific conditions under which international 
democracy promoters are context-sensitive and what they mean for the practice of 
democracy promotion. 
In general, this study’s findings are relevant for the practice of international 
democracy promotions because it offers orientation with regard to the following 
questions that are phrased from the democracy promoter’s perspective: 
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 Which domestic political dynamics do we need to pay attention to in our 
target countries if we want to engage in a context-sensitive manner over time? 
 How can we enhance our capabilities to become aware of such critical 
political dynamics, in light of which we should consider adapting our 
engagement to? 
 When we experience such critical political dynamics in our target countries, 
in what way and at which level do we need to respond and adapt our 
engagement in a meaningful way? 
With the introduction of specific types of change and corresponding types of 
adaptation, conceptualized and empirically substantiated in this study, 
international democracy promoters now have an orientation at hand, which 
political dynamics in their target countries requires their attention, at which level 
of their organization they ideally respond—field or headquarters—and which 
elements they ideally adapt—activities, areas of engagement, instruments, country 
approach. Furthermore, this study provides insights into democracy promoter’s 
own inner workings that they should pay attention to if they aim at enhancing 
their capabilities to interact with critical developments in their target country 
environments in a context-sensitive manner. Although these organization-internal 
prerequisites require further research in order to be further substantiated in a more 
generalizable way, they do offer indications of the areas of the democracy 
promoter’s organizational set-up and procedures that are conducive to their 
context-sensitivity and adaptability when engaging in target countries. 
The finding that the likelihood of context-sensitive adaptation is more likely in 
response to “ruptures” than it is in response to gradual types of change in the 
domestic political context means for international democracy promoters that they 
need to put particular effort into ensuring that they become aware of and adapt to 
gradual types of change if they aim at being context-sensitive actors in their field.  
In practical terms, this is most important with regard to practical adaptation in 
response to actor-centered change because this constitutes the response with the 
greatest degree of flexibility of the democracy promoter, and democracy 
promoters are, therefore, well-advised to make more effective use of this type of 
response.  
In political and strategic terms, investing efforts into becoming aware of and 
responding to structural change should be a priority for democracy promoters 
because of the global trend of authoritarian leaders applying soft measures of 
repression (Merkel 2017) that match this study’s type of democratic backsliding. 
The findings from the analysis of the OSCE’s engagement in Georgia suggests 
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that democracy promoter’s need to pay particular attention to methodological 
procedures that enable them and enhance their capacities to translate their 
knowledge of political dynamics and change into well-considered and targeted 
responses. However, as far as specific strategies, specific areas and instruments of 
engagement that are most effective in response to the respective structural 
dynamics are concerned, further research is required, as has been pointed out 
above. 
In particular with regard to organization-internal prerequisites for context-
sensitivity and adaptability: 
This study’s findings on organization-internal prerequisites that help international 
democracy promoters to ensure becoming aware of the political situation and 
changing political conditions in their target country context can be considered 
relatively case-bound and their generalizability has its limits. Although the 
plausibility of being generalizable may be higher for some of the findings than for 
others, all of the following statements on the plausibility in this regard require 
further research in order to be substantiated: 
 Having operational capabilities on the ground can plausibly be considered a 
necessary prerequisite for international democracy promoters in general when 
it comes to a practical adaptation of activities within existing areas of 
engagement in response to gradual change in the target country’s actor-
centered political context conditions. It is, however, unlikely to be a sufficient 
prerequisite. In order to be capable of making full use of this most flexible 
type of adaptation, a certain degree of autonomy in terms of authority to 
decide upon additional activities is likely to constitute another necessary 
internal prerequisite of democracy promoters in the field. Because of the 
highly flexible character of this type of change at the level of field activities, 
international democracy promoters that aim at being context-sensitive are 
well-advised to ‘invest’ in internal prerequisites that enable practical 
adaptation in interaction with actor-centered change. 
 It is plausible that analytical capacities of headquarter structures of 
international democracy promoters are generally not a necessary prerequisite 
in order to respond with general/political adaptation to “ruptures” and to 
gradual change in structural context conditions if analytical capacities exist in 
the democracy promoter’s operational structures and can be utilized by 
headquarters—for instance, through regular reporting procedures of 
operational structures to decision-making structures. 
 The analysis of the case of the OSCE in Georgia in the period from 1992 to 
2004 showed that the combination of operational capabilities on the ground 
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and regular routines of monitoring and reporting to headquarters helps the 
democracy promoting organization to ensure that its decision-making and 
operational structures are up-to-date and well-informed about political 
developments in the host country. This, in the case of the OSCE in Georgia, 
enabled responses from the political level to gradual change in structural 
political conditions, for instance with visits of the CiO to intervene with 
political dialogue and public statements in the democratic backsliding trend 
of the country in the early 2000s. However, the findings also show that the 
OSCE would benefit from making better use of these internal prerequisites in 
terms of translating the good knowledge into more systematic and targeted 
responses (see the following point). 
 The OSCE’s observed weakness of lacking the ability to translate its unique 
insights into its host country’s political developments into a systematically 
considered response in Georgia during the period under review suggests that 
an additional intra-organizational prerequisite would likely enhance the 
quality of all types of adaptation (with the exception of ad-hoc responses): 
methodological procedures for systematic and strategic planning of the 
engagement (including the activity-level). 
Thus, although not fully generalizable, the findings of this study provide several 
insights that are of practical relevance and may serve as orientation and guidance 
to democracy promotion practitioners. The presently unfavorable international 
environment that international democracy promoters find themselves in, make 
further efforts of democracy promoters to engage in a context-sensitive manner all 
the more indispensable. This study offered orientation in terms of the political 
dynamics in target countries to look out for, which element and which level of the 
engagement the democracy promoter should be reconsidered in response, and in 
terms of the area of the democracy promoter’s inner workings that may help 
enhance context-sensitivity. In order to assist international actors in their efforts to 
successfully promote democratization, scholars of international democracy 
promotion, norm diffusion and international organizations need to engage in 
further research. This study has offered some ideas in previous sections of this 
conclusion. 
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